A philosophy essay
II 'norma-I I I~me, pp.
~ rme,pp.
ship, the ~notin- !omforts I e.
I [18 what- f.e~ence.
~vmg or lorgasm" lould be \said be- ,0 avery lo~gasm.
raIses an ~goal.
I . 1' east Ylll- !ted sen- i.Sensa-I .
oerottc I !Boston:elings as ~ealousy .commu-II Division ~ed one !n of the I lnt; they feelings.
1m Paul, I Chapter 5 PLAINSEX AlanGoldman 1 S everal recent artides onsex herald itsacceptance asalegitimate topic foranalytic philosophers (althoughithas been atopic inphi- losophy sincePlato). Onemight havethought conceptual analysisun- necessary inthis area; despite thenotorious strugglesofjudges and legislators todefine pornography suitably,weallmight beexpected to know what sexisand tobe able toidentify atleast paradigm sexualde- sires andactivities withoutmuchdifficulty. Philosophy isnevertheless of relevance hereiffor noother reason thanthattheconcept ofsex re- mains atthe center ofmoral andsocial consciousness inour, andper- haps any,society. Beforewecan getasensible viewofthe relation ofsex to morality, perversion, socialregulation, andmarriage, werequire a sensible analysis ofthe concept itself;onewhich neither understates its animal pleasure noroverstates itsimportance withinatheory orsystem ofvalue. 1say "before," buttheorder isnot quite sodear, forquestions in this area, aselsewhere inmoral philosophy, areboth conceptual and normative atthe same time. Ourconcept ofsex will partially determine our moral viewofit,but asphilosophers weshould formulate aconcept that will accord withitsproper moralstatus. Whatwerequire here,as elsewhere, is"reflective equilibrium," agoal notachieved bytraditional ful criti- hey and ~ of The bation. Goldman, Alan,"Plain Sex,"Philosophy andPublie Affairs 6:3(1977), pp.267-87. Copy- right @1977 byPrinceton University Press.Reprinted bypennission ofPrinceton Univer- sity Press. 39 40AlanGoldman andrecent analyses together withtheir moral implications. Becausesex- ual activity, likeother natural functions suchaseating orexercising, has become imbedded inlayers ofcultural, moral,andsuperstitious super- structure, itis hard toconceive itin its simplest terms.Butpartially for this reason, itis only bythinking aboutplainsexthat wecan begin to achieve thisconceptual equilibrium.
1 shall suggest herethatsexcontinues tobe misrepresented inrecent writings, atleast inphilosophical writings,and1shall criticize thepre- dominant formofanalysis which1term "means-end analysis."Suchcon- ceptions attribute anecessary externalgoalorpurpose tosexual activity, whether itbe reproduction, theexpression oflove, simple communica- tion, orinterpersonal awareness.Theyanalyze sexualactivity asameans to one ofthese ends,implying thatsexual desireisadesire toreproduce, to love orbe loved, ortocommunicate withothers. AlIdefinitions ofthis type suggest falseviews ofthe relation ofsex toperversion andmorality by implying thatsexwhich doesnotfitone ofthese models orfulfill one of these functions isin some waydeviant orincomplete.
The altemative, simpleranalysiswithwhich 1will begin isthat sexual desire isdesire forcontact withanother person's bodyandforthe plea- sure which suchcontact produces; sexualactivity isactivity whichtends to fulfill suchdesire ofthe agent. Whereas Aristotle andButler werecor- rect inholding thatpleasure isnormally abyproduct ratherthanagoal of purposeful action,inthe case ofsex this isnot sodear. Thedesire for another's bodyis,principally amongotherthings, thedesire forthe pleasure thatphysical contactbrings.Onthe other hand, itisnot ade- sire foraparticular sensationdetachable fromitscausal c°!ltext, asen- sation which canbederived inother ways.Thisdefinition interms ofthe general goalofsexual desireappears preferable toan attempt tomore explicitly listordefine specific sexualactivities, formany activities such as kissing, embracing, massaging,orholding handsmayormay notbe sexual, depending uponthecontext andmore specifically uponthepur- poses, needs, ordesires intowhich suchactivities fit.The generality of the definition alsorepresents arefusal (common inrecent psychologi- cal texts) tooveremphasize orgasmasthe goal ofsexual desireorgeni- taI sex asthe only norm ofsexual activity (thiswillbehedged slightlyin thediscussion ofperversion below). . Centraltothe definition isthe fact that thegoal ofsexual desireand activity isthe physical contactitself,rather thansomething elsewhich this contact mightexpress. Bycontrast, what1term "means-end analy- ses" posit endswhich 1take tobe extraneous toplain sex,andthey view sex asameans tothese ends.Their faultliesnotindefining sexinterms of its general goal,butinseeing plainsexasmerely ameans toother sep- arable ends.1term these "means-end analyses"forconvenience, al- though "means-separable-end analysis,"whiletoocumbersome, might be more fullyexpl2 person isaminimaJ essary andsufficiei may want toexprei texts; butwithout tJ when itis sought fq are not predomimlJ tact initself, withG through it,issuffic!
fulfills it.Various a:
ressing incertain ~ of genital symptorq necessary criteriaf~ This initial analYi It might seemtoob!
ual desire inactivitij cases, however, thel is not directed towa the goal ofthe ac~ someone downor~ contact withanotht;j does notseem aneJ baby' sdesire tobe (!
dIe it.In the case oJ contact, fortheple!
desire, especially in~ ual. Itwill differ ne more amorphous, nl body. Itmay alsobl physical contactpe~ which casewehave J as dearly sexual.Thl ing ofaffection, not terms ofaction whid capture suchacti°9 characterize ourresl here formyanalysis some cultures politJ need notbehomoJ something extrinsid Our definition 01 appeartoonarrow 1J !
body, maybesexual versing inacertain i PlainSex 41 bse sex-i ing, has lsuper- [ally for L .
~egm to Iilrecent I ~e pre- lch con- lacti~ty, mumca- I rmeans Iroduce, IS of this Imorality I IlfiU one I Iltsexual ~e plea- ~h tends I rere cor- UI agoal 'esire for :forthetlot ade- I K:t, asen- I Ills ofthe Ito more pessuch ~ynot be ,thepur- brality of khologi- I . ior gem- Fghdy in I esire and lse which Ind analy- ):hey view ,in tenns }ther sep- ience, al- I .
h ~e, mlg t be more fullyexplanatory. Thedesire forphysical contactwithanother person isaminimal criterion for(normal) sexualdesire, butisboth nec- essary andsufficient toqualify nonnal desireassexual. Ofcourse, we may want toexpress otherfeelings through sexualactsinvarious con- texts; butwithout thedesire forthephysical contactinand foritself, or when itis sought forother reasons, activities inwhich contact isinvolved are not predominantly sexual.Furthermore, thedesire forphysical con- tact initself, without thewish toexpress affection orother feelings through it,issufficient torender sexualtheactivity ofthe agent which fulfills it.Various activities withthisgoal alone, suchaskissing andca- ressing incertain contexts, qualifyassexual evenwithout thepresence of genital symptoms ofsexual excitement. Thelatter arenot therefore necessary criteriaforsexual activity.
This initial analysis mayseem tosome either over-orunderinclusive.
It might seemtoobroad inleading ustointerpret physicalcontactassex- ual desire inactivities suchasfootball andother contact sports.Inthese cases, however, thedesire isnot forcontact withanother bodyperse,it is not directed towardaparticular personforthat purpose, anditis not the goal ofthe activity-the goaliswinning orexercising orknocking someone downordisplaying one'sprowess. Ifthe desire ispurely for contactwith anotherspecificperson's body,thentointerpret itas sexual does notseem anexaggeration. Aslightly moredifficult caseisthat ofa baby's desire tobe cuddled andournatural response inwanting tocud- dle it.In the case ofthe baby, thedesire maybesimply forthe physical contact, forthe pleasure ofthe caresses. Ifso, we may characterize this desire, especially inkeeping withFreudian theory,assexual orprotosex- ual. Itwill differ nevertheless fromfull-fledged sexualdesireinbeing more amorphous, notdirected outwardtowardanother specificperson's body. Itmay alsobethat what theinfant unconsciously desiresisnot physical contact persebut signs ofaffection, tendemess, orsecurity, in which casewehave further reasonforhesitating tocharacterize itswants as clearly sexual. Theintent ofour response tothe baby isoften theshow- ing ofaffection, notthepure physical contact,sothat ourdefinition in terms ofaction which fulfills sexualdesireonthepart ofthe agent doesnot capture suchactions, whatever wesay ofthe baby. (Ifitis intuitive to characterize ourresponses asse;xual aswell, there isclearly noproblem here formy analysis.) Thesame canbesaid ofsigns ofaffection (orin some cultures politegreeting) amongmenorwomen: thesecertainly need notbehomosexual whentheintent isonly toshow friendship, something extrinsictoplain sexalthough valuablewhenadded toit.
Our definition ofsex intenns ofthe desire forphysical contactmay appear toonarrow inthat aperson's personality, notmerely herorhis body, maybesexually attractive toanother, andinthat looking orcon- versing inacertain waycanbesexual inagiven context without bodily ./ 42Alan Goldman contact. Nevertheless, itis not thecontents ofone's thoughts persethat are sexually appealing, butone's personality asembodied incertain manners ofbehavior. Furthermore, ifaperson issexually attracted by another's personality, heorshe will desire notjust fur:therconversation, but actual sexual contact. Whilelooking ator conversing withsomeone can beinterpreted assexual ingiven contexts itisso when intended as preliminary to,and hence parasitic upon,elemental sexualinterest.
Voyeurism orviewingapornographic moviequalifies asasexual activity, but only asan imaginative substituteforthe real thing (otherwise ade- viation fromthenorm asexpressed inour definition). Thesame istrue of masturbation asasexual activity without apartner.
That theinitial definition indicatesatleast aningredient ofsexual de- sire and activity istoo obvious toargue. Weallknow whatsexis,atleast in obvious cases,anddonot need philosophers totell us.My preliminary analysis ismeant toserve asacontrast towhat sexisnot, atleast notnec- essarily. 1concentrate uponthephysically manifested desireforan- other's body,and1take ascentral theimmersion inthe physical aspect of one's ownexistence andattention tothe physical embodiment ofthe other. Onemayderive pleasure inasex actfrom expressing certainfeel- ings toone' spartner orfrom awareness ofthe attitude ofone' spartner, but sexual desireisessentially desireforphysical contactitself:itis abod- ily desire forthe body ofanother thatdominates ourmentaI lifefor more orless brief periods. TraditionaI writingswerecorrect toempha- size thepurely physical oranimal aspectofsex; they were wrong onlyin condemning it.This characterization ofsex asan intensely pleasurable physical activityandacute physical desiremayseem tosome tocap ture only itsbarest level.Butitisworth distinguishing andfocusing uponthis least common denominator inorder toavoid thefalse views ofsexual morality andperversion whichemerge fromthinking thatsexisessen- tially something else. dered theconr miliar andso changes wroug in arational se:
ever present pc ual morality d good reasons, beneficial toei as society has<:
bejustified in complicated b mothers deser these question morality ofse}!
with marriage It isobvious duce, thatthe always, distincI viously mentio and exercisin~ ishment orh geance). Desf for many to
virtue ofits c production a!
now inthe prl analysis isele; acts become i reproduction sexual ethic:
fails togener sex isconden in themselve!
ual accordin~ II We may turn then towhat sexisnot, tothe arguments regardingsup- posed conceptual connections betweensexand other activities whichit is necessary toconceptually distinguish.Themost comprehensible at- tempt tobuild anextraneous purposeintothesexactidentifies thatpur- pose asreproduction, itsprimary biological function.Whilethismay be "nature's" purpose,itcertainly neednotbeours (theanalogy witheat- ing, while sometimes overworked, ispertinent here).Whilethisidentifi- cation mayonce havehadarational basiswhich alsogrounded the identification ofthe value andmorality ofsex with thatapplicable tore- production andchildrearing, thedevelopment ofcontraception ren- BeforedisCUi consistent se amples ofth, PlainSex 43 hts per sethat ied incertain iy attracted by conversation, with someone :n intended as ~xual interest.
sexual activity, )therwise ade- le same istrue dered theconnection weak.Methods ofcontraception arebynow sofa- miliar andsowidely usedthatitis not necessary todwell upon the changes wrought bythese developments inthe concept ofsex itself and in arational sexualethicdependent uponthatconcept. Inthe past, the ever present possibility ofchildren rendered theconcepts ofsex and sex- ual morality different fromthose required atpresent. Theremaybe good reasons, ifthe presence andcare ofboth mother andfather are beneficial tochildren, forrestricting reproduction tomarriage. Insofar as society hasalegitimate roleinprotecting children'sinterests,itmay be justified ingiving marriage alegal status, although thisquestion is complicated bythe fact (among others)thatchildren borntosingle mothers deservenopenalties. Inany case, thepoint hereissimply that these questions areirrelevant atthe present timetothose regarding the morality ofsex and itspotential socialregulation. (Furtherconnections with marriage willbediscussed below.) It isobvious thatthedesire forsex isnot necessarily adesire torepro- duce, thatthepsychological manifestation hasbecome, ifitwere not always, distinct fromitsbiological roots.There aremany parallels, aspre- viously mentioned, withother natural functions. Thepleasures ofeating and exercising aretoalarge extent independent oftheir rolesinnour- ishment orhealth (asthe junk-food industrydiscovered withaven- geance). Despitetheobvious parallelwithsex,there isstill atendency for many tothink thatsex actswhich canbereproductive are,ifnot more moral orless immoral, atleast more natural. Thesecategories of morality and"naturalness," ornormality1 arenot tobe identified with each other, aswill beargued below,andneither isapplicable tosex by virtue ofits connection toreproduction. Thetendency toidentify re- production asthe conceptually connectedendofsex ismost prevalent now inthe pronouncements ofthe Catholic church.Theretheassumed analysis isdearly tiedtoarestrictive sexualmorality according towhich acts become immoral andunnatural whentheyarenot oriented towards reproduction, amorality whichhasindependent rootsinthe Christian sexual ethicasitderives fromPaul. However, themeans-end analysis fails togenerate aconsistent sexualethic:homosexual andoral-genital sex iscondemned whilekissing orcaressing, actsequally unlikely tolead in themselves tofertilization, evenwhen properly characterized assex- ual according toour definition, arenot. 1tof sexual de- t sex is,atleast \1y preliminary Lt least notnec- desire foran- physical aspect odiment ofthe ng certain feel- f one's partner, tself: itis abod- mentallife for Tect toempha- e wrong onlyin ;ely pleasurable ome tocapture using upon this views ofsexual nat sex isessen- sregarding sup- Ictivities whichit nprehensible at- entifies thatpur- Vhile thismay be malogy witheat- hile thisidentifi- 0 grounded the applicable tore- ntraception ren- Dl Before discussing furtherrelations ofmeans-end analysestofalse orin- consistent sexualethicsandconcepts ofperversion, 1turn toother ex- amples ofthese analyses. Onecommon positionviewssexasessentially II 44AlanGoldman anexpression oflove 01'affection betweenthepartners. Itisgenerally recognized thatthere areother typesoflove besides sexual,butsexitself is taken asan expression ofone type, sometimes termed"romantic" love.! Various factorsagainought toweaken thisidentification. First, there areother typesoflove besides thatwhich itisappropriate toex- press sexually, and"romantic" loveitself canbeexpressed inmany other ways. 1am not denying thatsexcan take onheightened valueandmean- ing when itbecomes avehicle forthe expression offeelings oflove 01' tenderness, butsocan many otherusually mundane activitiessuchas getting upearly tomake breakfast onSunday, cleaning thehouse, and so on. Second, sexitself canbeused tocommunicate manyotheremo- tions besides love,and,as1will argue below, cancommunicate nothing in particular andstillbegood sex.
On adeeper level,aninternai tensionisbound toresuIt fromaniden- tification ofsex, which 1have described asaphysical-psychological desire, with loveasalong-term, deepemotional relationship betweentwoindi- viduals. Asthis type ofrelationship, loveispermanent, atleast inintent, and more 01'less exclusive. Anormal personcannot deeplylovemore than afew individuals eveninalifetime. Wemay besuspicious thatthose who attempt 01'claim tolove many lovethem weakly ifat all. Yet, fleeting sexual desirecanarise inrelation toavariety ofother individuals onefinds sexually attractive. Itmay even be,assome haveclaimed, thatsexual de- sire inhumans naturally seeksvariety, whilethisisobviously falseoflove.
For thisreason, monogamous sex,even ifjustified, almostalwaysrepre- sents asacrifice 01'the exercise ofself-control onthe part ofthe spouses, while monogamous lovegenerally doesnot.There isno such thing asca- suallove inthe sense inwhich 1intend theterm "love." Itmay occasion- ally happen thataspouse fallsdeeply inlove with someone else(especially when sexisconceived interms oflove), butthisisrelatively rareincom- parison topassing sexualdesires forothers; andwhile theformer oftenin- dicates aweakness 01'fauIt inthe marriage relation,thelatter doesnot.
Iflove isindeed moreexclusive inits objects thanissexual desire, this explains whythose whoview sexasessentially anexpression oflove would againtendtohold arepressive orrestrictive sexualethic.Asinthe case ofreproduction, theremaybegood reasons forreserving thetotal commitment ofdeep lovetothe context ofmarriage andfamily-the normal personality maynotwithstand additional divisionsofuItimate commitment andallegiance. Thereisno question thatmarriage itselfis best sustained byadeep relation oflove andaffection; andeven iflove is not naturally monogamous, thebenefits offamily unitstochildren provide additional reasontoavoid serious commitments elsewhere which weaken familyties.Itcan beargued similarly thatmonogamous sex strengthens familiesbyrestricting andatthe same timeguarantee- ing anoutlet forsexual desireinmarriage. Butthere ismore forcetothe argumeFlt~that society wouldH cent confusioFl love, andwoulc lie'ratiOn topas!
,r.iage certainly ten amere sub In fact, the:
Iterms ofleve a appHed consis curtailed theE that some WOI means, asa'Pl power andfre .tached tothe !
taken witha.gl IP'e ofthe imp to aconceptio 14 am. not Su!
tove 01'that it Ner amI deny emotionally nl 160th. :JustasSI when itdoes, :
d'esire forsex.
other sharedla iil'l:timately con ural feat1:lre 0:1 caologicatly a beyond .thattl tae restrictive '!fhe .int:imacy al-ly healthy w:
including emt sul,bofartifici" .lbve and~sexh å'er a,means-e lnrecent! arti, t!hat sexisnot the form oftb PlainSex 45 .I enerally lexitself mantic" I F' n, lrst,I ,eto ex- I ~y otherämean- ~ !love or uch as se, and tr emo- r°thing l 'd an 1en- ddesire, I'd' r~m 1-~mtent, I ye more I<1t those Ifleeting pe finds Xtial de- I ioflove.
IS repre- ~pouses, ng asca- 'ccasion- . ' all speCl y iin com- pften in- ~s not.
sire, this Ioflove ~ inthe [he total [ily-the jIltimate e itself is biflove children ~sewhere >gamous larantee- .
~e tothe argument thatrecognition ofadear distinction betweensexand love in society would helpavoid disastrous marriageswhichresultfromadoles- cent confusion ofthe two when sexual desireismistaken forpermanent love, andwould weaken damagingjealousies whichariseinmarriages in relation topassing sexualdesires. Theloveandaffection ofasound mar- riage certainly differsfromtheadolescent romanticvariety,whichisof- ten amere substitute forsex inthe context ofarepressive sexualethic.
In fact, therestrictive sexualethictiedtothe means-end analysisin terms oflove again hasfailed tobe consistent. Atleast, ithas notbeen applied consistently, butforms partofthe double standard whichhas curtailed thefreedom ofwomen. Itispredictable inlight ofthis history that some women wouldnowadvocate usingsexasanother kindof means, asapolitical weaponorasaway toincrease u~ustlydenied power andfreedom. Theinconsistency inthe sexual ethictypically at- tached tothe sex-Iove analysis, according towhich ithas generally been taken withagrain ofsalt when applied tomen, issimply another exam- ple ofthe impossibility oftailoring aplausible moraltheory inthis area to aconception ofsex which builds inconceptually extraneousfactors.
1 am not suggesting herethatsexought nevertobe connected with love orthat itis not amore significant andvaluable activitywhenitiso Nor am1denying thatindividuals needloveasmuch assex and perhaps emotionally needatleast onecomplete relationship whichencompasses both, Justassex can express loveandtake onheightened significance when itdoes, solove isoften naturally accompanied byan intermittent desire forsex. But again loveisaccompanied appropriately bydesires for other shared activities aswell. What makes thedesire forsex seem more intimately connected withloveisthe intimacy whichisseen tobe anat- ural feature ofmutual sexacts. Like love, sexisheld tolay one bare psy- chologically aswell asphysically. Sexisunquestionably intimate,but beyond thatthepsychological to11often attached maybeafunction of the restrictive sexualethicitself, rather thanalegitimate apologyforit.
The intimacy involved inlove ispsychologically consuminginagener- ally healthy way,while thepsychological to11sofsexual relations, often including embarrassment asacorrelate ofintimacy, aretoo often there- sult ofartificial sexualethicsandtaboos. Theintimacy involvedinboth love and sexisinsufficient inany case inlight ofprevious pointstoren- der ameans-end analysisinthese terms appropriate.
IV In recent artides, Thomas NagelandRobert Solomon, whorecognize that sexisnot merely ameans tocommunicate love,nevertheless retain the form ofthis analysis whilebroadening it.For Solomon, sexremains 46AlanGoldman ameans ofcommunicating (heexplicitly usesthemetaphor ofbodylan- guage), although thefeelings thatcanbecommunicated nowinc1ude, in addition tolove andtenderness, domination, dependence, anger, trust, andsoon.2 Nagel doesnotrefer explicitly tocommunication, but his analysis issimilar inthat heviews sexasacomplex formofinterper- sonal awareness inwhich desireitselfisconsciously communicated on several different levels.Insex, according tohis analysis, twopeople are aroused byeach other, awareofthe other' sarousal, andfurther aroused by this awareness.3 Suchmultileveled consciousawareness ofone's own and theother's desireistaken asthe norm ofasexual relation, andthis model istherefore c1osetothat which viewssexasameans ofinterper- sonal communication.
Solomon's analysisisbeset bythe same difficulties asthose pointed out inrelation tothe narrower sex-Ioveconcept. Justaslove canbecom- municated bymany activities otherthansex,which donot therefore be- come properly analyzedasessentially vehic1esofcommunication (making breakfast, c1eaningthehouse, andsoon), thesame istrue of the other feelings mentioned bySolomon. Domination canbecommu- nicated through economic manipulation, trustbyajoint savings ac- count. Driving acar can besimultaneously expressinganger,pride,joy, and soon. We may, infact, communicate orexpress feelings inanything we do, but this does notmake everything wedointo language. Drivinga car isnot tobe defined asan automotive meansofcommunication, al- though withalittle ingenuity wemight workoutanautomotive vocabu- lary (tailgating asan expression ofaggression orimpatience; beating another caraway from astoplight asexpressing domination) tomatch the vocabulary of"body language." Thatonecancommunicate various feelings duringsexacts does notmake theseactsmerely orprimarily a means ofcommunicating.
More importantly, toanalyze sexasameans ofcommunication isto overlook theintrinsic natureandvaIue ofthe actitself. Sexisnot ages- ture orseries ofgestures, infact notnecessarily ameans toany other end, but aphysical activityintensely pleasurable initself. When alanguage is used, thesymbols normally havenoimportance inthemselves; theynmc- tion merely asvehic1es forwhat canbecommunicated bythem. Further- more skillinthe use oflanguage isatechnical achievement thatmust be carefully learned;ifbetter sexismore successful communication by means ofamore skillful useofbody language, thenwehad allbetter be well schooled inthe vocabulary andgrammar. Solomon's analysis,which uses thelanguage metaphor, suggeststheappropriateness ofasex-man- ual approach, thesubstitution ofabit oftechnological prowessforthe natural pleasure ofthe unforced surrender tofeeling anddesire.
It may bethat Solomon's positioncouldbeimproved byusing the analogy ofmusic rather thanthatoflanguage, asan aesthetic formof communication'l municating, in~ generally pleasin; perience thanh~ far asmusic isae I primarily ameaI) does injustice tOI communication :
For Solomon,!
tends toward vu~ around. Thisisa; ses tocondemn 1 count. BothSoli primarily tostip~ but todefine nOI neither iscapa~ with ourfirm int) being thatboth ] an unromanticiz; sion represents ~ then anyunsucq verted. Furtherm years, orbetweel be, ifnot perver1J communicative ( the pleasures ofl dependent upo~ rather thanare~ imaginative OUtll rehearsing one'~ talking toonese~ Nagel faresll( norm. SpontaneJ welllack thecom . which hespeaks I sire that one's p, primary elemen!
one's partner toi sive. Just assex <; it can sometime!
But atother timc be merely distrciJ may actually imI above,just asma PlainSex 47 )fbody lan- )w include, ~ce, anger, lcation, but )f interper- nicated on people are ler aroused [one's own m, and this )f interper- communication. Musicmightbethought ofasaform ofaesthetic com- municating, inwhich theexperience ofthe "phonemes" themselvesis generally pleasing.Andlistening tomusic isperhaps moreofasexual ex- perience thanhaving someone talktoyou. Yet,itseems tome that inso- far asmusic isaesthetic andpleasing initself, itis not best conceived as primarily ameans forcommunicating specificfeelings. Suchananalysis does injustice toaesthetic experience inmuch thesame wayasthe sex- communication analysisdebases sexualexperience itself.4 For Solomon, sexthat isnot atotally self-conscious communicative act tends toward vulgarity,5 whereas1would havethought itthe other way around. Thisisanother illustration ofthe tendency ofmeans-end analy- ses tocondemn whatappears perfectly naturalornormal sexonmy ac- count. BothSolomon andNagel usetheir definitions, however,not primarily tostipulate moralnorms forsex, aswe saw inearlier analyses, but todefine normsagainst whichtomeasure perversion. Onceagain, neither iscapable ofgenerating consistency orreflective equilibrium with ourfirm intuitions astowhat counts assubnormal sex,theproblem being thatboth build factors intotheir norms whichareextraneous to an unromanticized viewofnormal sexualdesireandactivity. Ifperver- sion represents abreakdown incommunication, asSolomon maintains, then anyunsuccessful ormisunderstood advanceshouldcountasper- verted. Furthermore, sexbetween husband andwife married forseveral years, orbetween anypartners alreadyfamiliar witheach other, would be, ifnot perverted, nevertheless subnormalortrite anddull, inthat the communicative contentwouldbeminimal inlacking allnovelty. Infact the pleasures ofsex need notwear offwith familiarity, asthey would if dependent uponthecommunicative contentofthe feelings. Finally, rather thanarelease orrelief fromphysical desirethrough asubstitute imaginative outlet,masturbation wouldbecome away ofpracticing or rehearsing one'stechnique orvocabulary ononeself, orsimply away of talking tooneself, asSolomon himselfsays.6 Nagel faresnobetter inthe implications ofhis overintellectualized norm. Spontaneous andheated sexbetween twofamiliar partners may welllack thecomplex conscious multileveled interpersonal awarenessof which hespeaks without beinginthe least perverted. Theegotistical de- sire that one's partner bearoused byone's owndesire doesnotseem a primary element ofthe sexual urge,andduring sexacts one may like one's partner tobe sometimes activeandaroused, sometimes morepas- sive. Just assex can bemore significant whenloveiscommunicated, so it can sometimes beheightened byanawareness ofthe other's desire.
But atother timesthisawareness ofan avid desire ofone's partner can be merely distracting. Theconscious awareness towhich Nagelrefers may actually impede theimmersion inthe physical ofwhich 1spoke above,just asmay concentration uponone's"vocabulary" ortechnique. .se pointed :an becom- lerefore be- lJlunication te istrue of be commu- savings ac- , pride,joy, in anything e. Driving a lication, al- Jve vocabu- ce; beating l) to match :ate various primarily a lcation isto is not ages- V other end, language is s; they func- ID. Further- hat must be l'lication by :UI better be :uysis, which fa sex-man- wess forthe :sire.
'y using the ~tic form of 48AlanGoldman Sexisaway ofrelating toanother, butprimarily aphysical ratherthan intellectual way.ForNagel, theultimate indegeneration orperversion would havetobe what hecalls "mutual epidermal stimulation"7 without mutual awareness ofeach other' sstate ofmind. Butthissounds likenor- mal, ifnot ideal, sextome (perhaps onlyaminimal description ofit).
His model certainly seemsmoreappropriate toasophisticated seduc- tion scene thantothe sexactitself,8 whichaccording tothe model would often havetocount asasubnormal anticlimaxtothe intellectual fore- play. While Nagel's account resembles Solomon's means-end analysisof sex, here thesexactitself doesnoteven qualify asapreferred orcentral means tothe end ofinterpersonal communication. appetite, hisargu!
other vulgar fonn:
desire canbefov Lower animals art I either.Rancid fooJ tainly failstosho~ lets usknow that}; traditional Platonj end analyses conj They showthati~ so-called revolutiq picionthatplain I selves," thatyieldiJ v 1have nowcriticized varioustypesofanalysis sharingorsuggesting a common means-end form.1have suggested thatanalyses ofthis form re- late toattempts tolimit moral ornatural sextothat which fulfills some purpose orfunction extraneous tobasic sexual desire. Theattempts to brand formsofsex outside theidealized modelsasimmoral orperverted fail toachieve consistency withintuitions thatthey themselves donot direcdy question. Thereproductive modelbrands oral-genital sexa deviation, butcannot account forkissing orholding hands;thecom- munication accountholdsvoyeurism tobe perverted butcannot ac- commodate sexacts without muchconscious thoughtorseductive nonphysical foreplay;thesex-Iove modelmakesmostsexual desireseem degrading orbase. Thefirstandlastcondemn extra-marital sexonthe sound butirrelevant groundsthatreproduction anddeep commitment are best confined tofamily contexts. Theromanticization ofsex and the confusion ofsexual desirewithloveoperate inboth directions: sexout- side thecontext ofromantic loveisrepressed; onceitisrepressed, part- ners become moredifficult tofind andsexbecomes romanticized further, outofproportion toits real value forthe individual.
What allthese analyses shareinaddition toacommon formisaccor- dance withandperhaps derivation fromthePlatonic-Christian moraltra- dition, according towhich theanimal orpurely physical element of humans isthe source ofimmorality, andplain sexinthe sense 1defined it isan expression ofthis element, henceinitself tobe condemned. .All the analyses examined seemtoseek adistance fromsexual desireitselfin attempting toextend itconceptually beyondthephysical. Theloveand communication analysesseekrefinement orintellectualization ofthe de- sire; plain physical sexbecomes vulgar,andtoostraightforward sexualen- counters withoutanaura ofrespectable cerebralcommunicative content are tobe avoided. Solomon explicidyargues thatsexcannot bea"mere" Having criticized perversion theyh lines. Tothe quesl the answer isthatl sis ofsex which iE wrong forthat re:
general moralruli apply toall humaj speak ofabusineJ ther moral orimu ness practices wh~ well. Sexisnot in variably placesus i Itgives usopportl harm others, dec~ as the fact that aq to its wrongness ifi nors arewrong oli act isto be excusti passion" isto be e:
insanity ratherth::
legitimate excuse, Sexual motives art I factthat they ares whether negative Whatever mightb in love orsex. PlainSex 49 :ather than perversion n"7 without ds like nor- )tion ofit).
ated seduc- lodel would ectual fore- i analysis of d or central appetite, hisargument beingthatifitwere, subway exhibitionism and other vulgar formswould bepleasing.9 Thisfailstorecognize thatsexual desire canbefocused orselective atthe same timeasbeing physical.
Lower animals arenot attracted byevery other member oftheir species, either. Rancid foodforced downone'sthroat isnot pleasing, butthat cer- tainly failstoshow thathunger isnot aphysical appetite. Sexualdesire lets usknow thatweare physical beingsand,indeed, animals; thisiswhy traditionai Platonicmorality isso thorough inits condemnation. Means- end analyses continue toreflect thistradition, sometimes unwittingly.
They show thatinconceptualizing sexitis still difficult, despiteyearsof so-called revolution inthis area, tofree ourselves fromthelingering sus- pidon thatplain sexasphysical desireisan expression ofour "lower selves," thatyielding toour animal natures issubhuman orvulgar. uggesting a ihis form re- fulfills some attempts to )r perverted ~lves donot enital sexa ls; the com- t cannot ac- )r seductive desire seem d sex onthe :ommitment [sex andthe ons: sexout- Iressed, part- omantidzed [1, )rm lSaccor- an moral tra- l element of Ilse 1defined ldemned. AlI lesire itself in fhe love and ion ofthe de- lfd sexual en- :ative content tbe a"mere" VI Having criticized theseanalyses forthe sexual ethicsandconcepts of perversion theyimply, itremains tocontrast myaccount alongthese lines. Tothe question ofwhatmorality mightbeimplied bymyanalysis, the answer isthat there arenomoral implications whatever.Anyanaly- sis ofsex which imputes amoral character tosex acts inthemselves is wrong forthat reason. Thereisno morality intrinsictosex, although general moralrulesapply tothe treatment ofothers insex acts asthey apply toall human relations. Wecan speak ofasexual ethicaswe can speak ofabusiness ethic,without implying thatbusiness initself isei- ther moral orimmoral orthat special rulesarerequired tojudge busi- ness practices whicharenot derived fromrulesthatapply elsewhere as well. Sexisnot initself amoral category, althoughlikebusiness itin- variably placesusinto relations withothers inwhich moralmIesapply.
It gives-us opportunity todo what isotherwise recognized aswrong, to harm others, deceive themormanipulate themagainst theirwills.Just as the fact that anact issexual initself never renders itwrong oradds to its wrongness ifitiswrong onother grounds (sexualactstowards mi- nors arewrong onother grounds, aswill beargued below), sono wrong act isto be excused because donefromasexual motive. Ifa"crime of passion" isto be excused, itwould havetobe on grounds oftemporary insanity ratherthansexual context (whether insanitydoesconstitute a legitimate excuseforcertain actionsistoo bigatopic toargue here).
Sexual motives areamong otherswhich maybecome deranged, andthe fact that they aresexual hasnobearing initself onthe moral character, whether negative orexculpatory, ofthe actions deriving fromthem.
Whatever mightbetrue ofwar, itis certainly notthecase thatall'sfair in love orsex. u 111 I II i r 50AlanGoldman Ourfirstconclusion regardingmoralityandsexistherefore thatno conduct otheIWise immoralshouldbeexcused becauseitissexual con- duct, andnothing insex isimmoral unlesscondemned byrules which apply elsewhere aswell. Thelastclause requires furtherclarification.
Sexual conduct canbegoverned byparticular mIesrelating onlytosex itself. Butthese precepts mustbeimplied bygeneral moralmIeswhen these areapplied tospecific sexualrelations ortypes ofconduct. The same istrue ofmIes offair business, ethicalmedicine, orcourtesy indriv- ing acar. 1nthe latter case,particular actsonthe road mayberepre- hensible, suchastailgating orpassing onthe right, which seem tobear no resemblance asactions toany outside thecontext ofhighway safety.
Nevertheless theirimmorality derivesfromthefact that they place oth- ers indanger, acircumstance which,whenavoidable, isto be con- demned inany context. Thisstructure ofgeneral andspecifically applicable mIesdescribes areasonable sexualethicaswell. Totake an extreme case,rapeisalways asexual actand itis always immoral. Amle against rapecantherefore beconsidered anobvious partofsexual morality whichhasnobearing onnonsexual conduct.Buttheimmoral- ity ofrape derives fromitsbeing anextreme violation ofaperson' sbody, of the right nottobe humiliated, andofthe general moralprohibition against usingotherpersons againsttheirwills, notfrom thefact that itis a sexual act.
The application elsewhereofgeneral moralmIestosexual conduct is further complicated bythe fact that itwill berelative tothe particular de- sires andpreferences ofone's partner (thesemaybeinfluenced byand hence insome sense include misguided beliefsaboutsexual morality it- self). Thismeans thatthere willbefewer specific mIesinthe area ofsex- ual ethics thaninother areasofconduct, suchasdriving cars,where the relativity ofpreference isirrelevant tothe prohibition ofobjectively dan- gerous conduct. Morereliance willhave tobe placed uponthegeneral moral mle,which inthis area holds simply thatthepreferences, desires, and interests ofone' spartner orpotential partneroughttobe taken into account. Thismleiscertainly notspecifically formulated togovern sex- ual relations; itisaform ofthe central principle ofmorality itself.But when applied tosex, itprohibits certainactions, suchasmolestation of children, whichcannot becategorized asviolations ofthe mle without at the same timebeing classified assexual. 1believe thislastcase isthe closest wecan come toan action whichiswrong becauseitissexual, but even hereitswrongness isbetter characterized asderiving fromthe detrimental effectssuchbehavior canhave onthe future emotional and sexual lifeofthe naive victims, andfrom thefact that such behavior therefore involvesmanipulation ofinnocent personswithoutregardfor their interests. Hence,thiscase alsoinvolves violation ofageneral moral mle which applies elsewhere aswell. Aside from Platonic mo~ ing that ther~ is that such, 1 donistic, utilj facie morali' seems inco tion. Thepl.
a gooc}with duty topur ~- pleasure of given myrig' of sex acts th: 1 and ought t the domain moral fram9 ity inhumaIJ sexual aCtiVl ~ ' tested, thes where, theI 1 .
I P em reconi 1t may apI!
must beatl ~ vari~bly inv one sownp lation of 3 otherasam formulation. the first un i tion. Many involve usin' immoral onl tual, orwhe!
all parties. ~ eFningthe J 1norder to perative, o.
merely bybJ in an act w~ . partner as~ sires, by~l ~or ensunng iprocity Whl right actsfr! PlainSex 51 hatnoIalcon- Iw~ich catlOn.
!to sex jwhen jt. The Iindriv- ~repre-iObear Isafety.
ce oth- I le con- :ifically ~ :akean I IA rule sexual imoral- ~ body, tibition hat itis I ~duct is Mar de- 'by and ,ality it- lofsex- lere the hydan-I~eneral desires, len into ;m sex- rlf. But ition of without ~is the ual, but om the naI and ehavior ~ard for ~moral Aside fromfaulty conceptual analysesofsex and theinfluence ofthe Platonic moraltradition, therearetwo more plausible reasonsforthink- ing that there aremoral dimensions intrinsictosex acts perse.The first is that such actsarenormally intenselypleasurable. Accordingtoahe- donistic, utilitarian moraltheory theytherefore shouldbeatleast prima facie morally right,rather thanmorally neutralinthemselves. Tome this seems incorrect andreflects unfavorably onthe ethical theoryinques- tion. Thepleasure intrinsictosex acts isagood, butnot, itseems tome, a good withmuch positive moralsignificance. Certainly1can have no duty topursue suchpleasure myself,andwhile itmay benice togive pleasure ofany form toothers, thereisno ethical requirement todo so, given myright overmyown body. Theexception relatestothe context of sex acts themselves, whenonepartner derivespleasure fromtheother and ought toreturn thefavor. Thisdutytoreciprocate takesusout of the domain ofhedonistic utilitarianism, however,andinto aKantian moral framework, thecentral principles ofwhichcallforsuch reciproc- ity inhuman relations. Sinceindependent moraljudgments regarding sexual activities constitute onearea inwhich ethical theories aretobe tested, theseobservations indicatehere,as1believe othersindicate else- where, thefertility ofthe Kantian, asopposed tothe utilitarian, princi- ple inreconstructing reasonedmoralconsciousness.
It may appear fromthisalternative Kantianviewpoint thatsexual acts must beatleast prima faciewrong inthemselves. Thisisbecause theyin- variably involveatdifferent stagesthemanipulation ofone's partner for one's ownpleasure, whichmightappear tobe prohibited onthe formu- lation ofKant's principle whichholdsthatoneought nottotreat an- other asameans tosuch private ends.Amore realistic rendering ofthis formulation, however,onewhich recognizes itsintended equivalence to the first universalizability principle,admitsnosuch absolute prohibi- tion. Many human relations, mosteconomic transactions forexample, involve usingother individuals forpersonal benefit.Theserelations are immoral onlywhen theyareone-sided, whenthebenefits arenot mu- tua!, orwhen thetransactions arenot freely andrationally endorsedby all parties. Thesame holds trueofsexual acts.Thecentral principle gov- erning themisthe Kantian demand forreciprocity insexual relations.
In order tocomply withthesecond formulation ofthe categorical im- perative, onemust recognize thesubjectivity ofone's partner (not merely bybeing aroused byher orhis desire, asNagel describes). Even in an act which byitsnature "objectifies" theother, onerecognizes a partner asasubject withdemands anddesires byyielding tothose de- sires, byallowing oneselftobe asexual objectaswell, bygiving pleasure or ensuring thatthepleasures ofthe acts aremutual. Itisthis kind ofrec- iprocity whichforms thebasis formorality insex, which distinguishes right actsfrom wrong inthis area asin others. (Ofcourse, priortosex 52AlanGoldman actsonemust gauge theireffects uponpotential partnersandtake these I longer rangeinterests intoaccount.) VII 1 suggested earlierthatinaddition togenerating confusionregardingthe rightness orwrongness ofsex acts, false conceptual analysesofthe means- end form cause confusion aboutthevalue ofsex tothe individual. Myac- count recognizes thesatisfaction ofdesire andthepleasure thisbrings as the central psychological functionofthe sex actfor the individual. Sexaf- fords usaparadigm ofpleasure, butnotacornerstone ofvalue.Formost of us itis not only aneeded outletfordesire butalso themost enjoyable form ofrecreation weknow. Itsvalue isnevertheless easilymistaken bybe- ing confused withthatoflove, when itis taken asessentially anexpression of that emotion. Although intense,thepleasures ofsex arebrief andrepet- itive rather thancumulative. Theygivevalue tothe specific actswhich gen- erate them, butnotthelasting kindofvalue whichenhances one'swhole life. The briefness ofthe pleasures contributes totheir intensity (orper- haps their intensity makesthemnecessarily brief),butitalso relegates them tothe periphery ofmost rational plansforthe good life.
By contrast, lovetypically develops overalong term relation; whileits pleasures maybeless intense andphysical, theyareofmore cumulative value. Theimportance oflove tothe individual maywellbecentral ina rational systemofvalue. Andithas perhaps aneven deeper moralsignif- icance relating tothe identification withtheinterests ofanother person, which broadens one'spossible relationships withothers as,well. Marriage is again important inpreserving thisrelation between adultsandchil- dren, which seemsasimportant tothe adults asitis to the children in broadening concernswhichhaveatendency tobecome selfish.Sexual desire, bycontrast, isdesire foranother whichisnevertheless essentially self-regarding. Sexualpleasure iscertainly agood forthe individual, and for many itmay benecessary inorder forthem tofunction inareason- ably cheerful way.Butitbears littlerelation tothose othervalues justdis- cussed, towhich someanalyses falselysuggest aconceptual connection.
VIII While myinitial analysis lacksmoral implications initself, asitshould, it does suggest bycontrast aconcept ofsexual perversion. Sincethecon- cept ofperversion isitself asexual concept, itwill always bedefined rel- ative tosome definition ofnormal sex;andanyconception ofthe norm will imply acontrary notionofperverse forms.Theconcept suggested by my account a!
analyses exan fnoro IheJ
would' beper cessful14 seduct nona,buttai sexual actsth.
tinuoNs seXU2 requisite sens desireitself in Ilot forconta 'ing harmea, ,j normality is,t tya:>ical\desiFe wi,tJh Ihety:pic t!B.em. These ouiginali defit eccur inacti for !the pleas &finition of tali sex sexuai .t1:len speakil1 Solomon ( ,Forthem tai that theJen tively fortha age speaker statistically \ erly count a:
ply abnorm romanticize sexual desir other areas an example upon ther achieves its clearly desiJ ing longer.
necessarily with sexual gree towhic the concep statistical, d, PlainSex 53 I puld, it hecon- ~ed rel- Fnorm !sted by myaccount againdiffers sharply fromthose implied bythe means-end analyses examined above.Perversion doesnotrepresent adeviation from thereproductive function(orkissing wouldbeperverted), froma loving relationship (ormost sexual desireandmany heterosexual acts would beperverted), orfrom efficiency incommunicating (orunsuc- cessful seduction attemptswouldbeperverted). Itisadeviation froma norm, butthenorm inquestion ismerely statistical. afcourse, notall sexual actsthat arestatistically unusualareperverted-a three-hourcon- tinuous sexualactwould beunusual butnot necessarily abnormalinthe requisite sense.Theabnormality inquestion mustrelate tothe form ofthe desireitselfin ordertoconstitute sexualperversion; forexample, desire, not forcontact withanother, butformerely looking, forharming orbe- ing harmed, forcontact withitems ofelothing. Theconcept ofsexual ab- normality isthat suggested bymy definition ofnormal sexinterms ofits typical desire. However, notallunusual desiresqualifYeither,onlythose with thetypical physical sexualeffects upontheindividual whosatisfies them. These effects, suchaserection inmales, werenotbuilt intothe original definition ofsex interms ofsexual desire, forthey donot always occur inactivities thatareproperly characterized assexual, say,kissing forthe pleasure ofit.But they doseem tobear aeloser relation tothe definition ofactivities asperverted. (Forthose whoconsider onlygeni- taIsex sexual, we could build suchsymptoms into anarrowerdefinition, thenspeaking ofsex inabroad senseaswell as"proper" sex.) Solomon andNagel disagree withthisstatistical notionofperversion.
For them theconcept isevaluative ratherthanstatistical. 1do not deny that theterm "perverted" isoften usedevaluatively (andpurely emo- tively forthat matter), orthat ithas anegative connotation forthe aver- age speaker. 1do deny that wecan find anorm, otherthanthatof statistically usualdesire, against whichalland only activities thatprop- erly count assexual perversions canbecontrasted. Pervertedsexissim- ply abnormal sex,and ifthe norm isnot tobe anidealized or romanticized extraneousendorpurpose, itmust express theway human sexual desires usually manifest themselves. afcourse notallnorms in other areas ofdiscourse needbe statistical inthis way. Physical healthis anexample ofarelatively elearnorm which doesnotseem todepend upon thenumbers ofhealthy people. Buttheconcept inthis case achieves itselarity through theconnection ofphysical healthwithother clearly desirable physicalfunctions andcharacteristics, forexample, liv- inglonger. Inthe case ofsex, thatwhich isstatistically abnormalisnot necessarily incapacitating inother ways,andyetthese abnormal desires with sexual effects upontheirsubject docount asperverted tothe de- gree towhich theirobjects deviatefromusual ones.Theconnotations of the concept ofperversion beyondthoseconnected withabnormality or statistical deviation derivemorefromtheattitudes ofthose likelytocall tthese I l jng the ~eans- I.My ac- rmgs as ISexaf-1>rmost ~oyable ;by he- iression ~repet- th gen-swholeI [or per- ~legates ;hile its I 1 .
~u atIve tal ina I ~ signif- person, ~age id chil- hen in ISexual fntially ml, and I reason- just dis- ~ction.
. 54AlanGoldman certain actsperverted thanfrom specifiable featuresofthe acts them- selves. Theseconnotations addtothe concept ofabnormality thatofsub- normality, butthere isno norm against whichthelatter canbemeasured intelligibly inaccord withalland only actsintuitively calledperverted.
The only proper evaluative normsrelating tosex involve degrees of pleasure inthe acts and moral norms, butneither ofthe sescales coin- cides withstatistical degreesofabnormality, accordingtowhich perver- sion isto be measured. Thethree parameters operateindependently (this wasimplied forthe first twowhen itwas held above thattheplea- sure ofsex isagood, butnot necessarily amoral good). Perverted sex may bemore orless enjoyable toparticular individuals thannormal sex, and more orless moral, depending upontheparticular relationsin- volved. Raping asheep maybemore perverted thanraping awoman, but certainly notmore condemnable morally.1°Itisnevertheless true that theevaluative connotations attachingtothe term "perverted" derive partly fromthefact that most people consider perverted sexhighly im- moral. Manysuchactsareforbidden bylong standing taboos,anditis sometimes difficulttodistinguish whatisforbidden fromwhatisim- moral. Others, suchassadistic acts,aregenuinely immoral,butagain not atal1 because oftheir connection withsexorabnormality. Theprin- ciples which condemn theseactswould condemn themequally ifthey were common andnonsexual. Itisnot true thatweproperly couldcon- tinue toconsider actsperverted whichwerefound tobe very common practice acrosssocieties. Suchacts,ifharmful, mightcontinue tobe con- demned properly asimmoral, butitwas just shown thattheimmorality of an act does notvary with itsdegree ofperversion. Ifnot harmful, common actspreviously considered abnormalmightcontinue tobe called perverted foratime bythe moralistic minority;buttheterm when applied tosuch cases would retainonlyitsemotive negative connotation without consistent logicalcriteria forapplication. Itwould represent merely prejudiced moraljudgments. .
To adequately explainwhythere isatendency toso deeply condemn perverted actswould require atreatise inpsychology beyondthescope of this paper. Partofthe reason undoubtedly relatestothe tradition of repressive sexualethicsandfalse conceptions ofsex; another parttothe fact that allabnormality seemstodisturb andfascinate usatthe same time. Theformer explains whysexual perversion ismore abhorrent to many thanother forms ofabnormality; thelatter indicates whywetend to have anemotive andevaluative reactiontoperversion inthe first place. Itmay be,ashas been suggested according toaFreudian line,l1 that ouruneasiness derivesfromlatent desires weare loathe toadmit, but thisthesis takesusinto psychological issues1am not competent to judge. VVhatever thepsychological explanation,itsuffices topoint out here thattheconceptual connection betweenperversion andgenuine or consistent moral( ,leading means-end i~ The position 1hav( tally new. Something~ course wasgenuinel~ from Freud tothe B and repressive conc( sex asmerely amean though sometimes a!
to the thesis (among necessary partofsQ(~ a position thatbegan view. Perhaps thetiIJ able middle ground 1.Even Bertrandl ity, atleast foritsperili sex inthe absenee 00 is to be regarded prim Morals (NewYork: Ba!
2. Robert Solom
" 1 .
I tee mque: praetlej 7. Nagel, p.15. ij above.] 8.Janice Moultd ing, Mareh 1976.(TJ !
9. Solomon, p.2 10. The example' Sex,p.96. I 11. See Michael SI ophy andSex,261-61. II I lactsthem- Ithatofsub-emeasured I peIVerted.
'degrees of Iscales eoin- rich perver- lependently fat the plea- I lIVerted sex flormal sex, relations in- !gawoman, t ~theless true I d " d .
~rte enve !x highly im- bos, and itis , what isim- !u, but againIity.The prin- ~ually ifthey dy could eon- I iery common lue tobe eon- le immorality ~ ot harmful, ,tinue tobe e tenn when ~connotation ~ld represent I~ply condemn I md theseope !e tradition of I !ler part tothe I IS at the same I iabhorrent to :s why wetend ~n inthe first ~eudian line,11 ~the toadmit, kompetent to I .
~s to pomt out I d .
[l an genume I Plain Sex 55 orconsistent moralevaluation isspurious andagain suggested bymis- leading means-end idealizations ofthe eoneept ofsex.
The position 1have taken inthis paper against thoseeoneepts isnot to- tally new. Something similartoitis found inFreud's viewofsex, whieh of course wasgenuinely revolutionary, andinthe body ofwritings deriving from Freud tothe present time.Butinhis revolt against romantieized and repressive eoneeptions, Freudwenttoofar-from arefusal toview sex asmerely ameans toaview ofitas the end ofall human behavior, al- though sometimes anelaborately disguisedend.Thispansexualism led to the thesis (among others)thatrepression wasindeed aninevitable and necessary partofsocial regulation ofany form, astrange eonsequenee of a position thatbegan byopposing therepressive aspeetsofthe means-end view. Perhaps thetime finally hasarrived whenweean aehieve areason- able middle ground inthis area, atleast inphilosophy ifnot insociety.
Notes 1. Even Bertrand Russell,whosewriting inthis area wasamodel ofrational- ity, atleast foritsperiod, tendstomake thisidentifieation andtocondemn plain sexin theabsence oflove: "sexintercourse apartfromlovehaslittle value, and is to be regarded primarily asexperimentation withaview tolove." Marriage and Morals (NewYork: Bantam, 1959),p.87.
2. Robert Solomon, "SexandPerversion," PhilosophyandSex,ed.R.Baker andF. E!liston (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1975),268-87.
3. Thomas Nagel,"Sexual Perversion," TheJournai ofPhilosophy 66,No. 1 (1960), pp.5-17. (Thisvolume, pp.9-20.) 4. Sex might beconsidered (atleast partially) ascommunication inavery broad sellseinthe same wayasperforming ensemblemusic,inthe sense that .there isin both ideally acommunion orperfectly sharedexperience withan- other. Thisis,however, onepossible idealviewwhose centralfeature isnot nec- essary tosexual actsordesire perse.And inemphasizing thecommunication of specific feelings bymeans ofbody language, theanalysis underconsideration narrows theend toone clearly extrinsic toplain andeven good sex.
5. Solomon, pp.284-85.
6. Ibid., p.283. One isreminded ofWoodyAllen'srejoinder topraise ofhis technique: "1practice aiotwhen I'malone." 7. Nagel, p.15. [This passage isnot inthe version ofNagel's essayreprinted above.] 8.Janice Moulton madethesame point inapaper atthe Pacific APAmeet- ing, March 1976.(Thisvolume, pp.31-38.) 9. Solomon, p.285.
10. The example islike onefrom SaraRuddick, "BetterSex,"Philosophy and Sex, p.96.
11. See Michael Slote,"Inapplicable ConceptsandSexual Perversion," Philos- ophy andSex, 261-67.
