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_________________ _________________ Cite as: 56 2 U . S. ____ (2011) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTIC E: This op inion is su bjec t to f orma l rev ision bef ore pu blicat ion in the preliminary p rint of th e U nited States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the R eporter of D ecisions, Su preme C ourt of the United States, Wa sh­ ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ ogra phical or other formal err ors, in or der that corrections may be mad e before the prelim inary print goes to press. SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES No. 09–2 91 ERIC L. T HOMPSON, PETITIONER v. NORTH AMERIC AN STAI NL ESS, L P ON WRIT OF CERTIORA RI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [Jan uary 24, 2011] JUSTICE SCA LIA delivered the opini on of the Co urt. Until 2003, both petitioner Eric Thompson and his fiancée, Mi riam Regalado, were employees of respondent North American Stain less (NAS). In February 2003, the Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notified NAS that Rega lado had filed a charge alleging sex discrimination. Three weeks later, NAS fired Thompson. Thompson then filed a charge with the EE OC. Af ter conciliation efforts proved unsuccessful, he s ued NAS i n the United States Dist rict Cour t f or the East ern Distric t of Kentucky u nder Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19 64, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq ., claiming that NAS had fired him in order to re taliat e against Regalado for filing her charge with the EEOC. The District Court granted summary judgment to NAS, concluding that Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation claims.” 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 ( ED Ky. 2006). After a panel of the Sixth Cir cuit reversed the Dis trict Court, the Sixth Cir cuit granted rehearing en banc and affi rmed by a 10-to-6 vote. 567 F. 3d 8 04 (2009). The court reasoned that because Thompson did not “engag[e] in any statutorily protecte d 2 THOMPSON v. NORTH A MERICAN ST AINLES S, LP Opinion of the Court activity, either on his own behalf or on beha lf of Miriam Regalado,” he “is not included in the class of persons for whom Cong ress created a retaliation cause of action.” Id., at 807–808. We granted certiorari. 561 U. S. ___ (2010). I Title VII p rovides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful em­ ployment practice for an employer to discrim inate against any of his employees . . . because he has made a charge ” under Title VII. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a). The statute permits “a person claiming to be aggrieved” to file a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employer c ommitted an unlawful employment practice, and, if the EE OC declines to s ue the e mplo yer , it per mits a ci vil ac tion to “be brou gh t . . . by the perso n clai min g to be aggrie ved . . . by the al­ leged unl awful em plo yment pra ctice. ” §2 000e –5(b ), (f)(1). It is undisputed that Regala do’s filing of a charge with the EEOC was protected conduct under Title VII. In the procedural posture of this case, we are als o required to assume that NA S fir ed Thompson in order to retaliate against Regalado for filing a ch arge of dis crimination. This case therefore presents two questions : First, di d NAS ’s firing of Thompson constit ute unlawful retaliation? And second , if it did, does Title VII grant Thompson a cause of action? II With regar d to the first question, we have little diffi­ culty conclu ding that if the facts alleged by Thompson are true, then NAS’s firing of Thompson violated Title VII. In Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. Whit e, 548 U. S. 53 (2006), we held that Title VII’s antir etaliation provision must be construed t o cover a br oad range of employer conduct. W e reached th at conclusion by cont rasting the text of Tit le 3 Cite as: 56 2 U . S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court VII’s antiretaliation provision with its substantive antidis­ crimination provision. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, relig ion, sex, and na tional origin “‘with resp ect to . . . c ompensation, terms, c onditions, or privileges of employment,’ ” and d iscriminatory prac tice s that would “‘deprive any individual of emplo yment oppor­ tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.’ ” Id ., at 6 2 (quoting 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2( a) (emphasis deleted)). In contrast, T itle VII’s antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer from “ ‘discriminat[ing] against any of his em ployees’ ” for engaging in protected conduct, wi thout speci fying the e mployer ac ts that a re prohibited. 548 U. S., at 62 (quoti ng §2000e–3(a) (empha­ sis deleted)). Based on this text ual distinction and our understanding of the antiretalia tion provision’s purpose, we held th at “the antiretaliation provision , unlike th e substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employ­ ment.” Id., at 64. Rather, Title VII’s antiretaliation pro­ vision prohi bits any employer action that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker fro m making or supportin g a charge of discrimination.” Id., at 68 (intern al quotation marks omit ted). We think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in prote cted activity if she k new that her fiancé would be fired. Indeed, N AS does not dispute that Thompson’s firing meets the standard set forth in Bu rlington . T r. of O ral A rg. 3 0. NAS raises the concern, however, tha t prohibiting reprisals against third parties will lead to difficult line- drawing problems con ­ cerning the types of relationships entitled t o protection. Perhaps retaliating against an employee b y firing his fiancée would dissuade the employee from engaging in protected a ctivity, but what about firing a n employee’s girlfriend, close friend, or trusted co-work er? Applying the Burlington standard to third-pa rty reprisals, NAS argue s, 4 THOMPSON v. NORTH A MERICAN ST AINLES S, LP Opinion of the Court will place the employer at risk any time it fires any em­ ployee who happens to have a c onnection t o a differen t employee who filed a c harge with the EEOC. Although we ack nowledge the force of this point, we do not think i t justifies a categoric al rule that third-pa rty reprisals do not violate Title VII. As explained above, we adopted a broad stan dard in Burlington because Title VII’s antiretaliation provisio n is worded broadly. We think there is n o textual basis for making an exception to it for third- party repris als, and a p reference for clear rule s cannot justify departin g from statutory text. We must also decline to identify a fixed class of relation­ ships for which third-party repri sals are un lawful. We expect that firing a cl ose family member will almost al­ ways meet the Bu rli ngton stan dard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a m ere acquain tance will almost never do so, but b eyond that we are relu ctant to ge neralize. As we explained in Burlin gton , 548 U. S., at 69, “the signifi­ cance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the parti cular cir cumst ances.” Given the bro ad statu tor y text and th e variety of workplace contexts in which re ­ taliation may occur, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible to a compre hensive set of clear rules. We emphasize, however, that “the provision’s standard fo r judging ha rm must b e objective,” so as to “avoi[d] th e uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to dete rmine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.” Id., at 68–69. III The more difficult question in this case i s whether Thompson may sue NAS for its alleged viol ation of Title VII. The statute provides that “a civil action may b e brought . . . by the person clai ming to be aggrieved.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(1). The Sixth Circuit co ncluded that this provision was mer ely a reiter ation of the requirement 5 Cite as: 56 2 U . S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court that the plaintiff have Article III standing. 567 F. 3d, at 808, n. 1. We do not understand how that can be. The provision unquestiona bly permits a person “claiming to be aggrieved” to bring “a civil action.” It is argu able that the aggrievement referred to is nothing more than the mini­ mal Article III standi ng, which consists of i njury in fact caused by the defendant and rem ediable by the court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992). But Thompson’s claim undoubtedly meets those requiremen ts, so if th at is indeed all that aggrievement consists of, he may sue. We have suggested in dictum that the Title VII ag­ grievement requirement confe rre d a righ t t o sue on all who satisfied Article III standing. Traffican te v. Metro - politan Li fe Ins. Co. , 4 09 U. S. 20 5 (1972), involved the “person aggrieved” provision of Title VIII (the Fair Hous­ ing Act) rather than Ti tle VII. In deciding th e case, how­ ever, we relied upon, and cited with approval, a Third Circuit opi nion involving Title VII, which, we said, “con­ cluded that the words used s howed ‘a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Con stitution.’ ” Id., at 2 09 (quoting Hack ett v. McGuir e Br os., Inc. , 445 F. 2d 442, 446 (1971)). We think that dictum regarding T itle VII was too expan­ sive. Indeed, the Traff icante opinion did not adhere to it in expressi ng its Title VIII ho lding that residents of an apartment complex could sue the owner for his racial discrimination against prospective tenants. The opinion said that the “person a ggrieved” of Title VII I was coexten­ sive with Article III “ insofar as te nants of the same hous - ing unit that is ch arged with discrimina tion are con - cerned .” 409 U. S., at 209 (em phasis added). Later opinions, w e must acknowledg e, reiterate that the term “aggrieved” in Title VI II reaches as far as Article III pe r­ mits, see Bennett v. Sp ear , 520 U. S. 154, 165–166 (1997); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood , 4 41 U. S. 91, 6 THOMPSON v. NORTH A MERICAN ST AINLES S, LP Opinion of the Court 109 (1979), though th e holdings of those ca ses are com­ patible with the “zone of interests” limitation that we discuss below. In an y event, it is Title VII rather than Title VIII that is befo re us here, and as to that we are surely not bound by the Traffi cante dictum. We now fin d that this dictum was ill-consid ered, and we decline to follow it. If any person injured in the Article I II sense by a Title VII violation could sue, absurd conse­ quences would follow. For example, a shareholder would be able to s ue a company for firing a valuable employee for racially discriminatory reasons, so long as he could show that the value of his stock decreased as a con sequence. At oral argum ent Thompson acknowledged that such a suit would not lie, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5–6. We agree, and ther e­ fore conclude that the term “agg rieved” must be construed more narrowly than the outer bou ndaries of Article III. At the other extreme from the position that “person aggrieved” means anyone with Article III standing, NAS argues that it is a ter m of art th at refers on ly to the e m­ ployee who engaged in the protected activity. We k now of no other context in which the words carry thi s artificially narrow meaning, and if that is what Congre ss intended it would more naturally have said “person claiming to ha ve been discriminated against” rath er than “person claiming to be aggrieved.” We s ee no basis in text or prior practice for limiting the latter phrase to the person who was th e subject of unlawful retaliation. Moreover, such a readin g contradicts the very holding of Trafficante , which was tha t residents of an apartment complex were “person[s] ag­ grieved” by discrimination ag ainst prospecti ve tenants. We see n o reason why the same phrase in Titl e VII shoul d be given a narrower me aning. In our view there is a common usa ge of the term “person aggrieved” that avoids the extremity of equ ating it with Article III and yet is fully consistent with our application of the term in Trafficante. The Administrative Procedure 7 Cite as: 56 2 U . S. ____ (2011) Opinion of the Court Act, 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq ., authorizes suit to challenge a federal agency by any “perso n . . . adversely affected o r aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute. ” §702. We have held that this language establishes a regime under which a plaintiff may not s ue unless he “falls within the ‘zone of inte rests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision wh ose violation fo rms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed - era tion , 497 U. S. 871, 883 (1990). We have described th e “zone of interests” test as denying a right of review “ if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or in­ consistent with the pu rposes im plicit in the s tatute that it cannot reasonably be a ssumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clar ke v. Securities Industry Assn. , 4 79 U. S. 388, 399–400 (1987). We hold that the term “a g­ grieved” in Title VII i ncorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with a n interest “arguably [s ought] to b e protected by the statutes,” Nation al Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. , 522 U. S. 479, 495 (1998) (internal qu otation marks omitted), while excluding plain­ tiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibition s in Title VII. Applying that test he re, we con clude that Thompson falls within the zone of interests protected b y Title VII. Thompson was an employee of N AS, and the purpose o f Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’ unlawful actions. Moreover, accepting the fa cts as alleged, Thompson is not an accidental victim of the retaliation— collateral damage, so to speak , of the employer’s unlawful act. To th e contrary, injuring h im was th e employer’s intended means of harming Regalado. Hurti ng him wa s the unlawful act by which the employer punished her. In those circu mstances, we think T hompson well within t he zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII. H e is a person aggrieved wit h standing to sue. 8 THOMPSON v. NORTH A MERICAN ST AINLES S, LP Opinion of the Court * * * The judgm ent of the Sixth Cir cuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for f urther p roc eedings consistent wit h this opinion . It is so orde red. JUSTICE KAGAN took no part i n the cons ideration or decision of t his case. _________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 56 2 U . S. ____ (2011) GINSBURG, J., conc urri ng SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES No. 09–2 91 ERIC L. T HOMPSON, PETITIONER v. NORTH AMERIC AN STAI NL ESS, L P ON WRIT OF CERTIORA RI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [Jan uary 24, 2011] JUSTICE GIN SBUR G, with whom J USTICE BRE YER joins, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion, and add a fortifyin g observa - tion: Today’s decision accords with the longstanding views of the Eq ual Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), th e federal agency that a dministers Title VII. In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC counsels t hat Title VII “prohibit[s] retaliation agains t so meone so cl osely relate d to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage or prevent the person from pursuin g those rig hts. ” Brie f for Unite d States as Amicus Cu riae 12–13 (quoting EEOC Compli - ance Manual §8–II(C)(3) (1998)). Such retaliation “can be challenged,” the Manual affirms, “by both th e individual who engage d in protected activity and the relative, where both are e mployees.” Id. , at 2 5–26 (quoting Compliance Manual §8–II(B)(3)(c)). The EEOC’s state ments in the Manual merit deference under Skidmore v. Swif t & Co. , 323 U. S. 134 (1944). See Fed eral Expre ss Cor p. v. Holowecki , 552 U. S. 3 89, 399–400 (2008). The EEOC’s interpretati on of Title VII, I fur ther note, is consistent with interpretations of analogous statutes by other federal agencies. See, e.g. , NLRB v. Adv erti ser s Mfg . Co. , 823 F. 2d 1086, 10 88–1089 (CA7 1987) (adopting NLRB’s position that retalia tion against a relative violates the National 2 THOMPSON v. NORTH A MERICAN ST AINLES S, LP GINSBURG, J., conc urri ng Labor Relat ions Act); Tasty Baking Co. v. NLR B, 254 F. 3d 114, 127–128 (CADC 2001) (same), cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11.