communication

37Philos B o n n ie S te in h o c kBonieSthtcikA dtuuek lrkeuityH Agehkh rik Lakhretu t F ikrikA rikAk eh anything immoral about adultery. I f you are religious, and your religion (like m ost) criticizes adultery, then you’ll have a quick answer to this question. But Steinhock wants us to think about whether there are grounds that both religious and nonreligious people can accept that will indict adultery. She thinks that there are.

In addition to the practical reasons against com m itting adultery, Steinhock claims that two moral reasons oppose it: adultery is a form o f promise-breaking, and it is a form o f deception. Yet as Steinhock admits, these reasons w ould disappear i f w e were to allow open mar riages, in which there was no promise o f an exclusive sexual relation ship between spouses. S he argues that such relations are n ot’immoral, although she does believe that they stray from a valuable ideal o f what a marriage should be.

Steinhock concludes w ith a discussion o f love, marital fidelity, and sexual relations. S he finds it hard to see the value in remaining sexually faithful to som eone you no longer love. S h e also notes the possibility o f emotionally betraying som eone you are sexually faithful to. I f she is correct, then the links between em otional and sexual fidelity, marriage, and love may be more complicated than w e at first thought.

Bonnie Steinhock, “Adultery.” In QQ; Report from the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy 6.1 (1986): 12-14.382rBnSoitc 3833ccording to a 1980 survey in Cosmopolitan, 54 percent of Ameri can wives have had extramarital affairs; a study of 100,000 married women by the considerably tamer Redbook magazine found that 40 percent of the wives over 40 had been unfaithful. While such surveys are, to some extent, self-selecting—those who do it are more likely to fill out questionnaires about it—sexual mores have clearly changed in recent years. Linda Wolfe, who reported the results of the Cosmopolitan survey, suggests that “this increase in infidelity among m arried women represents not so much a deviation from traditional standards of fidelity as a break with the old double standard.” Studies show that m en have always strayed in significant numbers.

Yet 80 percent of “Cosmo girls” did not approve of infidelity and wished their own husbands and lovers would be faithful. Eighty-eight percent of respondents to a poll taken in Iowa in 1983 viewed “coveting your neigh bor’s spouse” as a “major sin.” It seems that while almost nobody approves of adultery, m en have always done it, and women are catching up.

The increase in female adultery doubtless has to do with recent and radical changes in our attitudes toward sex and sexuality. We no longer feel guilty about enjoying sex; indeed, the capacity for sexual enjoyment is often regarded as a criterion of mental health. W hen sex itself is no longer intrinsically shameful, restraints on sexual behavior are loosened. In fact, we might, question whether the abiding disapproval of infidelity merely gives lip service to an ancient taboo. Is there a rational justification for disapproving of adultery which will carry force with everyone, religious and nonreligious alike?

Trust and Deception Note first that adultery, unlike murder, theft, and lying, is not universally forbidden. Traditional Eskimo culture, for example, regarded sharing one’s wife with a visitor as a m atter of courtesy. The difference can be explained by looking at the effects of these practices on social cohesiveness. Without rules protecting the lives, persons, and property of its members, no group could long endure. Indeed, rules against killing, assault, lying, and stealing seem fundamental to having a morality at all.

Not so with adultery. For adultery is z. private matter, essentially con cerning only the relationship between husband and wife. It is not essential to morality like these other prohibitions: there are stable societies with genuine moral codes which tolerate extra-marital sex. Although adultery 384 T h e E t h i c a l L i f eremains a criminal offense in some jurisdictions, it is rarely prosecuted.

Surely this is because it is widely regarded as a private matter: in the words of BiUie Holiday, “Ain’t nobody’s business if I do.” However, even if adultery is a private matter, with which the state should not interfere, it is not a morally neutral issue. O ur view of adultery is connected to our thoughts and feelings about love and marriage, sex and the family, the value of fidelity, sexual jealousy, and exclusivity. How we think about adultery will affect the quality of our relationships, the way we raise our children, the kind of society we have and want to have.

So it is important to consider whether our attitudes toward adultery are justifiable.

Several practical considerations militate against adultery: pregnancy and genital herpes immediately spring to mind. However, unwanted preg nancies are a risk of all sexual intercourse, within or without marriage; venereal disease is a risk of all nonexclusive sex, not just adulterous sex. So these risks do not provide a reason for objecting specifically to adultery. In any event, they offer merely pragmatic, as opposed to moral, objections. If adultery is wrong, it does not become less so because one has been steril ized or inoculated against venereal disease.

Two main reasons support regarding adultery as seriously i m m oral One is that adultery is an instance of promise-breaking, on the view that marriage involves, explicitly or implicitly, a promise of sexual fidelity: to forsake all others. That there is this attitude in our culture is clear. Mick no t noted for sexual puritanism, allegedly refused to m arry Jerry HaU, the mother o f his baby, because he had no intention of accepting an exclusive sexual relationship. While Jagger’s willingness to become an unwed father is hardly mainstream morality, his refusal to marry, knowing that he did not wish to be faithful, respects the idea that marriage requires such a commitment. Moreover, the promise of sexual fidelity is regarded as a very serious and important one. To cheat on one’s spouse indicates a lack of concern, a willingness to cause pain, and so a lack of love. Finally, one who breaks promises cannot be trusted. And trust is essential to the intimate partnership o f marriage, which may be irreparably weakened by its betrayal.

The second reason for regarding adultery as immoral is that it involves deception, for example, lying about one’s whereabouts and relations with others. Perhaps a marriage can withstand the occasional lie, but a pattern of lying will have irrevocable consequences for a marriage, if discovered, and probably even if not. Like breaking promises, lying is regarded as aLniShrtck 385bPr7(dlri(h cBr7 eb 1oerz7eBrzk ( b(BhPol ie i(cl iSl erl hBl7 ie ,loBeP,hs (, ( deo(h mlo,er lriBihl7 ie ol,mltiq O pen Marriage These two arguments suffice to make m ost cases of adultery wrong, given the attitudes and expectations of most people. But what if marriage did not involve any promise of sexual fidelity? What if there were no need for deception, because neither partner expected or wanted such fidelity?

Objections to “open marriage” cannot focus on promise-breaking and deception, for the expectation of exclusivity is absent. If an open marriage has been freely chosen by both spouses, and not imposed by a dominant on a dependent partner, would such an arrangement be morally accept able, even desirable?

The attractiveness of extramarital affairs, without dishonesty, disloy alty, or guilt, should not be downplayed. However satisfying sex between m arried people may be, it cannot have the excitement o f a new relation ship. (“Not better” a friend once said defensively to his wife, attempting to explain his infidelity, “just different:’) Might we not be better off, our lives fuller and richer, if we allowed ourselves the thrill of new and different sexual encounters?

Perhaps the expectation of sexual exclusivity in marriage stems from emotions which are not admirable: jealousy and possessiveness. That most people experience these feelings is no reason for applauding or institu tionalizing them. Independence in marriage is now generally regarded as a good thing: too much “togetherness” is boring and stifling. In a good marriage, the partners can enjoy different activities, travel apart, and have separate friends. Why draw the line at sexual activity?

The natural response to this question invokes a certain conception of love and sex: sex is an expression of affection and intimacy and so should be reserved for people who love each other. Further, it is assumed that one can and should have such feelings for only one other person at any time.

To make love with someone else is to express feelings of affection and inti macy that should be reserved for one’s spouse alone.

This rejection of adultery assumes the validity of a particular concep tion of love and sex, which can be attacked in two ways. We might divorce sex from love and regard sex as a pleasurable activity in its own right, comparable to the enjoyment of a good meal. In his article “Is Adultery Immoral?” Richard Wasserstrom suggests that the linkage of sex with love 37P hh e Et h ic a l LifeEeTe h! " #eTle hf"h 6aTe!! lh l! 6Elle8 #t " fl$feE echlca !6 f "! Tc)e !e. l! lahEla!l "TTt #"8 cE 8lEht i6h hfl! l! "a c)eETt !lTl!hl )le- c hfe caae hlca #eh-eea !e. "a8 Tc)e =eeTla$! c Tc)e c 6E #eh-eea ecTe ea9ctla$ !e.6"T laheE c6E!e ach c6h c " !ea!e hf"h !e.6"T Te"!6Ee 6!h #e 6Elle8 #6h Ee l!eTt #e "6!e c hfe 6h6"T Te"!6Ee hfet $l)e cae "achfeE ecTe a"h6E"TTt f")e eeTla$! c "e hlca cE hfc!e -fc " e hfe f"t "a8 !e. l! " )eEt $cc8 -"t c " la$ !cecae e.hE"cE8la"ElTt f"t 3h hfe !"e hle !e.

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Such “renunciation” is natural in the first throes of romantic love; it is pre cisely because this stage does not last that we must promise to be faithful through the notoriously unromantic realities of m arried life.

Fidelity as an Ideal On the view I have been defending, genuinely open marriages are not immoral, although they deviate from a valued ideal of what marriage should be. While this is not the only ideal, or incumbent on all rational agents, it is a moral view in that it embodies a claim about a good way for people to live. The prohibition of adultery, then, is neither arbitrary nor irrational. However, even if we are justified in accepting the ideal of fidel ity, we know that people do not always live up to the ideals they accept andVniShrtck 387we recognize that some failures to do so are worse than others. We regard a brief affair, occasioned by a prolonged separation, as morally different from installing a mistress.

Further, sexual activity is not necessary for deviation from the ideal of marriage which lies behind the demand for fidelity. As John Heckler observed during his bitter and public divorce from former Health and Human Services Secretary Margaret Heckler, “In marriage, there are two partners. W hen one person starts contributing far less than the other per son to the marriage, that’s the original infidelity. You don’t need any third party.” While this statement was probably a justification of his own infi delities, the point is valid. To abandon one’s spouse, whether to a career or to another person, is also a kind of betrayal.

If a m an becomes deeply involved emotionally with another woman, it may be little comfort that he is able to assure his wife that “Nothing hap pened.” Sexual infidelity has significance as a sign of a deeper betrayal— falling in love with someone else. It m aybe objected that we cannot control the way we feel, only the way we behave; that we should not be blamed for falling in love, but only for acting on the feeling. While we may not have direct control over our feelings, however, we are responsible for getting ourselves into situations in which certain feelings naturally arise. “It just happened” is rarely an accurate portrayal of an extramarital love affair.

If there can be betrayal without sex, can there be sex without betrayal?

In the novel Forfeit, by Dick Francis, the hero is deeply in love with his wife, who was paralyzed by polio in the early days of their marriage. Her great unspoken fear is that he will leave her; instead, he tends to her devot edly. For several years, he forgoes sex, but eventually succumbs to an affair.

While his adultery is hardly praiseworthy, it is understandable. He could divorce his wife and m arry again, but it is precisely his refusal to abandon her, his continuing love and tender care, that makes us admire him.

People do fall in love with others and out of love with their spouses.

Ought they to refrain from making love while still legally tied? I cannot see much, if any, moral value in remaining physically faithful, on principle, to a spouse one no longer loves. This will displease those who regard the wrongness o f adultery as a moral absolute, but my account has nothing to do with absolutes and everything to do with what it means to love some one deeply and completely. It is the value of that sort of relationship that makes sexual fidelity an ideal worth the sacrifice.

Neither a mere religiously based taboo, nor a relic of a repressive view of sexuality, the prohibition against adultery expresses a particular 377 hh e Et h ic a l Lif e ca ehlca c "EEle8 Tc)e h l! cae -e "a fcacE la c6E c-a Tl)e! "a8 #e36e"hf hc c6E flT8Eea -lhf cal8ea e la lh! )"T6e "! " cfeEeah "a8 E"hlca"T l8e"T Bonnie Steinbeck: Adultery 1) W hat reasons does Steinbock give for thinking that adultery is seri ously immoral? Do these reasons apply to all cases of adultery?

2) Steinbock claims that open marriages “deviate from a valued ideal of what marriage should be.” Do you agree with her about this? Is it m or ally wrong for spouses to agree to an open marriage?

3) Is it morally permissible to have sex merely for pleasure, or should people have sex only with partners whom they love?

4) Steinbock suggests at the end of the article that adultery may be per missible in some circumstances. W hat circumstances are these, and what reasons does she give for thinking adultery is permissible in such cases? Do you agree with her?

\Licensing Parents H u g h L a F o ll e tte7 '; a i

A nd in any event, as he sees it, matters o f principle strongly support a licensing scheme.

LaFollette argues that i f an activity stands a significant chance o f causing substantial harm to others, then, i f we allow it at all, we ought to require a license before letting people engage in it. Driving a car, per forming surgery, dispensing prescription drugs each righdy requires a license, even though the relevant tests for competence are not guaranteed to be one hundred percent accurate, and some people who very much want to do these things will be disqualified from doing them. I f LaFollette is right, raising children frlls into this same category. As a result, par ents need to be licensed, and some will fail to pass the relevant tests. Such people, argues LaFollette, should not be allowed to become parents.

There is a natural reply to such an argument: adults have a right to raise children, and any licensing requirement violates that right.

LaFollette carefully reviews the different ways in which one might understand and argue for such a right. H e thinks that the best ways are compatible w ith, and even lend support to, his licensing idea.