Philosophy and Music

Ideology T his chapter brings tagether twa natians that we have already intraduced but left rather underdevelaped: .E.0wer and the social CQPsR;�];l.Qf reality. Every saciety attempts ta guarantee its' own cantinuing existence. A saciety maintajnsitself by:reproducin� its in stitutians and)t � structure.af ,�acj.9.Lre.ktigp�R? Ta da sa, it has ta continuausly reproduce the things necessary far its existence, from the resaurces ta produce faod and shelter far its peaple, ta the labar neces­ sary ta transform these resources inta commadities, ta the individuals willing and able ta participate in the institutians and .occupy their assigned roles in the sacial relatianships. But we have been suggesting throughaut this baak that the institutians and relatianships that consti­ tute a saciety always embady structures .of pawer and inequality. If a society is ta cantinue existing, it must, therefare, ensure that its particu­ lar relatians .of pawer-its particular hierarchies .of ecanamic, palitical, and cultural power-cantinue ta .operate with same appearance .of legit­ imacy in the lives .of the general papulatian. One way .of daing that is ta use farce ta cantrol peaple's lives and to actively suppress appasitian.

�11hling and...n:tQI:�.QflDt way io.volyesg¥tting eeaple ta --y_ �cept an ideolo&1 � 12articula � w�.Y QLth�kll,}g a �dseein g"the wa �ld ./f' lhat makes the eXlstmg .2! g

./ MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA importance increased significantly in the eighteenth and nineteenth .

centuries, as part of the processes of modernization in Europe and America. Historically, becoming modern involved the democratiza­ tion of both political and cultural life. As "the masses" gained political power and cultural literacy, partly as a result of the develop�e�t of new communication media, the use of force became more diffIcult, costly, and visible, and thus it became an instrument only of last resort. Instead, society came to rely more and more on the ideologi­ cal possibilities of communication and culture.

IDEOLOGY, REAilTY, AND REPRESENTATION The issue of ideology is closely tied to the discussion in the previous two chapters: �dia ma�� meanings ane! �ganize them into vari­ ous codes and systems. Implicit in these arguments is the assumption th�t'ili�s�=�des intejin�t!�f!.hty; they make the world meaningful and comprehensible. T.b� .. Jnt!Qd�cti0I1. �.

f . t �r .IT1� )i�� .r�fl{ity..and.J:bg.J11Qrld. signals _ the _m�ve from._ gu��!ion� _gf �eanJng ..

t�.

q1Jg§. tj.��g�es en: tation .from.cuHvre tQ ideo19gy. After all, there are lots of mearungful ·t�xts {hat do not ne�-;���rily�iaim to describe an actual reality. Much of the time, people assume they know the difference between fact and fiction; although, as we shall see, this assumption is very problematic.

Many meaningful statements explicitly describe a world that is not actual (for example, a world in which a man with super strength and X-ray vision constantly saves the world from bad guys). That world might be one that we can imagine; it might even be one that we assume to be plausible. Or there may be certain features of that world that we take to be descriptive of our own world. For example, we might agree that the legitimate law enforcement agencies need help, or that the difference between the good guys and the bad guys is obvious. Other meaningful texts describe fantasies that people may take to be describ­ ing impossible realities or at least realities that they would not want to see actualized. People experience the world only through the cultural codes of meaning that enable them to interpret or make sense of the world. Yet people are capable of understanding many codes �f me�g that :�ey are incapable of experiencing as possible or even Imagmable realIties.

In other words, certain codes of meaning are not only intelligible, they 194 Ideology are also assumed to be descriptions or possible descriptions of the wor .ld. As descriptions or representations, particular codes appear . ObVlOUS, commonsensical, and even natural. They are assumed to be objective descriptions of how things are and, more often than not, of how things have to be.

The word representation literally means "re-presentation." To � e-pres :,nt somet�ng �eans to take an original, mediate it, and "play It bac� .. But, agam, this process almost necessarily alters the reality of the .ongmal : �ejJ !���� g2!� !DY£l¥.�_�m a\2n � aim on and. allout.. _;e�l,�!y: but It IS not the same as realism. It is not merely a matter of real istIcall � .constructing an imagined world; it is not merely a matter of what cnhcs have called "the willful suspension of disbelief ." In this sense of r� alism, the producer of a text will try to maximize the experi­ ence and Impact of the text on the audience by drawing the audience into the universe that the text has created. Hence, as we have noted films use continuity editing to create the illusion, not that this is the real wor .ld, but that the world the film creates has a reality of its own, a r � alIty that acts in much the same way as the reality of the world out­ SIde the text behaves . Even so-called reality TV is a representation.

The producers use a variety of techniques (such as hand held cameras "confessional" type interviews, or "surveillance camera" type images) to convince the audience that what is presented is unmediated, or at least less m.

ediated than what is on television the r. est O.f . t.h .

e time .

/ .10 make a r e [email protected].!J:¥-t a..b id e.tJ;lIait....QWll. .£ resence in and operation o�lh':._t�t As we have already suggested, a produc �r w�o IS aImmg for realism will avoid editing practices that em phaSIze his or her own interventions; for example, audiences notice such things as jump cuts, when cinematographers and video editors keep � camera a� d subjects in the same position but edit out a portion of a fIlmed or VIdeotaped sequence. They not only notice that some­ thing is missing but are also reminded that the world they are seeing is not "real" because it has been produced. The illusion of realism is broken. And. for just this reason, media producers seek to avoid jump cuts: They aIm for a seamless, involving presentation that draws the au dience's attention into the content. The audience must "forget" for a mo�ent that the text is "just a text" producing meaning: Its realism, whic .h may or may �ot necessitate that the world of the text has specific relations to the audIence's everyday reality, depends on the audience's ability to imagine the actualization of that world.

19 5 MA KING SE NSE OF THE MEDIA two of the author s wer e wat chin g the . firs t For example , whe n 1 d . dwa y thr oug h the mOVI e, as . . 199 0 we were start e ml .

d Bat man mOV 1e � '. .

hen a coll ege studen t sitti ng beh m us Bat man is scal mg a b.Ull dmg ,; 1" U to then , we gue ss, he had found blu rted out, "Cheez,ls that fad ey .

d� a bat costum e an d ho ppin g off I f own- up resse m .

f the portraya 0 a gr .

0 D nni s Mur en the sup ervI sor 0 f tly plaus1b le. r, as e ' .

sky scrapers per ec d .

f e Aca dem y Awar d Win ner spe cial effe cts for Terminato r 2 a.n � SlX- lt m hy Everyone can tell if .

t "Re ality 1S so OUC .

in that catego ry, put 1 , hin . unbe lievabl e, you 've lost the so meth ing isn't real. Once so met g IS " ( t d in Poll ak 1991, p. B2). li .

au dien ce quo e ' h h d is not necessa rily rea stIc, t· on the ot er an, .

Rep resenta lOn, .

1't Real ism as a gen re IS 1 t kin g a claI m on rea 1 y.

alth oug h it is a w �ys sa .

whi ch articula r text s mig ht atte mpt to onl y the most ObV IOUS w ay � kP 1 'm s abo ut real ity. But even .

11 tl at 1S to ma e c al ope rate ide olog�ca y- 1. . k f 11 the Disney ani mated mo vies -can the most fantastic text s-thm 0 a' d I . not a char acteristi c of text s still be effe ctive ideologica lly. Folr 1 teo do gy dl �eplo yed in soci ety.ln?.s1. ar a s ,r th ys they are oca e an . --r- the mse lves but 0) e w at makes a claim about t �e� e!Y }� at its � �,!eXl� g!z���� � � � r;;;;d --; �� ibl�� t T;;;;:'p �W;,t i:.,.i;ieologica 1.

ence l iv es m-a bou t w hat l�!1£LP �� --A-' 1'" f 199 2 "rio ts" erup ted - -� """� � �"""""""'f 11 ing exa mpl e: In pn 0 , Co nsi der the 0 ow C l'f rnia J'ur y acq uitt ed four f Ventura County, a 1 0 , , in Los Angele s a ter a .

f the beating of moto nst .

harges stem mmg rom P oli ce office rs on c .

th nation and many acr oSS V· t lly eve ry per son In e , h' h Rod ney Kin g. lf ua 'd f the beating , in w IC d t dly seen a ho me VI eo 0 h the wor ld, ha repea e .

ff' No one challenged t e 58 r by pol lce 0 lCer s.

Kin g was struck lffies .

ture real eve nts. But to ren der a "tr uth " of the vide otape: l� dId .ca lPh d t inte rpret the reality of the . .

the Kmg tna a 0 .

ver dict, the Jurors m d on them one vers lO n, ting attor ney s pre sse vide otape. The prosecu b lice officers out of con trol; the tha t Kin g wa � sa vag ely. be ;: e; th � �� police offi cers acted reason �b ly defe nse's ver SIOn ofrealit y .

d'ffe ren t ide olog ical artlcu- .

t ces One pIcture, two 1 .

.

und er the Clrcum s an · 1 ,",,..,,t� ... e ..... t�at,,,,.....,r;the ...x�:I£.,���r n ntlOn l ' r But a so no lC . .. - """"' ..... lati ons, two diffe rent rea I Ie �.

1 ". t "-r ath � than as " p�tsl " or \ I", cl..t}:l e e ven ts foll owi ng the tr � .:

:'� .""''''' :r1noillo: �l.&l:b oice,_ , -" .' 71 -"V'e'flci n uon smg -� gn � �e ' . -:; <" "demons tratIons , ,!?r e ......,. ........ ��.� • ..".- ""':" b omm ' g repr esentatlOn; '" _ _ -a r' - tt of meanm g ec --rd�o logy is no t onl y a m a er d ine qual ity Althoug h the h estion of power an .

f h it is als o abo ut t e qu .' d 'th the Fren ch philosop hes 0 t e f 'd 1 gy ong mate WI hil con cept O leo 0 .

t s the Ger man p oso- . tl eighte enth century , I wa .

Enli ghtenm ent m le .

1 M who develop ed the concept In pher and political eco nom Ist Kar arx 196 Ideology its present form. Writing in the nineteenth century, Marx wanted to understand how minorities were able to maintain power and why the vast majority of people accepted a system and even acted in ways the consequences of which seemed to be against their own interests. Why did subordinated populations accept their subordination and even act in ways that continue that status? Quoting Marx (1975), In the social pro.

duction which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which legal and political superstructure arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond, The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life, It is not the conscious· ness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness. (p. 425) Marx is concerned here with simple questions. How do societies maintain and reproduce structures of social difference and power?

Why do some people see themselves as superior and thus justify their privi leged position in society? More important, why do people who are su bordinated accept their subordination? In some societies, hierarchy is main tained through the use of force; you may be surprised to learn that even less than a hundred years ago, factory owners often used force to subdue workers and to compel them to accept their exploitation (Ewen, 1976). Even today, force is often used against illegal immigrants and in many Third World countries . However, most modem democra­ cies eschew the use of force in favor of ideology. If those in power can succeed in constructing a dominant vision that justifies social inequal­ ities, and they can win agreement to this vision, then their position of power is reasonably secure; force becomes unnecessary. The construc­ tion of such a consensus is thus always tied to the particular interest groups that struggle for power in society. �atjon ilFld.:r;ll.ammROIIiI"Q-Q.f,..

such a consensus is called hegemom .

... L�t's take-"iS' e examp e: fu the nineteenth-century American South, the dominant ideology represented Blacks as inferior, often not quite human, beings. To the extent that both Blacks and Whites agreed to this ideology (and notice that this agreement was often unconscious 19 7 , .

t/ ... , "." -' r MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA because it seemed so commonsensical), the system of subordination and subjugation endured. Of course, not everyone-cert ainly not all Blacks and not all Whites-accepted race-based subordination as a nat­ ural fact, and some struggled against it And often force was used to subdue such disagreements. Still, the ideology was largely successful for many decades. Paradoxic ally, this ideology often was more humane in its consequences than less discriminatory ideologies; in treating Blacks as not fully and rationall y human, it allowed for interracial rela­ tionships of a fairly wide range, and it usually protected Blacks as if they were like children. For all of the horrors of this period, then, we should not forget that Northerners who staked out the moral high ground often ended up treating Blacks worse than did southern Whites. Nonetheless, and certainly by today's standards in the United States, any ideology that justifies the enslavement of any human by another is unjustifiable.

I n� th e_c ont erp. P9 rf:1rX,�Qr!f!'.Jh!;_m�g.t' Las�jDY9! y�9j� _t.he gr� duc ­ .!L9n. _oUg�0IQg y.;,a}.Ub����e . After all, they are, as we have suggested, perhaps the most important producers of meaning and the codes of meaning in contemporary society. Furthermore, they are often a central and important part of people's everyday lives. They have the potential, then, to become the site at which meanings become more than mean­ ing. J::Yhen.the .media . become . representations,_when they m�-t.. claims �� . .! bf_"Y.eY_i.il�_ty Qrl91§,=tl�)1 ,b?J;Qm e�p,o.w:exfuLideologkal.jpsjjtu­ , tiOp.s , And they are, therefore, potentially a source of great conflict and struggle.

Almost all media texts, from the news to Evenjbody Loves Raymon d, can be seen as ideological. Although it is true that not all media texts (whether apparently factual news reports or obviously fictional enter­ tainment programs) support the status quo or the power structure, what is often presupposed or taken for granted is a set of relationships that usually do: The dominant codes of the media in the United States, for example, rarely if ever question whether a business enterprise should make a profit or whether politics is defined solely by the elec­ toral system as opposed, for example, to organized protest Similarly, the media seem to regularly present the world in a way that makes assumptions about such things as the primacy of the nuclear family, the necessity of working for wages, and the relative value of various segments of the population; in these media portrayals, these values seem commonsensical, universal, and even unquestionable. That is, 19 8 Ideology the media, like other ideological operators, are constantly hiding the gap between reality and their representations of it. Even alternative media operate ideologic ally. They just may not share the mainstream ideo logy. But ideology cannot be underst ood simply in terms of particu­ lar unrelated acts of representation, or particular unrelated codes of meaning, �pplied to particular events, people, relations, or practices.

It a�ways Involves ways of representing, seeing, and thinking about reality. In Ways of Seein g, John Berger (1972) gives a number of examples of the new ways of seeing the world that characterized the emer�en7e of n:odern society � Europe. Berger points, for example, to artIsts practIce of representIng people with their possessions as a new perceptual system for thinking about the value of individuals.

S�milarly , he points to the ways in which women are represented in VIsual arts (from painting to advertiSing) as the passive objects of an unseen man's gaze. Another example of a "way of seeing" the world touches some of the deepest assumptions about reality in the United States, where the laws, economy, and value system all seem to be centered on the "natural" priority of the individual. Americans tend to see individuals as th� most basic and valued unit of social life. Perhaps this in part explaInS Americans' hostility to socialism, as well as the effectiveness of negative rhetorical appeals that attack social alternatives (from single­ source health care to labor unions) as so�ialist. It might also explain most Americans' suspicion of religious cults, because they are based on the community as the basic unit of social life. Ideologies are not merely particular systems of representation or ways of seeing. � are also ways of excluding and limiting, for they -.l }et the �ounda :ies k on what we gr.Ei:..able to-1lnderstand as I2.Qs��� Ji­ Iaeologles are also not neutral. In defining the terms within which reality is experienced, perceived, and interpreted, they are always arti.cul �ted or connected to the stru ggle of one group or another to �amtam or challenge particular social organizations, particular rela- tIons of power. !s!t; olo gy is,. then, abQyt,tryiug..to...ge.Lpeup!e W.

see..t.be �grl.d. .ac.c.ording.J;f).th. e�h�Lms �code.s ..tl14.t..h�en..selby one or *­ �rou ps of p.:.££l e, Us�illx)hQ.�e who control tb�12Q.wer within' �y. Although some ideological codes are explicitly linked t o polit�cal positions and philosophies (think of the ideologies of com­ mUnIsm and capitalism, or of the Democrats and the Republicans), 199 MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA ideology is a much more pervasive and common feature of social existence . Capitalist societies, for example, need to have people who are willing to sell their labor so that someone else can profit from it. Capitalist ideology needs to have people believe that anyone can be economically successful who is willing to apply himself or herself.

People who "fail" must have something wrong with them. (What must constantly remain hidden is the fact that there are structural inequali­ ties in the system and that the system in fact needs such inequalities.) Similarl y, the two-party system depends upon people's unshakable belief that the two-party system guarantees them a real say in the gov­ ernance of their country. Patriarchy-the assumed superiority of men and the masculine over women and the feminine-requires that all people take as "natural and obvious" that men are stronger, more ratio­ nal, better rulers, natural family heads, and so on. An example of an ideological or taken-for-granted assumption about the natural way of organizing television can be seen in the fact that American television programs are always interrupted by commercials. Whereas Americans find watching this unproblematic and have no problems connecting the segments into a single narrative, people from other cultures often complain that they find it difficult to follow the story and distinguish the program segments from commercials. As we shall see in Chapter 9, ideology is always involved in the way that the media treat various segments of the society.

REALITY AND THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY Reality is a somewhat paradoxical concept because reality is what most people assume exists independently of any concept or repre­ sentation. Reality is what exists, end of discussion. Thousands of years of argument in metaphysics (the theory of the nature of reality) and epistemology (the theory of knowledge of reality) quickly dis­ proves the commonsense assumption that reality is not a problem .

Even if reality is what it seems, however, the question remains how human beings can know and talk about it. The most common theory, and the most commonsensical, a..§§.Umes tha��5..a��itilli1.-2f �riillact? (what actually exists or happens),j.he� .nw:nilll_�jngs..

�t-el-Y-Fercei\Le3uchJ�<;:t� LjiI!d _�h� t _ !��se .pef(;epti?��J an3_�� '")(1(1 Ideology � ac ts they cor e d) � ._: . r: sE.9n to �an be accuratel d 'b even m1rrored .b y th . . " . ��' Y . � sc n f�;L.ca lll ured or _ __ .

e va nous verba ancLv isuaLl -- ' ..

£llllure...E very society assumes that its own g�g1¥! �� of h�man provide the only and m t perceptlOns and languages sorts of realism have twoOS actc flurate representation of reality . These grea aws' They are thn .

cannot explain ' . . e ocentnc and they ffilspercephons halluci t' d' so forth. ,n a lOns, 1sagreements, and A second theory goe b k I PI t h' s ac at east as far as the Greek philos h a 0, w 0, rn The Republic , offered the foIl . op er humans' relationship to realit I' owmg fable to describe been prisoners in a cave h � ' � agrne that some people have always wall. Behind them f ,c arne so that they can only see the back , 19ures move and dance in fr t f f' shadows on the back wall The ri .

on 0 a He, casting cave and never having se�n th �.

soners, havmg never been out of the are real and that they are al� 1f ures l� assume both that the shadows I 0 rea 1ty. Plato was sugg f h peop e confuse appearances (wh' h d h es rng t at I . 1C 0 ave some cau I . d .

re ahon to reality) for reality 't If PI sa or rn eXlcal b 1 se . ato drew an abs 1 t d" .

etween people's experie f h 0 u e IshnctlOn d nce 0 t e world-an experie f .

: er :��::� ::�: S��� dw l�t eh alit tY itself ·d The latter exists b:: n� :::; a�:� , ou an un erstand' f h causal relationship, people are inca b mg 0 t. e nature of this Such a "phenomenal" theor mak pa Ie. of knowrng reality itself.

of reality. y es expenence the other inferior half . A third th e.or y asserts that ��ru.�"l�J1Q t . .rea l....iJ;wml . Errect se � ls rafue r,..th FEQau Gt.ci.h; . . .bM.i. � v" people create and re-create . um .aU ..JJl.¥ £nho o.....,.s omething In this view no independe ( tprOd l� ce � marntaill, repair, and transform).

, n rea 1ty IS ever availabl t h rather, the things that ar t k b e 0 uman beings; e a en to e real are real b h socially constructed, or re resented as r .

eca�se .t ey are .3e� �o be made to mea n. P The cla' h eal.

A�co �drng .to thIS v1ew, ..!E!1 :.. .. , Ir implies that communi J:' . lffi t at realIty IS sOClally constructed chain or sliding of Sig�;' lOn . IS always doubly articulated: First, the . 1ers IS stopped to produce me' d ond, parhcular meanings are th I . anmg, an ,sec- d emse ves articulated to oth .

an events as their representations The ft' h .

er practices ing or significance' the second th HS IS t e production of mean­ of reality And' 'f ,e representation and construction . mso ar as each of thes fl ' from a POSitiO � f - P-;--- -h--·,,- -· ���� � !?ns E.. �� ssible only _ _ wer, t en, the SOCIal co st , f f -----;-.-- always a .-ryocess inex tricab b - 1 t€G � ruc ill.1L.Ql J@ !.UUs- "';-"-_ __ �. ¥_re a . ,....tGl-tn€-re.lati.,Qns f .

s O Clety, l.Jotice that such a theo d . . .. _.2.., p.£��E.2!1_� _ _ ry oes not necessanly imply that there MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA is nothing that is not language or culture, that there is �o materi �l realit y. It does, however, imply that insofar as human be�ngs �xpen­ ence any reality, such reality is alway s the double articulatlOn of culture, an ideo!ogical product.

.

Each of these theories of reality and knowledge offers a dIfferent account of the operation of ideology. Because human existence is always more complicated than its theoretical description, each of them has a certain truth and describes at least certain moments of the rela­ tions of power constructed within and by the cultural and communi­ cation environments in which people live.

A Realistic Theory of Ideology / The most commonly held theory of ideolo gy, �£ aJisLth.e.ru� �de91Qgy _aQ....1 al �� .. <:..on� � � For example � Marx and Engels (1970) claimed that the dominant ideas of a socIety are the ideas of the dominant class. That is, the class that holds power (for example, the capitalist class) attempts to imp�se its .ideas, its �ersion of reality , on the rest of society. These ideas mtentIOnally n:Isrepre­ sent the world, at least from the point of view of the real mterests of the working class. The capitalist class tells the world that it .is the natural order of things that labor power be sold as a commodIty on the market, that the quality of one 's being is measured by one's life, that the family is where one lives out one's real life, and so on. The fact that workers believe them means that, in one way or another (and Marx never quite figured out how), they are brainwa �hed. They are suffering from false consciousness because they are takmg as true knowledge ideas that are false. (This formulation assumes that there must exist true knowledge and that there must be some way to tell the difference.) This theory of ideology also implies that there is a direc� corre- spondence between social position (such as .class me�ber �hIp) an� knowledge and interests. Thus there is something called the mterests of the working class, which can be defined independently of any par­ ticular social struggle and defined solely by the fact that workers sell their labor as a commodity. Moreover, there is a truth that would describe their reality. Simila rly, the capitalist class has its own interests and its own truth. The problem comes when the truth of the capital ist class is universalized and naturalized, then offered as the truth for 202 Ideology everyone, as if it were both the way the world is and the way it has to b e. In other words, ideas, knowledge, and culture are simply a reflec­ tion of the social position of those who produce them. They are not real; they are nothing but the effect of more real and determining social and economic relations.

Such a view of ideology is common in the contemporary world. As we shall see in Chapter 9, it plays a central role in many discussions a b out the politics of identi ty, as when one member of a group accuses an other of having bought into the mindset of the dominant group.

Equally common, some critics of contemporary society assume that the media are consciously and intentionally feeding the population false infor mation and a false set of attitudes about the way the world is and has to be. In fact, some critics assume that, on the basis of the social identity of the producer of a particular text (by which they usually mean the board of directors of the responsible corporation), one can know the ideological bias of a text. Capitalists produce procapitalist texts that intentionally misrepresent reality to the audience for the sake of maintaining their own power. Male-run corporations produce pro­ ma sculine texts that intentionally misrepresent reality to the audience for the sake of maintaining their own power.

Experience and Ideology A phenomenal theory of reality adds a layer to the analysis of ide �log� .

.

gXR�p�n��, al.way �jrL§QID ��n§� J£lLe� 2�J:.�� .ha.�2..� r�ty i.)t always eXIsts at a d Istan ce from reality. And xgte4(Reri�JKg ,/ .h� it§...9o.Wn..s or kru.. tIalth .. 1t is, at the very least, the necessary starting point for any attempt to discover the truth of reality . Experience is the dimension through which human beings live the meaningfulness of their culture. That is, a phenomenal theory emphasizes the fact that hu man beings live in a meaningful world, but it still privileges the real world as if it could be accessed outside of the codes of meaning that define people's experience of it.

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of reality giyes v r..i.sa..to a hllm anistic theo�y 9f.ideology, This theory of ideology emphasizes the more humanistic and less econo mistic side of Marx's (1975) writings. It refuses to reduce culture and knowledge to a mirror image of reality or to a direct effect of some­ thing else; it refuses to ignore the active role of meaning in human life.

Instead, this theory begins with the assumption that people's position 203 MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA in the social world determines their experience of the world through the mediation of the cultural and communication forms that have emerged naturally and au thentically from that positio n. That is, rather than assuming that there is a natural correspondence between social position and truth, a humanistic theory of ideology assumes a natural correspondence between social position, cultural forms, and experi­ ence. First, social position determines experience. By virtue of being working class, a worker is alienated from his or her labor, whether or not he or she knows it. By virtue of being a woman or a person of color , one inevitably has certain experiences of the world. For example, every woman has had the experience of being "sized up" by men, and any person of color has had the experience of being treated differently from White people. Second, left to their own devices, groups produce their own cultural forms and institutions, which accurately express and represent their experience.

However, precisely because these social groups are politically and economically subordinated, their culture is also subordinated to the cultural institutions and forms of the dominant class. The domi­ nant culture tries, through any number of means, to replace and dis­ place the authentic culture of the subordinate. It may simply drive or crowd their institutions out of business in the name of profit, in the way that the record and radio industries basically defeated and erased the music hall tradition of the working class. It may marginal­ ize the cultural products and practices of the subordinate groups by constructing them as unworthy of serious consideration, or of social support. It may castigate them as vulgar, profane, obscene, dangerous, and even unpatriotic. Or it may appropriate them by making them a part of the dominant cultural codes so that these authentic expressions of subordinate experience are transformed from a challenge to the dominant values into a reaffirmation. This is called recuperation. For example, during the protests against the Vietnam War, dominant news media reporting on demonstrations would often emphasize that the very fact of such protests confirmed the unique privilege (freedom) of American society. In the process, the actual object of the protest (for example, the war in Vietnam or the disproportionate number of Blacks serving in the armed forces) was forgotten or ignored (Gitlin, 1980).

The result of this contest between an authentic culture and a dominant culture is that the subordinate group's ability to express and 204 Ideology represent its authentic experience is negated . The dominant culture misrepre sents and redefines others' experience. Thus the subordinate group comes to experience the world in the codes of the dominant group; its experience is made inauthentic because of the mediating power of cultural or communicative codes. While the truth of knowl­ edge (as an authentic relation to the world through experience) and ideological misrepresentation are still at stake, the key terms are no longer truth and reality but experience and culture.

The correspondence that such a theory assumes-a correspon­ dence between one's position in and perspective on reality , experi­ ence, and cultural forms-is reflected in the assumption that there is a structural homology or parallelism that operates and can be read across these diverse dimensions. It is as if, everywhere one looks, one sees a particular message that can be taken to describe the structure of culture and experience, whether the authentic or the dominant.

For example, consider Raymond Williams's (1992) discovery of the structure of mobile privatization. Mobile privatization, in its simplest terms, defines a structure in which the individual avoids the hostile world by retreating into the privacy and safety of the home. The outside world is beamed into the home via the mass media; no longer do individuals need to foray out into the world to gather information. Williams argues that this "structure of feeling" describes at least a significant part of the culture and experience of contemp orary life and that it can be read from a wide range of texts and aspects of the mass media.1 Social Constructionism and Ideology -'22!.h.. ��� ��l.l�.2rt.�Q).g g�m tbilLl��glQK¥�.i§..llt�9,m� VC" j�D§�Qi§tQX,tio.n.Qt.£.Qrr�c!a2.1�misJ;�t.ese.ntatiQn Qf.realily. In the end, ideology is a kind of bias operating within culture and knowledge. But social :?� ::,� i,���� ?e::!.�� �,�t th :: :,}s a � !� ,?�� r���,� t- srcreor representatIons that wouFdatiow one to measure the truth or .... ) �,9!.����tio ns. lOe'010 gy IS n m-�mas''''oecaiis' e-rf carmO'tb� -;

� er. Phenomenal theories of reality that contrast it to "mere appearance" assume that people (or at least the critic or scholar) have at some level an unmediated (nonideological) experience of the world 205 MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA that can serve as a normative yardstick against which to judge specific ideologies.2 People live within the systems of representation; they experience the world according to their codes of meaning. There is nothing outside of them that allows them to measure or judge their truth. Ideologies, then, are the systems of meaning within which people live in reality or, to put it differently, live their relationship to rea lity. They define how people experience the world, what they take for granted. Ideologies define what is taken to be common sense; the truth of ideological state­ ments appears obvious and even natural. But people are often unaware of many of these ideological codes, because the codes are unconscious and often unchallengeable.

If realist theories deny experience any significance, and humanis­ tic theories make experien�e into the privileged access to truth, a social constructionist theory argues that experience itself is what ideology produces. It suggests that the most powerful and important effect of ideological representations is that they construct our most fundamen­ tal and basic experiences of the world. When Richard Nixon and even Robert Kennedy went hunting for Communists in the 1950s, they hon­ estly saw such figures everywhere and viewed them as a real menace.

Th ere was no way to argue against this ideology by appealing to some experience outside of another ideology. In other words, an ideology is self-contained and nonfalsifiable.

Th e twentieth-century French philosopher Louis Althusser (1970) was the leading proponent of such a theory of ideolo gy, arrived at, he argued, by bringing the insights and arguments of semiotics and struc­ turalism to bear on the question of ideol ogy. Althusser defined ideology as the systems of representation in which people live out their imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existenc e. Notice: What is at stake here is not people's relations to reality but their relationship to a rela­ tionship. What is this imaginary relationship if not people's already meaningfully interpreted relations to the world? To put it simply , there is no way out of experience. Experience is the beginning and end of ideolo gy. It is the world in which human beings always exist, and it is the product of ideological experiences.

If this theory is accurate, then it would seem to follow that the more obvious the truth of an experience is and the more certain people are of that truth, the more ideological that experience is. Consider the following analogy: Two people are talking. Person A says that his arm 206 Ideo logy is brok en. Perso n B say s tha t it is not Onl ".

of fact . (Ev en jud gme nts of s h .

Y on e IS ngh t m this matt er u c rna tte rs of fac t' 1 p ow ��. As Mic hel Foucault [1973] has de mvo ve rela tions of me dlc me is partly a hi t f mo nstrate d, the his tory of s ory 0 the reorg . .

ex ampl e, Who has the . aru zation of power: For P pow er to dIag nose su h thi n ers on A ha d sai d tha t he '. c gs?) But suppos e The re is an obv ious p robl e:� m pabm , and B ha d cha llenged this claim.

f· ere , eca use Pers on A d a exp en enc e an d not fact.

rna e a stat em ent i1 .

. ' w e ass um e tha t pe 1 d ege d emp mcal acc ess to th . op e 0 have some priv- th elr OWn exp erie n I at I see red, although l b' ceo canno t be mis taken th y, ca n e mIs taken that th .

ere . et a con stru ctionist th f .

ere IS somethi ng red . eory 0 Ide Olog y J ust such exp erie ntia l stat seems to sug gest tha t em ent s, stat em ents th t sec ure , are in fact the most ide olo gical.

a see m to be the most Ho w doe s this produ ction of ex .

ind iVidual s into its signify in s per �enc e Wo rk? 1t '"Y0 rk� b.r E.u � � ore or t� � e�r; sI ' O �� ��;' a w �y as to make them of th . .

ns, m IVlU uals b � = ....-- _ ... __ � .ow n exp erie nces Yo k �-"- .. - --_� co �Jti ut1io rs . � .--.; .... . u now when you " " � IS, yo u aut hor ize yo"li'rown .

t . see a re d car. That th m erp reta tlOn as the t th b e SOu rce and aut hor of th t ru ecause you are I deol ogy works in J'ust thO e s al teme �� and hence of the experie nce IS way t pos lho .

d' . .

of the ir ow n ide ologica l st t . ns m IVldu a1s as the subjects P 1 b a e me nts and hence f th .

! eo p e�e them$e 1ves to b th b' 0 err exper iences .

ill L t ."� .e e ar Iters of an . lac construct ed b �id 1 ·' 1 =r -""':� ex pen ence that is thi --- - -,,-� eo ogi ca codes Alth us - (19 ;7"-'''' ..... _ s pro cess as inte rpellation " fu t 11--: ser 0) des crib es as si lm in d" d 1 .. . _ erp-�_ ahQn '§ ig.go Qg, y� �h;I;�, � � J.��,<� s to S �gt IC ositio ns with in' = -� L t� � lOhc 2 renr es enta tio,n"' !of: � . 'l":""""t ---....... --. I1 s 02:' n co mm unic ative f -- �� i,Ij.�- ;..:xzP�� � �. u.eg l � ��'r � We can further exp licate this rath er d' .

.

two expe rim ents Fir st p' k IffI cult nohon by sug gesting t .

" IC up someth ing th t en In the first-person sing ul h a Someo ne else has writ- I � s� �ak� a Du d. Yo u will find th at you b' . . r or a rep ort. Now rea d it y ou fee l yo urs elf living wh t theg m to Iden hfy with the I in the text, that a e perso n who Wr t 't l' s ee ms to becom e par t of y h- 0 e 1 lVe d, and that it Thr h ou, or ra t er you see m t b . aug an ide ntif icat ion with the I .; b ' 0 ecom e par t of it.

Ide nti .ty, but , of Cour se, this will onl '� egms to bec ome part of your Wh at IS goi ng on. y e te mp orary bec aus e you know . Now, try a seco nd exp erim ent· The .

I m agi ne tha t the worl d tha t' .

next tJme yo u go to a mov ie th at you are in it. As k yo lif s rehPre sen ted on the sc ree n is real and Th' k urs e W ere are you st d' In abo ut your field f ' . a n mg in tha t w orl d a VISIOn, what you can and .

ca nnot see; MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA that will pretty clearly define where you are. Then, ask yourself if you could be standing anywhere else. Even if you can imagine other positions, you will still be unable to actu ally put yourself in them; you remain firmly rooted where you are. Why? You are positioned by the camera. Because the camera that filmed the scene is your only source of information about the world of the movie, you are basically forced to identify with the camera and to be in the place it defin es for you . Films represent a reality that does not exist outside the film. Viewers experience it according to the way they are positioned in relation to what appears on the screen. They can see only what the camera shows them. More important, in most commercial Hollywood films, the camera never violates people's sense of their perceptual position in the world by showing them something that it would be impossible for them to see. They cannot see what is going on behind a wall or in another place or behind their backs. The camera may turn around, but it must always do so in predictable ways that do not violate the viewers' sense of where they are standing in relation to the film 's worl d. These two experiments illustrate the process of interpellation. Interpellation literally means "putting into the space." Theorists use it to describe the way in which different codes-the codes of language or the codes of the cinema, for example-place people into particular positions that define their subjectivity and experien ce of the world. It is a bit like walking down the street and hearing some­ one say, "Hey you." You turn around thinking that perhaps they have called to you . In that instance, you have been hailed and posi­ tioned -interpellated by that single simple utterance. Interpellation makes the individual into a subject (a speaker of language) responsi­ ble for every word that he or she speaks and for the reality that these words imply. Return to the image in Chapter 5 of a game of musical chairs: Meaning is created when the moving signifiers stop moving, and some signifiers slide below others into the chairs, taking on the function of signifieds. Interpellation answers the question of why the music stops. The individual speaker stops the music; it is his or her apparent intention that creates the meaning. To put it another way, it is the I who is both inside and outside of langu age that draws the line between the signifier and the signified . (See Box 7.1, "Interpellation and Advertising .") 208 pellation and Adver tising � os �t of advertisements ran on television a few years ago f mod ;1\J rClse equipm ent. One advertisement featured an a Ideology . \ another an attractive female model Both v O lceo e\� nd Imager A . .

co " :d y. vOlceo ver would intone "Th' ��� �:nt n�� n� �� ec ���- �fh shot of a finely mu �cle ] f.. ��� :Jv:� � shoulders ' '0 t " er body parts suc �/� 'our leg" "your . ' ur s omach, and end with "This I. " ' pan led by a m-shot of the m d If' 0 be you accom- was the close t advertisement � e rom the w ta .

This final image was the only ti e saw the pers ��Se f� oc ! hOW e enti re model , and . What we wo I e to focus on here i t ,i.. .

Interpellation by th ertiseme t li I . s e .4 licit use of Ideological rem inds us that ide 0 . s n.

e eVlsl n ' olar Mimi White (1992) are systems ret t' to construct individua so 'I b' " sen a Ions that "function and recognition of one ' v cia su Je 's, ntributing to the production , . sense o f> d ty" (p 169) N Ing Impli citly hails the au 'e bt l,. , " ow, all advertis- "This could be you " What t ' u I I . vertlsement was more explicit:

to the hailin g and �ays i�Pli 't � e, If an audience member responds . h ' ould be me"? I th IS t e ad asking you to do?

WH . ' n 0 er words, what is "you ," who are you? Wh�t t s sklng you to believe or value? If this world, one's place in it an 0 umptlons does one make about the At its most basic, to y" t ets thln�: don.e?

mean that one is or ide fie th b' � be me �o thiS particular ad could d isposable income, It oul, ean t� at Ite, middle class, with a certain sonalit y, intelligenc Int aJiity d values appearance over per- one's body and 0 , 'I i '7 ' an , so .

\ could mean that one sees to work on my a ' IS a conti nuing ie'c t to be worked on ("I need d ' i ' a so on my relatio . � and an on my ed ati nd ") It Id ,o n my decora ting; ally based a �h, of �h�t i ' cou , mea one buys into a cultur- ness of th 'Po ,� but their b:�� n�ld� red at I\e: not only the white- Gould me n;tl ne buys into the' a �. of bo ifr and so on. And it proble (in case the proble � o lon l tha� p. �ng things solves li ev i'" interpe llates its aUd m 0 not ooklng Ii models) .

d' lence In many way , II IreG ad s. We are hailed as " " eCla y through b d you or perhaps as p " " ' ro c ,�, game shows talk shows a d we In news 1 � � e a h 'I d ' , n across the um (Aile a hd ' as ,;� al e when a television host looks directly n, 10 ' I 0 us. Each of these instances can be viewed a �0.l . ��� li� � ta aUs �� �c�s ��� :� � ���i� the lerms of refere nce l)i�lng us to value? What is It 'k' IS It asking us to bel ieve?

W ho bene fits if we ' see the w�r� d l� h�S u�: �� O? And , final ly, we shou 209 MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA In this way, by having reporters "embedded" with the troops during the second Iraq War, and reporting live from the battlefront, the Pentagon sought to interpellate the audience by increasing the audience 's identif ication with the troops (and therefore with the war effort itself) by placing them in the shoes of a person in combat.

Positioning the audience in this way makes them feel more directly a part of the war itself. The reality of the war that was presented was that as experienced by some of the U.S. troops, and not the reality of others (such as the Iraqi troops or civilians, or diplomats, or others).

If ideologies are somehow linked to particular power relations and interests, then it appears that one has to assume that ideolo gies somehow distort reality for the sake of the interests of those in power .

Returning to the example above, it is in the interest of capitalists to con­ struct an ideology of the free market of labor , but such a market does not actually exist, or so it would seem. But, according to social con­ structionism, an ideology is not a biased view of a reality that can be described outside of ideology. This problem is known as myst ification.

Ideology mystifies in two Wqys. First, Kg�C �l!se an ideology pre-s en E li �I f� h�§ �1 ;��- u ;� §1,j J hi Q��) t� co nn��trQn !Q Thti;;.k ests', of particular �9cial grolJPS QLPow�r.blocs in society. By making th� labor market, as it functions in capitalis n;.:'�p pea;: 'to be the only rational and natural form of labor , for example, the ideolo gy of capi­ talism hides the ways in which this particular form of the labor mar­ ket exploits workers for the benefit of capitalists. Second, }deolo�y !£.. !E.ysttiY1I2g"p _r �s!� eIL ��������'?�� ,�h�!��U ty"llJ_�. res en ts .

For /fexamPle, the ideology of patriarchy represents women as the weaker sex and thus continues the privileged position of men in society, Precisely because of the commonsensical nature of this ideological I representation, parents often treat boys and girls differently. Boys will . be encouraged to participate in activities that augment their streng th, and they are allowed to be rough, whereas girls will be guided toward \ more passive pursuits. Or consider a different example: Marx (1977) said that the major figure of capitalist ideology is the commo dity, something made to be sold. Capitalist ideology represents everything , including labor, as a commodit y. Through the power of this ideology , everything in capitalism -including workers-becomes a commodity, The mystification arises not because things are not commod ities (they are) but because they need not be. In a differ ent ideo logy, such as the communism Marx envisioned, labor need not be rewarded on 210 Ideology the basi s of its valu e, but o� the basis " hum ane life. of peo ple s reqU Iremen ts for a Or, to retu rn to the questio n of at' diff eren t syst em of child ' p narchy , one can imag ine a , reanng that would h dIsp rove the app arently natu I d 'f'e ' amo ng ot er thin gs, ra I ler ence s betw een th B new system woul d not actu 11 d' e sexes. ut this a y Isprove patriarchy h patr iarchy with a diffe rent ' so muc as rep lace whic h wou ld in turn crea te .� onstructlO� or rep resentation of reality, I s ow n real Ity.

IDE OLO GY AND ST RU GGL E One need not choose amo ng thes e theo ries f' , see n to have different uses Th . I 0 IdeologIes, for each can be . e SocIa constructi . t h the broa d terr ain on whic h " oms t eory describes a SOC Iety s COrnrnun' ti actively dete rmine bot h the tru tur f ' Ica on and cultural life s ce o SOC Ial r I ti h' their relat ionship to the worl d. Still 't h r ea ons IpS (power) and ations in which ideology b ,las Ittle to say abou t spe cific situ- eco mes a more c ' struggle, A humanistic theory f'd 1 onsclOUS and explicit site of attempt s on the part of sub or:in �t: � ���e .s�ribes the. struggle between life outside of the cont rol of the dom ' n�es . to defme a part of their ity to which they a�sig n d' ma�t maJ.on ty, a space of authentic- a Irect relationship t th ' b ' It also desc ribes som e of the r ( . 0 elf su ordmation. �:�=: ::a�� O!:� e�,,: �rii� ; et ��:��t:

S d:� �� ;�� a:�:;: :o:�� conc erned with the way dornm ' ti' , rnm� IOn. Both of these theories are a on IS achI eved and ' .

the cons truction of a cult ur 1 , mamtamed through , a consensus usmg the f cation, But neith er the ory add h ' ,means 0 cornrnuni- . resses t ose SItuations wh th '. con sensus IS prec arious enou gh that it b '. ere e eXIs ting expl icit ideolog ical war that often cons .ca nl ���m tamed only by an enc e. A reali st theo ry of ide 1 . ft CIOUS Y IssIrnulates to the audi­ political economi c battl es (f� ogy IS 01 en u�ef�l for describing explicitly . r examp e, capItalism vs co ') , A SOCIal constru ctionist theory maintains th . , rnrnunlsm , mvqlve s pra ctices of artic ulation, In Cha ter 5 at Ideology always , eve nt or med ia pro duc t ca n have multi 1 p " We a:gued that any The same media produ ct ca b d P e m�anmgs or lOterpretations. , n e rea as telllOg a n b f d' stones, We argu ed that m . um er 0 Ifferent , , " eanlOg was produced blink' ' mg SIg nifle rs, sign s, or texts, Sim ilarl � 109 or arhc ulat- num ber of diffe rent stories about real '� ' the reb exls t at ��y mom ent a 1 y or a out speCIfIc events that 211 MAK ING SENSE OF THE MEDIA occur. Ideology is then the product of a double articulation: First, a text is articula ted to a certain meaning, and then a meaning has to be artic­ ulated to reality to become an ideological code. Consider any govern­ ment scandal (from Watergate to Irangate to the latest one): Every sc andal elicits a number of stories, each of which seems to make sense of the "fact s." Each version has different consequences, and each is related to dif ferent political interest groups. For example, Watergate was a scandal of the corruption of a small group within the Republican Par ty; Wa tergate was a phony scandal invented by Democrats to embar­ rass the Republicans; Watergate was a sign of the corruption that has become pervasive in American politics; Watergate was a "nonevent," no dif ferent from the way politics has ever been conducted.

Notice that it does make a dif ference which of these stories becomes the accepted one, which becomes "knowledge" that most Americans share. It is this struggle to make specific meanings and stories into ta ken-for -granted representations of reality that defines the struggle over ideology. If articulation describes the way specific meanings can be attached to specific signs or text s, it also describes the way a part ic­ ular set of meanings can be linked to mat erial or nond iscursive prac­ tices and events. Remember the example of the Trobriand Islanders, who believed that sex has nothing to do with reproduction: As a story , it can be humorous and entertaining to We sterners; but, as an ideol­ ogy , that story had been successfully articulated to reality so that the islander s actually experienced the world in its terms.

The question of how reality is represented, the choice between di fferent stories or pictures of reali ty, is not random. Nor is the decision freely made by each individual in isolation. Individuals do not get to decide that reality is this way, even though the rest of the world dis­ ag rees with them. The construction of a socially shared representa tion of reality is always implicated in society 's attempt to repr oduce its own existence and to ensure the continued viability of the pa rticular relations of power characterizing that society.

On the other hand, although one ideology (or mor e accurat ely, an ideological formation, because it is composed of nume rous state­ ments that might not fit seamlessly together) is usually dominant, there are alway s compe ting stories about events and reality in a socie ty. The dominant ideology defines the taken-for-granted or com monsense real­ ity of the vast majority of people in the society. How does this work?

Ideology can be effective only if it appears to be unque stionably true, 212 Ideology to be so obvious and natural that an rati to its inte rpretations. Recreatio nal d� fonal human would assent demonized by contemporary .gs, . or example , have become conservatIve Ideolo . d . . the common sense of A" gIes, an mcreasmgly men can SOCIety To stand d tain drugs to argue that th . up an speak for cer- led to beli�ve seems a1m ety . are no � the evil force that we have been , os ImpossIble Inde d th d '. mar ijuana is quite clear in th db ' e, e emoruzatlOn of medicinal purposes In this :a e ates .a � o� t the use of marijuana for of reality become b� th natu I y, ;pec �c Ideological representations ideology assume that any r:� o�: l b �ver sal. Those living within an sense perceptions; if they do t th emg wo�ld shar e their common- h no, en something must b . t em. The construction of "welf are " e wrong WIth cheat the American public 'd qf ueens as lazy parents out to . provI es a urther exam Ie. There are always multiple ideol ' '. p . is not quite the same as s . ogles WIthin any gIven socie ty. This aymg, as we did in Ch t 5 always many meanings t' F . ap er ,that there are or s ones. or an Ideolog . h It is a representation An'd I . Y IS more t an a story: . � �� eo Qg }{-e mb.o� t� la· b .

/. group that th;" _mearun ' g.o t . -�JrrL�y.<-'i,FiJfh rul r .' �= ... H!"" - � ll: S ory. ....re presen t li hI C olo gies are always in co 'h't :' -". '���_§. •. I� -u' onseq uently, ide- mpe IOn WIth each oth Th ' strugg le bet wee n ideo logies to ach ieve dorrun' eInr. here IS alw ays a b ance, t at sense I cannot e seen as passive "d "h ' peop e opes w 0 unkno .

I ' by a single dominant ideology B }. , wmg yare marupula ted how reality will or must be re' ecause t tere IS no Sure way to establish in the struggle over ideolo presen :e ,d, peop �e ar � �onstantly involved tells a story about wh hig�· The Bnhsh medIa cntIc Stuart Hall (1985) en s young Son wa I .

simultaneously something ab t hi 's e,arnmg the colors and ou sown Idenhty Th 1 understand why he was "bl k" b ' ,e Son cou d not ac, ecause m fact h b particular color has been arti ' , ,e was rown, But a color carries with it a parh' clulat ed tOf a part �cular social identity That cu ar set 0 meanmgs ' In Wi these are largely negative, as in black rna ' . estern cultures, of black at funerals And th . glC, black humor, the wearing . ese mearungs a . d . tion, This articulation is t re carne mto the articula- ralizes and legitimat es thPe ar band d.p ar �el of a rac ist ide ology that natu- su or mahon of Bl k B H out that one of the most i ac s, ut all also points the ideological struggle torr;:: :::;::����t �l��� �e civi ,l right s �t ruggle was tions and to reartic ulate it to a ", rom ItS negatIve connota­ Or consider another example 07� :e p �ItI�e .Image: "Black is beautif ul." the authors were owin ear cu ahon of color and race: When labeled flesh TOd: r y that g ulP , �ne of the crayons in the Crayola box was . co or IS peach. 213 I 'I ')t MAK ING SENSE OF THE MEDIA les hetween competing i� .Q!Q gi�1 ' Cul ture m' volves cons�ilnt stf1 ,l.gg _._,�l.( �.,, __ �_�_"._ -" � � = qo ple ' �.,,,- 1... ..l::-to Selmeft't9 .. .. _. r'" ' . :-:-- " ---r - to gain the l!p.p.er �J?laRl:t, . , , ' . _ ' co de��9S . �t.t�IEP . m�·' __ -=·"� -f-:- ts par h'cular meanings, to expenenc - - - ''' = .

Id terms 0 1 into seemg the wor m l' 1 format ions are not as coher ent ing the world in its ter�s. I� eo o� Ica f y have made it appear. As and systematic as the dISCUSSiOn t U.S Gar rna . (1971 ) argued common .

d'f Antomo ramsCi h, ...... � •. _, _ ..., the Italian journalist an . cn IC e On the contra ry, it is made up of _ s e ns � �� ysJ:.¥mat !S str 1.!<; � '';'_ 'd " � eiSta'llii l!!8L ass limp tions .' � tradicto f�gm�ll � Lme � g ... an_fr' an"'· n� ber of dif ferent ' . �- �lrl �h � so,... ;ph r ;�h eIlts om :V ' __ . ..-, ._ b !Lth ��bUfu,. ' '''''''''''''J-M JMh'� �-",w, .......... . f kn ledge jl.....,Q1l . . - remember where these bItS 0 ow sources.

Often, no one can bl' h d They are now , as Grams ci h . truth was esta IS e .

ongma ted or how t eir . try' we have lost the ability to h traces without an mven 0 , bl describes tern, d hy they seemed so reasona e remember where they came from an w at some time.

. f articular text need not be deter- Thus the ideologiCal effects 0 a p arrative One can watch h t t I'ty of the program or n .

mined only by teo a I t f the films unacceptable and .

find many aspec so . '1 the Batman mOVIes, h h t finding notions of Vigi an- I' f b t leave t e t ea er .

certainly unrea IS iC, U f h l'ce strongly articulated (or rearlic- tism and the incomp etence 0 t e Ps? 1 '1 I consider the Ram bo films:

. , mon sense. Imi ar y, ulated) m one s com .

hole one might argue that at least Looking at the narrat Ive a� a 1 w .

'f the movies makes the federal one possible ideological arhcu athiOn .0 bably not the most common .

t th enemy But t at IS pro d gover nment moe '.

h' h ere more likely linke to . 1 ff t of these mOVIes, w IC w .. ..

ide ologlca e ec d . d' 'dualism and even JIngOIstIc various notions of violence an :;n :; IDay displaced the Cold War pat riotis m. More recently , In d� en he my as the feared Other into .

by relocatmg t e ene k fear of comm umsm . f' .

f the 1950s one can as B .

the SCi-1 mOVIes 0 , outer space. ut, as m th ts facing the United States f' l . eally about new rea wh ether the 1 m IS r .. h ested less about particu- .

some cntIcs ave sugg , here on Earth or IS, as h d to reassert a strong sense of iden- .

nd more about t e nee t the la r enemIes a . th face of political challeng es 0 tity against a commo � ene�?

I: nd edi ffe rences. To put it simply , is the established system of Idenhh �s b t alien species really a ba cklash . I f sci fi mOVIes a ou C Id current reVIva 0 - .. ts and the end of the 0 . . fracism new Imml gran , against femmlsm, an 1M ' . Black films seem to und ermine any ') 0 the other hand, the en In Wa r. n . iformly threatening others.

abilit y to represent alIens as u� t ublic spectacles presents a One of the most int�re �tmg �ece ; tl � complexity of ideol ogical good opportunity for thinkmg a ou 1 714 Ideology stru ggle and the differen ces betwee n the theorie s of ideolog y we hav e disc ussed her e. On Aug ust 31,1997, Diana, Prin cess of Wa les, was kille d in an aut omob ile acc ident in Par is whil e flee ing with her lover fro m the pap arazzi. The w orld media cover age was unri valed, and the pub lic resp onse unp recedented. Over a bill ion peo ple watched the funer al; milli ons of peo ple sent flowers or wai ted for hou rs to sign bo oks of cond olen ces from all Ove r the Wor ld. The death of Dia na, the "peo ple's pri nces s," w as the occasio n for a wor ldwide collective act of pub lic and private mOurning.

Let us beg in by conSide ring how each of the three theorie s of ideo logy migh t be use d to enli ghten Our und erstanding of this event.

An ideolo gica l rea list might inte rpre t this event as anot her medi a spe ctac le that distr acts public attenti on from the seriou s proble ms of co ntem porary SOC iety by fOcusin g on the life of anot her me mbe r of the rich and famou s. Af ter all, Dian a's world wide cel ebrity was itsel f a co nstr uction of the med ia. Dia na's ima ge as the people's prin cess is fa lse con scio usness, beca use, in real ity, she was a wea lthy mem ber of the ruli ng elite who used mos t of her time and money in con spicu ous co nsu mpt ion of exo rbit antly pric ed desi gner fash ion.

A hu man istic theoris t mig ht talk abo ut the ritual aspe cts of her life and her death. Beg inning with her marri age and ending, for the mo ment, with her funeral , Dian a's enti re life and image as Prin cess of Wa les was a med ia ritu al cele brating all sorts of com mon values and drea ms. Like the mythic Cindere lla, the fairy tale that was Prin cess Diana's marriage reaf firmed our faith in lov e, mar riage, and the app ar­ e ntly happy end ing suggested by the myth that Prince Cha rming is wait ing around the corner for every woman . Dian a's life reaff irmed Our belief in the imp ortance of compa ssion, cha rity, and, in the con­ te mpo rary polit ical clim ate, volu nteeris m. But the events leading up to her divorce and her death wer e a spe ctac le of anot her orde r, reaf ­ fir min g Our Worst fears abo ut dysf unct ional mar riages, uns upp ortive fa milie s, and the victimizatio n of wo men in con tem porary society.

The social con structi onist migh t m ake a nu mbe r of obs ervatio ns.

F irst, he or she might rais e the question of Dia na's rela tion Ship to con ­ te mpo rary notions of roy alty and the pOwer of the monar chy in con tem ­ pora ry Briti sh life. Dia na's dea th see ms to hav e cha llen ged the mon archy in new and power ful ways that threaten to either refo rm or end its powe r. Sec ond, a soci al con structio nist might wa nt to inquire into the gro und s for the very real and power ful emotio nal identif ication with MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA Diana that marked the worldwide response to her death. Psychia trists reported that women patients talked about her life and death as public parables about the changing nature of life for women in contemporary societ y, from eating disorders to abuse. Finally, the social constru ctionist could use Diana 's lif e and death to talk about the changing nature and role of celebrity in the media; how the traditional and tabloid press are implicated in the development of the paparazzi and journalists who spend their lives stalking celebrities to provide the apparently insatiable demand for coverage. Are these changes in the media themselves related to other aspects of contemporary definitions of enterta inment and news, and the blurring of the distinction between them?

The question remains, Where is ideology produ ce d? Where is it found ?

Where are the struggles over ideology taking place? The answer is simple: wherever language, culture, and media are found . For it is in the ���"""""-..

shared culture of a society that ideology resides. And as the media have gro�wn to be ·the mosHmportari.f arld-vfSlble cultural institutions of the societ y, they have become the most important ideological battlefield .

It is in the media that one finds not only the dominant ideology-from which people learn the commonsense view of reali ty-b ut also subor­ dinate ideologies struggling to change that commonsense view.

NO TES 1. In fact, Williams discovers this structure through an ana lysis of the econom­ ics, technology, and cultural forms of television.

2. See Marx's Das Kapital (Capital, 1977), where he describes ideology as a necessary misrepresentation.

SUG GESTED READINGS Al thusser, L. (1971 ). Lenin and philosophy, and other essays (B. Brewster, Trans.).

London: New Left Books.

Berger, J. (19 72). Ways of seeing. London: Penguin.

Gramsci, A. (1971 ). Selec tions from The prison notebooks (Q. Hoare & G. Nowel l­ Smith, Trans.). New York: International Publishers.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (19 72). The German ideology. New York: Interna tional Pu blish ers.

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