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\\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 1 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY, BORDER SECURITY, AND MIGRANT DEATHS: AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF LIFE-SAVING EFFORTS UNDER THE BORDER SAFETY INITIATIVE* ROB T. GUERETTE Florida International University Research Summary:

Subsequent to U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) efforts to control illegal immigration throughout the 1990s, concern arose over an apparent increase in deaths of illegal migrants as they began to undertake more treacherous routes to enter the United States from Mexico. In response, the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) was created to increase safety along the southwest border. Using multiple data sources, including the USBP BSI Incident Tracking System, this study evaluated the impact of life- saving efforts performed under the BSI program. Results indicate that there has been no overall reduction in the rate of migrant deaths since BSI has been in operation. However, an evaluation of BORSTAR search and rescue teams and the 2003 Lateral Repatriation Program (LRP), which returned apprehended migrants from Tucson sector to less hazardous places along the border, were found to be effective in preventing migrant deaths.

Policy Implications:

Critics of U.S. immigration policy claim that the only way reductions in migrant deaths along the U.S.–Mexico border can be achieved is through liberalization of immigration policy and relaxing of border security. Yet, for more than a decade, U.S. policy makers have increased restrictions on immigration and have tightened security at the borders. Considering this, alternative means must be deployed in order to save migrant lives in the near term rather than waiting for a reversal of immigration policy. This study suggests that proactive life-saving measures implemented through a harm-reduction strategy can have some impact on saving migrant lives.

* Part of this research was supported through a project administered by the Border Research and Technology Center, a program of the National Institute of Justice. Points of view or opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. The author would like to thank Ronald V. Clarke for his assistance and guidance on the project. VOLUME 6 NUMBER 2 2007 PP 201–222 R \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 2 28-MAR-07 6:26 202 GUERETTE KEYWORDS: Migrant Death, Illegal Immigration Policy, Border Deaths, Border Patrol, Border Security Throughout the last few decades, the United States has faced increasing problems of foreign nationals entering the country illegally in hopes of benefiting from abundant economic opportunity. In response, the U.S.

Border Patrol implemented several operations in select border areas designed to prevent and detect illegal entries. 1 The purpose of these oper- ations was to close off routes most frequently traveled by migrants and smugglers so that they would (1) be deterred from entry, (2) shift their attempts to ports of entry where inspection is systematic, or (3) alter their routes to more remote terrain where Border Patrol agents would have the tactical advantage (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2001). In terms of altering migration routes, these operations seem to have been successful (Eschbach et al., 2001; GAO, 2001; Reyes et al., 2002).

In the wake of tightened border security, some border watchers called attention to an apparent increase in deaths as migrants sought out more treacherous routes to enter the United States undetected. Although it was expected that changes in traffic patterns would occur, an increase in migrant deaths was not (GAO, 2001:24). Since the year 2000, more than 300 migrant deaths are recorded along the border each year and it is believed many more perish but remain unfound. Citing these deaths, many criticized U.S. legislation and heightened border security calling for the reversal of immigration policy in the name of saving migrant lives. In response to these concerns, the then Immigration and Naturalization Ser- vice (INS) created the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) on June 16, 1998, which directed the United States Border Patrol (USBP) to increase safety along the border zone.

Rather than relaxing border security, BSI operations have focused on increasing border safety through adoption of a proactive harm-reduction strategy that resembles recent trends in community/problem-based polic- ing (Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Specifically, the BSI program sought to reduce deaths primarily through the use of educational campaigns informing would-be migrants of the dangers of crossing in remote areas, provisions of life-saving equip- ment and training for line agents, and through search and rescue opera- tions performed by Border Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) teams. The BSI program also carried out a repatriation program in the summer of 2003, which relocated apprehended migrants from the Tucson 1. Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego sector and Operation Safeguard in the Tucson sector, 1994; Operation Rio Grande Valley in south Texas, August 1997. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 3 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 203 area to less treacherous places along the Mexican border. To date, how- ever, it is unclear whether these efforts have been successful in preventing deaths among illegal immigrants. This study examines the impact of life- saving operations carried out under the BSI program. RESEARCH BACKGROUND For the past two decades, U.S. policy makers initiated consecutive poli- cies that led to increased fortification along the southwest border and more restrictive immigration laws. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the 1990 Immigration Reform Act, and the 1996 Ille- gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act have all sought to prevent illegal immigration. 2 Although several theories offer to explain this policy trend (Andreas, 2000; Martinez, 2002; Nevins, 2002a; Parenti, 1999; Welch, 2002), the uncontestable result has been fewer opportunities for legitimate entry into the United States and increased enforcement against those in violation. The continuation of this restric- tionist trend in the near term seems certain. The U.S. Congress recently authorized even more security at the southwest border, including the building of an additional 700 miles of fencing along the border (Bauza, 2006) and many border states have activated National Guard units to assist the Border Patrol.

One consequence of enhanced border security has been the apparent increase in migrant deaths. Several researchers attributed the cause of migrant casualties to U.S. immigration policy and the border buildup dur- ing the early 1990s (Cornelius, 2001; Eschbach et al., 1999, 2001; Reyes et al., 2002). This result was evidenced both by an increase in environmental exposure-related deaths as migrants began crossing more hazardous routes to enter the United States undetected and by an increase in the number of recorded deaths after the border enforcement campaigns began. Thus, as the difficulty of crossing the border increased, the number of migrants that 2. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) initiated three pri- mary provisions: (1) the creation of sanctions for employers who knowingly hired undocumented aliens, (2) increased enforcement along the U.S. borders, and (3) legali- zation of then current illegal aliens residing in the United States. The 1990 Immigration Reform Act for the first time stipulated that all immigrants were subject to numerical restrictions, restricted criteria for entry, and liberalized conditions for exclusion. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon- sibility Act and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. These acts expanded the powers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by allowing for the detention and deportation of any illegal and legal immigrant who has been charged with or convicted of a drug offense or who otherwise possesses a criminal record. Additionally, the 1996 act established measures to control U.S. borders and augmented enforcement of laws prohibiting businesses from employing illegal aliens. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 4 28-MAR-07 6:26 204 GUERETTE perished also rose. This connection has been used by critics of U.S. immi- gration policy to call for the removal of the border buildup in the name of saving migrant lives (Nevins, 2002b).

Rather than loosening security at the border, the then INS announced the creation of the BSI in response to concerns about migrant deaths. The program was launched in conjunction with the Mexican government and was designed to make the border safer for migrants, officers, 3 and border residents, although most efforts have been devoted to migrants. The BSI program became operational in June 1998 and consists of four elements:

prevention, search and rescue, identification, and tracking and recording.

Under this initiative, the Border Patrol has implemented several safety measures along the 2,013 miles of U.S.–Mexico border as part of the ongo- ing BSI strategy. These measures are as follows:

Implementation of public message campaigns and posting signs identifying the dangers of remote terrain crossings.

Search and rescue operations performed by selected and highly trained agents that comprise the BORSTAR teams.

Training of line agents in initial life-saving and rescue techniques.

Creation of a data tracking system that records all rescues and deaths along the U.S. side of the southwest border. The data are intended to inform ongoing life-saving measures.

In addition to ongoing operations implemented under BSI, the Border Patrol conducted a repatriation effort in September 2003 in an attempt to reduce migrant deaths. Facing record numbers of deaths that year in the West Desert of Arizona (located in the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector), the Lateral Repatriation Program (LRP) returned migrants apprehended in this area to other less hazardous places along the border. Originally the plan was to return the migrants to the interior of Mexico, but the Mexican government did not agree so migrants were returned to the southern por- tion of the Texas–Mexican border. It was believed that if migrants were returned directly across the Arizona border, as is standard practice, the migrants would simply reattempt entry, thereby once again risking their lives during the hottest summer months. 4 The LRP lasted 23 days and processed over 6,200 migrants at a cost of $1,352,080. 3. Throughout the 1990s, border agents increasingly were subject to sniper attacks, assaults, and shootings during drug enforcement and were assaulted with sticks and stones by Mexican smugglers (see Human Events Staff, 1997; Pendleton, 1995).

4. The effort to repatriate illegal immigrants is not new. A more comprehensive repatriation campaign was carried out in the 1950s, but on this occasion, the purpose of the effort was different. Although the former repatriation program was a response to illegal immigration more generally, the 2003 program was specifically intended to reduce migrant casualty and was managed by the director of the BSI. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 5 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 205 THE CURRENT STUDY The BSI is a harm-reduction strategy consistent with community- and problem-based policing trends found throughout the United States among local police jurisdictions (Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Since about the 1970s, a paradigm shift in U.S.

policing emerged that began a movement away from exclusive reliance on rapid response and routine patrols. New ideas called for greater police–community interaction, a proactive focus on identifying and deal- ing with specific community problems, and the use of data analysis to inform operations. Although the Border Patrol overall has adopted some community-based strategies (such as bike patrol in some border towns), most operations are firmly set in professional era practice. The BSI, how- ever, is more reflective of a problem-based approach because it focuses proactively on life saving and harm reduction and uses data recording to inform when, where, and how border deaths occur. The BSI represents an opportunity to understand how proactive policing might be applied in new contexts, such as in the case of migrant deaths.

Given the current geopolitical environment, removing border security hardly seems a feasible policy option. There have been recent proposals for de facto amnesty and temporary worker programs, but it is uncertain whether these would adequately alleviate the flow of illegal entries, thereby reducing migrant deaths. This uncertainty occurs for several rea- sons. First, policy proposals that include these options also call for increased border security. Just as enhanced border security has correlated with increased migrant deaths, greater border security also leads to greater reliance on human smugglers whose drive for profit can lead to migrant deaths (Guerette and Clarke, 2005). Second, amnesty programs will likely lead to even more immigration (Andreas, 2000). Granting asylum (or paths to citizenship) will reaffirm current smuggling networks and will lure other would-be migrants hoping to benefit from any immediate or future amnesty programs. Third, the yearly allowable entries called for under guest worker programs are not sufficient to offset the yearly flow of immi- gration. Recent proposals stipulate up to 200,000 allowable entries. With over 1 million apprehensions along the southwest border each year, the remainder will be left with only unauthorized opportunities for entry into the United States.

If open borders (or even loosened borders) are not likely in the near term, then can proactive harm-reduction strategies be relied on to make the border safer? The purpose of this article is to examine whether such practices, particularly those of the Border Patrol, serve as a viable appara- tus to save migrant lives. To what extent have actions taken under BSI impacted the rate of migrant deaths along the U.S.–Mexico border? Are \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 6 28-MAR-07 6:26 206 GUERETTE BORSTAR effective at saving migrant lives? Did the 2003 LRP prevent migrants from dying? The following analyses address these and related questions. First, a discussion of the data and analytical framework used to carry out this study is presented. DATA DEPENDENT VARIABLE Data on the frequency of individual migrant deaths 5 were gathered from multiple sources. For evaluation of BSI impact, analyses rely on data from state and national vital registration systems compiled by Eschbach et al.

(2001) as well as statistics in the BSI Incident Tracking System. Vital regis- tration system data were used because it provides a baseline for compari- son of trends in numbers of migrant deaths for an extended period of time.

The BSI Incident Tracking System does not allow for this baseline as data collection and tracking of deaths did not systematically begin until 1999.

The total time span of inquiry was from 1984 to 2003.

6 It is possible that deaths recorded in the BSI tracking system and the vital registration sys- tems differ because of varying classification systems and collection proce- dures, but one study indicated that these differences are small. 7 Even so, caution should be used when interpreting results from a single analysis of data derived from two separate collection processes.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES UNDOCUMENTED M IGRANT FLOWS To account for changes in the volume of illegal immigration over time, yearly U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions for the southwest border were used. The limitations of relying on apprehension data are well docu- mented (Eschbach et al., 2001; Espenshade, 1995) and despite efforts to develop a more precise measure of illegal migrant flow little progress has been made. Apprehension figures are not a direct measure of illegal 5. The BSI Incident Tracking system maintains both individual and event death counts. However, the vital registration data counts only individuals, which meant that the analysis had to be based on counts of individual deaths, not of events. As most cases involve single deaths, whichever is used—individuals or incidents—the general picture will be similar.

6. Vital registration data were compiled from Eschbach et al., 2001 for the years 1984 to 1998. BSI Incident Tracking System figures were used for years 1999 to 2003.

Yearly death figures derived from the BSI Incident Tracking System used in this study may diverge from numbers released publicly by the Border Patrol. This divergence is from retrospective editing of the data system in keeping with methodological protocols as more information about each incident is learned.

7. Reyes et al. (2002) compared U.S. vital registration data with USBP data for 1998 and found a small difference of 22. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 7 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 207 migrant flow, but they are a function of both Border Patrol activity and the number of migrants attempting illegal entry. To deal with these diffi- culties, most efforts have tried to use adjustments of apprehension data.

For instance, a study by Eschbach et al. (2001) took the log of monthly apprehensions and the log of monthly border patrol man hours, regressed them on one another, and then used the residual as a measure of unde- tected illegal migrant traffic. In their analysis, they found the residual measure to be highly consistent with straight apprehensions (p. 16) and eventually went back to using straight apprehensions in subsequent parts of their analysis (p. 19). Others have also relied on apprehension data as a general measure of migratory activity in the analysis of migrant deaths (Reyes et al., 2002:65). 8 MECHANISMS OF BSI I NTERVENTION Recent ideas in crime prevention studies suggest that mechanisms rather than causes should be identified that act within various contexts to explain specific outcomes (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). In this study, two “mecha- nisms” were specifically examined: (1) The impact of BORSTAR teams and (2) The LRP of 2003. Data for BORSTAR involvement in border deaths and rescues were introduced into the BSI Incident tracking system in 2002 but was not systematically recorded until 2003. To determine BORSTAR effectiveness, the 2003 data were used. In separate analyses, the impact of the LRP (as an independent variable) on migrant deaths was examined during the time period in which it took place.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND OTHER SITUATIONAL V ARIABLES Data on the gender of deceased or rescued migrants, their age, and the number of accompanying migrants were also used in some analyses. Data for these variables were collected from the BSI Incident Tracking System.

8. The Border Patrol does maintain records on what are referred to as “get-a- ways” based on observations by border agents in the field. These numbers ostensibly represent an indicator of successful illegal entries and as such could arguably be used to measure migrant traffic volumes. Many of these figures are derived using an ancient Native American tactic referred to as “sign cutting” in which Border Patrol agents smooth border terrain by dragging old tires behind a truck. Smooth sand and dirt allows agents to count series of footprints, thereby determining the approximate number of migrant crossings. After footprints are found, the terrain is resmoothed to identify sub- sequent crossings. However, the reliability and validity of these figures is suspect because much of the terrain along the border does not consist of dirt that can be smoothed and the extent that “sign cutting” is employed varies across sectors. In short, despite efforts to devise a more precise measure of illegal migrant flow apprehension, data provide the most reliable indicator. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 8 28-MAR-07 6:26 208 GUERETTE ANALYTICAL APPROACH Three areas of analysis were undertaken to understand the impact of BSI operations on migrant deaths. First, an aggregate assessment of rates of migrant casualty examined trends before and after BSI implementation.

Second, a comparison of whether BORSTAR agents performed better than regular line agents in saving migrant lives was performed. Third, the 2003 LRP was evaluated to determine its effectiveness in reducing migrant deaths.

To assess the aggregate impact of BSI operations, a simple interrupted time series design was used (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The range of analysis was from 1985 to 2003 which was sufficient to determine migrant death trends but did not allow for ARIMA modeling. 9 The time series was computed using the rate of migrant deaths per 100,000 border apprehensions.

A series of bivariate and multivariate analyses was employed to deter- mine BORSTAR effectiveness. Bivariate analysis comprised a crosstab comparison of deaths and rescues by BORSTAR or line agent personnel.

Analysis of BORSTAR was conducted only for the Tucson sector where they operate more frequently and only for year 2003 when recording prac- tices of their involvement in the BSI Tracking system are most reliable.

For multivariate analysis of BORSTAR effectiveness, logistic regression was employed to determine differences in the outcome of death for BOR- STAR and line agents while taking into account gender, age, and number of accompanying victims. Logistic regression was used because it allows for determinations of the extent to which a dichotomous dependent varia- ble is influenced by a set of independent variables (Bohrnstedt and Knoke, 1994; Neter et al., 1996). Thus, BSI Incident Tracking data were coded in a dichotomous arrangement with death coded as 1 and rescue coded as 0.

The use of logistic regression also allows for computation of odds ratios to compare the odds of death for each variable. Assessments of differences in the outcome of death in relation to gender, age, and accompanying migrants were used in the regression model to account for their affect on migrant deaths.

To evaluate LRP impact, two analyses were performed. First, compari- son was made between the numbers of exposure-heat deaths recorded in the Tucson sector during September 2003 (when LRP was implemented) with the number of same death types during the same month the prior year. Second, a quasi-experimental design with two nonequivalent com- parison groups was used to (1) compare Tucson’s change in relation to other similarly situated sectors; (2) to determine whether the relocation of 9. ARIMA models generally require around 100 data points for reliable analysis. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 9 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 209 migrants to the Texas sectors simply displaced the death problem to those areas; and (3) whether the receiving sectors experienced a diffusion of benefit. Displacement refers to the relocation of a problem (i.e., migrant deaths) to another area as a result of the intervention (i.e., the LRP). Dif- fusion of benefit represents the opposite of displacement referring to a shared reduction in the occurrence of death even though the specific inter- vention did not occur in those areas.

In doing so, two comparison areas were designated: a control and a buffer (Table 1). The purpose of the control area is to determine whether other similarly situated sectors that were not involved in the LRP exper- ienced declines similar to Tucson. If the control area also shows a decline, then it suggests that the LRP may not be effective and something else could have caused the decline in Tucson sector. The purpose of the buffer area is to determine whether the relocation of migrants to the receiving sectors caused an increase of deaths in those sectors (displacement) or a decrease in deaths (diffusion of benefit). If the death rate increases in these sectors compared with the previous year, then it suggests that dis- placement has occurred. If the death rate decreases, then it suggests that a diffusion of benefit has taken place. TABLE 1. COMPOSITION, PURPOSE AND REASONING FOR LRP COMPARISONS Comparisons Composition Purpose Reasoning Treatment Tucson sector To determine whether A decrease in deaths area migrant death rates suggests effectiveness.

increased or decreased. An increase does not.

Control area El Centro and To determine whether If the control area San Diego other similarly situated also declined, then it sectors sectors that were not suggests LRP is not involved in LRP effective and experienced declines something else caused similar to Tucson. the decline.

Buffer area McAllen, To determine whether If death rate increases Laredo, Del Rio, the relocation of in these sectors from and El Paso migrants to these sectors the previous year, sectors caused an increase of then it may suggest deaths in those sectors displacement. If it (displacement) or a decreases, then it decrease in deaths suggests diffusion of (diffusion of benefit). benefit.

The control area was drawn from El Centro and San Diego sectors, which generally have maintained similar rates of death in recent years and \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 10 28-MAR-07 6:26 210 GUERETTE are located on the western portion of the border like Tucson. To compare deaths across sectors, the numbers of death were standardized into rates of death per 10,000 monthly sector apprehensions. Rates per 10,000 (as opposed to the more common 100,000) were used because the numbers of apprehensions become smaller when disaggregated by the sector level. For the control area, rates were averaged to produce a single composite mea- sure of the death rate in those sectors.

The four Texas-Mexico sectors – El Paso, McAllen, Laredo, and Del Rio – were designated as the buffer area to determine whether displace- ment or diffusion of benefit occurred. These were used as the buffer because the migrants who were apprehended in Tucson sector were evenly relocated and released back into Mexico at each of these sectors. 10 Like the comparison area, rates of death per 10,000 monthly sector apprehen- sions for each of the four sectors were computed and the average was used as a single composite measure. The pre-time period was September 2002, and the post-time period was September 2003. A series of coefficients was computed for the LRP based on a technique for evaluating crime preven- tion programs, which allows for determinations of displacement and diffu- sion (Bowers and Johnson, 2003). These coefficients include determination of gross and net effects of the LRP; the latter determines program effects in relation to changes in the comparison areas (See the Appendix for more detail). FINDINGS AGGREGATE ASSESSMENT Figure 1 provides yearly rates of migrant deaths per 100,000 apprehen- sions from 1985 to 2003. Two general peaks can be observed, one in 1988 and the other in 2003. Prior to the implementation of BSI in 1998, the numbers of migrant deaths were actually on the decline after the 1988 peak until just before the BSI program began. Rates of death were reduced in 1999, but then they began to increase, reaching their highest peaks in 2003. Even though the post-BSI increase misses significance at the 0.05 level, 11 the trend lines of the pre- and post-periods are distinctly different: with a negative slope in the pre-time period and a positive slope during the post-BSI period. If we accept apprehensions as a proxy mea- sure of border activity, it seems the BSI program has not reduced migrant deaths overall. 10. The number of migrants sent to each sector is as follows: Del Rio 1,576; El Paso 1,575; Laredo 1,454; and McAllen 1,634.

11. The difference in pre- and post-BSI means becomes significant at p < 0.10; (t = –1.912, 17 df). \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 211 FIGURE 1. RATE OF MIGRANT DEATH PER 100,000 APPREHENSIONS, 1985-2003 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 Rate of Death Rate per 100K apprehensions Mean, 1985-1997 Mean, 1998-2003 Source: Eschbach et al. (2001) data, 1985-1998; BSI Incident Tracking System, 1999- 2003 (t = –1.911, 17 df, n.s.).

BORSTAR ASSESSMENT A primary component of the BSI strategy involves BORSTAR, a highly trained volunteer group of Border Patrol agents who perform search and rescue operations along the border region. Many of these agents are emer- gency medical technicians (EMTs) and are trained in a wide assortment of rescue operations, including swift water, mountain, and desert rescue. The training regime is arduous enough so that not all of those who apply make it onto the teams, and partly because of this, their numbers are small.

Ostensibly, these highly trained agents can better provide assistance to migrants in distress than can agents without such training and equipment.

Accordingly, it can be expected that migrants in distress who are responded to by BORSTAR will be less likely to die and will have greater chances of being rescued. Conversely, those migrants responded to by reg- ular Border Patrol line agents would have a greater risk of death and lower probabilities of rescue. This hypothesis was examined here.

The BORSTAR assessment was conducted only for the Tucson sector where BORSTAR operations are most concentrated 12 and only for 2003 12. As of January 2004 the distribution of BORSTAR agents by sector was as fol- lows: Tucson 38, San Diego 20, El Centro 16, Yuma 12, Del Rio 10, McAllen 8, Laredo 6, El Paso 5, and Marfa 1 (Source: United States Border Patrol). \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 12 28-MAR-07 6:26 212 GUERETTE when data about their involvement was entered systematically. 13 Heat exposure cases were analyzed because these are the most common and are most likely to be impacted by rapid response and medical assistance. The response of BORSTAR or line agents examined here was not randomly assigned; however, the chance of either group responding to a distressed migrant was more or less equal. This equality is because, in the Tucson sector, BORSTAR agents are interspersed with regular line agents to patrol the desert section of the border (located on the Tohono O’odham Reservation) during summer months. Thus, each group has a somewhat equal chance of encountering a distressed migrant while on patrol.

Table 2 provides a bivariate comparison of the number and percent of deaths and rescues by BORSTAR and line agents. The ratio of deaths to rescues for BORSTAR agents is considerably better than for line agents.

For BORSTAR, roughly 1 out of 10 migrants who were responded to die compared with around 5 out of 10 for the line agents. To put another way, the probability of death occurring for migrants responded to by BOR- STAR is 7%. For those responded to by regular line agents, the probability of death is 47%. This difference was highly significant (Pearson chi-square p < 0.001). TABLE 2. MIGRANT HEAT-EXPOSURE DEATHS AND RESCUES BY RESPONDING BORDER PATROL AGENT IN TUCSON SECTOR, FY2003 Deaths Rescues N = 421 Frequency (%) Frequency (%) BORSTAR 18 (7%) 260 (93%) Line agent 67 (47%) 76 (53%) Source: U.S. Border Patrol BSI Incident Tracking System.

Row percentages are reported.

p < 0.001. Pearson chi-square.

Table 3 shows the coefficients for the logistic regression. Like the bivari- ate analysis, the picture is the same; when a BORSTAR agent responds to a distressed migrant, the outcome of death is significantly reduced (p < 0.01). More specifically, holding all variables constant, the odds of a migrant death occurring is reduced 84% when a BORSTAR agent responds compared with a line agent. The only other significant predictor of death is the number of accompanying migrant victims. Holding all else constant for every increase in accompanying migrant victims, the odds of 13. BORSTAR involvement began being tracked in 2002 but not systematically until 2003. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 13 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 213 death occurring significantly decreases (p < 0.001). The model chi-square was significant at p < .001, which suggests a good model fit, and overall the entered variables explained about 48% of the variance in the dependent variable. Separate analyses were performed for BORSTAR effects in the aggregate for all sectors and for all death types. In each analysis, the results were similar. When a BORSTAR agent responds to a distressed migrant, the outcome of death is significantly reduced.

TABLE 3. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MIGRANT HEAT-EXPOSURE DEATHS IN TUCSON SECTOR BY BORSTAR, GENDER, AGE, AND NUMBER OF VICTIMS, FY2003 Standard B ErrorOdds Ratio BORSTAR –1.829** 0.583 0.161 Female 0.215 0.543 1.239 Age 0.042 0.026 1.043 Number of victims –0.772*** 0.199 0.462 Constant 0.691 0.906 1.996 –2 log-likelihood 94.815 Nagelkerke R 2 0.476 Model chi-square 44.660; 4 df; p < 0.001.

*Significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed test.

**Significant at 0.01 level, two-tailed test.

***Significant at 0.001 level, two-tailed test.

BSI LRP Although the LRP was directed at saving lives from all types of possible deaths, undoubtedly the primary focus was to reduce exposure deaths related to heat. Table 4 provides the number of heat exposure-related migrant deaths per month for 2003 in the Tucson sector. Here, the number of deaths decreased during the LRP (60%). Yet, the decrease was in the wake of large increases in deaths during the prior two months of July and August. This shift in direction provides some support of LRP effective- ness. Note that two other months, May and June, also show decreases in the number of migrant deaths. These reductions could be a product of Operation “Desert Safeguard,” which fortified the West Desert Corridor with additional rescue and line agents together with more aircraft support.

Had Desert Safeguard not been in operation, it is likely that increases would have been observed in these two months as well. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-MAR-07 6:26 214 GUERETTE TABLE 4. HEAT-EXPOSURE DEATHS BY MONTH IN TUCSON SECTOR, 2002 AND 2003 2002–2003 % Month TCA 2002 TCA 2003 Change January 0 0 0 February 0 0 0 March 0 0 0 April 1 3 +200% May 6 5 –17% June 47 16 –66% July 12 42 +250% August 13 15 +15% September 10 4 –60% October 0 0 0 November 0 0 0 December 0 0 0 Total 89 85 –3% Source: U.S. Border Patrol.

A primary concern in the application of prevention initiatives is that the problem will be displaced to another area, thereby undermining response effects. Concerns over displacement are particularly relevant when dis- cussing illegal immigration, as evidence exists that migration has been dis- placed to more remote terrain in response to heightened border enforcement campaigns commenced in the early 1990’s (Eschbach et al., 2001; GAO, 2001:2,10; Reyes et al., 2002).

Although the above analysis indicates that deaths were reduced during the time of the LRP in the Tucson sector from the previous year, it does not take into account the possibility of increased death levels in the Texas sectors where the migrants were relocated. At the same time, it does not determine whether the reduction of deaths is attributable to the interven- tion or some other spurious shift that would have taken place had the LRP not been deployed.

Table 5 provides a series of coefficients that help determine the effec- tiveness of the LRP. The first column gives the rate of death per 10,000 monthly sector apprehensions during September 2002, whereas the second column represents the same number for September 2003. The third col- umn presents the difference between the two periods. For Tucson, the dif- ference for the pre- and post-periods indicates a decline of 2.82 deaths per 10,000 apprehensions, which represents the “gross effect” (GE). At the same time, the rate of death increased in the control area from a rate of \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 215 6.97 to 12.49, which is an increase of 5.52. The NE or “net effect” coeffi- cient compares the change of the treatment area (Tucson sector) with the change in the control sectors. The NE in this case is 0.621, which indicates that the LRP was effective in reducing migrant deaths in relation to the comparison sectors. 14 TABLE 5. RESPONSE EFFECTS OF LRP FOR ALL DEATH TYPES (RATE OF DEATH PER 10,000 MONTHLY SECTOR APPREHENSIONS) September September Difference 2002 2003 Tucson (treatment area) 6.24 3.42 –2.82 Control area a 6.97 12.49 +5.52 Buffer area b 2.47 2.07 –0.40 GE = 2.82 NE = 0.621 WDQ = 0.303 TNE = 10.12 aMean of El Centro and San Diego.bMean of McAllen, Laredo, Del Rio, and El Paso.

To assess displacement and diffusion of benefit effects, Bowers and Johnson (2003) propose the use of a “weighted displacement quotient” or WDQ. The WDQ allows for assessments of displacement or diffusion in relation to effects found in the treatment area. Notice that in the buffer area the rate of death decreased slightly from 2.47 to 2.07, which is a dif- ference of –0.40. The WDQ can either be positive, indicating diffusion, or negative, indicating displacement. 15 In this case, the WDQ is 0.303, which signifies that the LRP had a diffusion effect in the buffer zone sectors.

So what then is the overall effect of the LRP? The “total net effect” (TNE) takes into account the treatment effect in relation to both the com- parison areas and the buffer zones, which allows for determination of overall impact of the intervention program. Here the TNE is 10.12, which indicates that, with the benefit of diffusion effects in the buffer sectors, the LRP contributed to an overall reduction in migrant deaths at a rate of 10 deaths per 10,000 monthly apprehensions (or rather 1 death per 1,000 monthly apprehensions). With the LRP repatriating just over 6,000 migrants, it seems that roughly 6 migrant lives were saved. However, even with the apparent effectiveness of the LRP and BORSTAR, the effects 14. A positive number indicates that the program was effective. A negative num- ber indicates that it made things worse, and a zero suggests that the intervention had no effect.

15. If the WDQ is greater than one, then the diffusion effect is greater than the response effect. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 16 28-MAR-07 6:26 216 GUERETTE were not large enough to have an impact on the overall rate of migrant deaths in the time series analysis. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS This study evaluated several components of the BSI. It examined the aggregate impact of the BSI on the rate of migrant death along the U.S.

and Mexico border. It also analyzed the effectiveness of BORSTAR involvement in the life-saving campaign and the effect of the 2003 LRP.

Both the BORSTAR and the LRP seem to have been successful in saving migrant lives. One implication is that the BORSTAR program should be expanded and given higher priority within all southwest border sectors.

Currently, BORSTAR teams operate in various ways and with varying numbers across Border Patrol sectors. In the McAllen sector, for instance, BORSTAR agents have not been deployed in the interior areas of the sector where many exposure-heat deaths are recorded around interstate checkpoints. In FY2003, BORSTAR responded to 509 distressed individu- als along the entire Mexican border, comprising 27% of all individual migrants who were either rescued or died. 16 To maximize BORSTAR’s potential to make the border safer, the number of these agents should be expanded in all sectors and they should be used at times and places where migrant deaths most frequently occur.

Like BORSTAR, the LRP also seems to provide an effective means to reduce migrant casualty. The above analysis indicates that roughly six lives were saved at a cost of around $1.4 million under the LRP. In the past, repatriation efforts were viewed as too costly when undertaken as a means to deal with illegal immigration more generally. When directed toward saving migrant lives, however, its application can be more surgical by con- ducting operations in times and places where it is most needed. A repatria- tion effort could also be coupled with other prevention efforts simultaneously, thereby amplifying life-saving effects.

Despite these positive effects, no overall decrease occurred in the num- ber or rate of migrant deaths when examined on the aggregate level. In many ways, this finding is similar to results from evaluations of local crime prevention efforts. Although evaluations of many proactive policing and crime-prevention programs show discernible localized reductions, little evidence exists that they have contributed to overall declines in crime rates experienced across the country (Eck and McGuire, 2000).

Yet, BORSTAR and the LRP are only two aspects of the broader proactive approach that are possible in addressing migrant deaths. A more 16. A total of 1,859 individual deaths and rescues occurred. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 17 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 217 formal adoption of a prevention program, such as situational crime pre- vention (SCP) or problem-oriented policing (POP), could better inform life-saving efforts. These programs would assist in identifying other ways of preventing deaths through more in-depth understanding of how, when, where, and under what conditions migrant deaths occur. In other words, much more might be done within the harm-reduction orientation.

Like all research, these findings have limitations. The absence of an extended systematically recorded series of migrant death data limits more complete understanding of BSI impact. Instead, the impact analysis of the BSI program is forced to rely on two separate sources of data. As such, caution should be taken when dismissing BSI effectiveness, because the absence of decline in the aggregate analysis may have more to do with data recording than with program impotence. Perhaps one inference is to use the evaluation findings toward informing development of future life- saving operations rather than dismantling current policy and practice.

Caution should also be taken in interpreting the findings from the LRP analyses because numbers of migrant deaths become small when disaggre- gated by month. Given these small numbers, findings of effectiveness or ineffectiveness might only be suggestive.

Moreover, it is difficult to identify Border Patrol efforts as the sole cause for any lives saved because several others groups have been active in life-saving campaigns along the border. Many groups concerned with con- ditions along the border have also carried out rescue operations through the work of volunteers and have provided medical treatment, distributed water and food, and even conducted medical evacuations to those in need.

Such groups include No More Deaths, the Border Action Network, Bor- der Links, Derechos Humanos, Humane Borders, Healing Our Borders, and numerous religious organizations among others. Even so, whether lives were saved by volunteer groups or Border Patrol agents, they both have employed proactive life-saving measures. The end result then is the same: The development and refinement of proactive harm-reduction strat- egies can prevent deaths.

This finding raises another point. In the past, the Border Patrol has been oppositional to those groups providing humanitarian assistance to migrants in distress. Some have even been prosecuted for federal immigra- tion crimes. 17 Yet, it would better serve the Border Patrol to form alli- ances with such groups and work in concert with them rather than criminalizing their actions. Doing so would provide the benefit of acting as 17. In July 2005, two volunteers for No More Deaths were arrested by the U.S.

Border Patrol and prosecuted for medically evacuating 3 illegal migrants in critical con- dition from the Arizona desert where temperatures were 105 degrees. The volunteers were said to follow established protocols of the organization by consulting medical pro- fessionals who advised them to evacuate the critically ill men to a medical facility and \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-MAR-07 6:26 218 GUERETTE a force multiplier for the government’s life-saving campaign and would assist in fostering better community acceptance of the Border Patrol, at least among those sympathetic to the illegal migrant.

Despite the above constraints, this study does provide evidence that some of the life-saving efforts undertaken by the U.S. Border Patrol have been worthwhile. Continued refinement of life-saving practice may not eliminate all deaths, but it is better than no action at all and the obligation to improve life-saving practice falls with government (Guerette, 2006).

Many have claimed that the only way to reduce migrant deaths along the border is through abandonment of current immigration policy and border enforcement. However, until the threat of international terrorism recedes, it is unlikely that any relaxing of border security will take place. Nor is it clear that revamping anti-immigration efforts that began in the 1990s will solve the death problem, considering that deaths frequently occurred prior to this period (Eschbach et al., 1999). Little doubt exists that federal policy makers need to address the multitude of issues that surround illegal immi- gration, but the strong polarity of opinions on these matters is sure to result in incremental changes at best. In the mean time, migrants will con- tinue to die. Given this, continued refinement and application of proactive life-saving measures may be the only immediate hope. REFERENCES Andreas, Peter 2000 Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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Rob Guerette is an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Florida International University, Miami, FL. His primary research interests include situational crime prevention, illegal immigration and border security, and public policy related to crime. His work has appeared in the Journal of Criminal Justice, Security Journal, and the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. He is co-editor of the book Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism (Ashgate Publishing, 2006). He holds a doctorate from Rutgers University-Newark and was a Fellow at the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 21 28-MAR-07 6:26 IMMIGRATION POLICY 221 APPENDIX A series of coefficients was computed to evaluate the outcome of the 2003 BSI LRP based on the work of Bowers and Johnson (2003). These coefficients include the computation of the gross effect (GE), net effect (NE), the total net effect (TNE), and the weighted displacement quotient (WDQ). The gross effect (GE) and the net effect (NE) are defined as GE = R b - R a (1) whereas NE = (R b/Cb) - (R a/Ca) (2) The WDQ was used to determine displacement or diffusion effects and is designated as WDQ = D a/Ca– D b/Cb (3) Ra/Ca– R b/Cb Additionally, the overall impact of the LRP was determined using the TNE model, which is defined by the relationship TNE = [R b(C a/Cb)-R a] + [D b(C a/Cb)-D a] (4) where D a is the death rate in the buffer area during the LRP, D b is the death rate in this area during the same time period the previous year, C a is the death rate in the comparison area during the LRP, C b is the death rate in this area during the same time period the previous year, R a is the death rate in the treatment area during the LRP, and R b is the death rate in this same area during the same time period the previous year. \\server05\productn\C\CPP\6-2\CPP202.txt unknown Seq: 22 28-MAR-07 6:26 222 GUERETTE