History Milestone 3

Work Relief in the 1930s and the Origins of the Social Security Act Author(syf 1 D Q F \ ( 5 R V e Source: Social Service Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Mar., 1989yf S S 1 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30012001 Accessed: 11-07-2017 11:18 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30012001?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Service Review This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief in the 1930s and the Origins of the Social Security Act Nancy E. Rose California State University, San Bernardino The Social Security Act has provided the basis of the United States federal welfare system since its enactment in 1935. Although the first draft included a proposal for Employment Assurance, a government work program that would have provided public-sector employment for the jobless, it was eliminated by the time the final version was passed. The causes of this exclusion can be found in the massive work- relief programs of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (May 1933-December 1935yf W K H I L U V W 8 Q L W H G 6 W D W H V I H G H U D O Z H O I D U H S U R J U D P D Q G W K H & L Y L O : R U N V $ G P L Q - istration (November 1933-March 1934yf 7 K H \ Z H U H S H U F H L Y H G D V V R S U R E O H P D W L F - interfering with labor markets and the basic rationality of capitalist production-for- profit-that no work program was contained in the Social Security Act. The work- relief programs of the 1930s can provide models for developing progressive alternatives to current proposals, particularly in support of extensive voluntary government work programs, and thereby help regain control of the welfare reform agenda. The Social Security Act has formed the basis of the United States welfare system since its enactment in 1935. It established the social insurance programs of social security and unemployment compensation as well as the public assistance programs of Aid to Dependent Children (later changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDCyf , Old Age Assistance, and Aid to the Blind. All of these provided direct relief, payments given without work that is normally paid a wage. A second welfare (formerly termed reliefyf S U R J U D P W K H : R U N V 3 U R J U H V s Administration (WPAyf Z D V D O V R S D V V H G L Q , W L Q F O X G H G R Q O \ Z R U k Social Service Review (March 1989yf . © 1989 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0037-7961/89/6301-0003$01.00 This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 64 Social Service Review relief, payments given in exchange for work that is normally paid a wage.2 Separation of direct relief into the permanent Social Security Act and work relief into the temporary WPA is curious. Indeed, the initial draft of the Social Security Act contained a proposal for Employment Assurance, a government work program that would have provided public-sector employment for the jobless.3 However, this was eliminated as the Social Security Act was revised. Omission of federally sanctioned work relief from the Social Security Act then left space on the local level for the restoration of "work tests," historically repressive forms of work relief evidenced today in workfare programs. The conservative nature of the Social Security Act has long been recognized by social scientists.4 However, the exclusion of work programs from the Social Security Act has not often been addressed, and existing explanations seem inadequate. In their study of federal work relief, Arthur W. Macmahon, John D. Millett, and Gladys Ogden cite a "vague sort of institutional rivalry" between the committee that drafted the Social Security Act and the existing relief agency to explain why "the (Rooseveltyf $ G P L Q L V W U D W L R Q Z D V Q R W S U H S D U H G W R D I I L U P V R G X U D E O H D Q d deliberate a relationship between a social security and a works program."5 In the forward to the 50th Anniversary Edition: The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935, a book celebrating the first half-century of the Social Security Act, Alan Pifer and Forrest Chisman suggest that the employment policy was dropped from the Social Security Act because it was "both too expensive and tainted by resemblance to the temporary public works programs that had become politically unpop- ular."6 However, this statement begs the question as to why the tem- porary programs were so unpopular. More persuasive explanations attribute the omission of work relief from the Social Security Act to opposition engendered by the Civil Works Administration (CWAyf D P D V V L Y H J R Y H U Q P H Q W Z R U N S U R J U D m that existed briefly from November 1933 through March 1934. By mid-January 1934, over 4.3 million people had CWA jobs at wages approximating those in the private sector.7 Strident opposition to both the CWA's size and wage rates was voiced by many employers, especial- ly those in the South who feared that federal intervention would disrupt the "caste system" that provided a pool of low-wage black labor.8 Yet the CWA itself has been a source of confusion to policy analysts. Even those who commend the CWA for quickly providing jobs at decent wages often echo criticisms that it was an expensive "boondoggle," that is, a waste of government money.9 A more complete explanation of why work programs were excluded from the Social Security Act also necessitates an examination of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERAyf 7 K H ) ( 5 $ Z D V W K e first United States federal welfare program, established by the Roosevelt This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 65 administration in May 1933 in response to the inadequacy of existing relief, organized protest by the unemployed, and New Deal policies designed to increase the "purchasing power of the masses." It lasted until December 1935 and was phased out as the WPA was implemented. State relief administrations distributed FERA funds contingent on their adherence to federal rules and regulations. Noncompliance with FERA policies led to sanctions-temporarily withholding funds from the state administrations or taking over their operations. Both work relief and direct relief were provided by the FERA. Al- though direct relief posed relatively few problems for the business sector, the same cannot be said of work relief. Work was provided each month for between 1.4 and 2.4 million of the unemployed at payments higher than they would have received for direct relief and sometimes higher than local wage rates as well. In addition, some innovative projects were established. The best-known projects, continued in the WPA, were for professionals such as actors, musicians, artists, and teachers. Less well known but far more problematic projects were also established in which FERA participants produced consumer goods for distribution to others on relief. Although the progressive nature of the FERA has been noted by some welfare policy analysts,10 others either dismiss it as simply a grant-in-aid program in which the federal government had little control or omit it entirely in discussions of New Deal work programs." In this article, I examine FERA and CWA work relief in terms of the three dimensions of the United States welfare system that have constrained its development: the "ideology of the dole" and maintenance of divisions among the working class; the level of relief payments and the functioning of labor markets; and the form of work relief and the logic of the market. I conclude that work relief in the FERA and CWA was perceived as so problematic that all work programs were excluded from the permanent Social Security Act and relegated instead to the temporary WPA. The WPA continued as a voluntary work-relief program but was less problematic than the FERA and the CWA. Work-relief policies that incurred little employer opposition-primarily differential treatment of relief recipients based on gender, race, and class-were retained in the WPA. However, policies that elicited the most strident business sector criticism-determination of work-relief wage rates and production of consumer goods on work-relief projects-were altered or terminated. The FERA, the CWA, and the "Ideology of the Dole" The "ideology of the dole" is the widely accepted belief that relief recipients are lazy and do not want to work. It helps maintain the division between the so-called deserving poor, those considered relatively This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 66 Social Service Review worthy of relief, and the "undeserving poor," those considered unworthy of relief. Historically, the "deserving poor" have been given more adequate aid in a less humiliating manner than has been true for the "undeserving poor." This can be seen in part in the use of the work test, that is, mandatory work relief, as the "undeserving poor" have usually been required to perform often menial work in exchange for meager means of subsistence. Three primary effects result from the "ideology of the dole." First, it reinforces the "work ethic" for people in dead-end low-wage jobs, as they tend to feel grateful to have a job as opposed to being on relief. Second, it saves money, as eligible people are often discouraged from applying for relief. Third, it prevents most people with jobs from recognizing the commonality between their situations and those of relief recipients. Wage and salary workers are compelled to work because they do not own sufficient income-producing assets to survive. However, their jobs are contingent on profits; if profits are too low compared to other uses of money (e.g., financial speculationyf W K H M R E V F D Q E e eliminated and the workers laid off. Thus they too can become dependent on income support from the state."2 Prior to the Great Depression and the enactment of the FERA, relief was based on the poor laws. Local governmental units (towns or countiesyf had responsibility for providing relief for their own residents, leaving nonresidents (also called transientsyf Z L W K Q R W K L Q J 7 K H G H V H U Y L Q J S R R U " consisted primarily of middle-class widows and their dependent children. Mimi Abramovitz explains that these women adhered to the "family ethic," as they fulfilled the societal norms of women's roles-working in the home raising children.'3 Since their poverty was seen as occurring through no fault of their own, they received "outdoor relief" while continuing to live in the community. The "undeserving poor," on the other hand, consisted of the "able-bodied" unemployed, recent im- migrants, and people of color. It also included women who had not conformed to the "family ethic," that is, unwed mothers, women who had been divorced or deserted, and women whose husbands failed to provide sufficient income. The "undeserving poor" typically received only "indoor relief" in the form of a work test, as they were required to enter a workhouse (also called almshouse or poorhouseyf Z R U N R n a poor farm, or be auctioned or indentured to an individual, in order to receive the minimal relief then provided." This system of relief broke down during the first 4 years of the Great Depression. Measured unemployment skyrocketed from 3.2 percent of the labor force in 1929 to 25.1 percent in March 1933, the nadir of the Great Depression.'5 Funds of private charities and local governments were drained so rapidly that by 1932 only one-fourth of the unemployed received any work relief or direct relief,'6 and much of the work relief that provided meager payments to approximately 1,650,000 people in February 1933 involved a work test.17 Not all of This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 67 the unemployed silently acquiesced to this situation. Since 1930, un- employed councils had organized hunger marches and other actions to demand increased relief, leading some government officials to fear that the councils might give rise to more drastic changes than they thought desirable.'8 Thus when the FERA was established, some policies were imple- mented to obviate the "ideology of the dole." Most important was the provision of FERA work relief on a clearly voluntary basis, in obvious contradiction to mandatory work tests that had reinforced the "ideology of the dole." Furthermore, almost all payments for work relief were provided in cash instead of in kind, although direct relief was given in both forms.'9 FERA administrators declared their goal to be providing work relief for those who were able to work, the "employables." Those considered "unemployable" were to be cared for through the traditional relief apparatus of local aid and private charities. However, lack of funds from local aid and private charities led to the inclusion of "unem- ployables" as well as "employables" on FERA rolls.20 Despite these progressive measures, the actions of FERA adminis- trators indicate that some of the unemployed were viewed as more worthy than others of receiving relief. By the 1930s militant labor organizing among primarily white men in the industrial core of the economy, particularly in response to the severe recessions that occurred each decade since the 1870s, led to their recategorization as "deserving poor." Those considered "undeserving" now included transients (the homelessyf Z R P H Q Z K R K D G Q R W F R P S O L H G Z L W K W K H I D P L O \ H W K L F D Q d people of color, while white industrial workingmen and white-col- lar workers of both genders were henceforth treated as "deserving poor." Shortly after the FERA began, a Transient Program was established for the homeless. Its initial impetus stemmed from widespread fear that a veritable army of homeless people was either on the move or living in squalid conditions in Hoovervilles of improvised housing built on the outskirts of most cities. The Transient Program included city shelters, which were usually renovated factories or warehouses, and camps outside cities. In both types of facilities, the homeless could receive food, some clothing, a place to sleep, and sometimes vocational training or work relief. Conditions in these places were often depressing, food was generally insufficient, and restrictions were placed on people's activities. This was particularly true of transient shelters and camps for individuals; families tended to receive better treatment.21 Another group that received relatively little relief in the FERA were women. Not until 5 months after the FERA began was a director of Women's Work appointed, and the following month a Women's Work Division established, to develop work-relief projects primarily for white women.22 Consisting chiefly of "traditional" women's activities, these This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 68 Social Service Review projects included sewing, gardening, canning, teaching, nursing, re- search, clerical work, as well as the arts and interviewing for the FERA. A maximum of 297,000 women were given work in the FERA in March 1935, only one-eighth of the total number of people then on the program. Reflecting their lower wages (compared to menyf L Q W K H S U L Y D W e sector, women received lower work-relief wage rates as well.23 Black and Hispanic men and women received even fewer work- relief positions than white women, and at similarly low levels of payment. FERA administrators explained that the paucity of work-relief positions was due to the difficulty of finding sponsors for projects involving people of color.24 This was a clear acceptance of discrimination based on race. In contrast to the treatment of transients, women, and people of color, the new "deserving poor" appeared to be white men and white- collar workers of both genders. Indeed, the predominant form of work relief in the FERA involved labor-intensive construction projects for unskilled men, as these projects received 70-86 percent of the total spent on all FERA work-relief projects.25 In addition to the FERA, two relief-related programs were established to provide work primarily for white men. Although the Civilian Con- servation Corps (CCCyf L V J H Q H U D O O \ W K R X J K W R I D V D V X F F H V V I X O F R Q V H U Y D W L R n program, President Roosevelt explained that it was intended to put "the wild boys of the road" and the young unemployed men in cities to work in the national forests.26 The Public Works Administration (PWAyf H V W D E O L V K H G L Q W K H O H J L V O D W L R Q W K D W P D Q G D W H G W K H 1 D W L R Q D O , Q - dustrial Recovery Act (NIRAyf S U R Y L G H G V H Y H U D O E L O O L R Q G R O O D U V R I I H G H U D l funds ($3.3 billion initiallyyf I R U F R Q V W U X F W L R Q S U R M H F W V W K D W Z H U H F R Q W U D F W H d out to private-sector firms. Work-relief projects for unemployed white men also encountered limits, some of which were clearly seen in the CWA. Within the first month of the program's operation, over 2 million new work-relief positions were created and assigned to the unemployed without having to first prove their eligibility by a "means test." Harry Hopkins, director of the FERA, CWA, and WPA, explained the importance of this policy: "We are licked before we start if this is confined entirely to the relief rolls. It is telling every man [sic] unemployed ... who fought this battle through from the beginning on his own, that he has to get on the relief rolls before he can get a job."27 Yet the CWA was cut back only 2 months after it was established, primarily due to interference with labor markets. Thereafter, the "means test" was once again used to ascertain the eligibility of all work-relief recipients. White-collar workers were also viewed as part of the "deserving poor" by FERA administrators, who apparently considered it more important to obviate the "ideology of the dole" for them than for any other unemployed workers. Policies implemented to make work relief more attractive for white-collar workers included establishing special This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 69 projects, making the determination of eligibility for relief almost painless and granting them relatively high relief payments. A myriad of white-collar projects were created. Many white-collar workers were given jobs collecting data on the unemployed and on the efficacy of other FERA programs. Projects were also established that utilized the talents of artists, writers, musicians, photographers, and actors. Indeed, these arts projects, which were expanded in the WPA, are among the best-known of all the New Deal programs. In addition, the Emergency Education Program and the Rural School Continuation Programs were set up to provide both work for un- employed teachers and education for students whose schools had been closed due to lack of revenues.28 The process of applying for relief was intentionally made far less humiliating for white-collar workers as they were able to receive relief based on "a questionnaire filled [out] by the applicant and verified by a professional or technical organization or by a case worker."29 This constituted a very different approach from the rigorous investigation carried over from the pre-FERA relief system and stipulated for all other relief applicants: The minimum investigation shall include a prompt visit to the home; inquiry as to real property, bank accounts, and other financial resources of the family; an interview with at least one recent employer; and determination of the ability and agreement of family, relatives, friends, and churches and other organizations to assist; also the liability under public welfare laws of the several States, of members of a family, or relatives to assume such support in order to prevent such member becoming a public charge." In addition, most relief recipients were visited at least once a month by FERA caseworkers "in order to establish the continued need of those who are receiving relief."31 Further inducements were implemented for white-collar workers. One was the establishment of separate relief offices for their use. As relief historian Josephine C. Brown explained, this was done "in order that they might avoid incurring the stigma of mingling with 'ordinary' relief applicants."32 The other was an increase in their relief payments. Initially done informally by state relief administrators throughout the country, FERA administrators mandated increased payments in an August 1934 directive stating that budgets for nonmanual and profes- sional workers shall provide for health, decency, and comfort "com- mensurate with the previous standard of living.""33 The FERA, the CWA, and the Preservation of Labor Markets The second dimension of relief concerns the level of payments and consequent effects on labor markets. When payments (for direct relief This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 70 Social Service Review and work reliefyf D U H K L J K H U W K D Q W K H O R Z H V W S U H Y D L O L Q J O R F D O Z D J H , people will tend to make the "rational economic choice" of welfare over wage labor, thereby directly impairing the functioning of some labor markets. In addition, there is an indirect effect on wages and labor markets since welfare payments serve as a prop to the entire structure of wage rates. When welfare payments are cut, people with jobs have less to "fall back on" if they are laid off.34 This decreases the bargaining power of employed workers, rendering them less able to demand higher wages and better working conditions. On the other hand, when the level of welfare payments is relatively high compared to income from wages, workers have a better "cushion" in times of unemployment. In effect, higher levels of welfare payments can erode the disciplinary function of unemployment by better enabling workers to subsist when they are not working for a wage. The level of wage rates on FERA and CWA work-relief projects provoked much controversy and was the locus of a great deal of struggle. Throughout the duration of these programs, employers objected that work-relief wage rates were too high. On the other hand, those in favor of relatively high rates-primarily organized labor, members of the unemployed councils, and most federal relief administrators- tried to maintain or increase them. Organized labor supported high work-relief wage rates in order to bolster wage levels of employed workers, an illustration of work-relief payments providing a floor for the ladder of wage rates. Unemployed councils included higher work- relief wage rates among their demands, as this clearly benefited their members. In addition to making general demands for better relief, people on work relief sometimes staged strikes to specifically demand higher payments on the projects.35 Most federal relief officials favored a policy of maintaining work- relief wage rates at levels equal to or above those in the private sector with a mandated minimum amount. They believed that this would raise extremely low work-relief and private-sector wage rates, increase the purchasing power of the masses, and respond to the sometimes militant protests of sections of the working class. Harry Hopkins de- fended this policy in congressional hearings against complaints that work-relief wage rates were too high: "I have a feeling that the wage scale is not too high; that the people who want to lower the scale and bring it down are people who have maintained their existence through the payment of low wages; that if the new conditions mean anything it means a larger distribution of this world's goods in the hands of the workers, and an adequate or sufficient wage scale."36 At the same time, conservative members of the New Deal admin- istration supported employer demands that the FERA allow state relief administrators more discretion in setting work-relief wage rates. They argued that this would allow labor markets to function more efficiently This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 71 with minimum interference from the federal government. In practice, however, it would result in lower wage rates both for those on work relief and in the private sector. Work-relief wage rate policies underwent substantial changes in the FERA and CWA. During the first 6 months of the FERA, a family's total payment was determined by its budgetary deficiency, that is, the estimated amount of money needed each month, minus its resources. This sum was then divided by the relevant work-relief wage rate to determine the number of hours a person could work. Work-relief wage rates were initially set by local relief administrators based on private- sector wage rates in the area. However, this policy did little to raise low rates and increase "purchasing power." In some areas of the country, particularly in rural areas of the South, private-sector wage rates as meager as 10-12.5 cents per hour for agricultural workers led to work- relief wage rates as low as five cents per hour.37 Low work-relief wage rates led FERA administrators in July 1933 to adopt perhaps the most contentious of all relief policies, the 30- cents-per-hour minimum rate. This rate was well above private sector wage rates in some occupations, notably agriculture and domestic service, and in some areas of the country, especially in the rural South. In fact, the earliest and continuously most strident complaints that the 30-cents-per-hour minimum was higher than private-sector wage rates were voiced by employers, many of them Southern, of agricultural laborers. Accompanied by charges that private-sector wage rates were being "dislocated"-that is, raised-and that sufficient numbers of workers were not available, these protests continued unabated through November 1934 when the minimum rate was finally rescinded.38 Effects of the 30-cents-per-hour minimum work-relief wage rate were quickly evidenced as average monthly work-relief payments im- mediately began to climb. Indeed, the increase from July through October was 32 percent.39 However, amounts paid to work-relief re- cipients were still quite low in many areas of the country, with the averages often remaining below those of direct relief. Furthermore, a decrease was seen in the number of people on work relief, as some relief administrations chose to shut down work relief altogether in order to avoid paying rates of at least 30 cents per hour.40 The Civil Works Administration By the fall of 1933, anticipation of increased organizing among the unemployed during the upcoming winter led New Deal officials to believe that stronger measures were needed. Indeed, there was cause for concern. First, people's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and fuel became more acute in cold weather, contributing to an upsurge in militant actions by unemployed councils during each of the preceding This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 72 Social Service Review Depression winters. Second, since the FERA, PWA, and Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAAyf K D G I D L O H G W R V S D U N W K H H [ S H F W H d economy recovery, increasing numbers of the jobless had exhausted their savings and were consequently dependent on outside help. Finally, as a result of tax revenues that remained well below normal levels, most states and localities continued to experience fiscal difficulties and therefore simply did not have the resources to meet the needs of the unemployed.41 Thus the CWA was established in November 1933. Authorized through an executive order based on the National Industrial Recovery Administration (NIRAyf W K H & : $ Z D V D F O H D U O \ I H G H U D O S U R J U D P D s opposed to the FERA, which was state-operated under federal guide- lines.42 Rapid implementation was achieved by simply transferring FERA personnel to the new program. However, the CWA's most fun- damental difference from the FERA was that half of the participants were taken directly from the pool of unemployed workers without first undergoing a "means test."43 Lack of the "means test" meant that budgetary deficiency could not be used to determine a family's total monthly payment on the CWA. Instead the PWA's system was adopted, as states were classified into three zones and minimum hourly rates were set for each. In the southern zone the minimum for skilled workers was set at $1.00 and for unskilled workers at 40 cents; in the central zone the corresponding rates were $1.10 and 45 cents; and in the northern zone they were $1.20 and 50 cents. Wage rates for semiskilled labor were set between those for skilled and unskilled, and a maximum of 30 hours of work per week was established, as was also the case in the PWA.44 An important exception to the 40-cents-per-hour minimum wage rate was made for state highway projects, which retained the old 30-cents-per-hour min- imum rate.45 This seems to have been done because highway projects utilized almost exclusively unskilled labor, which was largely unorganized and therefore had little power to defend a 40-cents-per-hour minimum wage rate. Federal relief officials' promises of quickly putting over 2 million additional people to work were quickly realized. In October 1933, 1.5 million people were on work relief. By mid-January 1934, this number had almost tripled to 4.4 million, approximately one-third of the un- employed. Compensation tripled as well, as average monthly payments increased from $16.96 in October 1933 to $60.16 2 months later.46 Strong reactions to the CWA were seen almost immediately. Enthu- siastic support was manifested by workers, New Deal officials, local government officials, small businessmen, liberals, and progressives, who perceived it as a spark for economic recovery. This was evidenced in an increase in retail merchants' sales of low-priced consumer goods and tools for construction projects, which in turn led to a rise in This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 73 private-sector employment.4' The feelings of many people were summed up by federal relief official Arthur Goldschmidt: "The CWA just started everything going."48 Support for the CWA was countered by harsh criticism from most of the business community. Many employers complained that the relief wages paid to several million unemployed workers were often higher than prevailing wage rates in the private sector, dislocating these latter rates and making it difficult to hire sufficient numbers of workers. Since the 1933 average hourly wage for production workers in man- ufacturing was 44 cents, it appears likely that CWA wage rates did indeed surpass private-sector rates for some categories of work in addition to agricultural and domestic service.49 The complaint that high CWA wage rates caused people to prefer the CWA to jobs in the private sector seemed to be validated by the high numbers of jobless who signed up. Reporters noted that city halls in New England were "almost mobbed" by CWA applicants. In Chelsea, Massachusetts, for example, 2,000 applicants were said to have been "congregating sullenly" while waiting for 155 CWA positions. New York City employment offices were so swamped with the several thousand unemployed people who began lining up shortly past midnight the night before CWA applications were taken, that branch offices were quickly set up in settlement houses and welfare organizations in order to handle the crowds.50 Additional criticisms were also directed at the CWA. Most widespread and problematic were complaints that the CWA was too expensive and would consequently cause an even larger budget deficit, considered by some to be a major impediment to economic recovery. Also commonly heard were criticisms of "make-work," that is, the projects were seen as unnecessary and devised solely to provide a semblance of work. Still other critics charged that the entire program was prone to graft and corruption. The threatened result of all these complaints was that the CWA would serve to further discourage private initiative; in other words, production and employment would not be substantially increased unless the situation was rectified.51 Business-sector criticisms of the CWA provoked a rather quick re- sponse from federal relief officials. In mid-January 1934, the CWA was sharply curtailed by cutting the number of hours individuals could work each week, and the planned termination of the entire program was declared. Rapidly put into effect, the first directive concerning the cut in hours arrived in a telegram on January 18, 1934, and mandated compliance from state relief administrations the following day. It ordered a reduction in the number of hours people could work on the CWA to 24 per week in cities with populations over 2,500 and 15 per week in towns with populations less than 2,500 or in the open countryside. Supervisory, clerical, and professional personnel were This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 74 Social Service Review exempted, as they could continue to work 30 hours per week. Five days later (in another telegram by Hopkinsyf W K H L Q L W L D O S R O L F \ Z D s amended to allow people in predominantly urban counties to also work 24 hours per week.52 Implementation of these cutbacks reflected the strength of different sections of the working class. The reduction in hours was in effect a form of wage-cutting, evidenced in the 25 percent decline in average weekly payments during the week following the policy's inception.53 Greater militance and organization of the unemployed in northern cities was reflected in the more precipitous reduction in hours in rural as opposed to urban areas and in the program's dismantling beginning in the South. As the CWA ended in March 1934, the separation of policies for rural and urban areas was further solidified in the estab- lishment of two separate programs. The FERA was resumed as the Emergency Work Relief Program (EWRPyf I R U W K H M R E O H V V L Q F L W L H V D Q d contiguous areas, while the Rural Rehabilitation Division was set up for the unemployed in less densely populated regions. Federal relief administrators' announcement of plans to immediately reduce and shortly terminate the CWA elicited strong support for the program and pleas for its continuation from a wide range of sources. Workers, retailers, progressives, and elected officials led to this chorus of proponents. As a writer in Time stated, "The wave of complaints against the way the CWA was run was only a mild ripple compared to the comber of complaints against the plan to stop running the CWA altogether.""54 The CWA had become, according to Time, "the most popular part of the New Deal," illustrated by the 37,000 letters sent to Congress in just 1 week in late January in reaction to the an- nouncement of its impending termination.55 This strong show of support caused New Deal administrators to waver somewhat on their decision to end the CWA. But it was carried through nonetheless. The only concession was a suggestion that the CWA might be revived to a limited extent during the following winter. Correcting Work-Relief Wage-Rate Policies to Preserve Labor Markets Following the demise of the CWA, federal relief programs again became both smaller and more restrictive. Returning to pre-CWA policies for determining eligibility for relief and setting work-relief wage rates and hours, a means test was again required for all applicants, and budgetary deficiency was used to determine total payments and the number of hours people could work. Furthermore, the number of people on the relief rolls was cut in half, falling from 4.4 million in January to 2.2 million in April.56 However, even these cuts proved insufficient to critics within the business sector. By the fall of 1934, state relief admin- istrations had already begun responding to protests from agricultural This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 75 employers that both direct-relief and work-relief payments were too high and thereby prevented them from attracting sufficient numbers of workers. Relief officials in some states that experienced high seasonal peaks of agricultural employment resumed the pre-FERA practice of temporarily suspending all relief when seasonal labor was needed and requiring new and conclusive proof of inability to secure a job before resuming any type of aid. Most common in southern cotton and tobacco- growing regions, this practice was officially condoned by the FERA in September 1934.57 On November 19, 1934, shortly after the Democrats' resounding victory in the midterm elections, FERA officials capped their work- relief wage-rate policy changes by finally abolishing the contentious 30-cents-per-hour minimum rate. Relief analyst Edward A. Williams explained that unremitting opposition to the 30-cents-per-hour min- imum finally led the FERA to abandon it.5" The New York Times phrased it more bluntly: "[The FERA] capitulated today in its battle to maintain a minimum wage scale of 30 cents an hour for employees on work relief projects.""59 The clearest impact of this policy change was on low work-relief wage rates. The prediction, made by FERA official Jacob Baker, that "the result should be a satisfactory adjustment to the customs and requirements of the communities," was validated as work-relief wage rates in many areas of the country quickly plummeted.60 By January 1935, rates had fallen below 30 cents per hour throughout the South. In Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee, work-relief wage rates between 10 and 20 cents per hour predominated, and rates in southern rural areas fell to between 10 and 12 cents per hour.61 The FERA, the CWA, and the Logic of the Market The form of work relief and the extent to which it preserves or interferes with the logic of the market constitutes the third dimension of relief. In capitalist economic systems, money is used to produce goods and services only if the profits they will generate are expected to be greater than profits resulting from other uses of the same money, primarily financial speculation. Thus profitability-the logic of the market-is the main determinant in decisions regarding production and investment. Alternatively, production decisions can be based solely on people's needs. Work relief can then be viewed along a spectrum from programs that are supportive of the logic of the market, that is, production-for- profit, to those based solely on human needs, or production-for-use. In existence before the FERA, production-for-use refers to projects in which consumer goods are produced by relief recipients and then used by the producers or distributed to others on relief. Problems can arise because production-for-use can lead people to question the ra- This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 76 Social Service Review tionale of relying on profits as the basis for production decisions and can, therefore, pose alternatives to capitalism. Although business sector concerns about work-relief wage rates were settled by the fall of 1934, threats to the "logic of the market" were not so quickly resolved. Instead, the spring of 1934 saw the expansion of production-for-use and the production of consumer goods that were clearly needed by the unemployed. It is quite telling that these projects, which provided over 15 percent of all work relief by the winter of 1935, were cut substantially in the WPA, and that projects businessmen seemed to find most offensive were completely eliminated. Three different types of work relief projects were established in the FERA: construction projects improving public property; white-collar projects for education, research, and the arts; and production-for-use. Construction projects constituted the vast majority of all FERA and CWA work relief: 27-34 percent of the total spent was used to build and repair roads; approximately 15 percent went to improve public buildings; and other construction projects, including work on sewer systems and other utilities, recreational facilities, waterways and flood control, and airports, received from 30 to 38 percent of the funds.62 Projects for white-collar workers in the arts, education, and research received approximately 5.7 percent of the CWA's funds and 11.5 percent of the allocations in the third phase of the FERA, the EWRP.63 Although construction projects, and especially white-collar projects, were routinely criticized as "make-work," most businessmen's ire was reserved for the newly created production-for-use projects. Production-for-use projects that predated the FERA-subsistence gardening, canning produce, and sewing in labor-intensive workrooms for women, and fuel procurement, primarily chopping wood, for men-were continued in the FERA and engendered almost no criticism from the business community. Indeed, labor-intensive sewing rooms composed the majority of production-for-use projects in the FERA and CWA. However, the production-for-use projects established in the 1930s-aid to self-help cooperatives, labor-intensive mattress making, processing cattle dying from the drought, and production of consumer goods in previously idle factories-became targets of vehement business- sector attacks. Complaints from both employers and workers concerning the "make- work" nature of many work-relief projects in the first few months of the FERA and the CWA led to the expansion of production-for-use as the CWA ended in the spring of 1934. Businessmen's complaints centered on projects typified by snow shoveling and leaf raking, which were continued from pre-FERA programs, while workers' criticisms targeted projects that were considered luxuries (e.g., landscaping, bridle paths, and airportsyf 4 Responses to criticisms of make-work had two contradictory results- the renewed pledge that work-relief projects would not compete with This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 77 private industry and the expansion of production-for-use. Pledges of noncompetition bolstered the use of construction projects and led to the policy of setting up most work-relief projects with a maximum amount of labor and a minimum amount of capital.65 Relief officials seemed to hope that if work-relief projects had lower capital-labor ratios compared to the private sector, they would operate on a different basis from private-sector production and thereby preclude interference with the logic of the market. Although somewhat effective with con- struction projects, this was not at all the case with the new production- for-use projects. Federal relief official Nels Anderson explained the no-win situation: "It is these [make-work projects], in fact, which often come nearest to meeting the government's pledge to industry to do only non-competitive work. If a project is useful it is sure to be criticized because it is competitive, while if it is non-competitive it is just as likely to be condemned by the same critics for not being useful."66 Production-for-Use Projects Established in the 1930s The first new production-for-use projects to receive FERA aid were self-help cooperatives. Cooperatives, established as early as 1930 by groups of unemployed workers, enabled members to trade their labor services to farmers for the ability to harvest crops. This arrangement worked quite well in some areas, especially southern California, since prices of agricultural commodities were so low that wages paid to workers for harvesting crops were often greater than the revenues farmers would obtain from their sale. FERA aid was provided to co- operatives on an experimental basis with several restrictions, most importantly that competition with private industry was prohibited.67 In practice this meant that goods produced by cooperatives could not be sold through normal market channels. Problems quickly arose for the cooperatives. The barter arrangements that had been so helpful in the pre-Roosevelt years of the Depression were no longer needed by most farmers due to the success of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAAyf L Q U D L V L Q J W K H S U L F H s of agricultural commodities. Consequently, production of goods became virtually the sole activity of the cooperatives. However, few avenues for sales existed since only two groups were allowed to purchase these goods: cooperative members, who had little money, and government agencies, primarily the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (which bought commodities to be distributed as in-kind reliefyf D Q G W K H V W D W e relief administrations. The first of the production-for-use projects implemented by the New Dealers was the mattress-making project. Planned during the winter of 1934 by administrators in the FERA and the AAA, it was designed to meet the needs of both programs. The AAA's goal of raising prices of agricultural goods was accomplished by reducing their This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 78 Social Service Review supply. However, the "destruction tactics" of slaughtering 6 million piglets and 200,000 pregnant sows and plowing under 10 million acres of cotton had elicited substantial public disapproval the previous spring.68 Thus AAA officials tried to find alternative uses for some of the surplus commodities, including cotton, that had been taken off the market.69 Federal relief officials favored the mattress project, since it would provide both work relief for women and bedding for some of the unemployed.70 In June 1934, FERA administrators authorized the purchase of 250,000 bales of cotton (less than 10yb R I W K H V X U S O X V F R W W R Q D F T X L U H d by the AAAyf I R U W K H S U R G X F W L R Q R I D S S U R [ L P D W H O \ P L O O L R Q P D W W U H V V H s and several million comforters.71 Both to preclude business sector charges of unfair competition and to prevent interference with the AAA's program of supply reduction, regulations for these projects clearly stipulated that the mattresses would not be sold through regular market channels, but would be distributed only as in-kind relief.72 By mid-August 1934, 559 labor-intensive workrooms had been set up in 40 states for the production of mattresses and other bedding (comforters and sheetsyf : R P H Q V H Z H G W K H P D W W U H V V H V D O P R V W H [ F O X V L Y H O \ E \ K D Q G , and men on work relief built the minimal equipment (primarily framesyf that was needed. The mattresses produced in these workrooms were indeed well made, judged to be of such good quality that they would last longer than mattresses produced in the private sector.73 The third type of production-for-use project to receive federal aid was centers for processing (slaughtering and canningyf F D W W O H V K H H S , and goats dying from the severe drought that had turned much of the midwest into a "dustbowl." Since facilities in existing commercial canneries were not extensive enough to handle the millions of animals who were close to death by 1934, the FERA and the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (FSRCyf G H Y H O R S H G Z R U N U H O L H I S U R F H V V L Q J F H Q W H U s on an emergency basis. The FSRC purchased the animals and directed the program, while the FERA provided funds and work relief labor and then distributed the products as in kind relief. By January 1, 1935, approximately 12 million cattle, sheep, and goats had been processed in the centers.74 In addition, leather from hides that were by-products of the processing centers was used in other projects, pri- marily shoe repair and the production of wearing apparel and har- nesses. The production-for-use projects that elicited the strongest business- sector criticism were those in which idle workers were put to work in idle factories. Facilities that had been totally or partially shut down by their owners were leased by state and local relief administrations for production of a variety of consumer goods. Most extensive in Ohio, this type of project was known throughout the country as the Ohio Plan.75 This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 79 The Ohio Plan began in June 1934 with the incorporation of the Ohio Relief Production Units by the State Relief Commission of Ohio. Twelve factories were rented that summer for the production of clothing and housewares, with former employees often returning to work in the reopened plants. This time, however, they were on relief. Intending to provide work relief in these production units for all of the 56,000 industrial workers in the state who were on relief, Ohio relief officials conducted a survey of all factories to determine their suitability for the program. Other states also leased factories for work-relief projects. An underwear factory was reopened in Bay City, Michigan, enabling the 250 former employees to return there on work relief. Two more underwear factories were opened in Maine, and at least two knitting mills were rented from their owners in Massachusetts.76 In Ohio and elsewhere the articles were manufactured in a variety of styles and materials to prevent their being branded as "relief goods." Assurances of noncompetition with private industry accompanied the Ohio Plan. Products manufactured in these projects could not be sold through normal market channels, but were available only as in- kind relief to recipients of FERA aid. All of the factories were leased on a short-term basis with the stipulation that any factory again able to manufacture profitably would be turned back to its owners. This seemed easy to enforce since the former management personnel were often reemployed to run the leased factories. Finally, federal relief officials periodically reiterated their promise that purchases from the private sector would not be substantially curtailed in favor of goods produced in leased factories or in any of the other production-for-use projects. Elimination of the New Production-for-Use Projects to Preserve the Logic of the Market Business-sector criticisms of the new production-for-use projects began shortly after project implementation and increased in stridency until their termination. Charges were made that these projects were less efficient than private enterprise, presented the private sector with unfair competition, and would lead to socialism. All three criticisms pertain to the logic of the market. Charges of inefficiency in work-relief projects have historically been based on the lack of a profit motive. The assumption is that unless production is based on profits, it cannot be efficient. However, accounts of FERA production-for-use projects indicate that projects involving meat processing, harness making, and production of consumer goods, in both cooperatives and in idle factories, were in fact operating efficiently by industry standards."77 The same cannot be said, however, of the This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 80 Social Service Review mattress-making project since production in these labor-intensive workrooms was deliberately designed to avoid competition with private- sector mattress manufacturers by using a maximum amount of labor and a minimum of capital equipment. Thus the criticisms of ineffi- ciency arose out of the very constraints that precluded efficient pro- duction.78 Complaints of unfair competition from public-sector production also were not surprising. Businessmen expanded on this contention, arguing that production-for-use would undermine the recovery and further increase unemployment since private-sector production would be replaced by public-sector production.79 However, this argument was flawed since the goods were not sold through normal market channels, but were distributed only to people on direct relief who, after 5 years of the Depression, had minimal resources; consequently, the receipt of these goods would not materially decrease their purchases of similar goods produced in the private sector. Business Week clarified this argument, explaining that competition from the existing small scale of production-for-use projects was not worrisome; instead, busi- nessmen's antipathy toward production-for-use stemmed from "the uncomfortable thought that government manufacture might be ex- panded widely and might become permanent."80 The final criticism, that production-for-use would lead toward so- cialism, was simply an expression of the business sector's most fun- damental fear-that production-for-profit would be replaced by pro- duction-for-use. However, their fears were not realized. By the time the FERA ended, so had federal aid to all of the new production-for- use projects. The cooperative program was severely restricted by both business- sector criticisms and the gradual switch by relief administrations from payment in-kind to payment by cash or check. Businessmen put up a "great protest" whenever federal agencies purchased goods produced by cooperatives, leading to only limited acquisition of cooperatives' goods.s' The continual protests against cooperatives also led to re- ductions in FERA aid. For example, cooperatives in California, where most cooperatives were located, received only .37 percent of the total FERA grant funds (and even less in the CWAyf I U R P - D Q X D U \ 3 through June 1935.82 The mattress-making project elicited strong criticism from both mat- tress producers and other businessmen. Alleged unfair competition from the relief projects provided the basis for "howls of protest from mattress manufacturers."83 However, the most important factor in the early containment of the project was the collective attack by employers who manufactured other products. As Anderson explained, other businessmen joined the protests of mattress manufacturers because This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 81 "they were afraid of what mattress-making might lead to."84 Less than 3 months after it was established, the mattress-making project was cut back. Although the FERA had initially been authorized to produce 2 million mattresses, federal relief officials announced in September 1934 that the project would be terminated within 2 to 3 months, after approximately 1 million mattresses had been made.85 Centers for processing animals dying from the drought were targets of criticisms by retailers of processed foodstuffs, especially of meat.86 Even more strident attacks were aimed at the projects established to process by-products of the animals. These complaints intensified during the late summer of 1934 as proposals were released to increase pro- duction of shoes and other leather products made from animal hides.87 Acceding to the protests of shoe manufacturers and other businessmen, FERA officials announced that instead of using the approximately three-and-one-half million hides in storage to make goods in work- relief projects, they would be processed by plants in the private sector through bids allowing a profit.88 The Ohio Plan was the target of both intense criticism from the business sector and strong support from other quarters. Relief ad- ministrators and work-relief recipients applauded the leased factories because they were more similar to regular jobs than other forms of work relief. Thus the work seemed less like a dole and better preserved workers' morale. Relief officials also believed that it more effectively protected work habits and skills, and consequently helped sustain the "work ethic." Further support was evidenced from ir dividual busi- nessmen whose factories were rented by local relief administrations, since they obtained payments from the leases, maintained their work- forces, and sometimes worked there themselves.89 Most businessmen, however, opposed the factory-lessing projects. Their criticisms began shortly after the inception of the program during the summer of 1934 and intensified throughout the following fall. As was true of the mattress-making project, protests were lodged both by employers who manufactured the same types of goods as those made in relief factories and by other businessmen as well. Sidney S. Korzenik, secretary of the National Knitted Outerwear Code Authority, criticized the two knitting mills leased in Massachusetts as "an inefficient method of distributing relief funds and menacing to private industry."90 Criticism of the Ohio Production Units was so effective that the Ohio Plan was completely dismantled following the FERA takeover of the Ohio Relief Administration in March 1935.91 The remaining leased factories projects were also terminated. According to Business Week: "So far as FERA is concerned it is apparent now that it will not fly in the face of the indignant protest of business by countenancing any extensive excursion into the field of private industry.""'92 This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 82 Social Service Review Results of the FERA and the CWA: Direct Relief in the Permanent Social Security Act and Work Relief in the Temporary WPA The Social Security Act and the WPA were passed in the spring of 1935 during the "second hundred days" of the New Deal. FERA and CWA work relief had proven so problematic that no work program was included in the permanent Social Security Act. Work relief was relegated instead to the temporary Works Progress Administration where it was left to expire in 1943 as mobilization for World War II brought the Great Depression to an end. The increasing vehemence of business-sector protest against pro- duction-for-use projects in the fall of 1934 was undoubtedly affected by a desire to influence proposals then being drawn up for a permanent system of relief. During the developmental stage of this process in the summer and fall of 1934, many government officials and others involved in formulating relief legislation did indeed envision work relief as a component of the permanent federal program. In the report explaining the proposal for Employment Assurance, the Committee on Economic Security, which drafted the initial version of the Social Security Act, declared its support for work relief: "We regard work as preferable to other forms of relief where possible."93 In addition to Employment Assurance, other proposals were also put forward. Most importantly, Hopkins presented a plan that would have transformed the FERA into a permanent Federal Work Relief Corporation," the United States Conference of Mayors proposed a public employment plan similar to the CWA that would have provided jobs for all of the able-bodied unemployed,95 and many social workers favored "taking the E out of FERA" and establishing a permanent federal system of work relief and direct relief.96 The business sector countered with substantial criticisms and vague proposals. The most serious of these were made by 90 business leaders at the Joint Business Conference for Economic Recovery, held in December 1934. In the conference report, they declared: "The most effective solution of the problem of unemployment and relief is the creation of such confidence between industry and the government that business can proceed with plans to develop new industries, to enlarge existing enterprises, and freely to place private capital in the investment field.""97 They asserted further that this confidence could best be achieved by the federal government returning all relief programs to the state and local level, abolishing make-work, substituting direct relief for work relief to the greatest extent possible, and reducing all relief in order to balance the federal budget.98 The report went on to This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 83 articulate the business leaders' basic fear: "Government competition with private business leads toward socialism."99 The essence of these criticisms was taken into account as the Social Security Act was revised.100 Although the Social Security Act succeeded in providing the foundation for a permanent program of income- support, its final version was less progressive than the original draft. In addition to excising Employment Assurance, opposition from the American Medical Association was widely considered to have caused the elimination of plans for national health insurance.101 Stipulations that Old Age Assistance provide "a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health" and that it could not be denied if requirements as to age and need were met-provisions which would have prohibited racial discrimination-were replaced by the virtually meaningless phrase that general assistance payments would be furnished "as far as practicable under the conditions in such State."102 Exclusion of workers in agri- culture, domestic service, the government, and nonprofit organizations from the social insurance programs ensured that most women and people of color would be eligible only for general assistance. Fur- thermore, after much debate it was decided that social insurance pro- grams would be financed by regressive payroll taxes instead of potentially progressive taxes on income and wealth.'03 The WPA, which contained all federally-supported work relief, caused far fewer problems than the FERA. Continuing as the FERA had, as a clearly temporary program, enabling legislation was passed each year from 1935 through 1943.104 The WPA provided work relief for between 1.5 and 3.3 million people (from 16yb W R \b of the joblessyf at any one time, the high points occurring in October and November of 1936 and 1938, shortly before elections.'05 The "ideology of the dole" was reinforced in the post-FERA relief system. Distinctions between those receiving work relief and direct relief were strengthened, as direct relief was turned back to state and local relief administrations. Since state and local revenues had not appreciably increased and federal policies were no longer in effect, immediate reductions were seen in both the number of cases receiving direct relief and the level of payments. This was accomplished, in part, by the reinstatement in many areas of pre-FERA practices designed to discourage application for relief: investigation of cases by police and firemen, forcing people to stand in line in public places in order to receive surplus commodities, sending single people to almshouses and county poorhouses instead of providing outdoor relief in com- munities, and providing an increasing portion of relief payments in- kind instead of in cash.'06 Finally, as increasingly reliable estimates of homelessness became available through FERA investigations, the federal government withdrew its support for the Transient Program and re- This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 84 Social Service Review turned responsibility for care of the homeless to state and local relief agencies. Consequently, transients usually received nothing.107 The reassertion of state and local authority over relief programs also led to a resumption of the work test, which quickly reappeared in local programs as the FERA was winding down in late 1935. By 1940, the work test was operating in at least 24 states where it affected approximately 180,000 people (about 8yb R I W K R V H R Q : 3 $ S U R M H F W V \f.'08 The WPA continued to modify work-relief wage-rate policies that had been perceived as interfering with labor markets during the FERA and the CWA. Individual WPA payments were initially based on a monthly security wage rather than an hourly rate, with the amount determined by skill level (unskilled, intermediate, skilled, and profes- sional and technicalyf D U H D R I W K H F R X Q W U \ I R X U F D W H J R U L H V \f, and degree of urbanization (five categoriesyf 7 K H U H V X O W D Q W O H Y H O V R I S D \ P H Q t ranged from $19.00 dollars per month-far below the contentious FERA minimum-to $94.00 per month.109 Compared to the FERA, the WPA posed virtually no alternatives to the logic of the market. FERA production-for-use projects that had called into question the basic rationality of production-for-profit were terminated by the time the WPA began. The only production-for-use projects continued in the WPA were those that predated the FERA."110 Conclusion Government work programs established since the 1930s have incor- porated lessons learned in the FERA and the CWA: programs have been more clearly divided into those for welfare recipients and those for the unemployed and underemployed regardless of their welfare status; instead of creating jobs for the unemployed most of the programs have either provided education and training or placed participants in already-existing jobs; mandatory programs have outweighed voluntary programs; payments have been designed to avoid interference with labor markets; and production-for-use has remained outside the boundaries of consideration. Mandatory work relief, which returned on the local level for some of the "unemployable" jobless removed from the federal rolls as the FERA ended, remained the only form of government work program from mid-1943 through the early 1960s. Federal work programs returned in 1962 with the Manpower Devel- opment and Training Act (MDTAyf Z K L F K S U R Y L G H G R Q W K H M R E W U D L Q L Q g in the private sector and vocational training through the public sector. In 1967 the Work Incentive (WINyf 3 U R J U D P X V H G D F R P E L Q D W L R Q R f carrots and sticks to channel AFDC recipients into already-existing jobs in the low-wage labor market. The only programs that were perceived as threatening to labor markets and the logic of the market-and the only job creation pro- This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 85 grams-appeared in the 1970s with the Public Employment Program (PEPyf I U R P D Q G W K H 3 X E O L F 6 H U Y L F H ( P S O R \ P H Q W 3 6 ( \f com- ponent of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETAyf from 1974-81. Complaints that were heard often in the 1930s were commonly made towards PSE: wages were too high, the program was prone to graft and corruption, the work was done inefficiently, and only make-work was provided."' Yet contradictory requirements in CETA's authorizing legislation made the latter two charges virtually inevitable. CETA was mandated to simultaneously provide useful services and prevent substitution of CETA projects for normal government operations. However, projects that were outside normal government operations were easily viewed as not useful. Additional limitations on both the duration of the projects and the length of a person's partic- ipation in the program, designed to prevent substitution of CETA workers for "normal government operations," exacerbated problems of make-work and inefficiency by complicating long-term planning and forcing agencies to spend a good deal of time training new CETA workers when the previous person's 12 months ended. Despite the fact that a maximum of 742,000 PSE jobs were created-compared to the CWA's 4.3 million jobs-criticisms of PSE seemed as intense as similar complaints had been in the 1930s."2 The outcome was similar as well. In 1978 CETA established the Private Sector Initiative Program (PSIPyf L Q Z K L F K 3 U L Y D W H , Q G X V W U \ & R X Q F L O V 3 , & V \f shaped training programs to meet the needs of local employers, and the entire CETA program was terminated shortly after Ronald Reagan became president in 1981. Government work programs in the 1980s have created virtually no problems for "ideology of the dole," the functioning of labor markets, or the logic of the market. Although it was short-lived, the PSIP provided the model for the Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPAyf R I , as local PICs have continued to design training programs for welfare and nonwelfare participants. Work programs for welfare recipients have often been mandatory and punitive. Given much discretion by the federal government, individual states have set up their own WIN demonstration (alternatives to WINyf D Q G Z R U N I D U H S U R J U D P V $ O W K R X J h minimal education and training has often been included, most of the programs have centered around work tests, or work requirements, as welfare recipients have been required to work at specially created public service jobs in order to receive their welfare checks."113 Job creation has been virtually absent from the 1980s debates. Welfare reform is again on the political agenda. Although substantial agreement exists among many legislators and policy analysts that welfare recipients should work outside the home, fundamental questions re- main.114 Should work be mandatory or voluntary? How should pay- ments, including work-related expenses, be set? What types of projects, This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 86 Social Service Review if any, should the government implement and how extensive should they be? Government work programs that existed in the 1930s, particularly the FERA and the CWA, can provide models for developing progressive alternatives to current programs and proposals. It is clear from the experience of the 1930s that the federal government-then only a fraction of its current size-does indeed have the capacity to put several million people to work in decent jobs at decent wages. These programs from the 1930s can also be used to support arguments that work should be voluntary and that payments should be high enough to lift people out of poverty. Finally, current government work programs could use as examples the innovative projects of the 1930s: construction and repair of public property (e.g., repairing bridges and mass trans- portation systemsyf S X E O L F V H F W R U S U R M H F W V H J W H D F K H U V D L G H V D Q G F R Q - servationyf S X E O L F V X S S R U W I R U W K H D U W V D Q G S U R G X F W L R Q R I Q H H G H G F R Q - sumer goods for other welfare recipients and the homeless. Applying lessons from the 1930s to the present can thereby help regain control of the welfare-reform agenda. Notes 1. In 1939 the WPA's name was changed from the Works Progress Administration to the WPA. 2. These definitions use the phrase "work that is normally paid a wage" to differentiate it from nonwage work performed in the home. 3. Eligibility for Employment Assurance would have occurred automatically after the exhaustion of a person's unemployment compensation and after a brief wait for those excluded from the unemployment compensation program. 4. Even Edwin Witte, chair of the Committee on Economic Security that formulated the Social Security Act, noted that at the time of its passage it was "acclaimed as sound and conservative." Edwin Witte, The Development of the Social Security Act (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962yf S 6 H H D O V R H J 3 D X O + ' R X J O D V 6 R F L D O 6 H F X U L W y in the United States: An Analysis and Appraisal of the Federal Social Security Act (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936yf S 0 D [ Z H O O 6 6 W H Z D U W 6 R F L D O 6 H F X U L W \ 1 H Z < R U N 1 R U W R Q , 1937yf S $ U W K X U 0 6 F K O H V L Q J H U - U 7 K H & R P L Q J R I W K H 1 H Z ' H D O Y R O R I 7 K H $ J e of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959yf S S ) U D Q F H V ) R [ 3 L Y H Q D Q d Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage, 1971yf S S : D O W H U , 7 U D W W Q H U ) U R P 3 R R U / D Z W R : H O I D U H 6 W D W H $ + L V W R U y of Social Welfare in America (New York: Free Press, 1979yf S S - L O O 4 X D G D J Q R , "Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935," American Sociological Review 49, no. 5 (1984yf - R K Q + ( K U H Q U H L F K 7 K H $ O W U X L V W L F , P D J L Q D W L R Q $ + L V W R U \ R I 6 R F L D l Work and Social Policy in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985yf , p. 100; and Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present (Boston: South End Press, 1988yf S S . 5. Arthur W. Macmahon, John D. Millett, and Gladys Ogden, The Administration of Federal Work Relief (New York: Da Capo, 1971yf S S . 6. Alan Pifer and Forrest Chisman, for project on the federal social role, 50th Anniversary Edition: The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935 and other Basic Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act (Washington, D.C.: National Conference on Social Welfare, 1985yf S [ . 7. An additional 93,000 people were given work relief through the general relief program, bringing the total to 4.4 million. Theodore E. Whiting and T. J. Woofter, Jr., This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 87 Summary of Relief and Federal Work Program Statistics, 1933-1940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941yf S D Q G : R U N V 3 U R M H F W V $ G P L Q L V W U D W L R Q : 3 $ \f, Final Statistical Report of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942yf S . 8. Piven and Cloward, p. 82; and Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: Basic, 1986yf S S . 9. See, e.g., Schlesinger, pp. 274-75; and Alden E Briscoe, "Public Service Employment in the 1930s: The WPA," in The Political Economy of Public Service Employment, ed. Harold L. Sheppard, Bennet Harrison, and William J. Spring (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972yf S . 10. Piven and Cloward, chap. 3; Katz, pp. 225-26; and Robert H. Bremner, "The New Deal and Social Welfare," in Fifty Years Later: The New Deal Evaluated, ed. Harvard Sitkoff (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985yf S . 11. See, e.g., Briscoe, p. 96; Henry L. Allen, "A Radical Critique of Federal Work and Manpower Programs, 1933-74," in Welfare in America: Controlling the Dangerous Classes, ed. Betty Reid Mandell (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975yf ( Z D n Clague, in collaboration with Leo Kramer, Manpower Policies and Programs: A Review, 1935-75 (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Upjohn Institute, 1976yf / H R Q D U G * R R G Z L Q D Q G 3 D X O L Q e Milius, "Forty Years of Work Training," in The Work Incentive Experience, ed. Charles D. Garvin, Audrey D. Smith, and William J. Reid (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1978yf D Q G * U D F H $ ) U D Q N O L Q D Q G 5 D Q G D O O % 5 L S O H \ & ( 7 $ 3 R O L W L F V D Q G 3 R O L F \ , 1973-1982 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984yf . 12. This reality has hit home for many in the 1970s and 1980s, as a variety of people, from steelworkers to university professors, have lost jobs they believed would be theirs until retirement. 13. Abramovitz. 14. See ibid., pp. 86-93, 155-163; and Katz, esp. chap. 1, for discussions of these early work tests. 15. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975yf S . 16. Piven and Cloward (n. 4 aboveyf S . 17. WPA, p. 46; and Joanna C. Colcord, William C. Koplovitz, and Russell H. Kurtz, Emergency Work Relief: As Carried Out in Twenty-six American Communities, 1930-1931, with Suggestions for Setting Up a Program (New York: Russell Sage, 1932yf S S . 18. Discussions of the unemployed councils can be found, e.g., in Roy Rosenzweig, "Radicals and the Jobless: The Musteites and the Unemployed Leagues, 1932-36," Labor History 16 (Winter 1975yf 2 U J D Q L ] L Q J W K H 8 Q H P S O R \ H G 7 K H ( D U O \ < H D U s of the Great Depression," Radical America 10 (July-August 1976yf D Q G 3 L Y H n and Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage, 1977yf F K D S . 19. In May 1934, the first month for which data was collected, direct relief consisted of 90.8 percent in-kind payments and only 9.2 percent cash payments. In contrast, only 5.9 percent of work relief was dispensed in kind, with the remaining 94.1 percent in cash. By December 1935, in-kind payments still dominated direct relief, as 55.4 percent of it was given in kind and 44.6 percent in cash. At that time, 96.8 percent of work relief was dispensed in cash and only 3.2 percent in kind. WPA (n. 7 aboveyf S . Relief payments had historically been given in kind due to the widespread view, which stemmed from the "ideology of the dole," that relief recipients were irresponsible and could not be trusted to purchase the goods they really needed. 20. In fact it was estimated that "unemployables" constituted approximately 20 percent of the FERA relief rolls. Arthur E. Burns, "Federal Emergency Relief Administration," in The Municipal Yearbook 1937: The Authoritative Resume of Activities and Statistical Data of American Cities, ed. Clarence E. Ridley and Orin F. Nolting (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1937yf S . 21. Ellery F. Reed, Federal Transient Program: An Evaluative Survey, May to July, 1934 (New York City: Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, 1934yf . 22. Doris Carothers, Chronology of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, May 12, 1933, to December 31, 1935, WPA Research Monograph 6 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937yf S S . This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 88 Social Service Review 23. Ibid., 27-28; Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERAyf 3 U R F H H G L Q J V R f the Conference on Emergency Needs of Women (November 20, 1933yf : R P H Q V ' L Y L V L R Q " FERA Monthly Report (July 1935yf S S D Q G 0 D U \ ( O L ] D E H W K 3 L G J H R Q : R P H Q L n the Economy of the United States of America: Employed Women under N.R.A. Codes (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937yf . 24. Alfred Edgar Smith, "The Negro and Relief," FERA Monthly Report (March 1936yf , pp. 14-15. 25. WPA, p. 54; and Corrington Gill, "The Civil Works Administration," in Ridley and Nolting, eds., p. 431. 26. William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper Colophon, 1963yf S . 27. Macmahon et al. (n. 5 aboveyf S . 28. Carothers, pp. 15, 20-21, 42, 71; and "Relief for White-Collar Workers," FERA Monthly Report (December 1935yf S S . 29. Carothers, p. 61. 30. FERA Monthly Report (May 22-June 30, 1933yf S S . 31. Ibid. 32. Josephine Chapin Brown, Public Relief, 1929-1939 (New York: Henry Holt, 1940yf S . 33. Carothers (n. 22 aboveyf S . 34. Since 1935, unemployment compensation has offered a first line of protection for laid-off workers. However, it has three important limits: (1yf S D \ P H Q W V D U H D S S U R [ L P D W H O y one-half of the income earned by working for a wage or salary; (2yf L W Q R U P D O O \ L V J L Y H n for only 26 weeks; and (3yf P D Q \ Z R U N H U V L Q W K H V H F R Q G D U \ O D E R U P D U N H W H J L Q D J U L F X O W X U H , some services, and some manufacturing outside the industrial core of the economyyf are excluded. 35. For example, such strikes were held by CWA workers in New York City in December 1933, and by FERA workers in Rochester, New York, in April 1934, and in Denver in October 1934. New York Times (December 5, 1933 and October 31, 1934yf D Q G 6 R F L D l Work Today 1 (July-August 1934yf S . 36. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, to Ascertain the Present and Future Policy of the CWA, H.R. 7527, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (February 13, 1934yf S . 37. Burns, "Work Relief Wage Policies, 1930-1936," FERA Monthly Report (June 1936yf S . 38. Criticisms of the minimum work-relief wage rate can be found in the following: U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in charge of Deficiency Appropriations, H.R. 7527, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (January 30, 1934yf , pp. 37-38; Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, pp. 14-15; Florida Emergency Relief Administration, Unemployment Relief in Florida, July 1932-March 1934 (October 1935yf S S % X U Q V : R U N 5 H O L H I : D J H 3 R O L F L H V " p. 39; New York Times (December 23, 1933yf D Q G 5 H O L H I & R P S H W L W L R Q 7 L P H - D Q X D U y 1, 1934yf S . 39. Burns, "Work Relief Wage Policies," p. 32. 40. This occurred, e.g., throughout North Carolina with the exception of a few cities. The reasoning was stated clearly by the North Carolina Emergency Relief Commission: "This wage was much above the level of wages in practically all sections of the state." North Carolina Emergency Relief Commission, Emergency Relief in North Carolina: A Record of the Development and the Activities of the North Carolina Emergency Relief Administration, 1932-1935 (Edwards and Broughton, 1936yf S . 41. By March 1933, approximately one thousand municipal governmental units had defaulted on their debts and by the end of the year 1,300 had done so. This year-end figure included 303 counties, 644 cities and towns, 300 school districts, and 60 other districts. In addition, the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and South Carolina also defaulted. Lester V. Chandler, America's Greatest Depression, 1929-1941 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970yf S S . 42. The Public Works Administration was also authorized by the NIRA, whereas the FERA and WPA were authorized through a series of Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts. This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 89 43. Bonnie Fox Schwartz argues that since the CWA bypassed much of the existing relief apparatus, it antagonized many social workers who then failed to support demands for the program's extension. Schwartz, The Civil Works Administration: The Business of Emergency Employment in the New Deal (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984yf . 44. Federal Civil Works Administration Rules and Regulations no. 1 issued on November 15, 1933, see Carothers (n. 22 aboveyf S S . 45. Ibid., p. 30. 46. Burns, "Work Relief Wage Policies," pp. 33-38; and WPA (n. 7 aboveyf S . 47. Edward A. Williams, Federal Aid for Relief (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939yf S 7 K H L Q F U H D V H L Q S U R G X F W L R Q D Q G H P S O R \ P H Q W F D Q E H V H H Q L Q W K H 2 percent rise from mid-November to mid-December of Business Week's "weekly index of business activity," Business Week (December 31, 1933yf S . 48. Arthur Goldschmidt, Head of Professional Service Projects, FERA, interview with author, October 15, 1981. 49. Bureau of the Census (n. 15 aboveyf S . 50. New York Times (November 26, 1933yf D Q G 6 F K O H V L Q J H U Q D E R Y H \f, p. 273. 51. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments (n. 36 aboveyf S S + H D U L Q J V E H I R U H W K H 6 X E F R P P L W W H H R I W K H + R X V H & R P P L W W H H R n Appropriations in charge of Deficiency Appropriations (n. 38 aboveyf S S 1 H Z < R U k Times (n. 39 aboveyf 1 H Z < R U N 7 L P H V - D Q X D U \ \f; "Relief:Competition" (n. 38 aboveyf S * L O O Q D E R Y H \f, p. 431; Florida Emergency Relief Administration (n. 38 aboveyf S S D Q G + D U U \ $ 0 L O O L V D Q G 5 R \ D O ( 0 R Q W J R P H U \ 7 K H ( F R Q R P L F s of Labor, vol. 2 of Labor's Risks and Social Insurance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938yf S . 95. 52. Carothers, p. 41. 53. Burns, "Work Relief Wage Policies" (n. 37 aboveyf S . 54. "Relief: $2 to All," Time (February 5, 1934yf S . 55. Ibid. 56. WPA (n. 7 aboveyf S D Q G : K L W L Q J D Q G : R R I W H U Q D E R Y H \f, p. 46. 57. FERA Monthly Report (July 1935yf . 58. Williams (n. 47 aboveyf S . 59. New York Times (November 23, 1934yf . 60. Ibid. 61. "Survey of Common Labor Rates on the Work Program," FERA Monthly Report (January 1935yf S S . 62. Gill (n. 25 aboveyf S D Q G : 3 $ S . 63. Ibid. 64. Stephen Raushenbaush, "Common Sense Follows the CWA," Nation (April 18, 1934yf S . 65. For example, in the CWA only 19.2 percent of the funds were spent on materials, while 79.3 percent went to wages and salaries (Gill, p. 421yf 7 K H U H P D L Q L Q J S H U F H Q t of the funds were used for other costs. 66. Nels Anderson, The Right to Work (New York: Modern Age, 1938yf S . 67. FERA Monthly Report (May 22-June 30, 1933yf S . 68. Leuchtenburg (n. 26 aboveyf S S . 69. The cotton surplus was quite large, as the accumulation of approximately 26 million unsold bales by 1931 helped cause the price of raw cotton to plummet from 20 cents per pound in 1928 to 6.4 cents per pound in 1932. T. J. Woofter, Jr., "Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation," FERA Monthly Report (June 1936yf S D Q d Bureau of the Census (n. 15 aboveyf S . 70. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, S. 2500, a bill to aid in relieving the existing national emergency through the free distribution to the needy of cotton and cotton products, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (February 9, 1934yf S . 3.

71. Women's Work Series no. 41, in Carothers (n. 22 aboveyf S . 72. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, S. 2500. 73. Clark Kerr and Paul S. Taylor, "The Self-Help Cooperatives in California," in Essays in Social Economics in Honor of Jessica Blanche Peixotto (1935; reprint, Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1967yf S . This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 90 Social Service Review 74. P. A. Kerr, "Production-for-Use and Distribution in Work Relief Activities," FERA Monthly Report (September 1935yf S S D Q G - D P H V 5 R U W \ 7 K H 5 H O L H I % X V L Q H V V , s Booming," Nation (August 22, 1934yf S . 75. Information on the Ohio Plan came from the following sources: P. A. Kerr, p. 12; Joanna C. Colcord, "Ohio Produces for Ohioans," Survey (December 1934yf S S . 371-73; "Operation of Idle Factories by Ohio Relief Authorities for Benefit of Un- employed," Monthly Labor Review (December 1934yf S S 5 * 6 Z L Q J ( 3 , C and the Ohio Plan," Nation (October 3, 1934yf S S D Q G 6 W D W H 5 H O L H I & R P P L V V L R n of Ohio, The State Relief Commission of Ohio and Its Activities, April 1932 to January 1, 1935 (Columbus, Ohio: Carroll Press, 1935yf S . 76. There may well have been other leased factories, but it is difficult to ascertain from the FERA reports whether a project was a leased factory or a labor-intensive workroom. 77. P. A. Kerr, pp. 2-12. 78. This explanation also holds true for criticisms of inefficiency in FERA construction projects. 79. Swing, p. 380; New York Times (September 9 and October 8, 1934yf . 80. "FERA Factories," Business Week (July 28, 1934yf S . 81. Williams (n. 47 aboveyf S . 82. State Relief Administration of California, Review of Activities of the State Relief Administration of California, 1933-1935 (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1936yf S . 83. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Bantam, 1948yf . 84. Anderson (n. 66 aboveyf S . 85. FERA Press Release no. 922, in Carothers (n. 22 aboveyf S . 86. "Relief Business," Business Week (September 15, 1934yf S . 87. New York Times (September 9 and October 8, 1934yf . 88. "Production for Use," Survey (October 1934yf S 5 H O L H I % X V L Q H V V S D Q d "Relief from Relief Industry," Business Week (October 20, 1934yf S . 89. Colcord, "Ohio Produces for Ohioans" (n. 75 aboveyf S 2 S H U D W L R Q R I , G O e Factories" (n. 75 aboveyf S D Q G $ Q G H U V R Q S S . 90. New York Times (November 21, 1934yf . 91. Cleveland Plain Dealer (March 17 and 18, 1935yf 1 H Z < R U N 7 L P H V 0 D U F K , and 19, 1935yf 1 D W L R Q 0 D U F K \f, p. 346; and Williams (n. 47 aboveyf S . 92. "Relief from Relief Industry," p. 7. 93. Report of the House Committee on Economic Security, in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, H.R. 4120, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (January 21-February 12, 1934yf S . 94. New York Times (November 29, 1934yf D Q G 0 D F P D K R Q H W D O Q D E R Y H \f, pp. 39-42. 95. "The Mayors Confer with the President," American City (October 1934yf S S - 40; and "The Business of Federal Relief," Survey (January 1935yf S . 96. "What about a Permanent Plan?" Survey (December 1934yf S ( G L W K $ E E R W W , "Don't Do It, Mr. Hopkins," Nation (January 9, 1935yf S S . 97. "Organized Business Presents Its Recovery Program," Congressional Digest (January 1935yf S . 98. Ibid., pp. 26-31; and "Recovery Concert," Business Week (December 22, 1934yf , pp. 5-6. 99. Congressional Digest (January 1935yf S . 100. Edwin Witte, chair of the Committee on Economic Security, wrote of several conferences he had with Henry I. Harriman, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: "Mr. Harriman's general attitude was that some legislation on social security was inevitable and that business should not put itself in the position of attempting to block this legislation, but should concentrate its efforts upon getting it into an acceptable form." Witte (n. 4 aboveyf S . 101. Ibid., p. viii. 102. Douglas (n. 4 aboveyf S S . 103. Ibid., pp. 63-65; Stewart (n. 4 aboveyf S S D Q G $ E U D K D P ( S V W H L Q , "'Social Security' under the New Deal," Nation (September 4, 1935yf S S . This content downloaded from 198.246.186.26 on Tue, 11 Jul 2017 11:18:02 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Work Relief 91 104. Donald S. Howard, The WPA and Federal Relief Policy (New York: Russell Sage, 1943yf S . 105. Whiting and Woofter (n. 7 aboveyf S S . 106. Brown (n. 32 aboveyf S D Q G / L Q F R O Q ) D L U O H \ 6 X U Y H \ R I ) R U P H U ( P H U J H Q F y Relief Administration Cases in New Jersey," FERA Monthly Report (June 1936yf S S . 100-108. 107. Howard, p. 338. 108. The work test was authorized in nine additional states as well. Howard, p. 633; Brown, p. 379; and Arthur E. Burns and Edward A. Williams, Federal Work, Security, and Relief Programs, WPA Research Monograph 24 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941yf S . 109. FERA Monthly Report (May 1935yf S S . 110. Of the total WPA expenditures, 6.4 percent was spent on sewing projects and only .6 percent on all other production-for-use (gardening and canning produceyf : 3 A (n. 7 aboveyf S . 111. See, e.g., Franklin and Ripley (n. 11 aboveyf S S ' D Y L G : K L W P D Q 7 K e Key to Welfare Reform," Atlantic (June 1987yf S / D X U L H - % D V V L D Q G 2 U O H \ $ V K H Q I H O W H U , "The Effect of Direct Job Creation and Training Programs on Low-skilled Workers," in Fighting Poverty, ed. Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986yf S D Q G 0 D U W L Q 0 R U V H : R R V W H U % U L Q J % D F N W K e WPA? It Also Had a Seamy Side," Wall Street Journal (September 3, 1986yf . 112. William Mirengoff, Lester Rindler, Harry Greenspan, and Scott Seablom, CETA: Assessment of Public Service Employment Programs (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1980yf S . 113. Analyses of the 1980s WIN Demonstration and workfare programs can be found in the following sources: Teresa L. Amott and Jean Kluver, ET: A Modelfor the Nation? An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Employment and Training Choices Program (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1986yf 1 D Q F \ 6 ' L F N L Q V R Q : K L F K : H O I D U H : R U k Strategies Work?" Social Work 31, no. 4 (July-August 1986yf - X G L W K * X H U R Q , Work Initiatives for Welfare Recipients (Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 1986yf 8 6 * H Q H U D O $ F F R X Q W L Q J 2 I I L F H : R U N D Q G : H O I D U H & X U U H Q W $ ) ' & : R U N 3 U R J U D P s and Implicationsfor Federal Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987yf ; Casey McKeever, Sixteen Months of GAIN: Troubling Trends (Sacramento: Western Center on Law and Poverty, 1988yf - X G L W K * X H U R Q 6 W D W H : H O I D U H ( P S O R \ P H Q W , Q L W L D W L Y H V : Lessons from the 1980s," Focus 11 , no. 1 (Spring 1988yf 8 6 * H Q H U D O $ F F R X Q W L Q g Office, Work and Welfare: Analysis of AFDC Emplayment Programs in Four States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988yf . 114. The fact that women on welfare already work in the home raising children has thus far not even been recognized in most of these debates. 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