Identify and discuss the different forms of discrimination Mexicans and Mexican-Americans faced politically, economically, and socially in the United States. Use the four assigned readings to provide

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas

Spring, 1998

5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31

LENGTH: 5506 words

SYMPOSIUM:

MANIFEST DESTINY: THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR AND THE TREATY

OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO

NAME: Richard Griswold del Castillo *

BIO:

* Dr. Griswold del Castillo earned his B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Los Angeles. He specializes in Chicana/o history and is the author of many books, including, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict (1990). His mostrecent book is North to Aztlan: Mexican Americans in United States History (1996)(with Arnoldo De Leon). Professor Castillo is currently Acting Director of the Masters Program in Liberal Arts at San Diego State University.

LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:

... It was Polk who decided to send an official peace commissioner to join the army in Mexico; Polk decided to recall

this commissioner once it appeared that the Mexicans were insincere in their negotiations; and Polk decided to

recommend the final version of the Treaty to the Senate, even though it had been concluded by an unauthorized agent.

... Had no pressure existed on the President to end the costly war, the United States probably would have delayed

negotiating a treaty and annexed more Mexican territory than it did. ... Ultimately Polk sent the United States Army to

occupy the disputed zone, a region between the Nueces and Rio Grande River that was not clearly part of Texas. ... The

most controversial sections of the Treaty, and the ones that would have the most lasting impact, were those dealing with

the citizenship and property rights of the former Mexican citizens residing in the ceded territories. ... Articles VIII and

IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo set forth the terms by which the former Mexican citizens and their property

would be incorporated politically into the United States. ... In reality, the Mexicans and Texans were fighting over the

use of the grazing lands and the differing conceptions of the use of the open prairie grasslands. ... Increased

Anglo-American migration into South Texas after 1848 was the origin of a large number of these claims. ... Many

Tejano grants in this region were perfected Spanish claims that had been recognized by the Mexican government.

TEXT:

[*31]

"Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private or speculative opinion of

individuals may be." n1

I. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo n2 is one hundred and fifty years old this month, having been signed by United

States and Mexican negotiators on February 2, 1848. The Treaty ended a war between Mexico and the United States,

Page 1 and ceded to the Americans about half of Mexico's national territory. As a result, it created a new ethnic minority group,

the Mexican-Americans.

The Mexican-American War and the Treaty that ended it were undertaken against the backdrop of Manifest

Destiny. This body of ideas and sentiments purported to justify the territorial expansion ofEnglish-speaking Americans

into territories held, occupied, or claimed by Mexicans and Indians. Disparate groups, from rustic back woodsmen to

sophisticated New England poets, from northern abolitionists to southern slave-holders, fervently believed that God had

[*32] ordained that Americans should populate and govern a vast expanse of land west of the Mississippi River. n3

One of the many proponents of this view was John O'Sullivan, editor of Democratic Review, who spoke of the

American "destiny to overspread the whole North American continent with an immense democratic population." n4 The

North Americans were the pioneers of the continent, who inevitably would spread the benefits of democracy and

freedom to the lesser peoples inhabiting the region.

Such optimistic predictions of expansion and growth were not limited to journalists but became the province of

such nationally known intellectuals as Walt Whitman and Ralph Waldo Emerson and politicians as diverse as the

patrician John Quincy Adams and the populist Andrew Jackson. Ultimately, the popularity of this ideology of Manifest

Destiny led the United States Congress to a near-unanimous declaration of war against Mexico in May, 1846. n5

Despite an overwhelming sentiment in favor of an expansionist war, there was some opposition. A small group, led

by Northern and Southern members of the Whig Party, opposed the war primarily because they suspected it as a plot to

strengthen the slave-owning classes. Over time, antiwar opposition grew and added to the pressures on President James

Polk to conclude the war and accept a final treaty. Opposition also derived from several other concerns. John C.

Calhoun, a Democrat, opposed it in the Senate because he feared that the war would lead to increased division over the

status of slavery in the territories. Other Southerners opposed the war because they feared that the acquisition of a large

nonwhite, nonslave (Mexican) population would have an undesirable effect on blacks, i.e. encouraging their aspirations

for freedom. n6

President Polk was the most important actor in the drama leading to the Mexican War and the negotiation of the

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Polk, a Democrat, believed fervently in the westward expansion of the United States,

particularly in the acquisition of California. Polk's reputation as a president has improved in recent historiogra [*33]

phy. At the time, however, his opponents reviled him as "Polk the Mendacious" and branded him as a pro-slavery

warmonger who used the Mexican War as an opportunity to expand the "slaveocracy."

Although controversy continues over Polk's responsibility for the war with Mexico, there is no doubt that he played

an important part in negotiating the peace. It was Polk who decided to send an official peace commissioner to join the

army in Mexico; Polk decided to recall this commissioner once it appeared that the Mexicans were insincere in their

negotiations; and Polk decided to recommend the final version of the Treaty to the Senate, even though it had been

concluded by an unauthorized agent.

National politics, particularly the Whig opposition to the war, influenced these decisions. Had no pressure existed

on the President to end the costly war, the United States probably would have delayed negotiating a treaty and annexed

more Mexican territory than it did.

A factor in bringing on the war and influencing the Treaty was the rise and fall of the Mexican war party. Many

Mexican military leaders welcomed war and played on their countrymen's pride to reject offers of peace. They had great

confidence in their army's ability to resist and even defeat the Americans. Foreign observers rated the Mexican military

highly. The London Times, for example, stated in 1845 that the Mexican armies "are superior to those of the United

States." n7 French and Spanish observers publically commented on the superiority of the Mexican forces and

geographic situation. The mountainous terrain, yellow fever, deserts, the vast expanses, and the Mexican home ground

advantage would conspire to defeat the Americans. During the war, as the Mexican army met defeat after disastrous

Page 2

5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *31 defeat, the war party's confidence and political credibility eroded. By 1848 it was possible for civilian leaders of the

peace faction to negotiate a settlement. n8

Party politics in Mexico played another kind of role during the course of the war and final drafting of the peace

treaty. The struggle between various groups produced chronic presidential instability that in turn made it almost

impossible to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the United States. Since the end of Mexico's War of Independence in

1821, every constitutionally elected president prior to the Mexican War except one, Guadalupe Victoria, had been

overthrown by a coup. The unsettled nature of Mexican politics, along with the [*34] internal division and distrust it

engendered, helped bring on the war, prolong it, and ironically, compelled the leadership to accept a treaty that would

end the fighting.

The precipitating cause of the war and key stumbling block in the drafting of the final peace treaty was the

annexation of Texas by the United States in 1845 and a long-standing difference of opinion over the boundaries of that

province. In 1836 Texans won their independence and established an independent republic. For nine years they

maintained that their new country included the territory north and east of the Rio Grande (including the eastern half of

New Mexico). Mexico never recognized Texan claims to independence and territory. This did not inhibit annexationists

in the United States from pushing for acquisition. Finally, on May 1, 1845, Congress passed a resolution of annexation,

and thus the United States inherited the Texans' controversial claim to the Rio Grande boundary. The resulting border

conflict figured prominently as a cause of the Mexican War and as an item of dispute in the treaty negotiations.

Ultimately Polk sent the United States Army to occupy the disputed zone, a region between the Nueces and Rio

Grande River that was not clearly part of Texas. In May 1846 he ordered General Zachary Taylor to advance to the Rio

Grande to "possess" the territory for the United States. Shortly afterwards, Mexican and United States troops exchanged

shots and joined in battle, giving president Polk his rationale for declaring war. The House of Representatives voted 174

to 14 in favor, the Senate 40 to 2. n9 The general public believed in the moral justness of the nation's inexorable

expansion westward.

Like most wars, the war between Mexico and the United States grew out of two conflicting interpretations of

history. The events that led to the war also led to a particular kind of peace treaty, one that would legitimize a

long-standing presidential policy for the acquisition of California and other Mexican territories. The United States, by

annexing Texas, inherited a civil war between that state and the Mexican Federal Republic, as well as a highly debatable

claim to boundaries. The volatility of Mexican politics conspired to defeat moves to negotiate a settlement of this

dispute.

After a year and a half of military engagements, during which perhaps 20,000 soldiers and civilians were killed, the

U. S. Army occupied Mexico City and most of the other key cities in Mexico. The [*35] Mexican government was

anxious for peace, not because the people demanded it, but because the leaders knew that with the American

occupation, Mexico had little chance of being able to continue the financing of an organized opposition. To get the

Americans to leave, it seemed desirable to accede to some of their territorial demands, as set forth in a draft treaty which

the American negotiator, Nicholas Trist, had brought with him to Mexico.

After a month of discussions they reached an agreement. According to Trist's own account of the negotiations, the

fate of the inhabitants of the ceded territory "constituted a subject upon which it was all important that the Treaty should

be guarded at all points." n10 They spent a good deal of time on various drafts of Articles VIII and IX, which dealt with

the property rights of Mexican citizens and American citizenship for Mexican citizens. The Mexican commissioners

succeeded in amplifying the texts of the two articles. They also introduced Article XI, which provided that the United

States would be responsible for controlling Indian incursions originating from its side of the border. On his own

initiative, Trist reduced the amount of the indemnity from 20 to 15 million dollars, judging that this would gain

acceptance for the treaty among those who felt that the United States had already paid enough in "blood and treasure."

n11

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5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *33 Finally, on February 2, 1848, the Mexican government yielded to financial and political pressures. The Mexican

commissioners met Trist in the Villa of Guadalupe Hidalgo, across from the shrine of the patron saint of Mexico, the

Virgen de Guadalupe. They signed the Treaty and then celebrated a mass together at the basilica. The signing of the

Treaty was only the beginning of the process. The congresses of both the United States and Mexico still had to ratify it.

The final result, after approval by the U. S. Senate and the Mexican Congress was a treaty that resolved some

problems but created many others. The issue of the Texas border was resolved in Article IV, although that article also

produced later disputes over the land boundary and would necessitate another treaty in 1854. The American side agreed

to article XXI, providing that future disputes would be submitted to international arbitration. Significantly, this was the

first such treaty stipulation that the United States government had ever signed with another country and would be soon

be a standard provision in international settlements.

[*36] The United States Senate omitted Article X, a provision that provided a clear affirmation of Mexican land

titles, especially in Texas. This omission was supposedly corrected during the drafting of the Protocol of Queretaro at

the time of Mexican ratification. Under the Protocol, the United States stated that by omitting Article X, the government

did not intend to invalidate Mexican land titles. This would later prove to be a meaningless statement when the U.S.

Supreme Court ruled in 1898 that the Protocol of Queretaro was not relevant for land cases. n12

Another provision of the treaty that would cause conflict between the two countries was Article XI. Under this

provision, the United States government agreed to control Indian movements into Mexico. Eventually this proved to be

a very expensive promise costing more than thirty-one million dollars. Anxious to eliminate this provision, the United

States government declared it no longer in force in the Gadsden Treaty of 1854.

The most controversial sections of the Treaty, and the ones that would have the most lasting impact, were those

dealing with the citizenship and property rights of the former Mexican citizens residing in the ceded territories. Articles

VIII and IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo set forth the terms by which the former Mexican citizens and their

property would be incorporated politically into the United States. These articles in the treaty affected some 100,000

Mexicans in the newly acquired territories, including a large number of Hispanicized and nomadic Indians in New

Mexico and California. As provided by Article VIII, a person had one year to "elect" his or her preference for Mexican

citizenship. If this were not done, it was stipulated that they had elected to become United States citizens and that they

would be granted citizenship by Congress at some future time.

The two articles also addressed the property rights of the conquered people. Absentee Mexican landholders would

have their property "inviolably respected," and others would "be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their

liberty and property." n13 In the six decades following the ratification of the Treaty, its deceptively clear provisions

regarding citizenship and property were complicated by legislative and judicial interpretations. In the end, the

application of the Treaty to the realities of life in the Southwest violated its spirit.

The discovery of gold in 1848 created a situation in which thousands of Yankee immigrants were competing with

native-born [*37] Californio and Mexican miners in the gold fields. n14 Xenophobia, nativism, residual of war-time

patriotism, and racism soon resulted in violent confrontations between English-speaking immigrants and other residents.

Eventually most of the latter were driven from the most profitable gold fields. As a consequence of vigilantism and its

attendant lynchings, harassment, and abuse of "foreigners," several countries lodged diplomatic protests and financial

claims against the U. S. government. n15 Generally, however, the Mexican government failed to present clear evidence

that native Californios were being deprived of their property and civil rights in violation of the Treaty.

Mexicans, even though they were technically citizens of the United States, were not spared violent reminders of

their second class status. During the first decades following the war, lynchings, murders, kangaroo trials, riots and

robberies involving English-speaking Americans (Anglos) and Mexican Americans emphasized the point. In Los

Angeles, California, a crude form of frontier justice reigned as vigilantes lynched thirty-seven men between 1854 and

1870, most of them Mexican Americans accused of murdering Anglos. The last recorded lynching of a Mexican

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5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *35 American in California was in 1892 of Francisco Torres in Santa Ana. n16

The same pattern of violence against Mexicans occurred in other areas of the former Mexican territories. In Texas,

shootings and killings of Mexicans passed almost without mention. Arnoldo De Leon, a noted Texas historian, told in

his book They Called Them Greasers, of scores of lynchings and mutilations against Mexicans in the nineteenth

century. In addition there were several anti-Mexican race riots in Texas towns; specifically, in 1886 there were riots in

Alpine and Laredo, in 1888 in Rio Grande City, and in 1894 in Beeville. Violence served to reinforce ethnic prejudice

and discrimination. As De Leon stated that:

fear of Mexicans and what they might do, should they find the opportunity to repay in kind what was being done to

them, translated [*38] into conflict throughout the nineteenth century, especially in the postbellum period. Violence

was thru both a result and a contributing cause of ethnic hatred and disdain for Mexicanos. n17

Additionally, in New Mexico the cycle of violence lasted well into the twentieth century because of the activities of

Las Gorras Blancas and the Mano Negra, secret groups of New Mexican Hispanos who fought to resist the

encroachment of Anglo American corporations and speculators. The famous Lincoln County War lasted twenty years,

between 1870 and 1890, involving hundreds of native New Mexicans and Texas cattlemen. Over the years scores of

men died in bloody gun fights, which were termed "wars" by the local newspapers. In reality, the Mexicans and Texans

were fighting over the use of the grazing lands and the differing conceptions of the use of the open prairie grasslands.

Ultimately, the Anglo Texans won the battle, not with bullets but with their control of the courts, the territorial

legislature and the local peace officers. n18

II. Land Loss

The United States-Mexican War ended in 1848, but an unofficial war against Mexicans and Mexico continued well into

the next century. Added to the outright violence, thousands of former Mexican property owners lost their lands to

speculators, banks, and lawyers. This destroyed the Mexican American middle class and insured that this ethnic group,

like the Mexican nation, would enter the twentieth century as an underdeveloped people. Thus, a major consequence of

Mexico losing the war with the United States in 1848 was the creation of a pattern of economic subordination that

contributed to the impoverishment of the Mexican people in the United States.

Each region has its own history of land loss with variant stories of corruption, injustice and ruin. A promise offered

by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, included in Articles VIII and IX and the Protocol of Queretaro, was the promise of

protection for private property. Unfortunately, it was in the realm of property rights that the greatest injustices occurred.

In California, thousands of gold-rush squatters encroached on the Californio land grants and demanded that

something be done to "liberate" the land. The result was the passage in Congress of the Land [*39] Act of 1851. n19

This law set up a Board of Land Commissioners whose job would be to adjudicate the validity of Mexican land grants

in California. Every grantee was required to present evidence supporting title within two years. Those failing to do so

would have their property pass to the public domain. The land commissioners were instructed by law to govern their

decisions according to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, Spanish and Mexican laws, and previous

decisions of the Supreme Court.

The Board of Land Claims in California examined 813 claims and eventually confirmed 604 of them involving

approximately nine million acres. This, however, did not mean that the majority of Mexican land holders were

ultimately protected by the courts. On the contrary, most Californio land holders lost their lands because of the

tremendous expense of litigation and legal fees. To pay for the legal defense of their lands, the Californios were forced

Page 5

5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *37 to mortgage their ranchos. Falling cattle prices and usurious rates of interest conspired to wipe them out as a

land-holding class.

Other individuals who held perfectly valid titles to their land under the Mexican law and who were able to survive

economically, lost their holdings because they had not fulfilled the terms of the 1851 Land Act. A number of court cases

in this regard involving Mexican and Spanish grants emerged, but the most famous one pertaining to the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo was Botiller v. Dominguez. n20 In that case the Supreme Court basically invalidated the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo's promise of protection of property rights.

III. New Mexico

The Compromise of 1850 made New Mexico a territory while California entered the Union as a state. This difference

in political status would produce different resolutions of land-tenure problems. In California a state judiciary functioned

to render relatively swift interpretations of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; in New Mexico federally appointed

officials had to have their decisions approved by Congress, a lengthy and often politicized process. Ironically, New

Mexico's more direct link to the national government meant that the [*40] property-rights guarantees under the Treaty

of Guadalupe Hidalgo would be even less important than in California.

In 1848, private and communal land grants in New Mexico covered about fifteen million square miles. In order to

determine the federal domain, Congress established the office of Surveyor General to recommend the disposition of

land claims. In August of 1854, Congress appointed William Pelham to the office. Once in New Mexico, he had

considerable trouble getting the Hispano land-grant owners to file their claims with his office. As a result, by 1863, only

25 town and private claims and 17 Pueblo Indian grants had been confirmed by Congress. By 1880, 1000 claims had

been filed by the Surveyor General but only 150 had been acted upon by the federal government. n21 As the number of

unconfirmed grants in litigation before the Surveyor General and the Congress lengthened, so too did the legal expenses

incurred by the Hispano pueblos and ranchers. Such lawyers and politicians as Stephen Benson Elkins and Thomas

Benton Catron formed the nucleus of the Santa Fe Ring, a confederation of opportunists who used the long legal battles

over land grants to acquire empires extending over millions of acres. The most famous example of the land- grabbing

activities of the Ring was the creation of the Maxwell Land Grant, a Spanish claim of 97,000 acres that became inflated

through the actions of the Ring to a final patent of 1,714,074 acres. n22

Besides losing their lands to rapacious lawyers and politicians, the Hispanos suffered the changing whims of

national politics. After a series of federal laws, a new court was established to review New Mexican land grants. As a

result more than two-thirds of the land claims were rejected. Ultimately only eighty-two grants received congressional

confirmation. This represented only 6 percent of the total area sought by land claimants. Thus, using the federal courts,

the U.S. government enlarged the national domain at the expense of hundreds of Hispano villages, leaving a bitter

legacy that would fester through the next century. n23

[*41]

IV. Texas

In 1856, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in McKinney v. Saviego n24 that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo did not apply

to Texas. This decision seemed to invalidate the meaning of the Protocol of Queretaro, which specifically identified

Texas land grants as being protected. Under this agreement, grants made prior to March 2, 1836 (the date of Texas'

self-proclaimed independence from Mexico), would remain as legal land grants. Thus, according to the Supreme Court,

Texas was not to be considered part of the Mexican Cession. n25 Congress had admitted Texas into the Union in 1845,

and that state's constitution ran counter to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Article VIII) in forbidding aliens from

holding property. (The Texas government had already declared as aliens those Tejanos who had left the Republic during

the Texas Rebellion).

Page 6

5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *39 The issue of Texas and the Treaty remained a point of contention well into the twentieth century. During a series of

meetings held in 1923 between the United States and Mexico, the issue of the status of the Texas land grants and the

applicability of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo resurfaced. The conferences, called the Bucareli Conferences, were

convened to settle the outstanding claims of both countries and to pave the way for the United States' diplomatic

recognition of Mexico's revolutionary government. To counter United States claims for damages suffered by Americans

during the revolution of 1910, the Mexican government decided to present the claims of its former citizens in the

Southwest. Initially they presented 836 claims amounting to 245 million dollars. Almost 193 million of this amount was

for Texas land claims invalidated in violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. n26 The Mexican government,

through its consulate in Texas, actively solicited land claims from heirs of the original land grant owners who had been

dispossessed of their lands after 1848.

Increased Anglo-American migration into South Texas after 1848 was the origin of a large number of these claims.

This was the area of Texas in which the first battles of the Mexican War had occurred and where there had been so

much diplomatic disagreement prior to the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Many Tejano grants in [*42]

this region were perfected Spanish claims that had been recognized by the Mexican government.

David Montejano, who studied the loss of Tejano lands, concluded that the process was a complex one involving

fraud, confiscation and the operation of the mechanisms of market competition. In the late nineteenth century, the

Tejanos did not have access to the capital to develop their lands so that they could remain solvent during the changes in

the ranching industry. They also had inherited a non- capitalist traditional view of the use of their lands. The death of a

patriarch often meant the dismemberment of the ranch as it was sold for back taxes and old debts. A large portion of the

famous King ranch in south Texas was pieced together during the forced sale of Tejano ranches during unfavorable

market conditions in the period between 1886 and 1889. n27

Whether by laws, force, foreclosure, or litigation, many Tejanos lost title to their ancestral lands in the period

between 1848 and 1923. Many had their cases presented on their behalf by the Mexican government during the Bucareli

negotiations. On September 8, 1923, the United States and Mexico agreed to establish a commission to review the

Texas land grants. Eventually 433 cases, valued at 121 million dollars, were presented on behalf of the heirs.

In 1941, after much delay, the Texas land claims were settled on the international level with the Mexican

government assuming the obligation of compensating the Texas heirs. The issue, however, was not resolved, for while

both the United States and Mexico recognized the legitimacy of the Texas claims under the Treaty of Guadalupe

Hidalgo, the Mexican government refused to carry out its financial obligations. This was despite of constant pressure

from the Tejano land- grant heirs. n28

V. Conclusion

The history of the first generation of Mexican Americans under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is one of failed

promises and impoverishment. Hundreds of state, territorial, and federal legal bodies produced a complex tapestry of

conflicting opinions and decisions. The citizenship rights seemingly guaranteed in Articles VIII and IX were [*43] not

all they appeared. Violence between Mexicans and the Anglo Americans who entered the new territories shaped the

social relations between the two groups. The property rights for former Mexican citizens in California, New Mexico,

and Texas proved to be fragile. Within a generation, the Mexican Americans who had been under the ostensible

protections of the Treaty became a disenfranchised, poverty-stricken, and terrorized minority.

The promises of the Treaty remained a challenge for subsequent generations. In the twentieth century we have seen

a resurgence in consciousness about the importance of the Treaty as a rights confirming document and as a statement

that has political value in contemporary terms. Contrary to what might have been predicted, the Treaty of Guadalupe

Hidalgo refuses to go away.

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5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *41 Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

GovernmentsFederal GovernmentExecutive OfficesGovernmentsPublic LandsLand GrantsPatent LawU.S. Patent &

Trademark Office ProceedingsExaminationsGeneral Overview

FOOTNOTES:

n1. United States v. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946).

n2. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafterTreaty].

n3. For a classic analysis of the ideas of Manifest Destiny in American life, see Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study ofNationalist Expansion in American History (1963). See also Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: AReinterpretation (1963).

n4. Weinberg, supra note 3, at 194, noted in N.Y. Morning News, Dec. 27, 1845.

n5. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1846); see also Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9.

n6. See John D. P. Fuller, Slaveholder Opposed Conquest of Mexico, in The Mexican War: Was it Manifest Destiny? 29 (Ramon EduardoRuiz ed., 1963).

n7. Justin Smith, Mexico Wanted War, in The Mexican War: Was it Manifest Destiny? 95 (Ramon Eduardo Ruiz ed., 1963).

n8. See id. at 95-105.

n9. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1846); see also Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9.

Page 8

5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *43 n10. 9 William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs 1043 (1937).

n11. Id.

n12. See Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165 (1898).

n13. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX.

n14. See Leonard Pitt, The Decline of the Californios: A Social History of the Spanish-Speaking Californians, 1846-1890 50 (3d ed. 1970).

n15. The history of the Mexican government's protests regarding the treatment of Mexicans in the U.S. in the period immediately after theMexican war can be found in a number of published works. See generally Manning, supra note 10, at 129-30, 133-34, 568-70; Maria de LosAngeles, La anexacion de Texas a los Estados Unidos, 192-195 (Thesis, U.N.A.M, 1959); Toribio Esquivel Obregon, Apuntes para lahistoria del derecho en Mexico (Editorial Polics, Mexico, 1937).

n16. See Laurence L. Hill, La Reina: Los Angeles in Three Centuries 43-45 (1889). See also Jean F. Riss, The Lynching of FranciscoTorres, Journal of Mexican American History 90-112.

n17. Arnoldo De Leon, They Called Them Greasers, 92-96, 102 (1983).

n18. See Robert J. Rosenbaum, Mexicano Resistance in the Southwest: "The Sacred Right of Self-Preservation" 90-96 (1981).

n19. See Land Act, ch , 9 Stat. 631 (1851).

n20. See 130 U.S. 238 (1889). For a citation of cases that challenged the 1851 land law citing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, see Minternv. Brower, 24 Cal. 644 (1864). See also Richard Powell, Compromises of Conflicting Claims: A Century of California Law, 1760 to 1860170-171(1977)(discussion of the court cases affecting Mexican land grants).

Page 9

5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *43 n21. New Mexican land-grant litigation, a complex subject, can be treated only superficially in a survey such as this. For a more detailedanalysis of the legal and historical aspects involved, see Victor Westphall, The Public Domain in New Mexico: 1854-1891 (1965); J.J.Bowden, Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in the Chihuahuan Acquisition (1971); 2 Ralph Emerson Twitchell, The Leading Facts of NewMexico's History 458-461 (1963).

n22. See Twitchell, supra note 21, at 462.

n23. See id. at 213-214.

n24. 18 U.S. (1 How.) 235 (1856).

n25. See id. at 263.

n26. See generally Rudolfo O. de la Garza & Karl Schmitt, Texas Land Grants and Chicano- Mexican Relations: A Case Study, Latin Am.Res. Rev. 123, 123-138 (1986).

n27. See David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836- 1986 63-70 (1987).

n28. See Robert Salazar, Texas Land Grant Heirs Seek Compensation, 9 Ajenda: A Journal of Hispanic Issues, 14-16 (1979). See alsoAsociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1519 (1984).

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5 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 31, *43