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Received 12 October 2011 Received in revised form 3 May 2013 Available online 3 August 2013 Keywords:

Anthropocene Biopolitics Climatesecurity Geopolitics Governance Risk Biohumanity abstract The discussion of the Anthropocene focuses attention on the changing geological context for the future of humanity, change wrought by practices that secure particular forms of human life. These are frequently discussed in geography in terms of biopolitics. In particular liberal societies powered by carboniferous capitalism and using their practices of war secure ‘biohumanity’. Climate change is one of the key dimen- sions of the future that biopolitical strategies of managing risk and contingency have so far failed to address effectively. The debate about the relationship climate and security emphasises that the geological circumstances of the Anthropocene require a different biopolitics, one that understands that securing the biohuman is now the danger, and as an exigesis of the E3G analysis of ‘‘Degrees of Risk’’ shows, one that conventional understandings of risk management cannot adequately encompass. The Anthropocene pro- vides a political recontextualisation for possible new forms of biopolitics after the biohuman. 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Liberalism universalizes war, then, not simply in the name of human life, but in promotion of a quite distinct form of ‘biohu- manity’. Committed to promoting and securing the life of the biohuman means, indeed, that liberal rule must be prepared to wage war not so much for the human, but on the human. It does so by seeking, among other things, to globalize the domes- ticating power of civil society mechanisms in a war against all other modes of cultural forms, invoking horror at other cultural, as well as tyrannical, political practices as its generic causus belli; practices it nonetheless also often finds useful, on occa- sion, to patronize rather than demonize. (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 20 ).

1. The Anthropocene and human sciences The argument about the necessity for designating present cir- cumstances a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, grew from a proposal from Paul Crutzen (2002) who suggested that the sheer scale of human generated changes to the biosphere caused by the rise of modern economies and carbon fuelled industrial urbanism was transforming matters to such a degree that the parameters of the relatively stable period since the last ice age, the Holocene, no longer applied. ‘‘The Anthropocene, on current evidence, seems to show global change consistent with the sug- gestion that an epoch-scale boundary has been crossed within the last two centuries’’ (Zalasiewicz et al., 2011: 840). While cli- mate change gets much of the attention, the larger context of glo- bal environmental change, including large-scale biodiversity loss, landscape transformation and other matters is a key part of the discussion. While debate continues about the finer points of how to specify this new era, or should it in fact be an age, or an epoch, the term has increasingly been used (Zalasiewicz et al., 2011).Slavoj Zizek (2010) has used the phrase ‘‘Welcome to the Anthropocene’’ as a subheading in his meditations on pres- ent circumstances in Living in the End Times ; the same phrase was used as the cover story of The Economist on May 26 2011.

The Haus der Kulturen der Welt in Berlin started ‘‘The Anthropo- cene Project’’ in early 2013 to engage widely with the new under- standings of nature implicit in the term. The Anthropocene makes it clear that at least the industrial decision makers within humanity are now determining the future geological circumstances of the planet, and in the process perhaps opening up possibilities for new forms of human life while radi- cally endangering the conditions that make most human life possi- ble. But as the rest of this paper suggests, who gets to decide what kind of life will be lived in what biospheric conditions matters greatly now that we are have come belatedly to realise that we are living in times of climate and geomorphological change encap- sulated by the debate in the geological sciences concerning the Anthropocene. This is a political and economic question that goes to heart of the geography disciplinary concern with the planet as humanity’s home, and as O’Brien (2011)emphasises, raises funda- mental questions for how human geography might respond to these new circumstances. Not least this matters given the dangers of invoking universal emergency and a post political technocratic 0016-7185/$ - see front matter 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.06.013 E-mail address: [email protected] Geoforum 49 (2013) 184–192 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Geoforum journal homepage: www.elsevi er.com/locate/geoforum Dalby, Simon. “Biopolitics and Climate Security in the Anthropocene.” Geoforum, vol. 49, Oct.

2013, pp. 184-192. ScienceDirect, doi: do.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.06.13. Permission to reprint by Elsevier Ltd. All Rights Reserved. GEOFORUM ELSEVIER CrossMark 04/21/2020 - RS0000000000000000000002881336 (Qi Fang) - PLEISTOCENE. HOLOCENE.

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While much debate about politics, governance and contempo- rary political economy within geography now takes place under the loose rubrics of the discussions of biopolitics (Coleman and Grove, 2009), climate change themes also link up with the two decade long discussion of the environmental dimensions of secu- rity (Dalby, 1992, 2002). The more recent discussions of both the political dangers of invoking climate change as a matter of mili- tary security, not least because of the unreconstructed geopoliti- cal imaginary frequently invoked while doing so (Gilbert, 2012) emphasise the importance of the climate and security linkages.

So too do the discussions of the inappropriateness of either con- temporary notions of international security or the military tech- nologies currently in vogue for dealing with climate (Dalby, 2009).

The focus in what follows is on biopolitics and on one particular formulation of all this in terms of risk rather than the militarization of climate change, but in doing so it complementsGilberts (2012) analysis of the dangers of such formulations in a world where so much has been militarized in the last decade. Given the frequent invocation of emergency in the arguments about climate change, not least byJames Lovelock (2009), and by environmentalists drawing on his earlier formulations (Spratt and Sutton, 2008), and the invocation of numerous biological formulations in the war on terror (Cooper, 2006), thinking carefully about these mat- ters is a pressing necessity for geopolitical analysis. Numerous mil- itary organisations are paying attention to climate as a security issue, and while part of this is a concern to speed up mitigation ac- tions, much of it is also about how to deal with matters of adapta- tion, and what are portrayed as threats due to migration and political instabilities (Brzoska, 2012). But writing off military insti- tutions as simply part of the problem isnt sensible either, as the reading of the E3G (2011) Degrees of Risk report in the latter stages suggests; contesting speci“c invocations of risk and security is both a political argument against the post-political assumptions and a critical geographical task that challenges the militarization of climate security (Dalby, 2013).

This paper suggests that an important reading of one form of biopolitics, that provided byMick Dillon (2008)andMelinda Coo- per (2006), concerned to understand security in terms of fears of emergence, should be turned on its metaphorical head to suggest that carboniferous capitalism, the new life form that has changed so many things that we now effectively live in a new geological era, is the emergence that threatens to transform all life quite dra- matically. This involves an obviously gross over-simpli“cation of Coopers and in particular Dillons work, but invoking his phrasing and linking it to the discussion of the Anthropocene suggests some clear limitations concerning the appropriation of the biopolitics, unless that is, it is delinked from the speci“c form it takes in dis- cussions of liberal notions of war and the task of securing the bio- human (Dillon and Reid, 2009).

While such an inversion may in danger of what Neil Smith long ago called the ideology of nature(1984, 2008), that is the promise of a certainty outside humanity as the benchmark for judgement, the epistemological source, as it were for humanity, the inversion is useful in so far as it poses the problem of how security might now be formulated if something more than the biohuman (Dillon and Reid, 2009) liberal consumer is considered within the ambit of contemporary politics. The theme of the Anthropocene is part of the answer to both the limits of the biohuman and the dangers of the ideology of nature. Crucially, and contrary to much popular pessimism about the Anthropocene as end times, the Anthropo- cene suggests very clearly that the future of the biosphere is an open question; what kind of nature gets produced is now the polit- ical question of our times. The Anthropocene in this sense extends Smiths (1984, 2008)insistence that nature and space are produced simultaneously by global capitalism. Given this new context the questions of what kind of politics making what kinds of life are ever more pressing. Decisions con- cerning what kind of biosphere will exist for future generations of humanity, and at least some of the species that manage to adapt to the radical changes that are wrought, are now being made whether contemporary political elites realise it or not (Webersik, 2010). This is about much more than biopolitics in the sense of the recognition that the basic biological features of the human species [have become] the object of a political strategy (Foucault, 2007: 1). It is about securing the future, and doing so in terms of managing risk and contingency asDillon (2008)suggests. But on the big scale that now means inquiring quite literally into what kind of planet carboniferous capitalism is making, and the risks and contingencies that emerge from this remaking of the bio- sphere. This is an eminently geographical question that puts the materialities of geopolitics at the heart of contemporary deliberations.

The disruptions set in motion are likely to suggest to many peo- ple that we are indeed inZizeks (2010)terms, living in the end times. The political pessimism in such formulations is precisely whatWallerstein (1999)warns against but the political vocabulary for thinking creatively about new forms of biopolitics, or perhaps even more importantly a politics after biopolitics, is as yet unclear.

Geographers in particular, given the transformation of the plane- tary home of our species, are now engaging with this theme as the extended discussion of the Anthropos at the 2013 annual convention of the Association of American Geographers makes clear. The discourses of climate security and the numerous modes of governing climate capitalism that are emerging require our attention urgently because they pose the key questions of what life is being at least notionally secured by these practices, and whether it is possible to shift the parameters of traditional geopolitics to formulate a political geoecology that engages much more than the perpetuation of contemporary injustices and the violence of the present order (Brauch et al., 2011; Dalby, 2010). 2. Biopolitics/geopolitics More recently these other forms of human life are the objects of development, and various practices of violent security provision as the discourses of security and development have melded in the discussions of the war on terror, regime change, humanitarian interventions, contingent sovereignty and the responsibility to protect. Ironically, or should that be logically, Michel Foucaul s concerns with pastoral power and its source in Christian practice has come back to haunt international politics with the demand for intervention, the presupposition that Western modernity S. Dalby / Geoforum 49 (2013) 184–192 04/21/2020 - RS0000000000000000000002881336 (Qi Fang) - PLEISTOCENE. HOLOCENE.

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Geographers interested in understanding the consequences of the war on terror for how politics now works, and in particular concerned to unravel the violent practices of American power and sometimes extraordinary lengths to which these go in attempting to square violence with a rule of law, have followed these themes up too (Gregory, 2006). The designation of people as illegal combatants and the high pro“le incarceration site at Guantanamo Bay exemplify both complex legal and technical prac- tices of rendition and dubious jurisdictional logics in places that are quite literally sometimes blank spaces on the map (Paglen, 2009). Or in some cases matters where sovereign control of formal spaces is rendered contingent, turned off when states fail to follow the approved modes of conduct, and intervention rendered appro- priate despite the once upon time supposed priority of sovereignty in international political life (Elden, 2009). Humanitarian emer- gency provides precisely this justi“cation as the war on Libya in 2011 once again demonstrates clearly. Fears of refugees ”owing north are not unrelated to these strategies of intervention; sover- eignty as border control is part of this exercise too (Jones, 2012).

Fears of climate refugees build on these prior geopolitical fears (Wright, 2012).

This discussion and the use of biopolitics and governmentality as analytical lenses for the geographical investigation of many things became much more pressing in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 when security came to the fore once again in the practices of states. Specifying the response to the 9/11 in terms of war and invoking numerous modes of security not least the speci“cation of the new bureaucratic arrangements in the United States as the Department of Homeland Security, both reinvented territorial strategies of governance and extended practices of circulation reg- ulation into all sorts of new technological modes. Screening, sen- sors, monitors and surveillance extended into the heart of globalised corporate practices as well as into the intimate spaces of would be airline passengers. Geopolitics morphed into numer- ous modes of population management as global dangers invoked numerous enhanced modes of biopolitical governance.

Coleman and Groves (2009)cautionary tale about the ubiquity of the term biopolitics and the lack of precision is a useful correc- tive here. The crucial point in all this is not that there are single modes of power; the sovereign the disciplinary and the govern- mental but that all three operate in various ways that are key to the production of modern subjects, and cohere, in so far as they do, in the key institutions and practices of security. In Foucaults own terms:... modes of rule that mark contemporary times. The apparatuses of security are key to the circulations that make modern life. As this goes globa how it is that globalisation is secured has become a matter for security analysts too; its extension and perpetuation is at the heart of American grand strategy (Bacevich, 2010). The focus on the micro-scale where much of the earlier geo- graphical engagement was on bodies and discipline is now related clearly to the larger scale matters of biopolitical regulation where populations are monitored and ruled in biopower practices such as state immigration controls.Hardt and Negri (2000)adopt this language to suggest very clearly that now global capitalism pro- duces both commodities and subjectivities and that this combina- tion means that biopolitics is now about power imbricated in most aspects of social life. Here the possibilities for rule are entangled with peopl s identities and these in turn are about the commodi- ties that they consume in living. Safety and danger link the logics of security to the practices of everyday life as well as to matters of geopolitical order; very spec cally the biohuman is that which has to be secured in the discourses of liberal security (Dillon and Reid, 2009).

Agambe s (1998, 2005)rather different reformulations of bio- politics go back to Greek debates of political life in contrast to mere bare life, suggesting a different mode of thinking that distinguishes citizenship and worthy life from those rendered homo sacer (Cole- man and Grove, 2009). Exceptions are made within territorial states, sovereignty resides in Carl Schmit s terms in the power to invoke exceptions to the law, and the sovereign may then deal with exceptional circumstances by suspending rather than operat- ing strictly outside the law. But many of these themes have been reinterpreted in the last decade in light of the practices of security that have marked the war on terror and in American o cial lan- guage during the second Bush administration, the long struggle to end tyranny (Dalby, 2009). To eliminate tyranny requires the replacement, with violence if necessary, of tyrannical regimes with spaces of liberal life, of modern states, of states where the logics of capital can circulate ensuring that whatDillon and Reid (2009) term the biohuman life of liberalism becomes universal, and with it the end to external threats to the promise of freedom understood in terms of the liberal subject.

Hardt and Negri (2004)subsequently emphasised the impor- tance of violence and the reassertion of biopower in terms of war- fare in their volume Multitude , and contrast this to the biopolitical production that they emphasise as the productive power of Em- pire . This is tied too into discussions of American power and the invocation of American exceptionalism, both in terms of the importance of the identity claims and the moral logic of its form of individualism, but also in the invocation of military might, the indispensible nation, in Madeline Albrigh s infamous turn of phrase, and the hegemonic guarantor of a pax Americana, the long-standing military underwriting of the liberal order (Latham, 1997). This double exception is, Hardt and Negri argue, in Multi- tude , key to understanding the military twist that globalisation has taken. The security formulations of the war on terror make neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism two sides of the same coin (Dalby, 2007). Counter-insurgency doctrines are a key part of the pac cation of contemporary imperial peripheries, frequently justi- ed as humanitarian interventions. Understanding this in terms of the expansion of a global economy and the reconstitution of iden- tities in terms of consumers as citizens is key to understanding the expansion of Empire in the last few decades.Rei s (2010)exten- sion of such reasoning suggests that humanitarian interventions have now morphed into a series of biopolitical practices that use emergencies as the designation of circumstances that require the biopolitical spec cation of governance in spaces deemed in need of such practices precisely because of the dangers posed by their absence. But it is precisely such practices that are changing the 186S. Dalby / Geoforum 49 (2013) 184–192 04/21/2020 - RS0000000000000000000002881336 (Qi Fang) - PLEISTOCENE. HOLOCENE.

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3. Contingent emergence? More than this the biopolitics discussion requires an engage- ment with neoliberal modes of economy, and with how in the last few decades risks and dangers have been nancialised, or ironi- cally, in the language of the money markets, securitized. Insurance is key to all this, where the dangers from natural hazards have long been a matter of turning danger into economic measures and buy- ing insurance (Sturm and Oh, 2010). Now the larger dangers to whole societies and fears of climate change are inducing a whole new nancial industry concerned with the matter of catastrophe bonds and making money betting against particular places being damaged (Grove, 2010). The strange consequences of such nan- cial manipulations are beyond this paper but the point is that risk is nancialised and in the process the politicization of the economy pushed into realms of security policy explicitly. InDillo s (2008:

318)terms:

Precisely because it has become so biopolitically dominated, governance these days increasingly takes place through strate- gizations of the contingent, including greater r nement of risk awareness, risk-based analysis and risk-trading. Risk thus oper- ationalizes the biopolitics of emergent life through the com- mod cation of contingency, now widely assumed to be constitutive of what it is to be a living, emergent, transactional being. As a device that directly operationalizes our contempo- rary biopolitics of security, risk is therefore central to the gov- ernmental politics of formation that now dominate our world.

Emergency provision is now a matter of corporate strategies and contractors available to provide services at short notice.

Reconstruction funds are available through catastrophe bonds, at least in theory given the uctuations in global markets, and the complexity of the nancial instruments involved.

Grov s (2010)analysis suggests that this is a mode of risk that insures only what is nancialised, the commercial sectors of an economy and the formal infrastructures of state. There are many outside the circuits of economy that are rendered vulnerable, sub- jected to conditions of bare life outside the catastrophe bond reach. Not exactly in a state of exception, but perhaps in a state of exemption, removed from the economic calculus of that which needs to be secured. But nonetheless should such people migrate in search of sustenance and survival they may become framed either as refugees and victims in need of camps and the infrastruc- ture of humanitarian interventions, or as a threat to sovereign states using very un-biopolitical modes of military violence to pre- vent their seeking shelter across international frontiers (Wright, 2012). Humanitarianism has morphed into a biopolitization of emergency, and into practices where the ungovernable is, through practices of adaptation, rendered governable (Reid, 2010). The bio- political strategies of liberal rule have morphed into complex for- mulations of adaptive strategies and policies of promoting resilience all in the name of securing the biohuman as a species.

But securing this biohuman is ironically the cause of the climate change that is now a central preoccupation of planners, risk ana- lysts and security analysts.

4. Climate security All of which is part of the new focus on security and spec cally inOel (2012)terms, the climatization of security discourse. The formal security apparatuses of a number of Norther states con- cerned to secur their states against the risks of climate change are paying attention. Most notably the United Kingdom has de- voted considerable diplomatic resources to the theme given the vulnerability of the island state to rising sea levels, and the notable urban vulnerabilities to both ooding and simultaneously to fresh water scarcity (Ashton, 2011). Nonetheless in the British case it is worth noting that the institutional debate about the 2010 security review and the discussion of priorities for the British forces largely ignores climate matters (Codner and Clarke, 2011).Brzoska (2012) has traced discussions of climate and security in key planning doc- uments in twenty ve states. The US military has been developing strategies to green its operations, and as of March 2011 US Federal agencies are required to incorporate climate change considerations into their planning due to Presidential Executive Order 13514. Sce- nario exercises and planning for extreme contingencies are part of military life, and now too these are beginning to incorporate envi- ronmental issues and climate change into strategic planning (Brig- gs, 2010).Cooper (2010)goes so far as to suggest that climate change has become just one more factor in calculations of Ameri- can grand strategy.

The risks of adaptation too are of course a matter of rapidly increasing marketization; climate capitalism is the great growth strategy of the present (Newell and Paterson, 2010). Cynically one might argue that it has taken capitalism a long time to com- modify hot air, but effectively that is now what has happened.

The calculabilities of carbon sinks and the designations of trees as effective sequestration adds another dimension to all this with the reinvention of colonisation now taking perverse forms that add whole new dimensions to how natur or environmen is governed (Lansing, 2010). Simply ignoring the inhabitants or removing them from the forests now become carbon sinks for con- sumers elsewhere, perpetuates the pattern of dispossession that so S. Dalby / Geoforum 49 (2013) 184–192 04/21/2020 - RS0000000000000000000002881336 (Qi Fang) - PLEISTOCENE. HOLOCENE.

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Given the growing precarity of life for many people in the South, and the dispossession of many by the acceleration of the processes of commercialisation of agriculture in the South and the appropriation of assets in the mortgage schemes of the North, part of the “nancial crisis, vulnerability has obviously increased precisely as territories are recon“gured as resources devoid of the people who inhabit them (Sassen, 2010). On top of these are the contingencies of the market epitomised by the spike in oil and food prices in 2008, which were repeated in early 2011. This in part is the cause of the political volatility in the Arab world in particular and it squarely raises both the questions of the failure of such neo-liberal strategies and the role of military agencies as the ultimate guarantors of security. The Arab Spring too is now a matter for consideration in terms of climate security (Mabey et al., 2013).

Such considerations have in turn propelled the discussion of hu- man security, an amalgam of policy aspiration and the perspective that puts the marginal and poor victims of political and environ- mental disruption at the heart of analysis, to challenge the technocratic provision of security through strategies of either neo-liberalism or military force (Beebe and Kaldor, 2010). Looking to those outside the formal circuits of the global economy as the key to security requires a more fundamental rethinking of security than those offered by the marketization of risk and the assump- tions of economy as the provider of basic human needs. With cli- mate change exacerbating the vulnerabilities of the urban poor as well as the marginal populations in many rural places the larger agenda of how to cope with the intersection of climate change and social marginalisation politicises the provision of security directly (Brauch et al., 2011). It raises the questions of large-scale dangers, something that is familiar to military planners, and how risks and strategies might be linked in ways that head off large-scale social disruptions.

Climate security implies that the biohuman as understood within the logics of conventional neo-liberalism is itself rendered in doubt by the emergent possibilities of climate change and the other transformations set in motion precisely by prior efforts to se- cure the biohuman. To do this however requires stepping outside the framing of the biohuman in terms of life sciences, and thinking more carefully about all this more explicitly in terms of geological sciences and the transformation of the earth that is already under- way. In doing so the logics of risk and strategies of managing con- tingencies come up against the unavoidable recognition that their context is also part of the new emergent condition of life in the Anthropocene, and that the modes of risk that frequently populate discussions of security, and its “nancialization, dont “t the situa- tion of large scale climate change that may be coming. 5. Degrees of Risk military in making climate change mitigation a political priority.

Clearly this is key to the many publications on climate change that linked it directly to security in 2007 in particular (Campbell et al., 2007; Campbell, 2008; German Advisory Council, 2008). The most comprehensive attempt to think the logics of this through using a military framework is the analysis presented in the 2011 E3G environmental consultancy report Degrees of Ris (Mabey et al., 2011). Facing potential foes the military has long had to assess the risks of plausible but perhaps unlikely scenarios for future co ict. Likewise the military has had to pri- oritize which risks are most dangerous and plan for extreme con- tingencies even if they are unlikely. Acting to shape the futur and to think through how current policies may head off future co ict is a standard part of strategic planning; its biopower in operation. But with such modes of analysis present, and facing climate change with its potentially disastrous series of future dis- ruptions, inMabe s (2007)logic, thinking about the future in terms of risk analysis is an obvious way to proceed. It is so he argues because this is already how the military thinks about planning anyway.

In combining the perspectives of a British environmental orga- nisation and military risk assessment the Degrees of Ris docu- ment adds another twist to the long debate about environmental security. Focusing on risk analysis the Degrees of Ris report draws parallels with threat analysis done of late on the matter of nuclear proliferation (Mabey et al., 2011). The dangers of weapons in the hands of global terrorists have galvanised a number of pro- grams to ensure the containment of ssionable material. While it should never be forgotten that these are usually American led pro- jects to ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of those who might threaten in some way American hegemony (Dalby, 2011), a similar mode of analysis would suggest the necessity of taking action to reduce the dangers of climate change; another self-generated risk to the long-term survival of modern economies.

Given the escalating costs of dealing with the problem the longer action is delayed, the analysis points to the logic of anticipatory policy. Failure to act will guarantee disasters that the military and the political institutions that they ostensibly protect will be unable to respond to effectively.

The military has practical and immediate interests in dealing with climate change of course. Extreme environmental conditions make military operations di cult. Floods and storms may destroy infrastructure, ports, airbases and related equipment (Busby, 2008). Peacetime deployments to deal with disasters are part of the military mandate too. Instability in many parts of the world may be aggravated by climate disruptions, and these too will re- quire security responses by Western militaries (Briggs, 2010). But beyond this if nothing is done the international political environ- ment is likely to deteriorate in ways that will have major geopolit- ical implications. Unless that is, the climate change is incorporated into foreign policy and cooperative ventures are set in motion to deal with coming changes.

The Degrees of Ris authors suggest that risk analysis is the appropriate framework for thinking about these matters, and note bluntly that focusing on the short term or the average of scenario predictions for coming decades is missing the more important matter of extreme perturbations to the climate system. [T]he worst case scenario are not necessarily low probability events, even though analysts tend to assume that they are. Some major tipping points may be inevitable if current momentum economic behavior persist (Mabey et al., 2011: 26). Added to this is the concern that the models used to predict climate response to green- house gas levels have it seems been systematically underestimat- ing the speed of change. The extensive melting of the Arctic sea ice in 2007 has made it clear that some responses are coming dec- ades faster than the models suggest, at least in part because the 188S. Dalby / Geoforum 49 (2013) 184–192 04/21/2020 - RS0000000000000000000002881336 (Qi Fang) - PLEISTOCENE. HOLOCENE.

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What is noteworthy in this report is that the number of major systems that might be susceptible to tipping points is much greater than in similar reports published over the last few years. In con- trast to the German Advisory Committee on Climate Change report of 2007 (in English in 2008) which listed “ve major systems in dan- ger of rapid climate change, drawing fromLenton et al. (2008), (in map 2.7,Mabey et al., 2011: 43) the Degrees of Risk report sug- gests thirteen potential tipping systems. This includes disruption of the Asian monsoon that is especially important as it directly re- lates to the food supply of a substantial part of humanity in South and South East Asia. While there is an extensive list of likely dis- ruptions the most important message is simply the uncertainties involved in any forecasts of climate change. These are numerous contingencies here, but how to govern them is the most pressing question this invocation of climate insecurity poses. Clearly, it im- plies, conventional modes are simply not addressing the future, and the likelihood of crisis appearing in unanticipated mode is very considerable. Climate change is, looking at present trends further into the future, both a high probability outcome and one with grave consequences. Hence the logic in this document that it needs priority attention at least on the order of magnitude currently gi- ven to nuclear weapon threats and the policies for containment of “ssile material.

Following through on all this suggests simply that rapid de-car- bonisation of the global economy is a pressing necessity if the plan- etary climate system is not going to be recon“gured in unpredictable ways with all the massive disruptions to security, however understood, that this implies. The parallels with other security problems that have been dealt with in the past by Western security agencies are suggestive, not least some but not all the fea- tures of cold war nuclear issues and, more recently, the fears of ter- rorism and nuclear proliferation. They all have high degrees of uncertainty over the sensitivity, range, scale, speed and the discon- tinuous nature of the threats, and signi“cant uncertainty over the effectiveness and reliability of response strategies. They present hard security consequences that would require serious military re- sponses if unmanaged, but need mainly civilian action to preven- tively reduce long-term security risks (Mabey et al., 2011: 78).

But, in an especially piquant passage, Degrees of Risk asserts:

There is one key difference that makes climate change much more certain than traditional security threats. Decision makers can rest assured that the climate system will follow the laws of physics (Mabey et al., 2011: 78). In this crucial regard life in the Anthropo- cene is a matter of securing the conditions of life beyond the poli- tics of traditional security; decisions are not dependent solely on other political actors or the random chance that history so fre- quently brings to human affairs. The laws of physics mean that the climate will respond to the level of carbon dioxide in the atmo- sphere; human volition decides on that level.

All this is especially important because climate change is not, the Degrees of Risk authors tell us, a typical risk situation. Nor- mal risk analysis works with low probability high consequences on one end of the scale, with high probability low consequence events on the other. This is not the case in climate change once the long term is factored into decision-making. Decision makers are used to thinking in terms of low-probability but high-impact events, and those that are high-probability but low-impact. How- ever, the clear existence of climate system tipping points means that … unless global emissions are dramatically reduced … high im- pact events will have high probability. This unfamiliar scenario of- ten seems hard for decision makers to absorb (Mabey et al., 2011:

79). In part this is simply because it lies outside the normal assumptions about the context within which political thinking operates, a contextualization that takes for granted a relatively stable environmental backdrop for human activities. This E3G analysis is one attempt to gain attention and make decision makers think about the unfamiliar scenario that is climate change. This is precisely the point about thinking in terms of the Anthropocene; the future of the planetary system is in the hands of those who decide the large-scale energy systems that power globalisation; the environment is not a given context for geopoli- tics. WhileNicholas Stern (2007)warned some years ago that the market had spectacularly failed to take this simple but fundamen- tal point seriously, and marketizing emissions has proceeded rap- idly in the last few years at least in Europe (Newell and Paterson, 2010), the larger point that humanity is deciding the future of ma- jor planetary systems has been slow to take hold in the political de- bate about securing the biohuman. In this regard the politics of risk here comes into question. Neither traditional risk management strategies nor conventional economic decision-making can be re- lied onto govern in the face of increasingly likely extreme events, much less the large-scale transition in the climate system that be- comes increasingly likely the longer dramatic reductions in green- house gas emissions are delayed. The parameters for designing infrastructure and social responses to disaster are no longer stable or given (Pascal, 2009). Leaving matters to the market, or chance, or providential intervention is no longer an option, albeit catastro- phe bond sellers do try; major decisions need to be taken to deal with the certainty of major security disruptions looming later in this century. But unlike the emergencies that the biopolitics liter- ature has focused so far on, this emergency, if that is what it is, is generated precisely by the practices of securing the biohuman.

The implicit geopolitics of contemporary discussions usually fails to engage this instead displacing the discussion onto matters of where the impacts may be felt most acutely and engaging with conventional notions of national security rather than the necessity to think in ecological terms or in terms of the global system (Busby, 2008). Once again focusing on securing the biohuman, Africa has been the focus of attention because of the frequent “nding in the climate model projections that drier circumstances, or less predict- able rainfall patterns are likely to lead to more frequent crop fail- ures (Brown et al., 2007). These fears of food riots and failed states “t into the larger geopolitical narrative of the war on terror with its speci“cation of peripheral threats to metropolitan socie- ties. The uncertainties have made policy discussions dif“cult, not least because of the tendency to operate on the premise that policy should be made on matters than can be judged certain. The reluc- tance to engage fully with uncertainty around climate change has resulted in policy proposals that are more vulnerable to partisan attack, less believable to the general public, more likely to result in fatalism or rejection, and more likely to fail under many future scenarios. Current climate policies are therefore insuf“cient to de- liver real climate security to the global population (Mabey et al., 2011: 121). Facing this future suggests a whole plethora of risk management and mitigation strategies will be needed and a will- ingness to both confront extreme scenarios and think about how to respond is now unavoidable, unless the whole project of global civilisation is abandoned.

Degrees of Risk concludes that an appropriate risk manage- ment scheme can be summarised in what they call an ABC frame- work. Simply put policy makers should aim (A) to keep global temperatures within the 2 S. Dalby / Geoforum 49 (2013) 184–192 04/21/2020 - RS0000000000000000000002881336 (Qi Fang) - PLEISTOCENE. HOLOCENE.

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The biohuman is clearly at risk, along with any other modes of human life that might survive; the risk is a carboniferous capital- ism imposed geological one, or will be unless the future is secured by strategies much different from those of the present. In contrast, asCooper (2010)notes, the scenario planning within the American strategic community suggests that these extreme circumstances are probably coming so planning for them in the long run is simply part of the strategic calculus. If that is the case then the attempts such as the E3G Degrees of Risk exercise to get military planners to explain to political elites the new geopolitical circumstances of the Anthropocene will have failed. Such a strategic calculus is not climate security that matters to future generations of most of humanity; even it if operates to temporarily perpetuate biohuman- ity in some parts of the planet. 6. Anthropocene geopolitics But the related analytical question for geographers is how to proceed given these circumstances, and how to tackle the logics of risk laid out in such documents as the E3G analysis of Degrees of Ris ; how to tackle geological threats, not just the biological ones that biopolitics has mostly focused on in the past decade.

As some geographers have suggested starting here at all may be the problem; working outside the frames of big science may be a better option (Hulme, 2008). But that said, the largest context that of the forces shaping the biosphere is key to geograph s raison etre. Focusing on practical cultural options for change in spec c places draws on the strengths of the discipline, but in doing so con- cedes the geopolitical spec cations of matters to the militarized formulations of the biohuman that perpetuates the production of climate change problems in the rst place. From all this some ten- tative conclusions about geography, the Anthropocene and intel- lectual change can be drawn.

First, to return toWallerstei s (1999)discussions of uncer- tainty and the importance of complexity thinking in the social sci- ences, it is clear that these themes have permeated the academy, and indeed the emergence of a school of environmental history that explicitly connects world systems sociology into the material transformation of the biosphere, is a most useful linkage across the natural and social sciences (Hornborg et al., 2007).Dillon and Reid (2009)make clear the modes of ecological reasoning that are cur- rently in vogue, of adaptation and resilience, are integral to the governance structures that facilitate securing the biohuman as the species that is in need of being secured. Looked at through the lenses of the Anthropocene, of life itself as key to shaping the future, then the contradiction is palpable, and unavoidable in any scholarly analysis that undertakes the analysis of possibilities for the future. An extension of the ecological mode of reasoning is clearly necessary, but has to be done both in ways that do not per- petuate the processes destabilizing the biosphere, and in ways that operate to challenge contemporary boundary constructions either in terms of the building of fences round states (Jones, 2012), or on the smaller scale of the biohuman consumer and privatised security provision, inAndrew Szas s (2007)chilling phrase, as a matter of trying to shop our way to safet . Second, the Anthropocene formulation requires that we directly challenge the logics itemised inRei s (2010)argument about biopoliticization of humanitarianism and in particular his invoca- tion ofKen s (2002)suggestion that such logics are now being ex- tended in the futuristic formulations of a whole planet to be secured. But the invocation of climate change as dangerous pro- duces just such logics. The discussion of the Anthropocene requires such considerations be taken seriously and the Earth System Sci- ence literature pushes this much further than arguments such as Kent and Reid suggest. Bluntly the debate about the Anthropocene suggests that the moguls of carboniferous capitalism have taken our fate into their hands; decisions made in the next few decades will determine the future climate of the planet for millennia to come (Steffen et al., 2011).

This is the context for thinking politically now, and how to do it in ways that keep political options open and do t fall into the technological determinations of particular invocations of danger are a major consideration for geographers. But asGilbert (2012) notes, none of this will work if the traditional themes of energy security for the existing metropoles on the one hand, and dangers from the ungoverned spaces of the global south on the other, con- tinue to shape the geopolitical formulations of security thinkers. It is an open question as to whether analyses such as Degrees of Ris can change these formulations to ones more e cacious to Anthropocene living for more than the biohuman. But as this paper has suggested, these arguments are much too important to leave to the generals and their consultants; geographers need to engage this directly and do so with geographical contextualisations that challenge the logics of extending neoliberalism, while thinking clearly about the geological possibilities being opened up and fore- closed by the current practices of carboniferous capitalism.

Third, the focus on the non-biohuman is a key theme, but the di culty here is that these considerations cannot ignore the changing geographies of the planet. ExtendingRei s (2010)obser- vations about the disappearance of notions of neutrality in the 1990s, thatDu eld (2001)documents in detail, requires now an extension of the argument in the sense that there is nowhere out- side the circuits of the global economy immune to the conse- quences of its actions. While politics that give voice to the alter- globalisation movements and those who resist the depredations of the new colonisations of plantation farming and carbon seques- tration arrangements is to be welcomed, not least because of their resistance to the colonising logics of neo-liberal globalisation (see Lohmann, 2006), the future co guration of the planet is being determined by the struggles over energy systems and the materials used in manufacturing in coming generations.

Fourth, the crucial pointReid (2010)makes is that humanitari- anism is now focusing on emergencies as opportunities for new modes of governance; disasters have been turned into opportuni- ties for development as NaomiKlein (2007)documented in detail.

But the Anthropocene if it is understood as an emergency, presents precisely this same necessity to those who might challenge the governance, or perhaps that should be lack of governance, of cli- mate change. The emergency circumstances are increasingly art - cial circumstances now, and modes of governance that take that enmeshment of the social as essential are indispensible to thinking outside the parameters of securing the biohuman. The danger now is that understanding global change as either a disaster or an emer- gency might unleash disaster capitalis as a global project. Very different notions of biopolitics are obviously urgently needed.

Alternately this paper suggests that the Anthropocene might not be understood as emergency, or to return toZize s (2010) 190S. Dalby / Geoforum 49 (2013) 184–192 04/21/2020 - RS0000000000000000000002881336 (Qi Fang) - PLEISTOCENE. HOLOCENE.

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Finally, the Anthropocene formulation emphasises the dangers of conceptualising the biohuman in species terms, as that species that is in need of securing in a world whereby it may be threatened by many things. Understanding security in terms of the biohuman as a species fails to grapple with the larger question of how that species is shaping the context that ostensibly renders it insecure, or the speed with which changes are coming. A formulation of the biohuman as merely a species instead of as a biosphere altering project fails to grapple with the scale of the problem and once either again falls back on the negative formulations of security as spatial exclusion (Dalby, 2010), or simply adds it into the calculus of imperial power and preparation for violent future contingencies.

Ironically though such thinking leads back into the discussions of emergence and the necessity of pre-emption of climate threats, a matter of heading off imminent catastrophe, by quite literally shaping the future in ways that rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions in hopes that we may yet merely face dangerous climate change rather than the very dangerous climate changes some sce- nario makers now expect (Anderson and Bows, 2011). But asMa- bey et al. (2011)make clear this will have to be a civilian pre- emption; military options are not plausible unless, that is, one seri- ously considers proposals for geo-engineering (seeHumphreys, 2011).

If critical geographers are to effectively challenge the non-polit- ical politics of climate change thatSwyngedouw (2013)so point- edly warns about we have to confront biologization of political discourse and the corollary forms of technological engineering that reduce solutions to matters of purely technical concern. The point is that the biohuman is remaking the biosphere and hence is effectively constructing a security dilemma one more time, one that perpetuates the practices that cause the problem to a degree that at least one notable scholar has suggested that we perhaps might be better abandoning this discursive terrain altogether (Neo- cleous, 2008). This paper suggests otherwise; these issues are sim- ply too important to concede to unreconstructed security discourse and its practitioners whether in think-tanks or the acad- emy. Instead, the Anthropocene, this paper contends, offers a pow- erful formulation that focuses on the geological context, not formulations that work with species or military engineering, and hence provides a political contextualisation that is much less sus- ceptible to the remapping of threats to modernity in the conven- tional metropolitan tropes of endangerment. Acknowledgements thought provoking comments, not all of which I have been able to follow through in the detail they deserve in this text.

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