Choose one of the Middle Eastern cases: Turkey Iran The Arab Middle East: Egypt, Syria, Iraq or LebanonThen choose one of the themes: Nationalism Secularism State-led modernization (industrializ

Beginning with the constitutional revolution of 1905, democratic forces mobilised to check the coercive state power. As each struggle failed, exclusive polities emerged, refusing to empower the people and grant civil liberties.

Growing oil revenues, and foreign intervention, strengthened the rulers’ power and facilitated state domination of society. In the 1979revolution Iranians fought to achieve national independence, establish political freedom and reduce rising inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income. The democratic forces did not prevail, however, as a faction of the qulam a p seized power, imposed a theocratic state, eliminated its coalition partners and repressed all opposition. In the context of global democratisation, the state generated a new set of conflicts that have yet to reach a climax. Establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty In the early years of the twentieth century Iran’s weak, corrupt government was incapable of blocking foreign powers from exerting substantial influence over the country’s affairs. Britain invaded Iran in January 1918on the heels of Russia’s October revolution as Bolsheviks withdrew their troops from Iran and renounced all tsarist privileges. 1By 1919 Britain was the sole foreign power in Persia, and attempted to consolidate its control formally with the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. The agreement, authored mainly by Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, stipulated that Britain would lend Iran £ 2,000 ,000 and construct railways, revise tariffs and collect war compensation from third parties. In exchange, Britain would become the exclusive supplier 1 Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar collapse to Pahlavi rule (London, 1998 )p.25. 481 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 of arms, military training and administrative advisers. Curzon argued that the agreement would serve both British and Persian interests. 2To ensure pas- sage, the British bribed the venal Persian ruler, Ah .mad Sh ah, and a number of leading politicians and qulam a p. 3The agreement was signed on 9August 1919, but required additional ratification by the parliament, or majlis, which had been disbanded four years earlier.

4 The Anglo-Persian Agreement set off intense political conflict within Iran that lasted twenty months, during which the premiership changed hands nine times. Nationalist and leftist forces in Azerbaijan, Gilan and M azandar an led the challenge against the government, charging that the agreement was an imperialist design to reduce Iran to a vassal state. 5In Azerbaijan the Democrat Party proposed reconvening parliament and establishing a repub- lic, and they renamed their province the Country of Freedom. In Gilan the Communist Party formed a Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran and in 1920 prepared to march into Tehran with a guerrilla force of some 1,500 . Mutinies in the gendarmerie and the Cossack Division paralysed the government, which was unable to end incessant tribal warfare, control British forces in the south or block the Red Army in the north. 6 In the midst of the government’s inability to convene parliament to ratify the Anglo-Persian Agreement, Colonel Reza Khan led some 3,000 men into Tehran on 21February 1921. 7Reza Khan’s action was approved by high- ranking British officers and officials, who argued that Iran needed a military strongman. 8In particular, the British ambassador, Herman Norman, advised Ah .mad Sh ah to accede to the coup d’e´ tat leaders’ demands as they were the ‘absolute masters’ of the situation. 9Upon his arrival, Reza Khan promptly arrested some sixty influential politicians, assuring the shah that he intended to protect the monarchy from revolution. He assumed the position of army commander and asked the shah to appoint Sayyid Z .iy a, a pro-British reformer, as prime minister. 10 Reza Khan and Z .iy a announced that the government would prevent national disintegration, end foreign occupation, implement social transfor- mation and usher in an age of national revival. On the day of the coup Z .iy a 2 Richard H. Ullman, The Anglo-Soviet relations, 1917–1921 (Princeton, 1972) pp. 351–2.

3 Ghani, Iran, pp. 43–6, 54 –7. 4Ibid., p. 49.

5 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between two revolutions (Princeton,1982), p. 114.

6 Ibid., pp. 115–17 . 7Ullman, Anglo-Soviet relations ,p.387.

8 Stephanie Cronin, The army and the creation of the Pahlavi state in Iran, 1910–1926 (London, 1997 ), p. 86; Ghani, Iran, pp. 154,158 ,191 –2.

9 Cronin, The army ,p.183. 10Ibid., p. 86. The New Cambridge History of Islam 482 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 declared that the adoption of the constitution fifteen years earlier had failed to bring about any changes, and that the ruling oligarchy still controlled the country’s wealth as if it were their birthright. Z.iy a outlined an ambitious programme for development, while Reza Khan proclaimed martial law. He suspended all publications, gatherings and the right of assembly, and he closed down cinemas, gambling clubs, theatres, shops selling alcoholic bev- erages and government offices – except those distributing food. 11Reza Khan used martial law to demobilise his opponents, and within a month he had jailed some 200politicians and wealth-holders. 12The new government also quickly abrogated the Anglo-Persian Agreement, declaring that the measure’s real intent was to neutralise the Soviet Union and its domestic supporters.

They signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union that cancelled Iran’s debt to the tsarist regime, nullified all concessions granted to Russia in the previous century and guaranteed that Iran’s territory would not be used to attack the Soviet Union, thus paving the way for the withdrawal of the Red Army from the north. 13Within five months the government also terminated the services of British officers. 14 Reza Khan moved swiftly to consolidate his power against domestic rivals. With the shah’s support, he ousted Z .iy a after three months and took charge of the Ministry of War. He solidified his position with Cossacks as the British departed, defeated the Jangal movement that con- trolled Gilan and M azandar an, and quelled mutinies in Tabr z and Mashhad.

Between 1922and1925 Reza Khan successfully defeated various rebellious tribes and brought them under government control. His army brutally destroyed tribal autonomy and resistance by hanging some men in each village and committing outrages upon the women. 15During this period Reza Khan threatened the parliament with force at least twice, and ended its independence by controlling elections. 16 Appointed prime minister in October 1923, he mobilised his supporters behind the scene to abolish the monarchy. His short-lived attempt to establish a republic in early 1924failed in the face of conservative opposition; but in December 1925he convened a constituent assembly that finally deposed Ah .mad Sh ah’s Q aj ar dynasty. In its place, Reza Khan installed the Pahlavi dynasty and became known as Reza Sh ah. He then proceeded to eliminate all autonomous power centres, including prominent opposition leaders, and subordinated civil society to 11 Ghani, Iran,p.200 .12Ibid., p. 177.

13 Ullman, Anglo-Soviet relations , pp.350,391 ; Abrahamian, Iran,p.118 .

14 Cronin, The army , pp.92–3. 15Ibid., p. 212. 16Ibid., p. 182. Iran from 1919 483 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 his military apparatus. 17He also repressed religious and linguistic minorities in the name of national unification. 18 Reza Sh ah’s secular orientation and policies adversely affected the interests of the qulam a p and marginalised their political influence. 19 During his rule repression reduced the prevalence of popular collective action, which had become prominent during the constitu- tional revolution. With rising oil revenues, Reza Sh ah also promoted Iran’s development. He undertook an ambitious programme to develop Iran’s infrastructure and modernised Iran’s legal and education systems, thus undermining the qulam a p who had played leading roles in those institutions. He introduced mandatory elementary education and established the Tehran University in 1935.By1941 he had sent 2,395 students abroad to study. 20 He improved the country’s public health through compulsory vaccinations and the eradication of various diseases. In the social sphere, Reza Sh ah stressed greater equality, and in 1935 abolished titles. He extended citizenship and education rights to women, including Tehran University, which admitted women from its inception, and in 1936 abolished the Persian chador, or veil. 21 Despite advances, Iran’s development was highly uneven, as state policies benefited the wealthy. Reza Sh ah, who came from a small landowning family, became the country’s largest landlord with personal estates estimated at 2,000 villages or parts by 1941. 22He acquired more than a hundred villages per year through legal and extra-legal means. 23His personal account in the National Bank increased from 100,000 tomans in 1930to68,000 ,000 tomans (equivalent to £ 3,000 ,000 )by1941 . 24In contrast, 95–98 per cent of the agrarian population owned no land at all.25Large landlords in the mid- 1930s owned half of all land, as well as entire villages – including the inhabitants. 26Reza Sh ah also harshly repressed peasant rebellions. Upon assuming power he 17 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of revolution: An interpretive history of modern Iran (New Haven, 1981), pp. 93–4.

18 Abrahamian, Iran,p.163 .

19 Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and politics in contemporary Iran: Clergy–state relations in the Pahlavi period (Albany,1980), pp. 23–59 .

20 Ghani, Iran,p.399 ; J Bharier, Economic development in Iran (London,1971), pp. 172–3.

21 L. P. Elwell-Sutton, ‘Reza Shah the Great: Founder of the Pahlavi dynasty’, in G.

Lenczowski (ed.), Iran under the Pahlavis (Stanford,1977), p. 34.

22 A. Lambton, The Persian land reform (Oxford,1969), pp. 49–50 .

23 E. Hooglund, Land and revolution in Iran, 1960–1980 (Austin, 1981), p. 40.

24 Donald N. Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The resurrection and reconstruction of Iran (New York, 1975), pp. 243–4.

25 Keddie, Roots of revolution ,p.103.

26 Overseas Consultants Inc., Report on seven year development plan for the Plan Organizaton of the Imperial Government of Iran ,5 vols. (New York, 1949), vol. III, p. 8. The New Cambridge History of Islam 484 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 arrested800labour activists and leftists, and forced many others under- ground. The government outlawed strikes and labour unions. Workers suffered from low wages and long working hours. The working classes and small producers paid a part of the cost of the development through high interest rates and indirect taxes on basic consumer items. 27 Although he withstood internal opposition and a major uprising in 1935,he was eventually toppled by the shifting international situation brought on by the Second World War. When the Soviet Union requested Britain’s help against German forces, Churchill proposed transferring war supplies to the Soviets by way of Iran. 28Although Iran declared neutrality when war broke out, Britain and the Allies objected to Reza Sh ah’s pro-German policies and the presence of several hundred German technicians in the country. 29 Britain’s need to supply the Soviets against the Germans, together with its dependence on Iranian oil, led to invasion from the west and the south by the British and from the north by the Soviets, subsequently bolstered by 30,000 American troops. Within three days the Iranian army began to retreat, and soon collapsed. Three weeks later, without consulting the Allies, Reza Sh ah abdicated and left his dynasty in the hands of his twenty-year-old son, Mohammad Reza. The departure of the autocratic ruler and the young, inexperienced mon- arch’s accession to the throne reduced state repression, resulting in the release of more than 1,250 political prisoners. At the same time, harsh economic conditions produced by war and occupation created opportunities for various classes and groups to mobilise and act collectively, as leftist and pro-Western political parties and publications expanded, encouraged by the Soviet Union and Britain. Political organisations in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan launched autonomy movements, and Azerbaijani socialists under the auspi- ces of the Soviet Union established an autonomous republic that lasted for nearly a year. However, when the Soviet Union withdrew in May 1946in the face of reported US threats to use nuclear force, 30the Iranian army attacked secessionist forces in both provinces, crushing them by December. The nationalist movement The most important development following the Second World War was the nationalist movement opposed to foreign control of Iran’s oil, as during the 27 Keddie, Roots of revolution , pp.102,107 .

28 Amin Saikal, The rise and fall of the shah (Princeton,1980), p.25.

29 Elwell-Sutton, ‘Reza Shah the Great’, pp. 49–50 . 30Time ,28 January 1980. Iran from 1919 485 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 war the Americans, and later the Soviets, attempted to win oil concessions from Iran. 31Dr Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882–1967 ), a Western-educated member of parliament, led the nationalist and liberal forces in 1949, and unified them under a single umbrella organisation called the National Front.

The Front advocated independent economic and political development by means of Iran’s own resources, most particularly oil. The Front also pressed to restrict the sh ah’s political power, transform agrarian relations, expand political freedoms, grant electoral franchise to women and enact liberal press laws. Within a short time the movement attracted the support of the majority of the population. The Front’s struggles culminated in the conflict against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the largest firm in the British Empire. To the British government, which owned 51per cent of the oil company, cheap Iranian oil was an important economic asset. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin once noted that without Iran’s oil, there would be ‘no hope of our being able to achieve the standard of living at which we are aiming in Great Britain’. 32 Nationalists claimed that, despite an increase in royalties from 16to 20 per cent of profits in 1933, Iran received considerably fewer royalties than the taxes paid by the oil company to the British government. They pointed out that royalty payments during the 1940s did not keep pace with increased oil extraction because of the oil company’s higher British taxes to finance the war. Nationalists also charged that the company sold Iranian oil at a discount to both the British navy and to the United States to pay off Britain’s war debt.

Indeed, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s pre-tax profits of £ 124,680,000 for 1949 and1950 alone surpassed the entire amount of royalties, £ 110,000 ,000 , the company paid to Iran in the thirty-eight years of its contract. 33British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden later sympathised with the Iranian position:

‘I understand their feelings, for it must seem to them ingenuous that His Majesty’s Government, as a large shareholder, should take increasing sums in taxation, and refuse the increased dividends from which the Iranian govern- ment would have benefited.’ 34 To increase its share of oil revenues, the Iranian parliament demanded in 1949 that Britain accept a fifty–fifty profit-sharing arrangement on oil, similar to terms conceded by American firms to Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. The 31 Saikal, Rise and fall ,p.25.

32 Stephen Kinzer, All the shah’s men: An American coup and the roots of Middle East terror (Hoboken, NJ, 2003), p. 68.

33 Mostafa Elm, Oil, power and principle (Syracuse,1992), pp. 18,38.

34 James A. Bill, The eagle and the lion: The tragedy of American–Iranian relations ( New York, 1988), p. 63. The New Cambridge History of Islam 486 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 British rejected the demand, offering instead to raise royalties to24cents per barrel, along with a few other reforms. Although the shah favoured the British offer, many Iranians were not satisfied and called him a puppet of both America and Britain. 35Faced with British rejection, the National Front demanded nationalisation of Iran’s oil. Public protests broke out and oil workers went on strike to support the nationalisation bill. During a parlia- mentary debate, Mosaddegh agreed to become prime minister provided that parliament approved nationalisation. Both chambers unanimously approved the implementation bill on the same day and elected Mosaddegh as prime minister by a vote of seventy-nine to twelve. Mosaddegh expelled British workers from the oilfields in September 1951, prompting Britain to decide to invade Iran. When President Truman opposed the invasion, Britain intro- duced a United Nations resolution to force Iran to denationalise the oil sector.

Mosaddegh personally defended Iran’s case before the UN Security Council, pointing out that although the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company earned £ 61,000 ,000 in1948 , Iran received only £ 9,000 ,000 while £ 28,000 ,000 was paid to the British treasury.

36 In the end, the Security Council refused to endorse the British resolution.

Britain also took its case to the International Court of Justice, where Mosaddegh argued in June 1952that the court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. When the court agreed with Iran’s position, the British government appealed to the Truman administration to intervene and overthrow Mosaddegh. Once again Truman rejected the idea; but his policy shifted, refusing to provide economic assistance to Iran. The State Department even prevented a US firm from sending American technicians to run Iran’s oil industry for fear of antagonising Britain. 37 Inside Iran, British agents also conspired to overthrow Mosaddegh through a coup d’e ´ tat . When Mosaddegh discovered their plot, he closed down the British embassy in October 1952and expelled the entire diplomatic mission. 38 Britain retaliated by imposing economic measures against Iran, 39 freezing Iran’s sterling assets in London, banning the export of key British commod- ities to Iran, boycotting Iranian oil, and threatening to sue anyone who purchased oil from Iran. The boycott produced an economic crisis in Iran, paralysing the government to the point where it could not pay employees’ salaries. 35 Ibid., pp. 52–3. 36Kinzer, All the shah’s men ,p.123.37Ibid., p. 115.

38 Ibid., p. 3. 39Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 194–5; Kinzer, All the shah’s men ,p.110. Iran from 1919 487 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Mosaddegh’s policies also turned some segments of the population against him.40Conservative politicians and the royal court were antagonised in early 1951 when Mosaddegh dissolved the senate formed by the shah two years earlier under martial law. The landed upper class, the largest single bloc in the parliament, was adversely affected by two decrees instituting agrarian reforms 41and freeing peasants from forced labour on their landlords’ estates.

Powerful elements in the army were angered when Mosaddegh purged more than 130officers, including 15generals. Finally, prominent religious leaders, including parliament speaker Ayat All ah K ash an , and Ayat All ah Bihbah an , who was influential among the poor in south Tehran, were antagonised by Mosaddegh’s liberal, secular policies and his defence of women’s rights and religious freedoms. 42 Ayat All ah K ash an had joined the National Front and actively supported the nationalisation of oil, but defected from Mosaddegh, stating that the prime minister had actually worsened Iran’s economic situation. On one occasion he questioned Mosaddegh rhetorically: ‘Our economy is bankrupt, our villages are destroyed, our sons have become communists, our schools have taken red colors. What are you doing?’ 43 Despite some defections, opponents could not oust Mosaddegh because of the support of the vast majority of the urban population, including the middle and working classes, and especially bazaar merchants, shopkeepers and artisans, who formed the backbone of the nationalist movement. During the conflict between Mosaddegh and the shah, Tehran bazaaris demonstrated their support for the prime minister by closing down the bazaar on at least fifty occasions. The Society of Merchants, Guilds, and Artisans continued to back Mosaddegh even after most conservative qulam a p and politicians had broken with the National Front. The society published a statement in Ettelaat newspaper on 14April 1953condemning Mosaddegh’s opponents and demanding passage of a bill preventing the sh ah from interfering in civil and military affairs. Two days later, large numbers of bazaaris demonstrated in favour of Mosaddegh. 44 Industrial workers and white-collar employees also mobilised for collective action in support of Mosaddegh during these conflicts. Oil workers were active in the events leading to the nationalisation of oil. Urban and industrial workers in Tehran and other cities repeatedly joined pro-Mosaddegh dem- onstrations and rallies during crucial political events, even when some qulam a p 40 Misagh Parsa, Social origins of the Iranian revolution (New Brunswick,1989), p. 42.

41 Hooglund, Land and revolution , pp.43–4.

42 R. W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh,1964), p. 154.

43 Kayhan ,14 September 1953. 44New York Times ,14 April 1953. The New Cambridge History of Islam 488 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 broke away from the prime minister. Industrial workers in Tehran and major urban centres joined oil workers on strike in Ab ad an, K rm ansh ah, and Is .fah an when Mosaddegh resigned in July 1952. Government employees in Tehran left their offices for political demonstrations supporting the prime minister on 21July. The following year white-collar employees demonstrated in April 1953in support of a bill limiting the monarch’s power, 45and they joined workers everywhere in political rallies on 21July 1953, commemorating the protests of the year before. The strength of Mosaddegh’s support was revealed in July 1952when he threatened to resign if the shah did not cease illegally appointing the minister of defence and the head of the armed forces. When the shah did not respond, the prime minister made good on his threat and resigned on 16July, stating:

‘Under the present situation, it is not possible to bring the struggles initiated by the Iranian people to a victorious conclusion.’ 46The shah named as prime minister Ah .mad Qaw am, who opposed Mosaddegh’s foreign policy and was endorsed by Britain and the United States. 47This appointment was met by pro-Mosaddegh popular strikes and large-scale demonstrations in all major cities, which prompted the government to respond with a crackdown on 21 July that left scores of protesters dead or wounded. Shaken by the scale of popular movement, Qaw am resigned and went into hiding, and the shah was forced to reappoint Mosaddegh. 48 The election of Eisenhower in the USA in November 1952changed the situation. Mosaddegh attempted to gain the new American president’s sup- port by accusing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company of colonialism and the British government of seeking to regain its former position. Although the United States initially claimed neutrality and called for negotiations, it came down on Britain’s side and refused to buy Iranian oil, citing public opposition in the absence of an oil settlement. Mosaddegh then requested American economic and technical assistance to develop Iran’s other resources, but Eisenhower again insisted that Iran settle its dispute with Britain before marketing its oil. Eisenhower’s position followed the views of American oil companies, which feared that Iranian oil nationalisation might produce similar outcomes in other countries. 49 With the Republicans’ victory in the USA, the British changed their approach and emphasised communism in place of British interest in Iranian 45 Parsa, Social origins , pp.133–6. 46Ettelaat ,17 July 1952.

47 Abrahamian, Iran,p.195 .48Parsa, Social origins , pp.42–3.

49 R. B. Stobaugh, ‘The evolution of Iranian oil policy, 1925–1975 ’, in Lenczowski (ed.), Iran under the Pahlavis ,p.210. Iran from 1919 489 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 oil. A senior agent of the British Secret Intelligence Service, Christopher Montague Woodhouse, met with top CIA and State Department officials to make the case for US intervention. ‘Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts out of fire, I decided to emphasise the Communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry. I argued that even if a settlement of the oil dispute could be negotiated with Musaddiq, which was doubtful, he was still incapable of resisting a coup d’etat by the Tudeh Party, Iran’s official Communist Party, if it were backed by the Soviet support. Therefore he must be removed.’ 50 In March1953the Eisenhower administration approved a coup d’e´ tat to overthrow Mosaddegh. Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and a distant cousin of Franklin Roosevelt, was appointed ‘field commander’.

Roosevelt recruited General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who had trained the Iranian Imperial Gendarmerie as well as a secret security squad. The CIA had already assembled a clandestine network of politicians, military officers, clergy, newspaper editors and street-gang leaders, paying them thousands of dollars per month to push the American agenda. A leading CIA propa- gandist, Richard Cottam, estimated that four-fifths of Tehran’s newspapers were under CIA influence. 51Once the decision was made to oust Mosaddegh, the Americans and British attempted to promote instability and resentment against the prime minister. Articles in the Iranian press claimed that Mosaddegh’s ancestors were Jewish and that he might be homosexual. In the Western media he was portrayed at times as a communist and at other times as the cause of instability, which could benefit the communists. The British even arranged the kidnapping, torture and murder of Iran’s chief of the national police, General Muh .ammad Afshartu, in late April 1953, in the hope of provoking a coup.

52 To carry out the coup, Roosevelt arrived in Iran followed shortly by Schwarzkopf with millions of dollars to distribute among Iranian operatives. 53 They recruited segments of the military, a few qulam a p, a group of well-known thugs and some prostitutes from southern Tehran’s poor neigh- bourhood. The thugs, who worked closely with the CIA agents, had no political ideology and operated purely for economic gain. When two leading thugs expressed reluctance to continue the operation and a desire to with- draw, Roosevelt offered the simple choice of cooperating for $ 50,000 or 50Bill, The eagle and the lion ,p.86. 51Kinzer, All the shah’s men ,p.6.

52 Mark J. Gasiorowski, ‘The 1953coup d’etat in Iran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies ,19 (1987 ), p. 270.

53 Kinzer, All the shah’s men ,p.8. The New Cambridge History of Islam 490 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 quitting and death. They decided to take the money and cooperate. 54The Iranian operatives failed in their initial attempt at a coup on 16August, and the shah, who had been very reluctant to remove Mosaddegh, fled the country. Despite Washington’s orders to leave Iran, Roosevelt improvised a new plan that succeeded three days later in ousting the prime minister and reinstalling the shah. Mosaddegh was overthrown during the Cold War, but the precise cause of the coup had little to do with communism. Although the Iranian Communist Party had become very powerful, it was not able to challenge the charismatic, popular prime minister. Moreover, the Soviet Union posed little or no actual threat to Iran after 1946when it bowed to Truman’s ultimatum to leave Iranian Azerbaijan and stay out of Iran’s political affairs. Neither the British MI 6, nor the CIA, nor the US secretary of state Dean Acheson believed at the time that communists presented a threat to the Iranian government.

55As early as October 1951Truman had told Mosaddegh that the USA would wage a world war if the Soviets took over Iran. 56With Stalin’s death in early March 1953 , internal divisions in Russia prevented the communists from acting in Iran. The realisation that the Soviet Union was unable to intervene in Iran may have prompted the United States to move against Mosaddegh, as Eisenhower endorsed the coup plan after Stalin died.

The decision to overthrow Mosaddegh coincided with another decision that greatly benefited American oil corporations. In 1952the Truman admin- istration initiated a lawsuit against oil companies, which Eisenhower with- drew a year later. 57Eisenhower was persuaded to drop the lawsuit by two members of his administration, Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, both partners in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which had been hired to defend the oil companies against the lawsuit. American oil companies also benefited substantially from the coup. After Mosaddegh’s ouster, a consor- tium was established to handle Iran’s oil industry. Britain lost its monopoly but retained 40per cent of Iran’s oil; five American oil companies received another 40per cent; and two European companies were given 20per cent.

The non-British companies paid $ 1,000 ,000 ,000 to the Anglo-Iranian Company for their concession totalling 60per cent. The consortium agreed 54 Ibid., p. 172.

55 M. J. Gasiorowski, US foreign policy and the shah: Building a client state in Iran (Ithaca, 1991), p. 83; Abrahamian, Iran,p.204 ; K. Roosevelt, Countercoup(New York,1979), p. 88.

56 Kinzer, All the shah’s men ,p.129.

57 J. Kwitny, Endless enemies: The making of an unfriendly world (New York,1986)p.162. Iran from 1919 491 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 to share its profits with Iran on a fifty–fifty basis, but refused to open its books to Iranian auditors or include Iranians on its board of directors. 58 In the succeeding years the consortium’s net profits were the highest in the region, averaging 69.3per cent of its net assets. 59 Iranians did not experience democracy in the aftermath of the coup.

Tehran was placed under martial law for four years until Iran’s secret intelligence agency, the SAVAK, was established with the help of the CIA.

Mosaddegh was sentenced to three years in prison and his foreign minister was executed. The former prime minister was then placed under house arrest and allowed visits only from relatives and a few close friends until his death in 1967 . Dozens of communists were executed and even more were imprisoned, as many fled the country. The new prime minister was General Z ahid who, according to the US ambassador in Iran, Loy Henderson, was given $ 2,000 ,000 to help carry out the coup. 60 Z ahid had been arrested as a Nazi collaborator by the British during the Second World War and exiled to Palestine. Now he became the new prime minister. The coup of 1953weak- ened the liberal National Front and practically eliminated the Tudeh Party.

Arguably, this intervention by the USA and Britain in the affairs of Iran held back the development of democracy and set the stage for the revolution of 1979 . The White Revolution State policies and external factors set the stage for the next round of conflicts.

Following the coup, the shah attempted to promote economic development as a means of expanding his support and assuring his political survival.

However, the government’s intensified efforts to expand development had the deleterious effect of boosting inflation and the cost of living. As oil revenues rose so did imports, while the necessity of repaying foreign loans created a trade imbalance and reduced foreign exchange to zero. On the advice of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank the Iranian government implemented a stabilisation programme in September 1959 which forbade luxury imported items, raised import tariffs on non-essential goods and restricted bank credit and the sale of foreign exchange. These policies raised interest rates and produced bazaar 58 Kinzer, All the shah’s men ,p.196.

59 J. M. Blair, The control of oil (New York,1976), p. 50.

60 M. Farmanfarmaian and R. Farmanfarmaian, Blood and oil: Inside the shah’s Iran(New York, 1997), p. 300n. The New Cambridge History of Islam 492 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 bankruptcies and bank failures. Inflation combined with low salaries gener- ated economic problems for the middle class and provoked labour strikes.More importantly, American policy makers pressed for reform. In May 1961 , shortly after taking office, the Kennedy administration offered to pro- vide $ 35,000 ,000 in aid to Iran in return for a number of reforms. In response to US pressure and growing internal conflicts, the shah appointed as prime minister qAl Am n , a relative of Mosaddegh and finance minister in his administration. Am n dissolved the newly elected parliament, allowed the National Front to resume public activities, exiled the head of the SAVAK, granted freedom of the press and appointed as minister of agriculture H .asan Arsanj an , a journalist with socialist views who had advocated land reform since the early 1940s.

Liberalisation in the context of an economic crisis set off popular mobi- lisation and collective action in many parts of the country. The second National Front revived its organisation and briefly mobilised bazaari and student supporters, although it was divided and could not pursue a coherent strategy towards Am n and the shah. In one action, the Front held a mass meeting in May 1961at Jal al yya Field in Tehran in which 80,000people participated. Threatened by popular mobilisation and Am n ’s positive postures towards the National Front, the shah moved against Am n and the National Front.

On 21January 1962paratroopers attacked Tehran University students who were protesting against the expulsion of two high-school students engaged in political activities. Many students were injured and the university chancellor, Dr Ah .mad Farh ad, resigned his post in protest against the attack. Am n denied any role in the repression, and six months later he resigned in a dispute with the shah over military expenditure. The shah’s next prime minister was a close friend, Asad All ah qAlam. qAlam allowed Arsanj an to retain his post for another year as minister of agricul- ture, but the shah watered down the land reform, introduced new measures and repackaged his programme as the White Revolution, or the ‘Revolution of the Shah and the People’. The six-point programme comprised ( 1) agrarian reform; ( 2) nationalisation of pastures and forests; ( 3) public sale of state-owned factories to finance land reform; ( 4) profit-sharing in industry; ( 5 ) enfranchisement of women; and ( 6) establishment of a literacy corps. The shah called for a plebiscite scheduled for 26January 1963to approve the reforms. In response, the National Front opposed the shah’s dictatorial approach and called for a protest strike. The bazaar closed for three days in advance of the plebiscite and the Front called for a demonstration the day Iran from 1919 493 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 before the voting. The government banned the demonstrations and arrested some400Front leaders and many of their bazaari supporters. 61 The qulam a p were divided in their response to the shah’s reforms. Only a small minority who maintained ties to the government supported the reforms; they included Ayat All ah Mahd aw , Allama W ahid , and the im am jum qa of Tehran. 62 Most of the qulam a p opposed land reform, especially in Azerbaijan, Is .fah an, and Kirm an, where the qulam a p had large landholdings and stood to lose under the proposed reforms. Some qulam a popposed the land reform because it meant confiscating land belonging to mosques and reli- gious institutions. Other pre-eminent clerics, including Ayat All ahs Shar qat- M ad ar and Muh .ammad Riz . a Golp ayg an , regarded women’s franchise as unacceptable, and they specifically asked the shah to withdraw this proposed reform. Still other clergy, including Ayat All ahs T .alaq an , Zanj an , and Mah .all at Sh r az , criticised the shah’s dictatorship and the capitulation laws and instead advocated justice for the poor. Ruh .All ah M usaw Khomeini was among the pre-eminent clerics, although relatively young and unknown in the early 1960s. His vociferous opposition to the shah and the proposed reforms soon made him well known. He condemned virtually all aspects of the White Revolution and their broader implications for Iran’s place in the world. A central theme of Khomeini’s attacks was his concern for the qulam a p’s position and for Islam, both of which he believed to be threatened by the reforms. Khomeini rejected women’s suffrage and equality as a Bah a p principle. He criticised land reform as leading to negative economic consequences. He denounced 63Iran’s economic pen- etration by Israel and the United States, the loss of Iranian markets and bankruptcies among farmers and bazaaris. Most importantly, and a point which has been ignored in scholarly analyses, Khomeini was the only political or religious leader who actually called for the overthrow of the shah’s regime at this time. In the months that followed, Khomeini repeatedly criticised the shah’s regime, specifically its reforms, its violation of Islam and the constitu- tion, and its economic policies. In the context of an economic crisis and rising authoritarianism, many segments of the population were politicised. Popular protests erupted in May and June 1963during Muh .arram, the Sh q month of mourning. The mourn- ing rituals provided a unique opportunity for the expression of political 61 H. E. Chehabi, Iranian politics and religious modernism: The liberation movement of Iran under the shah and Khomeini (Ithaca,1990). p. 175.

62 Akhavi, Religion and politics ,p.103.

63 Ruhollah Khomeini, S . ah . fa-yi N ur, 16vols. (Tehran, 1983), vol. I, p. 56. The New Cambridge History of Islam 494 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 opposition to the government. On3June 1963, during the central observance of Ash ur a, the processions were highly politicised, and marchers shouted anti-shah slogans as they reached the Marble Palace. 64Two days later, on 5 June, Khomeini was arrested along with a number of other qulam a p through- out the country. Within a few hours popular protests erupted in Tehran, Qum, Mashhad, Is .fah an, Sh r az, Tabr z and Kashan, and lasted for three days.

These protests were met by brutal repression which solidified the shah’s power but severed the loose alliance between the monarch and the clergy forged since the beginning of his reign.

Organisational weaknesses prevented challengers from bringing about political change. All secular opposition groups including the Tudeh Party and the National Front had been weakened following the 1953coup.

Additionally, the absence of coalition formation among major segments of the population enabled the military forces to repress and eliminate the opposition for more than a decade. Furthermore, internal divisions and loss of national networks after the overthrow of Mosaddegh prevented the second National Front from mobilising broad segments of the population before and during the June protests. The interests of several social groups were threatened by government policies, but not all of them were drawn into the protests of June 1963.

Bazaaris, for example, were unorganised and did not respond in a unified fashion. Although shopkeepers and artisans actively protested against the government’s actions, merchants refrained from open opposition. In a sam- ple of 579individuals arrested or killed in the protests, shopkeepers and artisans constituted the largest group, while only one was a merchant. 65 Once demonstrations turned violent and shots were fired, protesting bazaaris rapidly withdrew. 66 Outside the central bazaar, some shopkeepers did not join in the actions at all, and as a result their shops were smashed and even looted. Other major social groups also stayed away from the protests. University students, with some individual exceptions, did not actively join the demon- strators, even though most opposed the shah’s regime. Instead, they remained on the university campus and prominently displayed a banner that proclaimed, ‘The murderous and bloodthirsty shah spills the blood of the people.’ Students also shouted slogans against dictatorship and 64 Chehabi, Iranian politics,p.175 .

65 Mansoor Moaddel, ‘The Shi’i ulama and the state in Iran’, Theory and Society,15(1986 ), pp. 519–66 .

66 Parsa, Social origins ,p.100. Iran from 1919 495 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 supporting Prime Minister Mosaddegh. 67 Industrial workers, white-collar employees and peasants also did not participate much in the uprising. No workers’ strike or factory shutdown occurred anywhere in the country, and white-collar employees showed up at their jobs without interruption.

Likewise, teachers did not take part in the protests because they had mobi- lised earlier and won all their demands. Peasants from V aram n joined in the Tehran demonstrations, but elsewhere peasants were conspicuously absent from political action. Inactivity by these classes and groups prevented the opposition from consolidating their actions and facilitated the effectiveness of repression. Without a consolidated opposition, the uprising was quickly quashed, and the regime’s opponents were dispersed. Dictatorship and political realignment The political and economic developments of the early 1960s led to a realign- ment within the system and set the stage for the conflicts of the 1970s. In the countryside, land reform reduced the power of the landed upper class and extended state control over the peasantry. At the same time, land reform created a new class of small landlords and eliminated landless labourers, pushing them to urban areas. Economic development over the decade generated a small group whose wealth was rooted in industrial-financial interests as well as the military and state bureaucracy, providing the new basis of support for the state. These new supporters were highly dependent on the state and had little political power to press for democracy. After the events of 1963the shah dissolved the parliament and concentrated power in his own hands. He controlled all the major centres of power in the country, including the army, government bureaucracy, the cabinet, parlia- ment and political parties. He appointed all the top officials of the govern- ment and approved all political candidates for office. Political parties were never able to operate independently. Furthermore, the shah personally made every important political and economic decision, including national planning.

The government strictly controlled the press and other media. With the consolidation of exclusive rule, the shah relied increasingly on his coercive apparatus to maintain power. He forged a powerful army, and used the 67 Misagh Parsa, ‘Mosque of last resort: State reform and social conflict in the early 1960s’, in John Foran (ed.), A century of revolution: Social movements in Iran (Minneapolis,1994) p. 154 . The New Cambridge History of Islam 496 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 SAVAK to carry out his plans and control the population. Together, these forces provided stability for the regime.The shah’s regime also expanded its control over religious establishments and undermined the position of the qulam a p. 68Supported by the United States, robust oil revenues and a strong military, the state no longer relied on internal sources of support, thus bypassing the qulam a p and reducing their role in political affairs. Years later, during the revolutionary struggles, Ayat All ah Shar qat M ad ar complained that the shah’s regime violated the histor- ically established position of the qulam a p as intermediary between the govern- ment and people. During the following years, state policies undermined the status and influence of the qulam a p still further. As their economic position deteriorated in the 1970s and their religious donations declined, large seg- ments of the qulam a p became dependent on the state for economic assistance.

Even some of the highest-ranking qulam a p requested financial help from the royal court. 69The SAVAK and the prime minister’s office distributed millions of dollars among some 15,000 qulam a p. 70In 1977 the economic circumstances of thousands of qulam a pworsened when the government of Jamshid Am uzg ar cancelled the $ 35,000 ,000 spent by the prime minister’s office in supporting them. 71 Specific government policies adversely affected the qulam a p’s position. One example was the S azm an-i Awq af, or the Endowments Organisation, created by the government to take charge of land donated by individuals to religious institutions. The organisation at times illegally appropriated and sold reli- gious properties. These actions accelerated the decline of a number of mosques. According to official figures, 20,000 mosques existed in Iran in 1965 ; ten years later the Endowments Organisation reported only 9,015 .

Between 1960and1975 Tehran lost 9out of a total of 32theological schools. 72 The regime closed three of the country’s most important clerical madrasas, imprisoned several qulam a p and prohibited the few opposing qulam a p from giving sermons. In the educational sphere, government policies, combined with secularisation, progressively undermined the position of the qulam a p.

Monthly stipends for students and teachers at religious madrasas were abol- ished and replaced by significantly smaller funds dispersed by the 68 Akhavi, Religion and politics ,p.117.

69 A. Alam, The shah and I: The confidential diary of Iran’s royal court, 1969–1977 (London, 1991 ), pp. 215–16 .

70 Iranshahr ,24 December 1982.

71 A. Taheri, The spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic revolution (Bethesda,1986), p. 214.

72 Akhavi, Religion and politics ,p.129. Iran from 1919 497 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Endowments Organisation. 73The government further threatened to under- mine traditional qulam a p practices by creating a Religious Corps in 1971, modelled after the Literacy Corps, to teach peasants ‘true Islam’. Such state policies, combined with growing secularisation, contributed to a gradual decline in religious education.

The qulam a p also came under attack from some Islamic writers and intel- lectuals. S .adiq Tihr an , an q alim who left the profession, published a book vehemently criticising the qulam a p for corruption, selfish materialism, igno- rance and failure to involve themselves in politics. He accused some religious leaders and their families of lavishly consuming religious contributions. 74He further blamed the qulam a p for the fact that most people, especially the youth, did not attend mosques and had moved away from religion. 75 The expansion of secular education reduced many Iranians’ interest in traditional religion. In the years prior to the revolution the number of ceremonies held in mosques dwindled, along with mosque attendance and financial donations. 76Conditions deteriorated so much that ‘many religious students were attempting to complete secular high school at night, but many also merely drifted’ away from religious study. 77Even more importantly, as economic opportunities expanded in the public and private sector, a growing number of clerical students left their profession.

78 The qulam a pwere increasingly aware of the population’s declining commit- ment to religion, and at times criticised it. For example, during the revolu- tionary struggles a prominent q alim in a special mourning ceremony held at the Azerbaijani Mosque in the Tehran bazaar stated: ‘It has been a while that we have been asleep. Materialistic concerns filled our beings so much, and worldly, oppressive appearances looked so God-like that we had forgotten about our mission, commitment, and all the messages. But sleep, how long?’ 79 Ayat All ah Khomeini repeatedly denounced the cultural transforma- tions taking place in the country. He declared, both before and after the revolution, that under the shah ‘there was nothing left of Islam; there was only the name’. 80 ‘Our culture had been imported from the West. This culture penetrated all aspects of Iranian life, detaching people from Islam.’ 81 73 Ibid., p. 140. 74N. Tehrani, Ranhaniat Dar Shia (Tehran,1970), p. 99.

75 Ibid., pp. 81,106 . 76Kayhan International ,21 October 1978.

77 M. Fischer, Iran: From religious dispute to revolution (Cambridge,1980), p. 127.

78 Misagh Parsa, States, ideologies, and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines (Cambridge,2000)p.137.

79 Parsa, Social origins ,p.197. 80Jumhuri Eslami ,25 December 1982.

81 Ettelaat ,20 December 1982. The New Cambridge History of Islam 498 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Acknowledging a decline in thequlam a p’s prestige in intellectual circles, Khomeini pleaded with intellectuals and university students not to reject the qulam a p. ‘If they do not have political education, you should embrace them and give them political education.’ 82 The declining political position of the qulam a p was illustrated on 5June 1975 in an event ignored by virtually all scholars of the Iranian revolution. More than 1,000 clerical students seized control of the Madrasa-yi Fayz . yyah at Qum and were joined by clerical students from the Madrasa-yi Kh an, an adjacent school. The timing and place of the rebellion were well chosen. The date was the twelfth anniversary of Ayat All ah Khomeini’s 1963arrest and the subsequent massacre of protesters. The Madrasa-yi Fayz . yyah at Qum was located near the shrine of F at .ima, a pilgrimage site for Sh q Muslims from all over the country. The student protesters raised a red flag, symbol of Sh q martyrdom, high enough to be seen throughout the city of Qum. They also raised a banner that read ‘We commemorate the anniversary of the great rebellion of Im am Khomeini’, and broadcast tapes of Khomeini’s fiery speeches against the shah. From exile in Iraq, Ayat All ah Khomeini himself endorsed the clerical students’ protests. In a message of condolence to the Iranian people, he congratulated them for the ‘dawn of freedom’ and the elimination of imperialism and its ‘dirty agents’. In his message, Khomeini noted that by the second day of the rebellion, forty-five students had been killed, and that the government had refused the injured admission to Qum hospitals. 83The student rebellion lasted three days and nights until it was finally crushed by several units of army commandos dispatched from Tehran.

Dozens of students were killed and injured and more than 500arrested. 84 More than a hundred were convicted and given prison sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years. The school itself was shut down by SAVAK and remained closed until the end of the shah’s rule.

Although reported in the national press, this protest went completely unnoticed by the vast majority of the Iranian people. The response to the Qum rebellion was very limited. Clerical students in Mashhad also demon- strated against the government, and two qulam a p and approximately thirty students were arrested. In Tehran and Tabr z students protested against the repression of Qum clerical students. But no mourning ceremonies were held by the qulam a por the public, and no bazaar closures occurred anywhere in the 82 Khomeini, S . ah . fa-yi N ur, vol. I, p. 434. 83Ibid., p. 434.

84 These figures are taken from a written statement by students at the Madrasa-yi Fayz . yyah in Qum. Iran from 1919 499 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 country. The failure of the rebellion confirms the weaknesses of the pro-Khomeini clergy and the lack of a powerful Islamic movement ready to mobilise.While state repression undermined the qulam a p and effectively eliminated the moderate opposition, dissident intellectuals and political activists devel- oped alternative analyses and perspectives to remedy Iran’s problems. Some intellectuals turned to Islam, including Murtaz .a Mut .ahar , Mahd B azarg an and Abu plH .asan Ban -S .adr, who presented a modern interpretation of Islam that was compatible with Western democracy. While opposing the dictato- rial aspects of the shah’s regime, these intellectuals did not advocate a fundamental transformation of Iran’s social structure, and often cooperated with liberal nationalist supporters of Mosaddegh.

A few Muslim dissidents rejected Western modernity in favour of alter- native Islamic analyses. Jal al Al-i Ah .mad abandoned Marxism, and in his Westoxication criticised Iranian intellectuals who were alienated from their own tradition and history. He criticised secular Iranian intellectuals for being isolated from the masses and ignorant of the traditional beliefs of the majority of the population. He concluded that intellectuals must form an alliance with the qulam a p to solve the country’s problems through endogenous culture and values, and called for resistance against the hegemony of Western culture.

Son of a well-known q alim , Al-i Ah .mad argued that intellectuals must reach out to the qulam a p and the qulam a p must abandon their conservative stances. 85 Sociologist qAl Shar qat also turned to Islam to emancipate Iran from external domination and political repression. But unlike Al-i Ah .mad, he borrowed a great deal from socialism. In fact, he criticised the traditional interpretation of Islam and charged that the Sh qite clergy did not represent the true Islam. For centuries the qulam a p had betrayed the cause of Islam by legitimising the power of the rulers and the wealthy upper classes. 86Shar qat accused the qulam a p of obscurantism, ignorance and hypocrisy, which caused the flight of young Iranians towards Western ideologies and culture. 87 His criticism caused the youth, and even some clerical students, to refuse to follow the lead of the highest religious leaders in religious matters. 88Shar qat produced a socialist version of Islam, 89 and in a public lecture in 1970 compared Im am H .usayn to Che Guevara, the Argentine revolutionary Marxist. The government arrested qAl Shar qat in 1972 and shut down the 85M. Boroujerdi, Iranian intellectuals and the West: The tormented triumph of nativism ( Syracuse, 1996), pp. 72–3.

86 Abrahamian, Iran,p.113 .87Boroujerdi, Iranian intellectuals , pp.110–13.

88 Parsa, States, ideologies, and social revolutions ,p.137.89Abrahamian, Iran,p.105 . The New Cambridge History of Islam 500 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Islamic centre, H.usayniyya-yi Irsh ad, where he had criticised both the qulam a p and Marxism for three years. Shar qat ’s works heavily influenced the Islamic Muj ahid n, an organisation that engaged in armed struggle to overthrow the regime. Muj ahid n went even further in their analysis, accepted the Marxist materialist interpretation of history and proclaimed their goal of establishing a classless Islamic society.

The Muj ahid n were subjected to massive repression, with more than a hundred members arrested. A segment of the organisation split off in 1975 and replaced Islamic ideology with Marxism-Leninism. Internal divisions and government repression eventually demobilised the Muj ahid n in the years before the revolution. The organisation continues to oppose the Islamic Republic from outside the country, favouring a revolutionary change.

Other intellectuals turned to secular socialism, advocating a transforma- tion in the state and class structure. The significance of leftist intellectuals was demonstrated in the autumn of 1977when the Writers’ Association organised poetry nights in Tehran. During sixteen nights, sixty-four poets and writers spoke and read their poetry. Some 66per cent of the participants were secular socialist or Marxist, 28per cent were liberal-nationalist, and only 6.3 per cent followed some sort of Islamic ideology. The growing popularity of these events, which attracted thousands of students and intellectuals, led to govern- ment repression and the end of the poetry nights. Finally, some students and dissident intellectuals, who adopted variations of Marxism in the early 1960s, formed guerrilla organisations, and used armed struggle to overthrow the regime. Prominent among these was the Marxist-Leninist Fid a piy an, whose attacks against government forces triggered severe repression and the loss of many of their members. This organisation had a definite influence on university students and segments of the urban, educated population through political opposition and armed struggles. In the end, however, the organisa- tion was virtually paralysed by ideological divisions and repression, and had little impact on the popular uprising that led to the overthrow of the regime.

The key to the shah’s downfall was not intellectual opposition, but rather the country’s political economy. The 1979 revolution Centralisation of power, rapid state intervention in capital accumulation in the1970s and rising inequalities set the stage for political conflicts. State intervention expanded as the government became the nation’s single largest banker, industrialist, employer and landlord. This expansion was driven by Iran from 1919 501 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 burgeoning oil revenues, which shot up nearly fourteen times, from2,500 billion rials in 1954to37,177 billion rials in 1963. Twenty years later, revenues had swollen to 178,196 billion rials. Oil’s share in the GDP jumped from 21per cent in 1963–4 to nearly 52per cent in 1972–3, and 77per cent in 1977. 90Despite a decline in 1977–8, oil revenues still accounted for more than 35per cent of the country’s GDP. 91 State-sponsored development produced very impressive results in economic growth. The GNP, which had risen by 8per cent per year in the 1960s, rose by 14 .2 per cent in 1972–3, 30 .3 per cent in 1973–4,and 42per cent in 1974–5.GNPper capita also rose from $ 450in1972 to more than $ 2,400 in1978 . 92 Although increased revenues generated an impressive record of economic development, they also produced economic disparities, largely due to state development policies. Government policies favoured the interests of large, modern manu- facturing and ignored the small, traditional sector, which employed more than two-thirds of the urban industrial workforce. Committed to capital accumu- lation, the state repressed and demobilised the labour movement, banned strikes and reduced workers’ capacity for collective bargaining. State develop- ment strategy also ignored the plight of the agricultural sector and the rural population. These economic policies, combined with corruption and cronyism, increased the uneven distribution of income in Iran and enabled the royal family to become the wealthiest in the country, owning and controlling a big portion of the modern sector. 93The Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, was higher in Iran in 1969–70 than any country in the Middle East, South-East Asia or Western Europe, and equalled or exceeded Latin American countries for which data were available. 94The share of household expenditure of the top 20per cent of urban households rose from 52to 56per cent between 1959 and1974, while the household expenditure of the bottom 40per cent declined from 14to 11per cent. 95 Increased oil income in the first half of the 1970s proved a mixed blessing because the oil industry’s rapid growth was not matched by expansion in other economic sectors. A crisis of revenue absorption led to consumer price inflation, which the state attempted to curb by lifting tariffs to encourage 90 Bank Markazi Iran, Bank Markazi of Iran: Annual report and balance sheet (Tehran,1978), pp. 94–5.

91 Parsa, States, ideologies, and social revolutions ,p.56.

92 F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and development (Harmondsworth,1979), p. 138.

93 Parsa, States, ideologies, and social revolutions ,p.68.94Parsa, Social origins ,p.81.

95 T. Walton, ‘Economic development and revolutionary upheavals in Iran’, Cambridge Journal of Economics ,4 (1980 ), p. 283. The New Cambridge History of Islam 502 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 imports and imposing price controls and an ‘anti-profiteering’ campaign.

Prices of16,000items were rolled back in August 1975to January 1974levels, which negatively affected retail markets. Two years later inflation was still high, forcing the government to act more decisively. By 1977a new prime minister brought on an economic recession by reducing government expen- ditures, scrapping ambitious state projects still in the planning stages, restrict- ing access to bank credits 96 and continuing the anti-profiteering campaign.

In addition, the government imposed controls on urban land dealings and speculation, which had flourished during the oil boom. These problems were compounded by the fact that the state and economy had become highly dependent on oil, but revenues did not expand as anticipated. A worldwide recession coupled with a mild European winter in 1975 and only a modest increase in OPEC oil prices soon diminished Iranian oil revenues. By December 1975oil production was running 20per cent below the previous year, squeezing state-sponsored projects and financial needs. As income continued to decline, state expenditures exceeded revenues. The deficit for 1976was37.6 billion rials. It ballooned to 388.5 billion rials the following year 97 and to 550.2 billion rials in 1978. 98 The government responded by raising taxes on public corporations and the self-employed 99 and borrowing funds from abroad. Declining oil revenues affected the entire economy and society. The GDP, which had grown by 17.2 per cent in 1976, suddenly sank to 1.3 in 1977 and then plummeted to 11.9in 1978 . The production of large manufacturing firms declined, as did the value of industrial and non-oil exports. 100 Carpet exports, the largest non-oil export, declined by 13per cent in both value and volume in 1977. The largest cotton textile mills had difficulty maintaining operations. 101 Shortages of funds and electricity, along with slowed industrial production, provoked worker layoffs. In Tehran alone, tens of thousands of private housing projects were halted by lack of capital and construction materials. 102 Combined with mounting economic inequalities, the recession adversely affected broad segments of the population and set the stage for the emergence of social conflicts. 96 Ettelaat ,23 and 29August 1977.

97 Bank Markazi Iran, Annual report(Tehran,1977), p. 139.

98 International Monetary Fund, Government finance statistics yearbook (Washington, DC, 1981 ), p. 429.

99 Kayhan ,1 and 23February 1977.

100 Bank Markazi Iran, Annual report(Tehran,1977), pp. 111,152 .

101 M. Moaddel, Class, politics, and ideology in the Iranian revolution (New York,1993), p. 120.

102 Ettelaat ,16 November 1977. Iran from 1919 503 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 External pressures in the mid-1970s introduced an element of vulnerability into the political situation. Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the UN-affiliated International League for Human Rights began to expose human rights violations in Iran. Amnesty International accused Iran of being one of the world’s ‘worst violators of human rights’. More importantly, Jimmy Carter singled out Iran in the 1976 US presidential campaign as a country where human rights had been vio- lated. 103 American congressmen began to question the wisdom of selling so much weaponry to a regime where power resided solely in one man.

Although the Carter administration did not really press Iran to introduce major political changes, 104 the shah, dependent on US support, initiated small policy changes in the government’s treatment of political opponents. In March 1977the government released 256political prisoners, and in May permitted the International Red Cross to visit political prisoners. The govern- ment also legalised civilian trials for political opponents who criticised the government.

Prompted by the reduction of repression, leftist and secular moderate political groups were quick to mobilise for collective action. Students, who had been alone in the forefront of political struggles throughout the 1970s, stepped up collective action against the regime in the autumn of 1977. They were the first social group to call for the overthrow of the regime. The student movement had become radicalised the decade before, and generally supported the armed struggle waged by the Marxist Fid a qiy an and the Muj ahid n, who advocated Islamic socialism. 105 Primarily leftist, these stu- dents did not demand the formation of an Islamic republic, although a minority of less active students did support Ayat All ah Khomeini. Defunct organisations such as the National Front and the Writers’ Association revived by early June 1977, and published statements demanding political freedom and reform.

Bazaaris, adversely affected by the economic downturn and government’s anti-profiteering campaign, soon joined the struggles against the regime.

Concentrated in the historical business district of Tehran, bazaari activists who had once supported Mosaddegh’s National Front illegally revived the merchant guild and engaged in a number of collective actions against the shah. Bazaaris’ mobilisation through their trading networks was soon 103 Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 498–500 .

104 W. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York,1981), pp.19–20 .

105 Misagh Parsa, ‘Iranian students and the revolutionary struggles’, in B. Hourcade (ed.), Iran questions et connaissances , vol. III:Cultures et socie ´ te ´ s contemporaines (Paris,2003). The New Cambridge History of Islam 504 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 repressed by the regime, forcing them to mobilise through mosques, which provided some protection from attacks. Bazaaris participated in the mosque-led forty-day cycles of mourning and shut down their businesses in more and more cities to protest at the killing of demonstrators. These actions clearly contrasted with their earlier lack of support in June1975for student q ulam a p protesting on the twelfth anniversary of the 1963uprising. 106 Thequlam a p were not in a position to lead the struggle at the initial stage of the conflict. Instead, most of them had become depoliticised as a result of the repression following the 1963uprising. The highest echelons of the qulam a p eschewed collective action, and instead pursued a moderate line through quiet diplomacy. Nevertheless, under pressure from the public this moderate faction of the qulam a p was instrumental in opening the mosques for the cycles of mourning ceremonies that continued until the autumn of 1978. Khomeini was surprised by the inaction of the qulam a p. In a statement he encouraged them to mobilise, saying that others had already begun mobilising and that they, too, should write and protest. 107 Indeed, the collective actions of students and secular political organisations encouraged the minority of politicised clerics to mobilise against the government. Workers and white-collar employees were not active in political conflicts until after the struggles were already well under way. The industrial working class took no part in the cycles of mourning ceremonies during which bazaaris shut down their shops. Workers’ delayed mobilisation was an indication that their interests, conflicts and resources differed significantly from those of other classes. Workers mobilised for collective action at the end of the summer of 1978when the sustained protests organised mainly through the mosques forced the regime to proclaim greater reforms and liberalisation.

Workers, who perceived no benefits in the proposed reforms, seized the opportunity and began to mobilise and demand change. Workers with previous experience in strikes and imprisonment used their informal net- works, formed secret cells and committees with trusted co-workers, and launched strikes. 108 White-collar employees, mainly in the public sector, soon joined the strikes with economic and job-related demands. As employ- ees of the state, these workers faced similar problems and grievances and confronted a common enemy. Once they entered the fray, industrial workers directly targeted their employer – the state – for attack. 106 Parsa, Social origins ,p.100.

107 Khomeini, S . ah . fa-yi N ur , vol. I, p. 437.

108 A. Bayat, Workers and revolution in Iran (London,1987), p. 91. Iran from 1919 505 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Initial demands by workers were mainly economic and lacked political grievances. All strikers demanded higher wages, and most also insisted on allowances or loans for housing expenses and medical insurance. Many complained of pay inequities, especially in sectors where foreign workers were employed. Some protested against arbitrary promotion rules and secret ‘rewards’ by heads of bureaucracies. As the number and scale of strikes burgeoned, the regime initially responded on a national level and proceeded with concessions, rather than repression. Thus the government announced on 10October that salaries of all state employees would be raised by 25per cent in two stages. 109 Five days later the state promised housing loans to 20 ,000 government employees. 110 Workers’ responses varied. While some returned to their jobs, others complained that although they had been on strike for days, the authorities had not even investigated their grievances.

Most strikers were dissatisfied with the state’s concessions, which they regarded as insufficient compared to many demands for salary increases, from 50to100 per cent.

As strikes continued, economic issues gave way to political demands, notably by segments of the working classes that were more concentrated in large state enterprises and possessed greater skills and solidarity structures.

Some striking oil workers, for example, demanded the expulsion of various department chiefs, while other oil workers demanded freedom for all political prisoners, the dissolution of SAVAK, lifting of martial law, dissolution of government-sponsored unions, the formation of independent labour unions and freedom for all political parties. Although workers were becoming increasingly political, their demands were neither Islamic nor revolutionary in nature. They were not clamouring to overthrow the state, nor were they calling for the formation of an Islamic republic. Nevertheless, within the Iranian context, workers’ demands for changes were radical. In response to spiralling social conflicts, the shah returned to a policy of repression on 6November 1978, and appointed a military government. The army occupied all strategic institutions, including oil installations, radio and television stations, and newspapers, which had just successfully concluded a strike. With some exceptions, most strikers went back to work. But bazaaris responded to military rule by initiating unprecedented, protracted shutdowns in major cities and disrupting trade, which electrified the conflicts. Before the imposition of a military government, approximately seventy cities had 109 Ettelaat ,10 October 1978.

110 Ettelaat ,15 October 1978. The New Cambridge History of Islam 506 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 experienced some form of collective action. Shortly after the imposition of military government roughly a hundred additional cities were rocked by anti-government collective action. Strike committees sprang up everywhere to coordinate strike activities and demand political change.Oil workers played an important role in the final stage of the conflicts.

Their strikes had a distinctly different impact in part because they controlled the nation’s most vital economic asset. They also shared certain character- istics which increased the likelihood that their actions would become politi- cised. Oil workers numbered more than 30,000 and were heavily concentrated in specific oil-producing regions, which added to their ability to communicate, mobilise and act collectively. Oil workers’ strikes in the early 1950s had produced a core of political experience and awareness that they controlled the state’s primary source of revenue. As they rapidly became more militant in the autumn of 1978, their politicisation and conflicts mobi- lised other workers. In late November oil workers announced their intention to establish a national oil workers’ organisation to coordinate strikes and prevent their collapse. Once such an organisation was formed, they quickly walked out again on 2December, announcing that they would fight until victory, by which they meant the overthrow of the government. Their intention to remove the shah was echoed eight days later in a large march on Ash ur a during Muh .arram, the Sh qa mourning month, when a broad coalition of opposition forces demanded the ousting of the monarchy. Strikes and bazaar closings soon disrupted all social and economic activ- ities, paralysing the government. At the end of December workers represent- ing twenty-three state ministries and private-sector organisations formed a central council to coordinate the strikes. The council rejected any compro- mise with Prime Minister Bakhtiy ar, who they claimed represented ‘imperi- alism and dictatorship’, and instead they formally recognised Khomeini as leader of the people’s ‘anti-imperialist, anti-despotic’ movement. The next day, 3February 1979, parliamentary employees went on strike, followed by employees in the prime minister’s office. These state employees declared their solidarity with the popular struggles and denounced violence and bloodshed by the government. 111 Employees of eleven other government ministries announced on 7February that they would obey only the govern- ment nominated by Khomeini. The shah left Iran on 16January, and two weeks later Khomeini returned. A broad coalition created a revolutionary situation, destabilised the armed forces, and eventually ousted the monarchy. 111 Kayhan ,4 February 1979. Iran from 1919 507 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 As the narrative demonstrates, the initial political openings did not instantly produce popular mobilisation by major classes and collectivities.

Because they had different interests, solidarities and vulnerabilities, their propensities towards revolutionary action differed, and they entered the struggles at different times with specific demands before finally coming together in a broad revolutionary coalition. Thus, it is important to note that ideological explanations of the Iranian revolution that spring from a single causal variable are inadequate to explain the causes, timing and processes that comprise revolutions and hence cannot do justice to the complexities of revolutionary conflicts and struggles. 112 Consolidation of power As secular challengers were repressed and divisions prevented liberal and leftist organisations from forming coalitions, the mosque emerged as the single institution through which the monarchy’s opponents could mobilise.

But Ayat All ah Khomeini’s rise to the position of the revolution’s paramount leader was due primarily to political rather than ideological reasons. Perhaps because he sought to forge a broad coalition, Khomeini never spoke publicly to the Iranian people about his radical, theocratic ideology. While in exile in Iraq he instructed his qulam a p supporters in late 1977to respect and work with students and intellectuals: ‘Tomorrow we will not become government ministers; our work is different. These are the ones who become ministers and representatives.’ 113 Later in France he characterised his own role, as he had done in the past, as merely that of a guide to the people. 114 In fact, Khomeini’s statements reflected the basic tenets of the liberal-nationalist movement – specifically, freedom from dictatorship and imperialism and an end to pillaging the country’s national resources. Beyond these nationalist demands, he condemned the government’s violation of Islamic principles. He steadfastly maintained that an Islamic government would guarantee national independence and provide political freedom for all Iranians. In the final weeks of the revolutionary conflicts, Khomeini repeatedly declared that independ- ence and freedom would be the essence of any Islamic republic. 115 From Paris he hinted that in an Islamic republic even Marxists would be free to express themselves. Women, too, would be free ‘to govern their fate and choose their 112 Misagh Parsa, ‘Conflicts and collective action in the Iranian revolution: A quantitative analysis’, Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis ,20 ,2 (2004 ), pp. 39–57.

113 Khomeini, S . ah . fa-yi N ur, vol. I, p. 436. 114 Ayandegan ,10 January 1979.

115 Khomeini, S . ah . fa-yi N ur, vol. IV, p. 252. The New Cambridge History of Islam 508 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 activities’. The shah’s dictatorial regime reduced women to objects of con- sumption, he asserted, while Islam opposed such treatment of women. 116 Khomeini received popular backing because of his opposition to dictatorship and his defence of freedom and national interests, but his theocratic ideology was unknown to the majority of Iranians.However, the Islamic Republic that Khomeini eventually constructed, and which was established in the constitution approved by referendum in December 1979, was a theocracy that restricted freedom and popular sover- eignty. The highest power in this system rested with the wil ayat-i faq h ,or jurist’s guardianship, often referred to as the ‘supreme leader’. Although in 1998 the Guardian Council ruled that non- qulam a p could indeed become candidates for the position, they also ruled that such candidates must have a high standard of religious expertise, thus effectively disqualifying all non- q ulam a p. The supreme leader was chosen by the Assembly of Experts, which theoretically could remove him, but in reality he was appointed for life and accountable to no one. According to Article 110of the constitution, the supreme leader had the power to veto all government decisions, and could even dismiss the president, who was elected by the people. Although the people voted to elect the Assembly of Experts, the president and the majlis (parliament), their choices were always restricted and limited by the power of the Guardian Council, which determined who could run for office. The Guardian Council itself was not a democratically elected body. It was com- posed of twelve members, half of whom were qulam a p and the other half ‘Muslim’ jurists. The supreme leader appointed half of its qulam a p members, and the other half was elected by the majlisfrom among the ‘Muslim lawyers’ nominated by the head of the judiciary, who was also appointed by the supreme leader. The supreme leader also appointed members of the Expediency Council, which was constitutionally charged with resolving disputes between the majlisand the Guardian Council.

The supreme leader had widespread powers under the constitution. He had a staff of some 600and appointed some 2,000 representatives to all state ministries and institutions, enabling him to supervise and control the execu- tive branch. As the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, he had the ability to declare war. The supreme leader also effectively controlled the country’s powerful institutions, including the military, national police, judiciary, Ministries of Intelligence and Information, Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, or ‘mobilisation’, a sizeable paramilitary force. The supreme leader also 116 Ayandegan ,17 January 1979. Iran from 1919 509 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 controlled dissidentqulam a p through his Special Clerical Court, which after the revolution executed dozens of clerics and defrocked and punished thou- sands of others. In addition to state resources, the supreme leader controlled the Mozrasafan Foundation, with assets amounting to about $ 12billion, using them as a source of funds for the clergy. In effect, the supreme leader and the ruling clergy exerted a great deal of power over economy, politics and society.

The formation of the theocratic regime generated a great deal of conflict.

Khomeini and his supporters succeeded in maintaining power and eliminat- ing coalition partners and challengers because of complex factors and pro- cesses. Amid rising domestic disagreements, Khomeini took advantage of external conflicts such as the 4November 1979–20 January 1981hostage crisis and the September 1980–August 1988Iraq war to ban worker strikes, repress dissidents and discredit opponents. Khomeini and his supporters quickly monopolised the media and the mosques, brushing aside their opponents and thereby blocking other social groups from using the media or mobilising through mosques. By directly appointing Friday prayer leaders, they ensured that dissident clerics would not control the mosques. As a result, mosques, which had become the most important location for pre-revolutionary mobi- lisation, were closed to dissidents in the Islamic Republic.

Khomeini also met the growing strength of the left, both secular and religious, by introducing new ideological elements into his platform. He shifted from his pre-revolutionary focus on national independence and free- dom from dictatorship to a resolute concentration on social justice. He stated repeatedly that Islam served the interests of the moustaz .q af n , the oppressed and deprived, noting that the feast of the oppressed is when the oppressors are eliminated. 117 Furthermore, he noted that the Islamic Republic was established to serve the interests of the moustaz .q af n . To attract working- class support, Khomeini sounded even more radical than Marx when he declared on May Day 1979: ‘Every day should be considered Workers’ Day for labor is the source of all things, even of heaven and hell as well as of the atom particle.’ 118 This ideological shift was significant in solidifying the Islamic Republic’s survival and the clergy’s supremacy. Khomeini also pres- sured the government to adopt policies favouring the lower socio-economic classes. He ordered the provisional government to expropriate Pahlavi 117 Khomeini, S . ah . fa-yi N ur, vol. IX, p. 246.

118 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Los Angeles,1993), p. 71. The New Cambridge History of Islam 510 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 dynasty assets and convert them to housing and employment opportunities for the poor. He opened a bank account and asked people to contribute money to build housing for the poor, and ordered the provisional govern- ment to provide free water and electricity for the poor who had been deprived during the monarchy. 119 As Khomeini adopted leftist tenets, the Islamic Republic also relied increas- ingly on repression to demobilise the opposition. Although Khomeini had repeatedly praised students’ struggles throughout the 1970s, after the revolu- tion he targeted the universities as a bastion of imperialism and launched a ‘cultural revolution’, to reorient them. As students abandoned support for the Islamic regime and backed worker and peasant councils and women’s rights, Khomeini and his allies began violent attacks on them. In the spring of 1980 dozens of students were killed in such attacks. In an unprecedented move, all colleges were closed down for at least two years, and thousands of students were expelled from universities. Soon afterwards all universities and govern- ment offices were purged, and independent workers’ councils were out- lawed. Harsh repression followed the removal of President Ban -S .adr in 1981 . Between the summers of 1981and1985 approximately 12,000 opponents of the state were either executed or killed in armed struggle. 120 In the summer of 1988 the government again executed thousands of political prisoners. 121 Indeed, repression was the secret to the consolidation of power in the Islamic Republic. Post-Khomeini divisions and failure of reforms Yet the qulam a p and their allies who seized power did not actually share the same ideological perspective. Although these divisions were somewhat con- tained while Khomeini was alive, his death in June 1989, along with deep- ening social and economic crises in the 1990s, intensified antagonism in the polity. Two loosely defined factions emerged with different perspectives on social, economic, political and cultural issues, although some did not fit exactly either group. The relatively conservative Jami qa-yi R uh . aniyyat-i Mub ariz (Society of combatant clergy) favoured expanding market forces and reducing state intervention in the economy and state subsidies. They were allied with the conservative Hay-at Ha-yi Mu atalefeh-yi Islami 119 Khomeini, S . ah . fa-yi N ur, vol. V, p. 120.

120 Parsa, States, ideologies, and social revolution ,p.250.

121 Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured confessions: Prisons and public recantations in modern Iran (Berkeley, 1999), p. 215. Iran from 1919 511 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 (Coalition of Islamic associations), which represented a wealthy segment of bazaar merchants. In contrast, the leftist Anjuman-i R uh . a n-i Mub ariz (Association of combatant clergies) advocated state control of the economy, egalitarian distribution of wealth and income, and opposed normalising relations with the West.

In the early 1990s conservatives launched an assault against their oppo- nents. Shortly before the 1992parliamentary elections the Guardian Council disqualified many of the leading candidates of the radical faction that had dominated the parliament for the first thirteen years. Under protests, it reinstated many of the disqualified candidates, but they could not overcome the situation as the conservative faction won all twenty-eight seats in Tehran, eliminating the radicals. With full control of the major centres of power and threatened by the wave of democratisation around the world, the conserva- tives also renewed repression of secular dissidents. During H ashim Rafsanj an ’s two terms as president (August 1989–August 1997) more than eighty dissidents were murdered or simply disappeared. The government also passed a law in 1996that criminalised dissent. The law authorised the death penalty for offences such as attacking the security of the state and insulting the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic and the memory of Im am Khomeini. Those found guilty of ‘propaganda against the Islamic Regime’ faced up to one year in jail. Government policies soon came under criticism, however. The mayor of Tehran, Karba sch , published a newspaper, Hamshahr , that openly criticised the conservatives. In a daring move in November 1994,134 leading writers signed a famous declaration against censorship. Journalists soon joined in and criticised shortcomings in the country. Islamic intellectuals such as qAbd al- Ka rim Sur ush, a former ally of the clergy, began advocating reforms and separation of religion and politics. University students openly discussed political reforms and democratisation. The Association of Islamic Students called on President Rafsanj an in 1996 to guarantee free speech and free elections for the next parliament and the presidency. Leading members of the radical qulam a p who were excluded from the 1992 parliamentary elections moderated their positions in advance of new elections. They moved away from supporting state intervention in the economy, and instead emphasised political reforms, the rule of law and the strengthening of civil society. These qulam a p attracted a diverse coalition of moderate technocrats and leftist Islamic intellectuals who also shifted their position in support of economic and political reforms. In response to calls for reforms, President Rafsanj an and Supreme Leader Ayat All ah Kh aman p The New Cambridge History of Islam 512 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 declared that the1997presidential elections would be free and fair. These announcements in turn encouraged students, youth and women throughout the country to participate.

The presence of a presidential candidate of the previously radical faction who had been excluded from the government in the early 1990s mobilised a large number of people. Muh .ammad Kh atam , one of four candidates approved by the Guardian Council, entered the race reluctantly after no other viable opposition candidate surfaced to receive permission from Kh aman p . Kh atam , a mid-ranking cleric, had been a member of the radical clerical faction that advocated egalitarian distribution of economic resources through state intervention in the economy. He briefly led a publishing house and was elected to the first parliament after the revolution. Appointed minister of Islamic guidance and culture in 1982, he earned a national reputation for easing restrictions on films, music, art and literature. With the ascendancy of the conservatives he was forced to resign in 1992, and was banished to the National Library in Tehran, where he faded from public view.

Although Kh atam accepted the basic foundations of the theocratic regime and condemned those who would favour changing the constitution, he advocated the rule of law, tolerance for opposing views, freedom of the press and the creation of a civil society. He argued for a more democratic system in which people could determine the political process, unlike con- servatives who claimed that people must obey divine rules as dictated by the supreme leader.

Kh atam ’s promise of reform appealed to youth, students and women, all of whom mobilised and voted for social and political change. The voter turnout was high, with 91per cent of the electorate participating, and Kh atam won the presidency with 69per cent of the vote against qAl Akbar N at .iq-N ur , a mid-level cleric and the powerful speaker of the parliament, who had been endorsed by the religious establishment, the pro-government faction of the bazaar merchants, government-controlled media, Basij militia and the Ans . ar-i H .izb All ah.

True to his promise, Kh atam ’s government licensed more than 740new publications, newspapers and magazines that advocated reform and civil liberties. More importantly, his reduction of repression in the context of rising income inequalities and corruption mobilised segments of the popula- tion to demand reforms. Once again, students played a leading role in challenging the conservatives’ power. As early as November 1997a group of students organised a rally calling for the popular election of a leader for the country with curtailed powers. Students at Tehran University demonstrated Iran from 1919 513 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 in support of democratisation in March1998, shouting slogans such as: ‘One country, one government, determined by the vote of the people.’ When in July 1999 Tehran University students were attacked while protesting against press censorship, large-scale demonstrations erupted for six days and spread to universities throughout the country. Angry students in Tehran shouted radical slogans against Iran’s supreme leader, Ayat All ah qAl Kh aman p .

‘Commander-in-chief resign!’ and ‘Down with the dictator!’ they chanted. 122 They attacked the very foundation of the Islamic Republic: ‘The people are miserable, the clerics are acting like gods!’ 123 ‘No more phoney parlia- ments!’ 124 Across the country, students organised protests and published dozens of statements condemning repression and expressing solidarity with Tehran University students. Despite the fact that many social groups and organisations issued statements of support and sympathy with them, con- servatives eventually silenced the students by widespread arrests and imprisonment. Students protested on a large scale again in June 2003against a proposed policy of privatisation of some universities. Student protests soon spread from Tehran to other cities. More importantly, ordinary people also joined the students to protest against the regime. The slogans clearly demonstrated that students opposed the entire Islamic regime. Their slogans were among the most extreme heard since the revolutionary struggles. In particular, protestors chanted very harsh slogans against the supreme leader, Ayat All ah Kh aman p , even though simple criticism of the leader is punished by imprisonment.

‘Khamenei, the traitor, must be hanged!’ they chanted. ‘Death to dictators!’ ‘The clerical regime is nearing its end!’ others shouted. ‘The nation is destitute, the mull a s act like God!’ ‘Dictator, shame on you, give up power!’ Kh atam could not put an end to the repression, torture and murder of dissidents, including D ary ush Fur uhar, former minister of labour, and his wife, Parv nah, and K az .im Sam p, a former minister of health in Mahd B azarg an’s transitional government. During Kh atam ’s eight-year presi- dency, hardliners closed more than 200newspapers 125 and imprisoned a number of leading journalists. Reporters Sans Frontie ` res described Iran as the ‘world’s biggest prison for journalists’. 126 In 2003 more than fifty journal- ists were arrested, and an Iranian-born Canadian journalist died in govern- ment custody due to a brain haemorrhage resulting from beatings. 127 122 New York Times ,15 July 1999.123 New York Times ,14 July 1999.

124 The Times ,18 July 1999.125 Washington Post ,15 February 2004.

126 Financial Times ,30 May 2001.127 New York Times ,16 July 2003. The New Cambridge History of Islam 514 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 In the context of the US invasion of Iraq, conservatives targeted the reformists in the parliament. The Guardian Council disqualified more than 2 ,500 reform candidates for the parliamentary elections of 2004, nearly 40per cent, including more than eighty incumbents, for being insufficiently com- mitted to the constitution of the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader. 128 In response, more than 600reformist candidates whose qualifications had been approved withdrew in protest, and 120of the deputies, or more than one-third of the parliament, resigned their posts in protest. 129 Many groups including academics, intellectuals, students and reformist parties boycotted the elections. The voter turnout of 50.6 per cent of the electorate was the lowest since the 1979revolution, and well below the 67per cent in 2000.In Tehran the rate was 28.1 per cent. Conservatives won at least 149of the 290 seats, sweeping out reformers, who had occupied 210of the 290seats in the previous parliament. Some ninety of the new deputies had backgrounds in various military and revolutionary institutions. An extremist conservative also won the presidency in the 2005elections, and thus put an end to the reform control of the government. Although extremists did not win many seats in the 2006local elections, reformists could not gain control.

Clearly, the Islamic Republic has been unable to put an end to the intense political conflicts unleashed during the Iranian revolution. The regime man- aged to repress the protests of students and teachers, and disparate regional grievances and disputes over the past decade. Yet continued economic difficulties, rising disparities, political exclusion and ideological conflicts render the Islamic Republic vulnerable to challenge. The decline in the power of the reform movement and formation of a conservative government backed by perhaps only 10to 15per cent of the population may in the end further the cause of genuine democracy and fundamental changes in the Islamic Republic. Indeed, evidence points to the growing radicalisation of the youth and intellectuals. The largest faction in the student movement has given up hope of reform, calling instead for fundamental transformation of the Islamic Republic. In sum, over the twentieth century powerful internal and external forces blocked the rise of democracy in Iran. Growing oil revenues, combined with external backing, provided material support for the state in repressing the challengers and denying democratic rights to the people. The cause of democracy was further betrayed when the monarchy was replaced by a 128 New York Times ,15 February 2004.

129 New York Times ,2 February 2004. Iran from 1919 515 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 theocracy and rule by a faction of thequlam a p. A reform movement chal- lenged the supremacy of the conservatives in recent years, but failed to change the basic nature of the Islamic Republic. Although today conservative factions seem to be in complete control of the state apparatus, there are signs of further radicalisation of segments of the reform movement. Government policies and global changes have reawakened democratic forces in Iran, setting in motion a dynamic whose outcome has yet to reach its climax. The New Cambridge History of Islam 516 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 11 May 2020 at 08:41:14 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011