Choose one of the Middle Eastern cases: Turkey Iran The Arab Middle East: Egypt, Syria, Iraq or LebanonThen choose one of the themes: Nationalism Secularism State-led modernization (industrializ

Many believe that inclusion of a country whose population is overwhelm- ingly Muslim and poor will undermine the coherence of the EU.

In Turkey too, however, there are people who find the inclusion of Turkey’s prime minister, Tayyip Erdog an, in the EU’s group photograph somewhat unsettling. This relatively small but highly influential group includes some members of the civilian and military elite and intellectuals.

Even though Westernisation has been the central ambition of the modern Turkish Republic since its foundation in 1923, and even though Turkey is closer than ever to these ideals today, this elite is unhappy that the country has been brought to this stage by a party and a politician with deep roots in Islamist politics. Since the 1920s it has been the Turkish government’s official line that Turkey’s Western and secular turn under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatu ¨ rk ( 1881 –1938 ) was devised specifically to cut Turkey’s ties with its Islamic past and traditions because these were seen as constituting insur- mountable barriers in the country’s modernisation. This group is uncomfort- able also because, after pursuing nationalist and modernist agendas together 1 I am grateful to Senem Aslan, Brook Adams, Sibel Bozdog an, Frederic Shorter, Michael Meeker and the Turkish Studies Group at the University of Washington for their comments. 301 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 for more than eighty years, it now seems that they will have to make a choice between these two paths. In today’s world it is becoming less and less easy for states to insist on maintaining exclusive control over their internal and external affairs if they want to remain part of ever-expanding global relationships.Turkey’s accession to her new status and the ‘family photo’ that marks this event can be disturbing only if we accept a formalistic definition of modern- ity. According to this, a nation cannot be modern unless the people who constitute it uniformly subscribe to the same set of rigidly defined ideals that are derived from European history. There is, however, another, more sub- stantive, understanding of modernisation that approaches it as a world- historical phenomenon. It includes the expansion of capitalist relations, industrialisation, urbanisation and individuation as well as the formation of nation-states and the notions of civil, human and economic rights. These can manifest themselves and combine with each other under different contexts and in different forms. Ignoring this potential for diversity, and insisting on formal unity and uniformity around a narrow set of modern ideals, deprives modernity of its dynamic essence and reduces it to an oppressive project, as has happened in numerous instances in other parts of the world – and, for long periods, in Turkey.

Indeed, for long stretches of time in Turkey’s modern history, its relatively small political elite has appropriated the right to determine the pace and the shape of its modernisation. The path they drew for Turkey was modelled after Western European experience and required a very heavy dose of state intervention to mould the nation’s broader social transformation so that it could fit into this new riverbed. In many ways this has been a successful project. It is the culmination of the policies of the past century that have transformed a land which was fragmented and under occupation, and a people whose identity and purpose were at best uncertain, into today’s robust nation, which is a candidate for membership in the EU. Yet the modernisa- tion project of the past century has also created a disjuncture between the Turkish state and society. Under this model, social forces in Turkey have largely been relegated to a relationship of dependency on the directives and imperatives that originate from the state and the elite who wield state power.

Even the presence of multi-party democracy during most of this time did not change this situation. In fact, there have been only two intervals when this relationship was reversed and Turkish society appeared to be genuinely empowered. The first of these was the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, henceforth DP) years in the 1950s, and the second is the current period of The New Cambridge History of Islam 302 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Adalet ve Kalk nma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, henceforth JDP) government. While the first of these ended in the coup of1960which brought the military and bureaucratic elite back into power, the JDP government is stronger than ever after introducing institutional reforms and making signifi- cant gains in linking Turkey to the EU. Today it may have become all but impossible for social forces in Turkey to be made subordinate again.

Examined in broader terms, the new picture of Europe that includes Turkey, far from being incongruous, may very well represent the melding of two genuinely modern currents, one in Turkey, the other in Europe, mutually reinforcing and strengthening each other’s emancipatory promise. This chapter starts with the rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatu ¨ rk, the national leader, and the formation of the republic in the early twentieth century and explains the bifurcation of Turkey’s modern history into two paths: one of these is state centred and formal; the other is society based and substantive. In addition to recounting the separate development of these paths, the chapter also considers what led to their convergence in the 1950s and, more recently, at the turn of the twenty-first century. Building a nation In the aftermath of the First World War, most territories of the Ottoman Empire were either colonised or fell under the occupation of French, British, Italian or Greek forces. Only central Anatolia was left free of foreign presence, and severe restrictions were placed on the political, military and economic powers of the Ottoman state. Mustafa Kemal Pas¸a (henceforth referred to as Atatu ¨ rk, the surname he was given in 1934) emerged as a national leader under these circumstances.

Atatu ¨ rk had already established a name for himself during the war as an able commander. Shortly after the signing of the armistice between Turkey and the Allied powers in October 1918, he secured an appointment as a military inspector in Anatolia. He left Istanbul, ostensibly to assume his new position; his real intention, however, was to organise a resistance movement. He quit the Ottoman army in 1919and convened a series of congresses in various parts of Anatolia, to garner support for the resistance and to build a national consensus as to what the boundaries of a Turkish state should be, and how to secure these boundaries. The participants in these congresses issued the National Pact (Misak- Milli) in September 1919, which stated that the lands that were to be liberated had to be limited to Asia Minor and a small part of the eastern Balkans: the area that had formed the basis of the armistice at the Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 303 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 end of the First World War. Setting these limited goals for the nationalist movement reflected Atatu¨ rk’s pragmatism and his determination to distin- guish the nationalist movement from the Ottoman Empire.

Once the ultimate goal of the nationalist struggle was decided upon, Atatu ¨ rk and his fellow nationalists regrouped the remnants of the Ottoman army and combined them with the irregular forces which were already mobilising against the occupation. In 1920this new force was placed under the authority of a newly created national assembly inaugurated in Ankara.

With these moves, the nationalist initiative was seeking to ground itself in Anatolia, specifically among the Muslim population. So sensitive were the nationalists to the religious sensibilities of the Anatolian population that when the s¸ eyhu¨ lislam , the chief Islamic authority in the empire, issued a fatw a in Istanbul decreeing that it was a religious duty to kill the nationalists, the nationalists obtained a counter-ruling from a sympathetic cleric to justify their uprising. 2Local notables, peasants, tribesmen, Muslims of all sects, members of religious orders, Kurds, Balkan and Caucasian immigrants were all represented in the national and local assemblies convened by the nationalists, and they participated in the resistance movement.

The fighting force that emerged from this disparate alliance turned out to be surprisingly effective. In 1920the nationalists secured the eastern borders by beating the Armenians and, in 1921, signing a treaty of friendship with the new Bolshevik regime in Russia. They then persuaded the French and the Italians to withdraw from the southern and south-eastern parts of Anatolia, thereby leaving Britain alone in its support for the Greek occupation of western Anatolia. In 1922the Greek army was roundly defeated and forced to evacuate the areas it had invaded from 1919. A final confrontation with Britain was avoided and, by the end of 1922, the nationalist regime had secured almost all the borders that it had identified as non-negotiable in the National Pact of 1919. The two main exceptions were the Mosul province in northern Iraq and the area around Antakya in southern Turkey. Turkey relinquished its claims on Mosul in favour of Great Britain in 1926.

Antakya, on the other hand, would be incorporated into the new republic in 1939 .

In November 1922the nationalists abolished the sultanate. The Ankara government and their territorial gains were recognised by the international community in the Lausanne peace conference in 1922and1923. The treaty 2Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish experiment in democracy (Boulder,1977), p. 363. The New Cambridge History of Islam 304 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 that was signed in Lausanne on24July 1923 ended the state of war that had been a constant since 1911and signalled the beginning of a new era in Turkey.

While the war of liberation and the diplomatic victories that followed it were significant accomplishments, the territory the new state inherited was in ruins. During the war years, two-and-a-half million Muslims, as many as 800 ,000 Armenians and 300,000 Greeks had lost their lives. 3There were millions of widows, orphans, refugees and internally displaced people in the country. It was by no means clear how this broken people would be united in a meaningful entity.

Since most of the Armenian population of Anatolia had been eliminated during the war and many Ottoman Greeks had emigrated, Muslims consti- tuted the overwhelming majority of the population in the territories of the new state. Accordingly, from the beginning of the nationalist struggle there was a growing emphasis on Islam as a common denominator that could become the rallying-point for the disparate communities in Anatolia. This was partly due to the fact that in Anatolia there were many refugees who had been expelled over the past quarter of a century from Russia and the Balkan states because of their religious identity. It is estimated that between 1877and 1914 more than half a million Muslims were forced to leave Russia for the Ottoman Empire, and between 1912and1920 about 400,000 Muslims from the Balkans sought refuge in Anatolia. 4The experience of expulsion and the fear of renewed oppression helped strengthen Muslim identity among the refu- gees and provided a convenient means of mobilisation to nationalists.

In contrast, the scars of the conflicts that had divided the indigenous peoples of Anatolia were so deep that it was impossible to contemplate the inclusion of non-Muslims, especially the Armenian and Greek communities, in the con- struction of the new nation. Accordingly, Turkish negotiators insisted that the Treaty of Lausanne include a provision that barred the return of the refugees who had left Anatolia during the war and required the exchange of Turkey’s remaining Greek Orthodox residents for the Muslims of Macedonia and Greece. 5 The Lausanne Treaty represents the end of a period of population shuffling that had affected the Ottoman territories since at least the Russo-Turkish War 3 Erik Zu ¨ rcher, Turkey: A modern history (London,1993), p. 171; Frederic Shorter, ‘The population of Turkey after the War of Independence’, International Journal of Middle East Studies ,17 (1985 ), pp. 419–21 .

4 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman population (Madison,1985), p. 70; Justin McCarthy, Death and exile (Princeton, 1995), p. 161.

5 Stephen Ladas, The exchange of minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey (New York,1932). Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 305 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 of1877 –8. After 1923little was left of the non-Muslim communities, which had been a prominent component of Ottoman society. The Greek population declined from its pre-war levels of almost 2million to 120,000 ; Armenians from 1.3 million to 65,000 . The Anatolian population, no more than 80per cent Muslim before the Balkan wars, had become 98per cent Muslim at the end of the War of Independence. 6 After the purging of most Christians, the Turkish population was still divided in different ways. Although they were Muslims, recent immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus came with their own specific interests and distinct cultures, and sought to maintain separate communities. The indige- nous population of Anatolia was also divided along regional and class lines.

The largest concentration of Kurdish communities in the world was in Anatolia. They were predominantly Sunn but were also marked by linguistic and tribal divisions. Also indigenous to Anatolia were several communities of Alevis and Nus .ayr s which were related to Sh q Islam. Finally, and most significantly, a very large number of both the Sunn s and Alevis were organised in religious orders, called t . ar qa s, the most important of which were the Naqshband , Q adir , Kh alid , Mevlev and Bektas¸ i orders. 7Islam had mobilised the Anatolian population against the invading Christian armies of Europe but, given these diverse interests and orientations, it was not clear that it would be an effective means of nation building in the post-Lausanne era. Indeed, the very societal organisation in Anatolia appeared to be pulling the country not towards strengthening state and nation, but towards local foci of power and decentralisation. Under the leadership of Atatu ¨ rk, who became the first president of the new republic in 1923and served in that capacity until his death in 1938, the nationalist regime countered these centrifugal forces by building central state institutions and using these to restrict the place of religion in Turkish politics. The nationalists hoped that they could, through institutional reform, mould the disparate and religious population of Turkey into a uniform national community. Following the declaration of the republic in 1923, the new state took a series of steps radically to limit the role of Islam in the public sector. In 1924the caliphate and the office of s¸eyhu¨ lislam were abolished and all members of the Ottoman dynasty were exiled. Religious affairs, including the ulemaand the administration of religiously endowed properties, were placed under the 6 Bas¸vek ˆ alet _ Istatistik Umum Mu ¨ du ¨ rlu ¨ g u ¨ , 1927 Umum ˆ Nu ¨ fus Tahriri (Ankara,1929).

7 Rus ¸en C ¸ ak r, Ayet ve slogan (Istanbul,1990), pp. 17–77. The New Cambridge History of Islam 306 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 control of the central government’s offices of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations Administration respectively. Also in1924, education was secu- larised under the Law of Unification of Education. In 1925religious shrines were closed down, and wearing the fez and other religious attire was banned.

1926 witnessed the adoption of a new Civil Code and Penal Code from European sources, as well as the calendar used in Europe. And in 1928, Ottoman numerals and the Arabic alphabet were replaced by their Western and Roman counterparts. These reforms were designed to change Turkish society fundamentally and irreversibly by breaking its ties with the Ottoman and Islamic past and by legislating how people should live, act, dress, write, talk, and even pray. 8This top-down policy of reform and reorganisation has recently been described as ‘high modernism’ which involved a sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied, usually through the state, in every field of human activity. 9When these measures were passed and implemented, more than 80per cent of Turkey’s population was living in rural areas and literacy was less than 10per cent. Most had never been fully integrated with the imperial regime.

Therefore they were not likely to be affected immediately by the new government’s reformed institutions. To overcome this barrier, the central government relied on a dedicated generation of teachers and bureaucrats who spread across the country and served as the bearers and implementers of modern ideals and reforms. To implement their sweeping programme of modernisation, the Turkish delegation at Lausanne was keen also to acquire the means to rebuild the country’s economy. Accordingly, the new Turkish state was released from its obligations under the commercial capitulations and free-trade treaties that had been signed between the Ottoman Empire and foreign powers. In return, Turkey agreed to maintain existing low tariff rates until 1929, and to pay about 65per cent of the total debt of the Ottoman Empire. 10 In the 1920s, despite these restrictions, the government was able to take steps to protect and promote the Turkish economy. New railways were built and state monopolies were established in alcohol, tobacco, matches and fuel 8 Soner C ¸ag aptay, ‘Crafting the Turkish nation, Kemalism and the Turkish nation in the 1930 s’, Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, ( 2003); Senem Aslan, ‘Citizen, speak Turkish! A nation in the making’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics ,13 (2007 ), pp. 245–72 .

9 James Scott, Seeing like a state (New Haven,1998); Sibel Bozdog an, Modernism and nation building (Seattle,2001).

10 Yahya Tezel, Cumhuriyet d¨ oneminin iktisat tarihi (Ankara,1982), p. 140. Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 307 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 importation. In1927the Law for the Encouragement of Industry introduced incentives for newly established enterprises; the aim was to promote the rise of a new Muslim-Turkish class of merchants and industrialists that could take the place of the Greeks and Armenians. Concerning agriculture, the new government’s most important policy was the abolition of the tithe and the animal tax in 1925. In part this rewarded landlords and notables for supporting of the nationalist cause. But more significantly, as these taxes were not replaced by new ones large numbers of peasants were freed from their obligations either to the state or to tax-farmers. 11Between 1923and1929 Turkey’s gross national product grew by 10.3per cent on an annual basis, agricultural output by 13.6 per cent and industrial output, including construc- tion, by 10.2per cent. 12However, robust as it was, most of this growth was making up for the losses of the war years; as late as 1928agricultural production had still not reached pre-First World War levels. 13 The restrictions of the Lausanne Treaty on Turkey’s foreign trade policy expired in 1929. This year also marked the beginning of a major crisis in the world economy, forcing most countries to retreat from international mar- kets. These conditions gave Turkey’s government an opportunity to reorder its economic priorities. The result was the creation of a protectionist eco- nomic policy that brought high tariffs (they increased from 13to 46 per cent on average) and restrictions on imports; state control over key industries, public utilities, foreign trade and infrastructure; and a pricing policy which favoured the urban industrial sector. For the Turkish economy then, the move from the 1920s to the 1930s entailed a transition from an open to a closed economy, which resulted from both government policies and the collapse of external markets for Turkey’s agricultural exports. For the long- term history of Turkey, another important outcome of this period was the growth in the power of the bureaucracy. In addition to the uncontested status of its political power, the bureaucracy now acquired a key position in the country’s economic decision making. Accordingly, the period between the early 1930s and the Second World War is described as ‘e ´ tatism’, which in Turkish economic history refers to the privileged position of the state in Turkey’s economy. In the 1930s some Muslim entrepreneurs benefited from their proximity to political power centres, and expanded their operations. As the state-protected 11 Roger Owen and S¸evket Pamuk, A history of Middle East economies in the twentieth century (Cambridge, 1999), pp.14–15 .

12 Ibid., p. 244. 13Ibid., p 16. The New Cambridge History of Islam 308 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 industrial sectors and regions started to grow, the agricultural sector as a whole – and especially the formerly important export-oriented agricultural regions such as western Anatolia – fell behind. In addition to the divide between the secular state and the religious masses, this urban-industrial bias of the state deepened the gulf that separated the governing elite of the country from the approximately80per cent of the population that was living in the rural areas.

Towards the end of the decade, growing inequalities in the distribution of economic and political power notwithstanding, the Turkish economy was recovering. But this trend ended with the outbreak of the Second World War.

Although Turkey managed to stay out of the fighting itself, it could not escape the economic consequences of the war. Consumer prices increased four and a half times during the war years, which pushed the already impoverished rural classes into further hardship. The size of the Turkish army was also increased by over ten times in this period, from 120,000 to1.5 million, the burden falling disproportionately on peasants. 14 Apart from the successful diplomacy that kept Turkey outside the war, the government’s policies during the war amounted to little more than ad hoc measures which tried to address the ever-growing shortages and price increases. One of these policies was the Wealth Tax which was levied in 1942 , ostensibly to tax the excess profits the merchants were making by exploiting the wartime black market. According to this law, such merchants and industrialists were to pay 50–70 per cent of their wealth as a one-time lump sum to government. If they could not produce the money in fifteen days, they would be drafted into work brigades and sent to eastern Turkey.

This tax was supposed to apply to all merchants who had made such illegal gains. In practice, however, 87per cent of those who were identified as being liable were non-Muslims, most of whom were forced to sell their businesses at far below market value and leave the country. 15Some Muslim businessmen took advantage of this situation and acquired significant amounts of property at low prices. 16 First under the leadership of Atatu ¨ rk and, after his death in 1938, under the single-party regime of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (the Republican People’s Party, henceforth RPP), reform and reorganisation of the Turkish state were carried out in an authoritarian way. The Law on the Maintenance of 14 Zu¨ rcher, Turkey ,p.207 .

15 Ayhan Aktar, Varl k vergisi ve Tu ¨ rkles¸ tirme politikalar (Istanbul,2000), pp. 135–243 .

16 Ays¸e Bug ra, State and business in modern Turkey (Albany,1994), p. 83. Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 309 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Order (Takrir-i Su ¨ k ˆ un Kanunu) that was passed in 1925gave the government the power to ban any organisation or publication deemed dangerous to social order. Although the law was designed ostensibly to deal with the Kurdish revolt that had started in 1925, its existence helped the governing elite to silence all opposition, including some of Atatu ¨ rk’s closest friends from the war, who now disagreed with him about his methods. In 1926the discovery of a plot against Atatu ¨ rk’s life gave the government an excuse to eliminate not only those who were involved in this particular conspiracy but also many others suspected of harbouring unfavourable views regarding the regime.

Seventeen people were hanged in Izmir and Ankara immediately following the discovery of the conspiracy; thirteen were sentenced in Izmir, and their sentences were carried out in public. 17In the two years during which this law and the special tribunals were active, a total of 7,500 were arrested and 660 were executed. 18 In two instances, in 1924and in 1930, Atatu ¨ rk allowed the establishment of opposition parties, partly to mollify the discontent among the elite. Despite being intended as loyal opposition parties, these quickly became the centres of popular discontent with the RPP and its policies. They were both closed down within a year of their inauguration. Thus, from 1931Turkey was a one- party state where the barrier between the party and the state had become blurred. The RPP ruled the country, and until 1945there was no space for independent opposition, civil society organisations or a free press. Despite the restrictive conditions, several groups tried to support paths of social change which were different from the government’s authoritarian high modernism. The first of these consisted of individuals who had supported the nationalist movement, but disagreed with Atatu ¨ rk on the direction the new regime was taking. Some opposed the secular reforms; others were uncom- fortable with Atatu ¨ rk’s dictatorial powers. Ultimately, many either made their peace with the regime or left the country to write critical accounts of Turkey’s transformation from exile. The second group chafing under the weight of the new order comprised the wealthy families in Anatolia. Many of these families had reached a modus vivendi with the Ottoman state whereby they were permitted to wield power locally and accumulate wealth as long as they did not question the overall directives of the Ottoman state. 19 A stronger and more centralised state 17 Andrew Mango, Atatu¨ rk (London, 1999), pp. 448–52 . 18Zu¨ rcher, Turkey ,p.181 .

19 Michael Meeker, A nation of empire: The Ottoman legacy of Turkish modernity (Berkeley, 2002 ). The New Cambridge History of Islam 310 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 threatened to undermine the status of these families. Also, especially in the south and the south-east, local families had gained some of their wealth and power by dominating the local economic networks which had expanded in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 20With the new borders and the imposition of a closed economy, these families found themselves confined to a smaller space, having to reorient their activities internally without the necessary resources or support to do this. They were also unhappy with the state’s eagerness to cultivate a new Anatolian elite, selected largely from the newly settled immigrants. These provincial families became the core supporters of the opposition parties which were formed in 1924,1930 and after 1945.

Third, the secular direction taken by the new state met forceful and almost immediate resistance from religious orders. One of the earliest and largest of these uprisings started as soon as the intentions of the new regime became clear. In 1925,S¸eyh Said, a Kurd and the spiritual leader of a Naqshband order in eastern Turkey, gathered several thousand followers and started an armed resistance against the nationalist government in Kurdish areas. S¸eyh Said and his followers declared their goal as the creation of an independent Kurdistan and the restoration of the caliphate. In the ensuing conflict, the Turkish government mobilized 52,000troops, half the peacetime strength of its new army. The suppression of this revolt and the government reprisals that followed were brutal. Said and forty-six others were hanged, and as many as 20,000 tribal leaders and their families were resettled in western Anatolia, including many not directly linked to the uprising. Government forces razed Kurdish villages, confiscated animals and placed the Kurdish areas of the country under martial law. As mentioned above, the special tribunals estab- lished to prosecute the participants in this rebellion remained active for two years and became an organ for suppressing not only Kurdish but all opposi- tion in the country. 21 The sweeping nature of S¸eyh Said’s defeat put a temporary halt to Kurdish resistance, but soon new Kurdish activism devel- oped and the Kurds became a permanent source of problems for the govern- ment’s vision of a centralised and homogenised state and society. A second religious leader who opposed the new regime and its policies was Bediu ¨ zzaman Said Nursi ( 1877–1960 ), another Kurd who was also the founder of the Nur movement rooted in the Naqshband and Kh alid orders. Said 20 Eberhard Wolfram, ‘Nomads and farmers in southeastern Turkey’, Oriens,6 (1953 ), pp. 46–9 .

21 David McDowall, A modern history of the Kurds (London,1997), pp. 194–202 . Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 311 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 Nursi and the Nur movement that gathered around him espoused not a universalist Islam but one that was specific to the experiences of the people of Anatolia. Said Nursi had had good relations with the Young Turks, supported the nationalist movement, and opposed S¸eyh Said’s emphasis on Kurdish identity. His world view, however, was starkly different from that advocated by the new state. Rather than believing in the power of a strong central state to shape people’s sensibilities as the nationalists did, Nursi and his followers focused their attention on the individual’s relationship to God. They advo- cated a return to pure Muslim thought, and argued that once everybody followed this path a just order and an appropriate political arrangement would emerge naturally. With its emphasis on spiritual purity and inter- personal relations, the Nur movement quickly became a potent alternative to the high modernist focus on the state. 22During the1930s and the 1940s, Said Nursi was arrested repeatedly by the authorities, for defying the laws of the republic and for advocating a return to a religiously based society. A final source of opposition was in rural areas, where the vast majority of the population had been bearing the brunt of the deteriorating economic conditions through the war years. Although political conditions in the coun- try did not allow grassroots politics to develop, these impoverished masses provided fodder for the plans of the main opposition groups mentioned above. Democrat Party years: integrating the nation By the end of the Second World War RPP rule was identified with the restriction of civil liberties and the deterioration of economic conditions in the country. It is therefore curious that the RPP leader _ In ¨ onu ¨ (1884 –1973 ) decided to open up the country’s political system. The reasons for this apparently suicidal move had to do with international conditions in the post-war years. In 1945Turkey’s leaders were convinced that only a close alliance with the United States and the western European powers could protect the country, especially since Stalin had refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and started to make belligerent comments concerning the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. 23In an effort to prove their democratic credentials and to benefit from the institutional protection and 22 S¸erif Mardin, Religion and social change in modern Turkey: The case of Bediu ¨ zzaman Said Nursi (Albany, 1989).

23 Ahmad, The Turkish experiment ,p.389. The New Cambridge History of Islam 312 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 financial help that the USA was providing to its allies in Europe, the RPP leaders decided to allow the formation of opposition parties in1945, and to hold the first general election in 1946. The first major new party to be formed, in 1946 , was the DP, but the elections of that year were far from democratic.

Sensing that the result would not be to its liking, the government withheld official results of the vote and simply announced that the DP had won 67 seats, as opposed to RPP’s 361.

The background of the DP’s founders shows that this party grew out of the intra-elite disagreements that had been going on in the RPP. Among the principal founders were Celal Bayar ( 1883–1986 ), who had been involved in the nationalist struggle since the late nineteenth century and had served as prime minister under Atatu ¨ rk; Refik Koraltan ( 1889–1974 ), a lawyer who had been active in generating local support for the nationalist cause in the Black Sea region; Fuad K ¨ opru ¨ lu¨ (1890 –1966 ), a celebrated historian linked to an illustrious Ottoman family; and finally Adnan Menderes ( 1889–1961 ), a weal- thy landlord from western Anatolia.

Regardless of the background of its founders, however, the DP quickly became a magnet for those alienated by RPP and its policies. In the first truly democratic elections, held in 1950, the DP swept into power, winning 53.4 per cent of the votes and 408seats, as opposed to RPP’s 39.8 per cent and 69seats.

In the elections held in 1954the DP increased its share of votes to 57.6per cent. 24Although they originated from within the ruling elite, the DP leaders strove to broaden the party’s appeal. For example, in a move that was diametrically opposed to the RPP’s centralised procedures, the DP’s local organisations directly nominated 80per cent of the candidates for seats in 1950 .

25Adnan Menderes, who would serve as prime minister between 1950 and 1960 , was particularly effective in addressing the concerns of marginalised segments of the society. In order to reinforce their ties to the discontented elements in Turkish society the Democrats designed economic policies, which favoured provin- cial and rural areas, such as the distribution of state lands and introducing price subsidies that favoured farmers. In the early 1950s, while the benefits of the favourable market were passed on to the rural sector, this same sector was shielded from adverse conditions after 1955. Agriculture also benefited from the significant increase in the importation of machinery, especially tractors, into Turkey, within the context of the US Marshall Aid Programme. 24 See www.tbmm.gov.tr.

25 Ahmad, The Turkish experiment , pp.81–2. Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 313 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 The area under cultivation expanded from8.2 million hectares in 1950to12.9 million in 1960. During the first half of the 1950s the Turkish economy, its agricultural and manufacturing sectors and its per capita income grew annu- ally between 4and 11per cent. 26 These rates were somewhat lower in the second half of the decade, mostly because of worsening conditions in external markets. In word and deed, the Democrats’ more tolerant approach towards reli- gion became another important way in which, in the 1950s, the marginalised majority of Turkish society was reintegrated into the political life of the country. Within months of their victory in 1950the DP relaxed some of the unpopular prohibitions of the 1930s and 1940s. Prohibition against the reading of the call to prayer in any language other than Turkish was lifted; govern- ment-owned radio stations started religious broadcasts; and mandatory reli- gion courses were introduced in schools. The Democrats released Said Nursi from prison and some of his followers were elected into parliament on the DP ticket. 27After the 1950s, partly as a result of the Democrats’ relaxation of some of the harsh restrictions that had been imposed on the public expression of Islam, and partly as a result of the population’s response to this new approach, Turkey never again lived through a period where Islam was vilified as in the early years of the republic. On the contrary, Islam became the object of particular attention and careful cultivation for all politicians and political parties. While important changes were taking place in the governing elite and in its links with the population, Turkey’s social and economic transformation continued in the 1950s. 28 In the ten years that the DP was in power, rural communities became better linked to the nation’s economy and politics, not only through their votes and the cultural policies of the ruling party, but also by taking advantage of the new means of transport and moving closer to the centres of economic and political power. By 1960 32per cent of Turkey’s population was living in cities large and small. 29The entry of millions of new immigrants into the expanding circles of settlement around the big cities ( gecekondu ) also had the effect of bringing into the city the deep strains of religious sentiment that had remained distant and submerged in rural areas 26 Owen and Pamuk, A history,p.250.

27 ‘Tart s¸mal mu ¨ tefekkir: O ¨ lu¨ mu ¨ nden 35y l sonra Said-i Nursi’, Nokta(22 –28 October 1995 ), p. 10.

28 C¸ag lar Keyder, State and class in Turkey (London,1987), pp. 117–40 .

29 Devlet _ Istatistik Enstitu ¨ su ¨ , 2000 Genel nu ¨ fus say m : Nu ¨ fusun sosyal ve ekonomik nitelikleri (Ankara, 2003), p. 46. The New Cambridge History of Islam 314 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 during much of the1930s and 1940s. Various religious orders became centred in these areas, giving a new sense of identity and cohesion to the commun- ities of the newly urbanised immigrants. Beyond the gecekondus, Istanbul’s overall appearance also changed in this decade. To improve Istanbul’s spatial integration, the DP-controlled municipal government planned and built wide boulevards and roads, some of which cut through the city’s historic core.

Also, apartment houses became the preferred mode of living for the rapidly growing population of the city, leaving an indelible mark in not only Istanbul but all of the country’s urban centres. 30 Although the Democrats redefined some of the priorities of the Turkish state, they remained, on the whole, despite their apparent equivocation on some fundamental principles of the early nationalist order, loyal to the overall goals of Kemalist modernisation. This is not surprising since some of the DP leaders had been among the closest friends and allies of Atatu ¨ rk through the last days of the Ottoman Empire and into the republic. As such they could be as firm as their RPP predecessors in restricting some aspects of political Islam, prosecuting some of the more visible Islamist leaders and protecting the symbols of secular order in Turkey. Hence, they suppressed the particularly militant Tij an order while writing a special Atatu ¨ rk Bill that made it a crime to desecrate the memory of the nationalist leader.

The Democrats also supported policies and actions that aimed further to homogenise the people of Turkey. One of the most important of these developments was the anti-Greek riots of 6– 7 September 1955for which the Democrats became partly responsible, by not reining them in on time – if not by provoking them. What started as street demonstrations to protest against an explosion at Atatu ¨ rk’s family house in Salonica quickly turned into a full- scale riot in Istanbul. In the two days of rioting thousands of homes, shops, factories, other businesses and even cemeteries that belonged to Greeks and other non-Muslim communities were destroyed. 31These riots spread a sense of fear and insecurity among the already small non-Muslim population of Istanbul, and caused many of them to emigrate. In the international arena, too, the Democrats continued a staunchly pro- Western policy. Turkey became firmly allied with the USA and its European allies. In 1952they even succeeded in getting Turkey accepted as a member of NATO, although the country had no coastline on the Atlantic and had not 30 _ Ipek Akp nar, ‘The rebuilding of Istanbul after the plan of Henri Prost, 1937–1960’, Ph.D. thesis, Bartlett School ( 2003).

31 Tuna Kuyucu, ‘Ethno-religious unmixing of Turkey: 6–7 September riots as a case in Turkish nationalism’, Nations and Nationalism ,11 ,3 (2005 ), pp. 361–80 . Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 315 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 fought in the Second World War. In no small measure, Turkey’s admission to NATO was facilitated by her dispatch of25,000 troops to fight in the Korean War alongside the United States. In addition to being included in the Marshall Plan and the Truman Pact, Turkey became a member of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, which would expand into the OECD in 1960 .In 1955 Turkey took the lead in organising the Baghdad Pact, which formed an alliance among the US allies Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, and in 1958US Marines used their bases in Turkey in carrying out their landing in Lebanon.

Incidentally, these policies became important factors in pushing states such as Egypt and Syria away from the USA and Turkey and towards the USSR. After 1954, as the effects of worsening world economic conditions started to be felt, DP governments tried to protect their main supporters with generous price subsidies, import restrictions and an overvaluation of the currency. 32At the same time, deteriorating conditions made the DP leaders fearful of opposition and increasingly intolerant of criticism. It became common for DP governments in the late 1950s to close down newspapers, persecute journalists and punish not only specific groups, but also cities and even whole regions for supporting the opposition. Although the DP moved away from inclusiveness and became less open to ideas that originated from local branches, the party leaders continued to cast themselves in the role of fighting urban/intellectual privilege, on behalf of the provincial and rural classes. Consequently, the late 1950s became years of growing discontent in big cities among intellectuals and junior military officers. The latter group was particularly unhappy about the economic and political power of the new civilian elites and its own deteriorating economic situation. Ultimately, these forces of opposition would coalesce behind the military coup of 1960. But the Democrats, and in particular Menderes, continued to be widely popular across the country until the military takeover on 27May 1960. Re-dividing the nation: 1960–80 On 27May 1960a group of junior officers, who had conspired secretly during the late 1950s, overthrew the government. They closed down parliament, suspended the constitution and arrested all active members of the DP, including members of parliament. Shortly thereafter, 588DP leaders, parlia- mentarians and party activists were put on trial on charges of high treason, abuse of power and other offences against the state and the nation. The 1960 32Owen and Pamuk, A history,p.108.

The New Cambridge History of Islam 316 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 coup was a major interruption of the ongoing transformation of Turkey, especially for the integration of the popular classes into the country’s political life. It was an attempt by the representatives of Turkey’s bureaucratic and military elite to reclaim the mantle of modernisation and reassert their control over the Turkey’s political evolution. Hence, except in the centres of major cities, there was no celebration or public expression of excitement in Turkey in the days that followed the coup.The officers who seized power on 27May formed an alliance with some university professors and together they designed a constitution that tried to prevent the recurrence of a power monopoly by a single political party. The new constitution included a bicameral system with checks and balances, an independent constitutional court, guarantees for an autonomous press and universities, and a bill of civil liberties. Although these reforms were supposed to be progressive, they were conceived by an illegal and authoritarian regime with little input from society. Furthermore, most people were focused on the way in which the DP and its leaders were sacked and on the humiliations to which they were subjected in show trials. When the constitution was presented in a referendum on 9July 1961 it received far less support than was expected, with less than two-thirds of the voters endorsing it. The large ‘no’ vote was interpreted as a sign of continuing support for the DP. 33 The outcome of the referendum made the coup leaders even more determined to confront Menderes and his legacy. Of the fourteen death sentences that were handed down by the military tribunal, his was one of three that were carried out on 16–17September 1961. By hanging the popular prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs and finance, the coup leaders were trying to provide some legitimacy for their actions. After all, if the DP’s offences could not be shown to be treasonous, it would be hard to justify overthrowing the entire constitutional order. The military leaders also thought that by killing him, they would put an end to the rumours of Menderes’ invincibility and immortality, which continued to spread in the country. Not surprisingly, however, these executions made the military regime even less popular.

After the coup, some of the officers wanted to hold on to power, perhaps indefinitely. The top military leadership, however, was unsympathetic to this. The DP leaders had cultivated good relations with them and they, in turn, felt loyal to the government. Some had been included in the coup plans only at the very last moment. While some joined the conspirators somewhat 33 Zu¨ rcher, Turkey ,p.258 . Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 317 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 reluctantly, many were forced into retirement. Following the coup, the remain- ing senior officers created a number of mechanisms which made it all but impossible for their junior colleagues to engage in another conspiracy. At the same time, they made sure that the military would retain a privileged position in the country even after the end of the military regime. One of the tools of this influence would be the National Security Council (NSC), which was formed in 1962. Staffed by senior commanders, the pre sident, prime minister and several cabinet members, this body was to have wide powers in shaping the country’s foreign and domestic policy. Furthermore, through the creation of the army’s Mutual Assistance Association, a milita ry investment fund, the armed forces gained a stake in the capitalist order. Consequently, the military became both a thoroughly integrated component of the political and social order in Turkey and, compared to the 1950s, a more unified and effective defender of that order. As a result, during subsequent interventions in 1971,1980 and1997,themilitarywould act within its chain of command, with the most senior officers taking the lead. The unpopularity of the coup became evident in the first elections on 15 October 1961, when political parties linked to the defunct DP gained a strong plurality ( 34.8 per cent for Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, henceforth JP) and 13.7 per cent for Yeni Tu ¨ rkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party), which was widely interpreted as a posthumous victory for Menderes. This trend continued through the 1960s with the JP, as the main heir to the DP tradition, winning a landslide in 1965with 52 .9 per cent of the votes, as opposed to RPP’s 28.7 per cent.

Especially after Su ¨ leyman Demirel (b. 1924) became its chairman in 1964, the JP set out to pursue an all-inclusive populist programme along the lines of the DP. Its platforms promised something for everybody, including the industrialists, workers, small traders and artisans, peasants, large landlords, religious constituencies and Western-oriented liberal intellectuals. Like Menderes, Demirel tried to employ a populist rhetoric to bond with the rural population. Unlike Menderes, however, Demirel moved quickly and more clearly to the side of the big industrialists in major cities, thereby alienating the smaller manufacturers in provincial towns. Also, the JP was determined to prevent another coup at all costs. Demirel therefore aban- doned all pretence of being critical of the state and the military-bureaucratic elite, and identified himself closely with the established order. He also tried to hold onto the DP’s constituency by doling out subsidies, protecting domestic markets and employing a staunchly anti-communist and religiously laden rhetoric. However, towards the end of the 1960s, as the country continued to go through the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, it became difficult to maintain such a big tent in Turkish politics. The New Cambridge History of Islam 318 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 In the1960s and the 1970s the coalition that had coalesced around the DP splintered to form several different political parties with more specific ideol- ogies and programmes. Turkey’s first explicitly Islamist political party, Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, henceforth NOP) was one of these. It was founded by Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1926)in 1970, both to introduce Islamist opposition into Turkish politics and to address the needs of the newly urbanised residents of shanty towns, the Anatolian merchants and small producers, all of whom were being squeezed by the government’s policy of supporting big capital. Another party on the right seeking support from the same constituency was the ultra-nationalist Milliyet¸ci Hareket Partisi (National Action Party, henceforth NAP). The NAP was headed by Alapslan Tu ¨ rkes¸, who, as a junior officer, had played a leading role in the 27 May coup. The NAP and the other parties on the right exploited the feelings of resentment and fear that were increasingly palpable among migrants as they faced a new life in the fast-changing urban environment. Initially, the only leftist alternative to these conservative parties was Tu ¨ rkiye _ Is ¸¸ ci Partisi (Turkish Workers’ Party, henceforth TWP). But after a brief period of electoral success in 1965, the TWP was pushed out of the formal political arena and splintered into several groups. In the late 1960s and 1970 s the RPP revised its platform and adopted a social democratic position on social issues. This would become the basis for its revival in the 1970s.

Outside the formal political parties, many professional, labour, student and civil organisations were formed in the 1960s. These became increasingly vocal in articulating either the interests of their constituencies, or, more typically, their utopian visions of what these interests should be and how Turkish society and state should change to serve those interests. There was, however, little in the way of formal ties between these organisations and political parties. Even the RPP, which would turn around its electoral fortunes significantly with its new social democratic rhetoric, limited its ties with civil society organisations lest they taint it with socialism or communism.

Hence, what was common to both the formal and informal parts of political society was the growing gap between what they were arguing, debating and, increasingly, fighting about, and the modern transformation and mobilisation that Turkish society was experiencing. One indication of this separation was the steady decline in the rate of participation in the general elections during the 1960 s, from a high of 81per cent in 1961to64.3 per cent in 1969. 34 34Ahmad, The Turkish experiment ,p.192.

Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 319 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 The economic policy Turkish governments pursued in these years was a typical application of import-substituting industrialisation. The government’s fiscal, monetary and tariff policies were all geared towards protecting and supporting domestic industries and industrialists producing for the internal market. In the short term these policies bore fruit and generated a noticeable shift towards urban industrial sectors in the economy. While the Turkish economy grew by about 6per cent on an annual basis during the 1960s, the rate of growth in the manufacturing industry was around 10per cent between 1963 and1977. In agriculture, growth remained steady around 3.4 per cent. In these years real wages almost doubled, which was key for creating and sustaining a domestic market for the products of the protected industries. 35 By 1970 38 .45 per cent of Turkey’s population was classified as urban. 36 Istanbul’s population grew from 1.8 million in 1960to over 3million in 1970 , and its rate of growth was over twice as fast as the growth of Turkey’s population. 37In the 1960s the area around Istanbul became both the centre of Turkey’s industrialisation and the main magnet for rural–urban migration. A report published in the late 1960s stated that the Istanbul region was home to 45per cent of all manufacturing plants in Turkey, and was producing 48per cent of the net value added. 38 The growing population of Istanbul brought a huge expansion of the gecekondu districts that surrounded the city. According to one study there were approximately 240,000 gecekondu dwellings in 1960;by1970 this number had increased to over 600,000 . It is estimated that between one-third and a half of Istanbul’s population have lived in gecekondudistricts at some point in their lives. 39Compared with their counterparts in other parts of the world, gecekondu districts in Turkey grew in a relatively organised fashion. Rather than being reservoirs of individuals caught between rural and urban life, each gecekondu area was a well-structured enclave, containing concentrations of people coming from the same region or even town in Anatolia. Some of these districts acquired distinct ethnic or religious identities, so that Kurdish or Alevi districts became well known. 40 While the overall patriarchal system continued to dominate the lives of the immigrants, those who arrived first were definitely more privileged. Similarly, connections to local government and the knowledge of how one could manipulate and gain access to it were 35 Owen and Pamuk, A history,p.250.

36 Devlet _ Istatistik Enstitu ¨ su ¨ , 2000 Genel nu ¨ fus say m ,p.46.

37 Mustafa S ¨ onmez, _ Istanbul’un iki yu ¨ zu ¨ (Ankara, 1996)p.121.

38 Ahmad, The Turkish experiment ,p.287.39S¨ onmez, _ Istanbul’un ,p.87.

40 Karpat, Kemal, The gecekondu: Rural migration and urbanization (Cambridge,1976). The New Cambridge History of Islam 320 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 important assets. Religious orders facilitated some of the migration by providing support, protection and employment to people. With the help of thet . ar qa s and other networks, these settlements fostered the development of powerful mechanisms for the integration of the millions of migrants into an urban life. 41Among the parties that emerged out of the political trans- formations of the 1960s, the NOP and the other Islamist parties that followed it were most successful in integrating themselves into these communities.

More than anything else, it was their ability to organise support and provide services on a micro-level that determined the long-term success of Islamist politics in Turkey. During this period of economic and political transformation, Turkey also became somewhat isolated from the outside world. The share of both imports and exports in the Gross National Product declined, and Turkey could find no diplomatic support during the Cyprus crisis of 1964. The only important exceptions to this trend were the new links that were developing between Turkey and Europe. These included the first waves of guest workers – about a million Turkish workers moved to Germany and other European countries in the 1960s – and the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963that started a process that was supposed to e nd with Turkey’s full membership in the European Economic Community, the EU’s predecessor.

By the end of the 1960s the major political parties in Turkey had become involved in an insular and increasingly acrimonious struggle among them- selves. At the same time, student groups and other extra-parliamentary organisations were fighting among themselves. The second half of the 1960 s was marked by violent confrontations between left- and right-wing student organisations, urban guerrilla activities which attacked symbols of authority, wealth and ‘American imperialism’, and an increasingly militant labour activism. As demonstrations, bombings, robberies, kidnappings and assassinations spread, it seemed that the government was losing its ability to withstand these attacks and to protect the life and property of its citizens. On 12March 1971the high command of the Turkish army issued an ultimatum demanding that a strong and credible government be formed to deal with ‘anarchy’ and to carry out ‘Kemalist reforms’. Following this ultima- tum, Demirel resigned as prime minister and a government of technocrats was formed to carry out the mandate of the generals. The military and its civilian allies tried to tighten their control over the government by eliminating some liberal clauses from the constitution, expanding the power of the NSC, 41 Jenny White, Money makes us relatives (Austin,1994). Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 321 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 instituting special tribunals to deal withoffences against the security of the state and imposing martial law in much of the country. Within two years, as many as 5 ,000 people had been arrested, tortured or tried and sentenced to various terms in prison or, in some cases, to death. 42Among those who fell victim to the regime were student and labour leaders, prom inent authors, academics and artists.

In the elections that were held in 1973and1977, history repeated itself. Just as the JP had become Turkey’s largest party following the 1960coup because it was seen as the main anti-junta party, the RPP, as the only party that had been consistent in its opposition to the 12March intervention, received the highest percentage of votes in both elections. Having wrested control of the RPP from Atatu ¨ rk’s close friend and comrade _ Ismet _ In ¨ onu ¨ in 1972 ,Bu¨ lent Ecevit ( 1925–2006 ) quickly gained in popularity through his leftist and populist rhetoric and his principled opposition to the military regime. Even more important for the RPP’s 1977victory, however, was Ecevit’s 1974decision to order the Turkish military to occupy 33per cent of the island of Cyprus in response to a Greek Cypriot coup which had threatened to bring about the annexation of the island by Greece. The other important political development was the emergence of the Islamist Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, henceforth NSP) in 1972 to take the place of the NOP, which was closed down by the military.

Like its predecessor, the NSP presented itself as the defender of traditional (read Islamic) values and interests in Turkey. As a result of the continuing migration of large numbers of people to Istanbul and other big cities, the bearers of these values were no longer concentrated in provincial or rural areas but had become visible and active in Turkey’s largest metropoles. As such, they had become integral parts of Turkey’s modern transformation although they were still left on the margins of public life. The NSP appealed directly to the discontent of these groups. 43In 1973 , much to the surprise of many observers, it became the third-largest party in Turkey and the junior partner in a coalition government with the RPP. Although this partnership did not last long, it was an important step in legitimising political Islam in Turkey’s formal politics.

The 12March intervention did little to address the problems that the military had cited in forcing the government out of power. During the 1970 s formal politics became even more dysfunctional and further removed from society. Turkey had eleven different governments between 1971and 42Zu¨ rcher, Turkey ,p.272 .

43 Binnaz Toprak, Islam and political development in Turkey (Leiden,1981). The New Cambridge History of Islam 322 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 1980, some led by people who were not even members of parliament. Also in these years, two ‘Nationalist Front’ governments were formed, consisting of all the major parties on the right. The main purpose of these coalitions was to limit the influence of civil society organisations and the left in Turkey’s politics.

Outside parliament, urban guerrilla organisations such as Devrimci Gen¸clik (Revolutionary youth) and Tu ¨ rk Halk Kurtulus¸ Ordusu (Turkish people’s liberation army) (on the left) and U ¨ lku ¨ Ocaklar (Idealist hearths) (on the right) became increasingly violent during the second half of the 1970s. The number of people who were killed in clashes among these organisations and between them and the security forces increased from 230in1977 to almost 1300 in1979 . 44 Some of these attacks involved targeted assassinations of prominent politicians, intellectuals and leaders of civil society organisations.

Even more ominously, Alevis and Kurds became special targets for ultra- nationalist groups, partly because of their outsider status vis-a ` -vis the original definition of Turkish identity, and partly because of their left-leaning politics.

On 23–24December 1978 111people were killed, and 210homes and over 70 businesses and offices belonging to Alevis were destroyed in the south-east- ern province of Kahramanmaras¸ . Nevertheless, Alevi identity never became the basis for a distinct political movement in Turkey, even in response to this violence. Some of the Kurds, on the other hand, chose a different route when they formed the new Kurdistan Workers’ Party (known by its Kurdish acronym, PKK) in 1978, with the goal of creating an independent Kurdistan.

In the second half of the 1970s Turkey was deeply affected by the global economic crisis induced in part by the oil boycott and OPEC price increases.

As a country that imported most of its energy supplies, the tenfold increase in the price of oil was disastrous for Turkey. Current account deficits became a permanent feature of the economy during this period. Furthermore, in response to the oil crisis, European countries halted their importation of labour from Turkey, thereby curbing a major source of foreign exchange. 45 The weak and short-lived governments of this era tried to deal with the economic crisis by continuing existing economic restrictions and introducing even more economic controls. For example, the value of the Turkish cur- rency was kept artificially high in a losing battle to protect domestic markets and industries. The result was a period of acute shortages and a jump in the rate of inflation, from 6.5 per cent in the early 1970s to over 105.3 per cent in 44 Zu¨ rcher, Turkey ,p.276.

45 Keyder, State and class , pp.165–96 . Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 323 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 1980. 46In the late 1970s Turkey started a new series of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but the radical restructuring of the Turkish economy that was required was all but impossible to implement in a country that had such an ineffectual state. Reconfiguring the nation: 1980–2000 On 12September 1980Turkey’s military made one more effort to re-establish control over social change, launching a new coup. Of the military interven- tions Turkey experienced in its history, this did most to widen the gap between formal politics and society. While previous military interventions had been selective in their persecution of politicians, the leaders of the 12 September coup were thorough in completely suppressing the democratic process in Turkey. The government was deposed, parliament was dissolved, political parties were closed down and their leaders were arrested, all political activity was banned, all mayors and municipal councils were fired and all labour unions and civil society organisations were outlawed. The constitu- tional protections for free speech, freedom of press and for the autonomy of universities were suspended. To say, write or even imply anything that was critical of the coup or the coup leaders was banned. The leader of the coup, Kenan Evren, and the commanders of the land, sea, air and gendarme forces concentrated all the legislative, executive and judiciary powers in their hands.

They described their overthrow of the government as a last resort to save the country. Yet all indications are that this coup was a long time in the making.

Within the first six weeks of the intervention, 11,500 people were arrested; by the end of the year this number had gone up to 30,000 . Within a year over 120 ,000 people were imprisoned for activities that were criminalised by the military regime. 47Without a previously prepared list of enemies, it would have been impossible for the military regime to move so swiftly after 12September.

In addition to suppressing democracy, the coup established a plethora of new laws, regulations and institutions designed to give enduring power to the military–bureaucratic elite and its ideological supporters, even after the formal end of the military regime. Among these were a new constitution that restricted individual freedoms, political activity and civil society organ- isations. It also established a unicameral assembly and a strengthened National Security Council, with a veto over all civilian government decisions 46 See www.belgenet.com/eko/enflasyon_ 01.html.

47 Zu¨ rcher, Turkey ,p.294 . The New Cambridge History of Islam 324 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 deemed relevant to national unity, security and foreign policy. The empow- erment of the NSC led to the bifurcation of the Turkish state; where substantial power moved to branches dominated by the military, security services and other organisations operating in secrecy. Throughout the1990s the minutes of the NSC’s meetings were not made public; nor were the military budgets ever disclosed in full. In the 1980s, however, Turkey changed in ways far different from those the military leaders envisaged. Though the military was keen on legislating an organised society, Turkey’s social transformation undermined them. The rural–urban migration accelerated significantly and the country passed a milestone in the mid-1980 s when, for the first time, more than half of its population was classified as urban. 48Rather than assimilating quickly, as had been predicted by an earlier generation of social scientists, the residents of the multiplying settlements in and around Istanbul and other big cities melded elements of their past with their new urban experience. Consequently, the 1980 s witnessed the emergence of a society that combined rural and urban, religious and secular, liberal and conservative and old and new in its culture, politics and economy. By 1990 , Istanbul, with its population of over 7million, had come to epitomise this peculiar amalgam which Turkey was becoming. In 1990only 37 per cent of the people living in Istanbul were born in the city; the rest were immigrants. 49 With its mosques, crowded streets, abject poverty, arabesk music and shanty towns, Istanbul was still like what some writers would describe an ‘oriental city’. Yet at the same time it was becoming a city of office towers, fast-food chains, expressways , shopping malls, five-star hotels and international festivals and conventions. In effect, by the 1990s the separation between state and society, which had corresponded very closely to an urban– rural separation in the earlier years of the republic, had lost this geographical anchor. Through their labour, the spread of their culture and their presence in urbanised centres, the formerly marginalised rural, poor and immigrant groups had become a central part of Turkey’s modern society. It was by no means the case, however, that they were all integrated and included in modern society on anequalbasis.Inthe 1980s a large segment of the new migrants could only find unregulated, temporar y and low-paying jobs. 48State Institute of Statistics, The population of Turkey1923–1994 : Demographic structure and development (Ankara,1995).

49 S¨ onmez, _ Istanbul’un ,p.125. Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 325 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 The transformation of Turkish society in the1980s also found a clear political expression in the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, henceforth WP). 50Within ten years of the end of the military regime in 1983this party would become the largest political party in Turkey, increasing its share of the vote from 7.1 per cent in 1987to21.4 per cent in 1995. By the mid- 1990s the WP was controlling several local governments and the mayor’s office in some of Turkey’s most important cities, including the capital city, Ankara, and the largest city, Istanbul. For a little over a year, in 1996–7, the WP would also serve as the primary party in a coalition government.

An important factor that thwarted the military’s social and political proj- ects in the 1980s was the country’s growing openness to the outside world, which occurred partly through the agreements between Turkey and interna- tional agencies, and partly as a result of steps the government took in response to demands from big business. Key among international agreements was the programme of economic stabilisation and liberalisation that had been put into effect in January 1980. The goal of this plan was a radical reorienta- tion of the Turkish economy towards privatisation, and towards liberalisation of foreign trade and capital markets. The Turkish lira was devalued, price controls and import quotas were eliminated, government subsidies were reduced and Turkey’s banking system was made more compatible with its foreign counterparts. Steps were also taken to reduce the size of the state bureaucracy and to start selling some of the government-owned industries. The conditions became particularly favourable for the full implementation of this programme after the military coup, when all dissent, including strikes and lockouts, was banned. These measures generated a significant increase in exports, from $ 2.3 billion or 2.6 per cent of GNP in 1979to $8billion in 1985, and to $ 13.0 billion or 8.6 per cent of GNP in 1990. Eighty per cent of this increase came from manufacture exports, demonstrating a new leap in Turkey’s industrialisation. 51These policies also unleashed the creative poten- tial of the Turkish economy which, in previous decades, had been inhibited by some onerous barriers. One result was the development of a strong network of middle-sized industrial establishments in Anatolian cities, which not only became major players in cultivating new export markets for Turkey, but also, in the 1990s, a formidable political force. 52 50Jenny White, Islamist mobilization in Turkey (Seattle,2002).

51 Owen and Pamuk, A history,p.119.

52 Ays¸e Bug ra, ‘The claws of the tigers’, Privateview,1 (1997 ), pp. 50–5. The New Cambridge History of Islam 326 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 The second factor contributing to the liberalisation of Turkey’s economy and foreign trade regime was the personality and policy preferences of Turgut O ¨ zal ( 1927–93 ), who dominated politics throughout this decade.

O ¨ zal was a high-ranking bureaucrat responsible for the economy in the last government before the coup, when Turkey signed the stabilisation agree- ment with the IMF. After the coup he was promoted to deputy prime minister with expanded powers over the economy. In 1983, in the first post- coup elections, he formed a new political party, the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, henceforth MP), and ran against the military’s hand- picked candidates. In yet another repetition of history, the Turkish electorate skipped the two parties supported by the military and flocked to O ¨ zal’s MP, which gained 45per cent of the vote, and won a clear majority in the new parliament. O ¨ zal served first as prime minister, and then as president, until his death 1993.

A large part of O ¨ zal’s appeal came from his background, which in some ways was close to being a microcosm of Turkey’s modern experience. He had started in the state bureaucracy, had moved on to work for the World Bank, and then for the private sector. He was born in a provincial town and had connections with the Naqshband religious order. He also spoke freely of his partial Kurdish heritage. Intellectually, O ¨ zal was close to a group of intellec- tuals who sought to achieve a synthesis between Turkish history and Islam by trying to demonstrate that Turkish Islam was historically distinct, unique, and particularly strong. In the early 1980s the military rulers supported this line of thinking as part of their struggle against communism. 53Ironically, the military’s support would become an important factor that helped political Islam gain strength in Turkish politics in these crucial years. O ¨ zal’s broad appeal was evident in his entourage, where one could find leftists, ultra- nationalists and hardcore secularists, as well as devout followers of religious orders. With such support, O ¨ zal was able to use state institutions to push through economic liberalisation measures in the 1980s, and extend these into other areas of Turkish society, multiplying the country’s ties to external sources of capital, commodities, information and services.

These changes in Turkey’s economic and political outlook coincided with favourable global conditions in the 1980s and the 1990s. First, in the height- ened Cold War atmosphere of the early Reagan years, Turkey, once again, was able to take advantage of its strategic importance and obtain aid from the West. Later, the end of the Cold War diminished the importance of Turkey’s 53 Hakan Yavuz, Islamic political identity in Turkey (New York,2003), pp. 69–75 . Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 327 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 status as a frontline state in the war against communism. At the same time, however, new possibilities for economic activity, political cooperation and cultural influence in the former Soviet Union emerged, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This was an important factor that contributed to the success of both the policy of export promotion and the new Anatolian industrialists who pursued business opportunities in these places. The steady rise and expansion of the EU and the strengthening of pan-European institu- tions were also to have a profound impact on Turkey. Turkey had been a party to initial negotiations, agreements and institutions which laid the foundations for today’s EU. In the intervening period, Turkey’s economic and political troubles had put her membership well beyond the realm of any probability. But in the fast-changing environment of the late1980sO¨ zal decided to push the issue, and formally applied for membership in 1987.

This set into motion a process which reached a decisive point only in December 2004when the EU agreed to start the negotiations that should end in Turkey’s integration into the union. Throughout these years, but especially since 1987, the possibility of accession to candidate status and eventual membership has given the EU and the other European organisations tremendous power to influence Turkey’s economic and political path. More than any other factor, this has played a key part in undermining the legacy of the 12September coup in Turkey.

Although he was responsible for liberalising significant parts of Turkey’s economy and society, O ¨ zal’s style of government also contributed to the development of widespread corruption. First under the military regime, then with the majority he commanded in the parliament, O ¨ zal pushed through many of the new laws without any real deliberation or input from any part of society, and without creating the necessary legal or institutional framework for them. This made the political process open to abuse and cronyism. Also, decisions imposed thus could be reversed just as easily when power shifted.

Indeed, in the 1990s political parties diluted the pace of liberalisation and export promotion by reintroducing the populist price subsidies of previous decades. After the death of O ¨ zal in 1993, Turkey’s government was once again dominated by a series of weak coalitions led by figures who had been in Turkish politics for close to half a century. Under these conditions the part of the state dominated by the military expanded its influence, and also became linked to the network of corrupt relations that was permeating the civilian government and bureaucracy. A key factor that perpetuated the power of the security apparatus, and especially that of the military, was the Kurdish nationalist insurgency, which The New Cambridge History of Islam 328 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 continued through most of the1980s and the 1990s. It was part of a broader Kurdish rights movement, not all parts of which necessarily agreed with the extreme demands of the PKK-led armed struggle. Within this Kurdish rights movement there was a succession of political parties which took part in elections and won representation in the parliament and in local administra- tion. 54Furthermore, a substantial part of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey had moved out of their traditional homeland in eastern Turkey and were living assimilated lives in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, the military pursued scorched-earth tactics in dealing with the insurgency and the Kurdish rights movement in general. In clashes between the Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish military over 30,000 people, mostly Kurds, were killed. More than a million Kurds were resettled far from their homes in eastern Turkey, and tens of thousands of villages and pastures were destroyed. 55The military and bureaucratic elite’s hostility towards the Kurdish rights movement was not confined to armed insurgency: in the 1990s three successive Kurdish political parties were closed down. In one instance in 1994, seven Kurdish parliamen- tarians were ejected from the National Assembly, arrested, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms for their nationalist views. In the 1990s the military and the police resorted to outright force, against not only Kurds but also other perceived threats as well. In March 1995police confronted rioting Alevis in two particularly congested and poor shanty towns of Istanbul, killing as many as twenty demonstrators. In 1997the military staged another intervention into the political process to force the Islamist-dominated coalition government out of office. Several times in the 1990s, and especially in December 2000, police and gendarme forces attacked several of their own prisons, using heavy machinery, bombs and weapons to confront inmates who were holding hunger strikes in protest against their conditions. More than thirty inmates were killed and several hundred wounded in the ensuing clashes. 56 In addition to these confrontations the Turkish state and bureaucracy also became engaged in fighting to reverse the growing prominence of Islam in the public sphere and to undermine the popularity of Islamist parties. 57In 54 Nicole Watts, ‘Routes to ethnic resistance: Virtual Kurdistan west and the transforma- tion of Kurdish politics in Turkey’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington ( 2001).

55 Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish question(Lanham,1998); 56 Arda _ Ibikog lu, ‘Turkish prisons: From wards to cells’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association (Fairbanks, 2003).

57 U¨ mit Cizre and Menderes C¸ nar, ‘Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and politics in the light of the February 28process’, South Atlantic Quarterly ,102 (2003 ), pp. 309–32 . Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 329 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 1997, shortly after pushing the Islamist-dominated coalition out of power, a new law was passed which made eight-year public primary education com- pulsory in order to prevent religious schools from training children at an early age. In 1998the headscarf ban was reinforced, making it all but impossible for covered women to work in government offices or enrol in public schools and universities. Also in 1998the WP was closed down. Its successor, the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, henceforth VP), would also be closed down in 2000.

Tayyip Erdog an, who was the mayor of Istanbul at the time, received a ten- month prison sentence in 1998for a ‘subversive’ poem read at a rally several years before. And in 1999an elected member of parliament was prevented from taking the oath of office because she refused to take off her headscarf.

Subsequently she was stripped of her citizenship.

The structure of the Turkish state and its approach to individual, religious and minority rights quickly became anachronistic in the late twentieth century. While the world was going through an ever-closer integration and notions of individual and human rights, civil society and democracy were gaining universal appeal and credibility, Turkey’s leadership seemed to be retreating back to old-fashioned intolerance. Especially for a state that had ambitions of becoming a full member of the EU, this was strange behaviour.

To make matters even more difficult, in the 1980s and 1990s Turkish society became better informed, better integrated and better connected to the out- side world. Particularly important was the cessation of the state monopoly in radio and television, which led to quick multiplication of private stations and channels. Equally significant was the revamping and expansion of Turkey’s communication network which led to a significant increase in fixed lines and mobile telephones. The people of Turkey also became more conscious of their diversity, more open in practising their Muslim religion, more inter- ested in their Ottoman past, more willing to open up to the outside world and generally more tolerant than their rulers. In a nationwide survey conducted in 1999 ,66. 6per cent of the respondents said that women should be permitted to work in the public sector and attend universities while wearing their headscarves. This survey also showed that, contrary to what was being claimed by officials, Turkish society was not deeply divided along secular– religious lines. Almost 70per cent of the respondents clearly stated their preference to live in a society where religion did not direct the affairs of the state and only 2.7 and 6per cent respectively described themselves as atheists and very religious. 58Several other surveys conducted during the 1990s also 58Ali C¸ arkog lu and Binnaz Toprak, Tu¨ rkiye’de din toplum ve siyaset (Istanbul,2000). The New Cambridge History of Islam 330 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 found consistently strong support for Turkey’s membership of the EU. 59The changes in Turkish society during these years can also be traced through its cultural output. In music, we have already alluded to the popularity of arabesk music, which mixes the elements of Turkish classical and folk music with those of its western pop and Arabic counterparts. The immensely popular songs that grew out of this genre in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the experience and the passions of the newly urbanised peripheral communities around Turkish cities. 60In literature too, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the eclipse of an older generation of popular novels by authors such as Yas ¸ar Kemal, which probed the harshness of rural life, by those of a new crop of internationally acclaimed writers including Orhan Pamuk, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2006, Latife Tekin and Elif S¸afak, which explored the contradictions of Turkey’s modern urban identity. 61 Throughout the 1990s, partly through democratic politics and partly as a result of the multiplying links between Turkey and global networks of communication, civil society and NGOs, various groups within Turkey acquired ways of exerting pressure on the Turkish state. Influential business associations and chambers of commerce published position papers criticising the 12September laws, the ban on headscarves and the state’s Kurdish policy.

In a sign of the strength of this opposition, this campaign included both older firms that had long benefited from state protection and younger firms excluded from this privileged circle. 62 At the same time, various Kurdish organisations in Europe succeeded in creating international public sympathy for the Kurdish cause. Turkey’s Kurdish groups were also able to apply for and receive compensation from the Turkish state by filing suits with the European Court of Human Rights. 63In July 1997The Economist summarised the contradictions and the growing isolation of the Turkish state with the headline ‘The Increasing Loneliness of Being Turkey’. 64 59 TU¨ SES, Tu¨ rkiye’de siyasi partierin se¸cmenleri ve toplum du ¨ zeni (Ankara, 1999).

60 Meral O ¨ zbek, ‘Arabesk culture: A case of modernization and popular identity’, in Sibel Bozdog an and Res¸at Kasaba (eds.), Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey (Seattle, 1997), pp. 211–32 .

61 See, e.g., Orhan Pamuk, Snow(New York, 2004); Latife Tekin, Berji Kristin: Tales from the garbage hills (New York,1992); Elif Shafak, The flea palace (London,2004).

62 Ziya O ¨ nis¸ and Umut Tu ¨ rem, ‘Entrepreneurs, democracy, and citizenship in Turkey’, Comparative Politics ,34 (2002 ), pp. 439–55 ;Is¸ k O ¨ zel, ‘Beyond the orthodox paradox: The break-up of state-business coalitions in Turkey in the 1980s’,Journal of International Affairs ,57 (2003 ), pp. 97–112 .

63 Watts, ‘Routes to ethnic resistance’, pp. 187–96 .

64 The Economist ,19 July 1997, pp. 21–3. Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 331 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 This situation changed as a result of the cumulative effect of several unrelated developments in the second half of the 1990s. The first of these was a traffic accident which took place in 1996, on the highway between Istanbul and Izmir, killing all but one of the passengers of a car. It turned out that the passengers of this vehicle included a senior police official, a drug kingpin wanted by Interpol and an anti-PKK Kurdish leader who was also a member of the parliament; and in the boot were government-issue weapons, silencers and fake diplomatic passports. This accident led to the first of a series of scandals which exposed corrupt relations between the security apparatus and the underworld. The second important development was the capture in 1999, with the help of the CIA, of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah O ¨ calan, in Kenya, where he had been hiding after being pushed out of his sanctuary in Syria. O ¨ calan’s capture greatly diminished the power of the Kurdish insurgency and undercut one of the principal reasons the military had always put forth to justify its continuing role in the Turkish government and its tactics in eastern Turkey.

The third development was the devastating earthquake that hit Istanbul and the industrial heartland of Turkey in August 1999, leaving 17,000 people dead, 30,000 injured and 500,000 homeless. It soon became apparent that the scale of destruction and the very high number of casualties were due, in part, to decades of governmental neglect in properly inspecting and enforcing the country’s building codes. This discovery, coupled with the tardiness with which the military and other official rescue teams responded to this disaster, peeled off another layer of the state and the military’s prestige in the eyes of the populace. Also, Greece, which had been held up as the eternal enemy for much of the history of modern Turkey, turned out to be one of the fastest and most efficient sources of aid and comfort for the victims. This latter develop- ment ushered in an unprecedented period of cooperation between the two states, helping, among other things, with Turkey’s accession to candidate status in the EU. Finally, there was the economic crisis of 2001, when, partly as a result of the corrupt and populist economic policies of successive governments and partly as a result of infighting among the members of the political elite, the Turkish economy came close to total collapse. Turkey’s GNP contracted by about 9.5 per cent in 2001–2, official unemployment rates passed 15per cent, and close to 20 per cent of the population fell below the poverty line. The shocks of the earthquake and the economic crisis also exposed the plight of the large numbers of people who had become linked to urban economies through low-paying jobs. Even though the labour of these people had made possible The New Cambridge History of Islam 332 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 the export boom and the globalisation of Istanbul, they received very limited benefits from the growth and expansion of Turkey’s economy and were among the first to suffer from the adverse turn in trends in2001–2. With the earthquake, the 2001crisis also laid bare the fault lines of Turkey’s recent developmental record. In the last twenty years, real wages had declined by as much as 35per cent, and the income inequality between the wealthier and poorer parts of the country had grown significantly worse. In 2000, per capita GDP was calculated to be about $ 16,000 in Istanbul, whereas in S¸ rnak, in eastern Turkey, the corresponding figure was less than $ 2,000 . 65 It may be an exaggeration to suggest that these four developments proved to be the final straws that finally broke the back of military-bureaucratic power in Turkey. It seemed thus, however, when, in the elections of November 2002, every political party and leader who had been involved in the coalition governments of the preceding period was voted out of parlia- ment. 66In contrast, the JDP, which had been formed only two years earlier, emerged as the clear winner, with 363seats in the 550-seat parliament. The only other party that passed the threshold to enter the parliament was the RPP, which benefited from having been out of parliament and hence untainted by the scandals of the previous years. The JDP was formed by a group of younger deputies who split from the older guard of the Islamist movement when the VP was closed down by the state security court. 67Those who were left behind formed their own Islamist party, Saadet Partisi (Happiness Party), which in 2002received only 2.5 per cent of the vote. The JDP founders abandoned their confrontational tactics and identified their mission in broadly modern terms, by emphasising the themes of democracy, human rights, development and justice. They distinguished themselves from the old guard of the Islamist movement who had become part of a new elite.

Above all, they signalled securing Turkey’s full membership in the EU as their ultimate objective. On this basis the JDP was also able to set itself apart from the other parties and gather support from a constituency which far exceeded strictly ‘Islamist’ voters. The personal stories of the founders showed how different they were from the previous political leaders in the country. For example, party chairman and prime minister Tayyip Erdog an grew up in a neighbourhood in Istanbul which was originally settled by the very first wave 65 UNDP, Turkey’s national human development report, 2004(New York, 2005) 66 Soli O ¨ zel, ‘Turkey at the polls: After the tsunami’, Journal of Democracy,14 (2003 ), pp. 80–94 .

67 Cizre and C¸ nar, ‘Turkey 2002’, pp. 322–28 . Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 333 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 of immigrants into the city. He was trained in one of the preacher schools which were always regarded with suspicion by the government elite. Bridging the gap Since coming to power with a strong majority in2002the JDP has signifi- cantly accelerated the series of reforms required by the EU to bring Turkey’s legal, political and economic institutions and practices into conformity with their European counterparts. The state security courts which had been set up by the military were abolished, the penal code was revised, the military was brought under civilian control and Kurdish and other minorities were allowed to learn and use their own languages. In foreign policy too, progress has been made in resolving seemingly intractable problems such as Cyprus, and in avoiding new ones, by staying out of the war in Iraq without seriously offending the United States. Finally, after the disastrous year that followed the 2001 crisis, the economy grew on average by 7.3 percent between 2002and 2005 . 68Also since 2004, inflation has remained in single digits for the first time in over twenty years. As Turkish governments have carried out recent reforms, international organisations have kept a close watch over the coun- try. The IMF has insisted on the implementation of the stabilisation pro- gramme negotiated in the aftermath of the 2001crisis, and the parameters of political and judicial reform have been set by the Copenhagen criteria that the EU requires of all candidate members.

Today, as a probable future member of the EU, Turkey is closer than ever to the goals that were set by Atatu ¨ rk. In December 2004the EU confirmed that Turkey’s judicial and political institutions were sufficiently in line with their European counterparts to move onto the next phase of negotiations.

Ironically, in its journey towards the EU Turkey has been led recently by a party that grew out of the country’s Islamist movement. While the specific character of Islam in Turkey explains part of this anomaly, 69 the more important explanation lies with the closing of the gap between the formal/ institutional and social aspects of Turkey’s modern transformation. Today, for the first time since the 1950s, Turkey is governed by a party that has organic ties with a significant plurality of its population. This has forced the old political elite to watch from the sidelines as Turkey continued its 68 TU¨ SIAD, Tu¨ rkiye ekonomisi, 2004(Istanbul, 2005).

69 Annemarie Schimmel, ‘Islam in Turkey’, in A. J. Arberry (ed.), Religion in the Middle East (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 68–95 . The New Cambridge History of Islam 334 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011 transformation. For this reason alone, the early years of the twenty-first century are likely to go down as a major turning-point in Turkey’s modern history.None of this should imply that the transformations that were ushered in 2003 are irreversible. Already at the end of 2006, eight of the thirty-four articles under which Turkey’s accession to the EU was being negotiated were suspended and Turkey had to watch as Bulgaria and Romania became full members of the EU. There are signs that the recently marginalised elites are trying to reassert their power, and the war in Iraq and the nationalistic turn in Europe are making it easier for them to push back against the forces of change. An assassin who has been linked to the country’s security agencies murdered the prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul on 19January 2007. The tensions that developed in 2007led to a political stalemate, in which the parliament failed to select a new president to replace Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose term had ended. General elections that were held in July 2007gave the JDP an even larger share of the vote and a bigger majority in the parliament. Taking advantage of this, the JDP engineered the election of Abdullah Gu ¨ l as president of the republic on 28August 2007.

The JDP control of the major levers of the government caused the members of the old elite to become even more concerned about their status in the country and the direction Turkey was taking. For example, the repeal on 9 February 2008of a law that had barred female students with headscarves from universities is interpreted by them as a major step away from the path of secular modernisation. Whether and how far Turkey will slide back to its former closed self will depend on both external and internal factors. At the time of the writing of this chapter, the country appears to be growing uncertain about its direction. A historical perspective on how similar critical points were handled in the past should be useful for understanding and managing the new difficulties that confront Turkey. Turkey from the rise of Atatu ¨ rk 335 of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms . https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.013Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core . Portland State Library , on 04 May 2020 at 07:12:55 , subject to the Cambridge Core terms Cambridge Histories Online \251 Cambridge University Press, 2011