Cite some facts about the seven major Mexican cartels and how they operate. What are at least three proposed solutions offered (p.408-410) for reducing the influence of the cartels? Finally, is it imp

However, due to the Mexican drug cartel activity, the violence along the southern border and the intrusion of Mexican drug cartel activity into the United States, candid remarks are necessary in order to fully understand the connection between Mexican drug cartels, U.S. based prison and street gangs. Immigrants In a speech given by Steven Sample, President of the University of Southern California i n 2008 for the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, he cited how diverse the city ofLos Angeles was. President Sample stated that Los Angeles has nearly 1,200 miles of freeways and they are important arteries to the rest of the country and Canada. The Los Angeles International Airport is the number one airport for origin and destination in the United States. In 2007, the airport handled 62 million passengers and almost two million tons of cargo (Sample, 2008). President Sample further stated that Los Ange les is an international economic infrastructure with 10.4 million people from over 120 different cultures, 96 cradle languages, 600 different religious groups and 49 foreign language publications. L.A. has more people ofMexican decent than any city outside of Mexico, the largest Korean population outside Seoul, Korea; the largest Japanese population outside Japan and the largest Asian -American population in the country (Sample, 2008). President Sample cited Jim Clifton, the CEO of the Gallup Organization, the world’s leading pollster. According to Clifton, researchers have proposed that it just took 1,000 individuals, inventors, scientists who contributed to the United States to get this country far, far ahead of Japan and Germany. This is why America is th e world leader in technology, medicine, business, telephony and science. What is particular noteworthy is that of these individual American pioneers more than half migrated from another country... they were in fact immigrants (Sample, 2008). Mexico I cit e these facts here because of all the controversy surrounding the immigrant issue. Immigrant populations can be stereotyped. The actions of few can be used to describe entire populations. As of July, 2008 the CIA reported the population of Mexico to be a l ittle less than 405 Chapter 6 - Transnational Gangs 110 million people (CIA, 2008). Los Angles is a major business hub with an infrastructure that is ideal for transport and travel for both legal and illegal business. With those thoughts in mind consi der the issue of America’s drug appetite. We will discover that this hunger drives the business for the trafficking of illegal drugs and also provides business opportunities for those who get involved. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has suggested that a pproximately 90 percent of the illegal drugs that enter America come through the southern U.S. -Mexico border. The Mexican drug cartels supply contraband to the American public by camouflaging their use by piggy backing transport on the same routes that imm igrants take. Sadly, the cartels fight each other for control of these routes. Cartels There are a number of drug cartels operating in Mexico. We will examine those that tend to impact the U.S. -Mexican border. They include The Arellano -Felix Organizatio n, known as the Tijuana Cartel, the Carrillo -Fuentes Organization, known as the Juarez Cartel, the Osiel Cardenas -Guillen Organization, known as the Gulf Cartel, and the Guzman -Loera Organization, also known as the Sinaloa Cartel. Los Zetas have developed into a drug cartel and there is a separate chapter that will examine their impact on the U.S. (Refer to Los Zetas). These cartels have geographically divided up turf in Mexico in order to control drug trafficking routes through Mexico and into the United States. What is at stake here? The answer is a consumer driven market that is estimated to have an annual profit worth of 13.6 to 48.4 billion dollars (Cook, 2007). Of course much of this money is sent outside of the United States to be laundered through f oreign banking systems. So much money is at stake here that Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman leader of the Sinaloa Cartel was named by Forbes Magazine on the World’s Billionaires list, March 11, 2009, as one of the world’s richest men (Forbes, 2009). The Mexican government suggests there are seven major cartels working in Mexico. Three of the larger cartels operate throughout much of Mexico. They are the Gulf, Sinaloa and Juarez cartels. Law enforcement anecdotal evidence indicates the Juarez Cartel operate in 21 Mexican states with principal basis in Culiacan, Sinaloa; Monterrey, Nuevo Leon and the cities of Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga, Chihuahua; Mexico City; Guadalajara, Jalisco; Cuernavaca, Morelos and Cancun in Quintana Roo.

The Sinaloa Cartel has been reported in 17 Mexican states and important centers are located in Mexico City; Tepic, Nayarit; Toluca and Cuautitlan, Mexico State and most of Sinaloa (Cook, 2007). However the city ofNuevo Laredo across from Laredo, Texas has been a traditional hot spot for cart el fighting between Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel. The Gulf Cartel operates in 13 Mexican states with important operation centers in the cities of Nuevo Laredo, Miguel Aleman, Reynosa and Matamoros, Tamaulipas. The Gulf Cartel, although smaller in size , still operates throughout Mexico; they have been reported in Nuevo Leon, Monterrey and Morelia, Michoacan. The Tijuana Cartel has been reported in 15 states and important operations centers located in Tijuana, Mexicali, Tecate and Ensenada in Baja Califo rnia and in parts of Sinaloa (Cook, 2007). There was a catalyst that most likely allowed the Mexican cartels to come to power. It probably was the demise of Cali and Medellin Cartel leadership in Columbia during the 1990s. In physics there is a saying “th at for every action there is a reaction.” When the Columbian Cartel leadership fell that opened an opportunity for the trafficking of illegal drugs to other groups. A logical direct route would be through Central America and Mexico. This gave the somewhat “smalltime” Mexican cartels an opportunity to expand their operations. As the Mexican cartels gained power American and Mexican law enforcement responded and a number of key cartel leaders were taken into custody. When this happened, rival cartels attempt ed to move in and take over the lucrative smuggling routes. Mid level leaders became cartel leaders. It was this action that most likely caused the spike in violence along the U.S. -Mexican border and throughout the country of Mexico and has resulted in the death of 406 — Mexico Drug Trafficking Organizations over 5 400 people in 2008 (CNN, 2009). Sadly, in 2008 alone more people have been murdered in the Mexican drug war than all the American military casualties in the entire Iraq war; 4 260 casualties (icasualties.org). Collateral Issues In addition to the brutal cartel drug battles there are a couple of other factors to consider that may contrib ute to the instability and violence in the country. Corruption continues to be a thorny issue for the Mexican government. Even though the current administration has made gainful strides in tiying to combat the corruption, the Mexican drug cartels have an u nlimited budget. No matter how much military or government officials’ wages are raised the cartels have the ability to counter the effort. Corruption issues have lead to arrest and investigations of top level federal law enfoicement agents, military offici als to local law enforcement. This only demonstrates that everyone has a price under the right conditions. Corruption also undermines the confidence of the citizens in the government, judicial system and law enforcement. Secondly, an often overlooked issu e is the fact that street gangs exist in Mexico as well as the cartels. Street gang membership can become a recruitment pool for new cartel membership. So there are two issues to deal with. Ignoring street gang activity while focusing on the violence cause d by the cartels could potentially lead to the formation of other “junior cartels” that will work with or against the existing cartels or against themselves. This could only end up with incieasing the violence within the region. As street gangs evolve they also tend to become more violent as gang populations increase in size and as rivalries develop between gangs. There are some anecdotal evidence that suggests street gangs operate throughout most of Mexico. They appear to operate like many U.S.

based trad itional Latino street gangs. No vertical leadership structure. They tend to operate in specific geographical areas within a city or town.

The gang will use graffiti and hand signs to communicate. These gangs tend to be involved in robberies, extortions, dr ug sales and even home invasion type robberies. The money that is earned is often used to purchase and use drugs. There is no data that can estimate the number of street gangs or the membership is Mexico. There is some anecdotal evidence that suggests for some street gang members there is a developing relationship between Mexican prison gangs and the drug cartels. This seems logical since the same types of relationships exist between their U.S. counterparts. Another issue to consider is the growing populat ion of drug users and addiction in Mexico. Again there is no data or academic research that can provide an estimate on the number of adults and juveniles in this population. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the drug use is increasing throughout Mexico espe cially along the U.S. - Mexico border. A growing population of addicts can only tax an already overloaded public resource system. This population will also cause the demand for illegal drugs in Mexico to increase. There are an estimated 200,000 addicts in Tijuana, Mexico. In Tijuana there are over 20,000 little “tienditas” or little shops where anyone can purchase drugs (San Pedro, 2009). Cartels also take advantage of arms trafficking. The military grade weapons that are being used by some cartels may hav e two points of entry into Mexico. The obvious and most cited in the media and by law enforcement is the United States. Straw purchases, stolen and illegally sold weapons are smuggled into Mexico. These weapons can include automatic assault rifles and high capacity handguns and according to U.S. law enforcement approximately 90 percent of the weapons seized from Mexican drug cartels come from the United States (Ellingwood and Wilkinson, 2009). It has been suggested that astonishingly up to 2,000 weapons per day are smuggled from the United States into Mexico. A November 2008 weapons seizure in Mexico and subsequent analysts revealed that 90 percent ofthe arms originated from 11 American states (Johnson, 2009). But there is a second portal arms travel throug h to enter Mexico. In the overall picture it is seldom mentioned. Military grade arms, including grenades, grenade launchers, anti -tank 407 Chapter 6 - Transnational Gangs weapons, amour piercing rounds, bazookas, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and 5 0 caliber sniper rifles can enter Mexico through the Central American country of Guatemala. These weapons could be stolen and /or left over arms from the civil wars in that region (Ellingwood and Wilkinson, 2009). Anecdotal evidence has also suggested that a wide sampling of the enhanced weapons have come from the international arms bazaar, with grenades and launchers produced by U.S., South Korean, Israeli, Spanish or former Soviet bloc manufacturers (Ellingwood and Wilkinson, 2009). Concurrent with the a rms race are the expansion of the drug armies that were initially formed to protect the cartels. These private mercenary armies can employ military deserters, ex -state and federal police and private citizens working for them. The two most known are Los Zet as and Negros and they are rivalries. There is no accurate estimate for the size of these security groups. It well understood that they are responsible for much of the violence in Mexico and they outgun local and federal police. To further compound the iss ue even though there more than 40,000 troops deployed throughout Mexico there have been 150,000 desertions from the military in Mexico during the past six years. Their departure has affected military operations in the states of Chihuahua, Guerrero, Sinaloa and Michoacan, all considered hot stops for cartel activity. Soldier’s loyalty can be bought especially when they earn $196 - $229 per month (Rodriguez, 2009). As noted with Los Zetas, drug armies can also evolve and become more sophisticated. Los Zetas in itially was formed to be the enforcement arm of the Gulf cartel. In 2003 after the leader of the cartel, Osiel Cardenas was arrested and extradited to the U.S.; Los Zetas continued to watch over interests of the cartel. However by 2009, Los Zetas has evolv ed into a drug cartel itself; still maintaining its connection with the Gulf cartel and expanding its recruitment pool. Estimates place the membership between 100 and 200. That does not include members joining the cartel from U.S. based street and prison g angs. Or the Mexican street gang members who join or the Mexican citizens who assist the cartel or the ex -military members from the Guatemalan Special Lorces. Although drug cartel violence is encountered throughout Mexico the main battle grounds appear to be the northern border cities of Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo and Ciudad Juarez. Add to this formula the presence of more than 3,200 maquiladora plants with approximately one million employees. These are factories that are able to use duty free materials and com ponents from foreign suppliers to manufacture finished products like electronics, car parts and soft goods like textiles (NDIC, 2004).

These products are then returned duty -free back to the suppliers. Most of these plants are located close to the U.S. -Mex ican border; where much of the cartel violence is occurring. Lor example, in 2003 the Ciudad Juarez, across from El Paso, Texas there were nearly 200,000 employees working in over 300 maquiladoras. The two largest maquiladoras in Mexico are located in Ciud ad Juarez and Tijuana (NDIC, 2004). Much of the drug cartel violence has also occurred in these two cities where it is common to find decapitated bodies. In response to the violence Mexico sent more than 7,500 troops to the Ciudad Juarez in early March, 2 009. Preliminary reports suggest that violence has decreased. But now the city is virtually under martial law.

This may have been a necessary remedy because the violence was extreme and involved cartel attacks against federal military troops. Lor example i n Lebruary, 2009 a cartel cash with the army troops ended with the death of 21 people after cartel members abducted local police. By the early part of 2009, President Calderon had committed 45,000 troops throughout Mexico to fight the drugs. With a total A rmy population of roughly 200,000 this is a sizeable resource allocation (Cardona, 2009). Transnational Characteristics Let’s examine the transnational nature of some Mexican drug cartels.

The violence is.not only in Mexico, some of it has spilled over i nto the United States. Reports suggest that Mexican drug cartels operate in at least 230 U.S. cities (Associated Press, 2009; CNN, 2009). The LBI 408 Mexico Drug Trafficking Organizations confirms that at least 60 American citizens have been kidnapped into Mexico. Many were taken directly from U.S. soil and smuggled across the border. As the violence expands it even hits U.S. Federal agents. For example, the Washington times reported in 2008 that a U.S. Border Patrol Agent was held at gun point by peopl e dressed as members of the Mexican military who had crossed the boidei in Arizona. The so called “Mexican soldiers’ 1 fled across the border as back up arrived for the Border Patrol agent (Seper, 2009). CNN leported that the city of Atlanta, Georgia has b ecome a hub for the distribution and the collection of drug monies for the Mexican cartels (Mungin, 2009). The same article also reported how a victim was found chained to a wall by his hands and feet in the basement of his Atlanta home. The victim was gag ged and beaten because he owed the cartels money. He was a dealer operating in the Atlanta area (Mungin, 2009).

Another news article reported that the Federation, Gulf and Juarez cartels operate in Illinois and an estimated 10 to 24 million drug proceed do llars are sent back to Mexico each month (Meyer, 2009). Phoenix, Arizona has become the “kidnap capital” for the United States.

Most of the kidnaps are a result of groups connected to the cartels that simply cross the border and kidnap the victim then ret reat south. These groups are known as “baj adores” or take down crews that usually operate in groups of five. In 2008, there were a reported 386 kidnappings in Arizona. This is more than any other U.S. city the vast majority were drug cartel related. It is suspected that some kidnappings never get reported to the police. Often the victims are drug dealers who don’t want the police attention (CNN, 2009). Some bajadores work directly for the cartels collecting money or acting as enforcers. Other groups act a s freelance mercenaries stealing drug or human trafficking shipments from traffickers making them responsible for the loss. The Phoenix Police Department also has reported that cartels will levy a tax on Mexican drug dealers utilizing their trafficking rou tes. This tax (el piso) can be up to $2,000 per week and $10,000 per week for Chinese and Middle Eastern dealers (Conant and Camp -Flores, 2009). Other cartels have followed the lead. The Tijuana cartel has been reported operating in 26 U.S. states; Alabam a, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wi sconsin (NDIC, 2004). The Juarez cartel has been reported operating in 27 U.S. states:

Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wisconsin (NDIC, 2004). The Gulf cartel has been reported operating in 10 U.S. states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ten nessee and Texas (NDIC, 2004). Los Zetas one of the newest cartels has been reported operating in three states, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. The cartel expansion is not limited just to the United States. It is logical to conclude that the cartels will a lso enter into Central America and Canada as their drug business expands, if they are not already present.

The operation of U.S. street and prison gangs has already been cited in both regions. Drugs and arms are smuggled into Canada from the United States by outlaw motorcycle and street gangs. The relationships are somewhat complicated between the Mexican drug trafficking organizations and U.S. based outlaw motorcycle, prison and street gangs. Some Mexican cartels have direct connections between U.S. based street and prison gangs. Some U.S. based prison gangs also have drug contacts with street and outlaw motorcycle gangs. Some prison gangs also have multiple connections between different Mexican drug cartels. A few street gangs become recruitment pools for the Mexican drug cartels. The overlapping umbrella that connects all 409 Chapter 6 - Transnational Gangs these groups is drugs, contraband and ultimately money. These groups form business relationships to make money. Money provides the most effective weapon any gang can use, that is corruption. The Mexican drug cartels use this weapon efficiently and with purpose. For example, in November, 2008 Noe Ramirez who was the prosecutor in charge of the Organized Crime unit of the Mexican Federal Attorney Gen eral’s office was charged with taking a monthly bribe of $450,000 to pass information to the Sinaloa drug cartel. Six other members of his unit face similar charges. The comments in this chapter do not define Mexico or all ofthe people who live there. This country is the world’s twelfth largest -economy and the United States second biggest trading partner and an important oil supplier (Economist, 2009). The stakes in this country are enormous for both Mexico and the United States. Mexican drug cartels are d rug traffickers and U.S. based gangs become the major distributors. However, the instability in several regions in Mexico caused by the drug cartels can have a lasting effect on the country and its citizens. For example, in a 2007 survey the data suggeste d that 70 percent of the crime goes unreported to the police. Mexico is a country of 32 states each operating independently from the government, not totally cooperative with the government or between each other. State governors are often reluctant to compl y with national requests. The local police departments are designed to keep political peace not solve crimes and there are over 1,600 municipal police forces in the country. The courts and police do not do their jobs properly; and Mexican society and the police do not work together (Economist, 2009). Solutions? There is hope and President Calderon’s government is making some progress. In June, 2008 a constitutional reform reorganized the courts and police. A new law signed in January 2009 set up a new nat ional public security system. This law requires all national, state and municipal police force to adopt uniform procedures for recruitment, vetting, training, operations and promotions. Every policeman in the country is supposed to be completely vetted. Th e federal police force has been expanded from 9,000 (2006) to 26,000 officers. The government has made extra funds available to local police forces. Another proposed law is designed to update the judicial system and allow oral evidence and move toward adve rsarial trials (Economists, 2009). 410 — Mexico Drug Trafficking Organizations This is a start, but it will take time, national effort and money to compete with the cartel’s most effective weapon. Suggested border security ideas have included talk abo ut using the U.S. military to secure the border. In effect this would shut down the border.

If that is done a couple of things could happen. There could be a domino effect on the people who travel across the border for legitimate work.

Without the opportun ity for U.S. employment the opportunity for employment by the drug cartels could become more viable. Look at the case of Santiago Meza in Tijuana. His nickname was the El Pozeleio (the soup maker). When Mr. Meza was caught by the police he confessed to dis solving the bodies of over 300 people in acid since 2000 on orders from drug cartels (The Economist, 2009). Mr. Meza was a civilian employed by the cartels. There is already anecdotal evidence that suggests cartels employ civilians and Mexican and U.S. str eet gang members. Possible solutions for border security can include completely shutting down the border. This is not a long term solution. There are a number of immigrants who are gainfully employed in the United States.

Immigrants send home remittances. In 2007 over 60 million dollars of remittances were sent back to Latin America including Mexico (Mac Harg, 2007). In 2008 the amount of remittances worldwide was estimated at 240 billion dollars. The remittances seem to be decreasing in 2008 due to the ec onomic woes and less money is sent home. This worries the Mexican government that matches the remittances 3 to 1 if used for community projects (Time, 2008). Shutting down the border would effectively stop the remittance flow back to Mexico. ’ With the pr ospect of no work in America job seeking Mexicans could eventually be employed by the cartels. Not because they want to but because in order to survive they have to. As cartels gain more and more of an economic base they could become major if not the large st employers in Mexico. The U.S. -Mexican border should be kept open. It will good for commerce for both countries. May a more controlled approach to border security can work. For example to more effectively monitor cross border traffic why not double the amount of entry points on both sides ofthe border. This could provide much employment for citizens ofboth countries. More portals means faster transit times between countries. To further expedite movement between countries why can’t some form of biometri c identification be used and shared with vetted Mexican counterparts. This would make legitimate travel across borders easy and more easily monitored. Use U.S. Border patrol and ICE agents collaboratively at the formal points of entry, concentrating their efforts. To prevent unauthorized or re -entry into the United States use a combination one to one Border Patrol -U.S. Army border interdiction task force to guard the border areas between the formal points of entry.

Often local law enforcement can be cross designated to Federal law enforcement task forces. Use the same procedure to cross designate U.S.

military to assist another Federal law enforcement agency. By doing so resources like vehicles, technology and aircraft can be shared between the military and Customs and Border Patrol agents. These teams could focus on guarding the areas between the formal entry points between Mexico and the U.S. The caveat here is that on the opposite side of the border these Border Patrol team would have a vetted Mexican co unterpart engaged in the same activity. Both sides of the border guarded vigorously forcing travel between countries to well controlled tunneling points of entry. To make this work travel through entry points should be coordinated between countries so that there are no long lines with hours of waiting. This is where biometric identification of individuals who regularly travel between countries can be facilitated. Also vehicle inspections could be performed on both side of the border.

This could be a double check system and again technology can used to help prevent illegal crossings of humans and contraband. With more border agents on both sides of the border more vehicles can be inspected expeditiously. Traditional visual inspections and the use of canines can further complement this process. More formal entry points means less vehicles at each entry points. 411 Chapter 8 - Transnational Gangs With increased personnel presence that could include military -Federal agent teams more vehicles can be inspected. At the World Trade Bridge located between Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo, Chihuahua, Mexico something similar could be done in order to physi cally inspect more trucks entering and leaving the United States. This in theory also could limit the amount of drugs entering the country and limit the amount of drug cash and weapons smuggled back into Mexico. Vehicles should be inspected coming to and l eaving the United States. Another enforcement activity should be implemented. Roving teams of ICE agents should be patrolling the areas adjacent to the formal points of entry. They could be the secondary net that randomly checks vehicles and individuals l eaving the border area. Sort of like airline travelers randomly selected to participate in secondary random screening before boarding the aircraft. Why not have random secondary inspections of vehicles going to and from border points of entry. Collectivel y these interventions could help decrease the amount of illegal drugs entering the United States; thus helping decrease the flow of drugs through Mexico and ultimately decrease revenue going to the drug cartels. Limiting the revenue cartels can earn will e ventually decrease cartel influence in Mexico by decreasing the amount of corruption. Remember the cartels most powerful weapon is money.

These programs could also limit the amount of weapons travelling across the borders assisting the Mexican government i n deescalating the arms race between cartels. To fully impact the illicit drug and arms trade similar programs should be implemented along the southern Mexican -Guatemalan -Belize borders. Working internationally between countries, a coordinated effort is need to insure total stability in Mexico. Don’t forget I mentioned the physics principal earlier that for every action there is a reaction. We should anticipate a reaction by the drug cartels and street gangs in Mexico. Violence may initially increase or b ecome present in areas where cartels have not previously been established. We should anticipate that cartels will attempt to develop alternate drug trafficking routes.

Logically this means there could be an increase in maritime smuggling between countries. Also we should exclude activity on the Canadian - U.S. border area. Mexican cartels could attempt to establish operational centers in Canada in order to continue operations in the United States. One other intervention may be helpful in the united fight aga inst Mexican drug cartel actively. It has been well documented that drug cartels are diversifying into other types of criminal activity like kidnapping and extortions. The U.S. and Mexico should be prepared to monitor and investigate these types of crimes with specially trained law enforcement - prosecution teams. There are also collateral crimes that assist in arms and human smuggling and cartel criminal activity in both countries; namely the false identification business. More resources are needed to monit or, investigate and prosecute this type of criminal activity. I think there are enough laws in the Penal Code. However, the countries of Canada, the United States and Mexico should collectively enact new laws that are specifically designed for smugglers; aimed at any type of smuggling between countries. This would include but not limited to pharmaceuticals, illegal drugs, weapons, ammunition, human beings, pirated soft goods, music CDs and movie DVDs, software and the transport of large sums of cash, $4,00 0 or more. The caveat here is smuggling and it does not have to be associated with any type of gang or cartel activity. Enforcement and punishment of violators could deter further such activity. The law should be written and adopted to that any prosecutor’ s office could charge the crime. That would empower federal, state and local prosecutors giving a tri -level approach to smuggling. 412