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1 Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Overview John F. Dovidio, Miles Hewstone, Peter Glick, and Victoria M. Esses ABSTRACT This chapter has two main objectives: to review inﬂuential ideas and ﬁndings in the literature and to outline the organization and content of the volume. The ﬁrst part of the chapter lays a conceptual and empirical foundation for other chapters in the volume. Speciﬁcally, the chapter deﬁnes and distinguishes the key concepts of prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination, highlighting how bias can occur at individual, institutional, and cultural levels. We also review different theoretical perspectives on these phenomena, including individual differences, social cognition, functional relations between groups, and identity concerns. We offer a broad overview of the ﬁeld, charting how this area has developed over previous decades and identify emerging trends and future directions. The second part of the chapter focuses speciﬁcally on the coverage of the area in the present volume. It explains the organization of the book and presents a brief synopsis of the chapters in the volume. Throughout psychology’s history, researchers have evinced strong interest in understanding prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Dovidio, 2001; Duckitt, 1992; Fiske, 1998), as well as the phe- nomenon of intergroup bias more generally (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Inter- group bias generally refers to the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own membership group (the ingroup) or its members more favorably than a non-membership group (the outgroup) or its members. These topics have along history in the disciplines of anthropology and sociology (e.g., Sumner, 1906). However, social psychologists, building on the solid foundations of Gordon Allport’s (1954) mas- terly volume,The Nature of Prejudice, have developed a systematic and more nuanced analysis of bias and its associated phenom- ena. Interest in prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination is currently shared by allied disciplines such as sociology and political science, and emerging disciplines such as neu- roscience. The practical implications of this 4OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC large body of research are widely recognized in the law (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990; Vidmar, 2003), medicine (Institute of Medicine, 2003), business (e.g., Brief, Dietz, Cohen, et al., 2000), the media, and education (e.g., Ben-Ari & Rich, 1997; Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999).

In recent years, research on prejudice and stereotyping has rapidly expanded in both quantity and perspective. With respect to quantity, even when the term ‘discrimination’ is omitted because of its alternative meaning in perception and learning, a PsychInfo search for entries with prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the title reveals a geometric progression, roughly doubling or tripling from each decade to the next, from only 29 works in the 1930s to 1,829 from 2000 through 2008. Of course, scientiﬁc information has accelerated generally. Thus, we examined the percentage of articles in which prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping appeared in the abstract, relative to the total number of articles published, in four leading general-interest journals in social psychology:

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, andEuropean Journal of Social Psychology.

Figure 1.1 presents the overall trend from 1965 to the present. From 1965 through 1984, 1–2 percent of the articles in these journals examined prejudice or stereotypes. Beginning in 1985, interest jumped; in recent years,almost 10 percent of the articles published in these mainstream journals study these phenomena. Moreover, as Figure 1.2 shows, the trend was similar across journals.

Approaches to understanding prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination have also signiﬁcantly broadened. Early theorists focused on individual differences, and associated prejudice with psychopathology (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, et al., 1950). In the 1970s and 1980s, the cognitive revolution in psychology generated interest in how cognitive processes lead to stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984); simultaneously European researchers focused on how group processes and social identities affect bias (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Both perspectives emphasized how normal psychological and social processes foster and maintain prejudice and stereotyping. The expansion has continued in recent years, with new perspectives on how speciﬁc emotions, nonconscious processes, and fundamental neural processes contribute to biases.

In addition to ‘drilling down’ into the nonconscious mind and brain processes, the ﬁeld has expanded upwards to consider how social structure creates and justiﬁes biases, which permeate social institutions, such as the legal and health-care systems. In sum, the study of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination represents a well-established area incorporating traditional and emerging 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1965– 19691970– 19741980– 19841990– 19942000– 20042005 – 2008 1975– 19791985– 19891995– 1999 Percent of articles on prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping Figure 1.1 Percent of articles in four leading social psychology journals that use the term prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the abstract (data aggregated across journals). PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION5 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Percent of articles on prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping JPSP JESP PSPB EJSP 1965– 19691970– 19741980– 19841990– 19942000– 2004 1975– 19791985– 19891995– 19992005– 2008 Figure 1.2 Percent of articles in four leading social psychology journals (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology– JPSP,Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin– PSPB, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology– JESP, andEuropean Journal of Social Psychology – EJSP) that use the term prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the abstract.

(often multi-disciplinary) perspectives that have consistently attracted signiﬁcant empir- ical and theoretical attention.

This volume provides a comprehensive summary of the state of research on preju- dice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Each chapter reviews the history of a speciﬁc topic, critically analyses what the ﬁeld understands and does not yet know, and identiﬁes promising avenues for further study.

As a whole, the volume considers the causes and consequences of bias toward a range of social groups, theoretical perspectives, and applications, summarizing current knowledge within a single volume that can serve as a key resource for students and scholars.

This introductory chapter lays the foun- dations for the volume by deﬁning and distinguishing key concepts, identifying basic underlying processes, outlining past research, and anticipating future directions, while explaining the general organization and con- tent of the book.

KEY CONCEPTS The current volume focuses on three forms of social bias toward a group and its mem- bers: (a) prejudice, an attitude reﬂecting an overall evaluation of a group; (b) stereotypes,associations, and attributions of speciﬁc char- acteristics to a group; and (c) discrimination, biased behavior toward, and treatment of, a group or its members. Conceptualizations of each of these aspects of bias have evolved over time. For example, recent research distinguishing between implicit and explicit cognition has greatly affected how theorists deﬁne prejudice and stereotypes. Likewise, concepts of discrimination have gone from a tight focus on individuals engaging in biased treatment to how institutional policies and cultural processes perpetuate disparities between groups. We brieﬂy review the development of each of these central concepts below. Prejudice Prejudice is typically conceptualized as an attitude that, like other attitudes, has a cog- nitive component (e.g., beliefs about a target group), an affective component (e.g., dislike), and a conative component (e.g., a behavioral predisposition to behave negatively toward the target group). In his seminal volume,The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) deﬁned prejudice as ‘an antipathy based on faulty and inﬂexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he 6OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC [sic] is a member of that group’ (p. 9). Most researchers have continued to deﬁne prejudice as a negative attitude (i.e., an antipathy).

Psychologists have assumed that, like other attitudes, prejudice subjectively organizes people’s environment and orients them to objects and people within it. Prejudice also serves other psychological functions, such as enhancing self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997) and providing material advantages (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). However, whereas psychologists have focused on prejudice as an intrapsychic process (an attitude held by an individual), sociologists have emphasized its group-based functions. Sociological theories emphasize large-scale social and structural dynamics in intergroup relations, especially race relations (Blauner, 1972; Bonacich, 1972). Sociological theories consider the dynamics of group relations in economic- and class-based terms – often to the exclusion of individual inﬂuences (see Bobo, 1999).

Despite divergent views, both psycho- logical and sociological approaches have converged to recognize the importance of how groups and collective identities affect intergroup relations (see Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). Blumer (1958a, 1958b, 1965a, 1965b), for instance, offered a sociologically based approach focusing on defense of group position, in which group competition is central to the development and maintenance of social biases. With respect to race relations, Blumer (1958a) wrote, ‘Race prejudice is a defensive reaction to such challenging of the sense of group position … As such, race prejudice is a protective device. It functions, however shortsightedly, to preserve the integrity and position of the dominant group’ (p. 5).

From a psychological orientation, in their classic Robbers Cave study, Sherif, Harvey, White, et al. (1961) similarly proposed that the functional relations between groups are critical in determining intergroup attitudes.

Speciﬁcally, they argued that competition between groups produces prejudice and discrimination, whereas intergroup interde- pendence and cooperative interaction that leads to successful outcomes reduces inter- group bias (see also Bobo, 1988; Bobo &Hutchings, 1996; Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966).

Recent deﬁnitions of prejudice bridge the individual-level emphasis of psychology and the group-level focus of sociology by concen- trating on the dynamic nature of prejudice.

Eagly and Diekman (2005), for example, view prejudice as a mechanism that maintains status and role differences between groups.

But, they also emphasize how individuals’ reactions contribute to this process. People who deviate from their group’s traditional role arouse negative reactions; others who exhibit behaviors that reinforce thestatus quoelicit positive responses. Consistent with this view, prejudice toward women has both ‘hostile’ and ‘benevolent’ components (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Hostile sexism punishes women who deviate from a traditional subordinate role (‘Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them’), whereas benevolent sexism celebrates women’s supportive, but still subordinate, position (‘Women should be cherished and protected by men’). This perspective reveals that current prejudices do not always include only an easily identiﬁable negative view about the target group, but may also include more subtle, but patronizing and also pernicious ‘positive’ views.

Because prejudice represents an individual- level psychological bias, members of tra- ditionally disadvantaged groups can also hold prejudices toward advantaged groups and their members. Although some research shows that minority-group members some- times accept cultural ideologies that justify differences in group position based on the positive qualities of the advantaged group (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), there is considerable evidence that minority-group members also harbor prejudice toward majority group members.

However, much of this prejudice is reactive, reﬂecting an anticipation of being discrim- inatedagainstby majority group members (Johnson & Lecci, 2003; Monteith & Spicer, 2000).

These complexities, and others considered throughout the current volume, make it PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION7 difﬁcult to formulate a single, overarching deﬁnition of prejudice. Nevertheless, we suggest the following deﬁnition, based on extensive social-psychological research of the sort reviewed in this volume: Prejudice is an individual-level attitude (whether subjec- tively positive or negative) toward groups and their members that creates or main- tains hierarchical status relations between groups.

Stereotypes By most historical accounts, Lippmann (1922) introduced the term ‘stereotype’ to refer to the typical picture that comes to mind when thinking about a particular social group. Whereas early research conceptualized stereotyping as a rather inﬂexible and faulty thought process, more recent research empha- sizes the functional and dynamic aspects of stereotypes as simplifying a complex environ- ment. Stereotypes are cognitive schemas used by social perceivers to process information about others (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

Stereotypes not only reﬂect beliefs about the traits characterizing typical group members but also contain information about other qualities such as social roles, the degree to which members of the group share speciﬁc qualities (i.e., within-group homogeneity or variability), and inﬂuence emotional reactions to group members. Stereotypes imply a sub- stantial amount of information about people beyond their immediately apparent surface qualities and generate expectations about group members’ anticipated behavior in new situations (to this extent they can, ironically, be seen as ‘enriching’; Oakes & Turner, 1990).

Yet, of course, stereotypes also constrain. In general, stereotypes produce a readiness to perceive behaviors or characteristics that are consistent with the stereotype. At the earliest stages of perceptual processing, stereotype- consistent characteristics are attended to most quickly. For instance, because cultural stereo- types associate Black people with violent crime in the United States, White people are quicker to recognize objects associated with crime (e.g., a gun) when primed with aBlack person than a White person (e.g., Payne, 2001).

Recent work also explores how social struc- ture affects the speciﬁc content of stereotypes.

Stereotypes can not only promote discrimi- nation by systematically inﬂuencing percep- tions, interpretations, and judgments, but they also arise from and are reinforced by discrim- ination, justifying disparities between groups.

In particular, people infer the characteristics of groups based on the social roles they occupy (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994). As a consequence, people view members of groups with lower socioeconomic status (even if caused by discrimination) as less competent and/or less motivated than high-status group members.

Moreover, minority group members are also socialized to adopt ‘system-justifying ideolo- gies,’ including stereotypic beliefs about their own group, that rationalize the group’s social position (Jost, Banaji, Nosek, et al., 2004).

Although some components of group stereotypes relate to unique aspects of inter- group history (e.g., enslavement of Black people in the United States, middle-man roles performed by Jews who were excluded from other forms of employment since the Middle Ages in Europe), systematic principles shape the broader content of stereotypes.

The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, et al. 2002) proposes two fundamental dimensions of stereotypes: warmth (associ- ated with ‘cooperative’ groups and denied to ‘competitive’ groups) and competence (asso- ciated with high-status groups and denied to low-status groups). Groups with stereotypes that are similarly high or low on each of the two dimensions of warmth and compe- tence arouse similar emotions. Stereotypically warm and competent groups (e.g., the ingroup, close allies) elicit pride and admiration; stereotypically warm but incompetent groups (e.g., housewives, the elderly) produce pity and sympathy; stereotypically cold but com- petent groups (e.g., Asians, Jews) elicit envy and jealousy; and stereotypically cold and incompetent groups (e.g., welfare recipients, poor people) generate disgust, anger, and resentment. This powerful approach helps to 8OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC explain why two quite distinct ethno-religious groups (e.g., the Chinese in Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, and Jews in Europe) are stereotyped in very similar ways (see Bonacich, 1973; Hewstone & Ward, 1985).

Cultural stereotypes tend to persevere for both cognitive and social reasons.

Cognitively, people often discount stereotype- discrepant behaviors, attributing them to situational factors, while making dispositional (and stereotype-reinforcing) attributions for stereotype-consistent behaviors (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). Socially, people behave in ways that elicit stereotype- conﬁrming reactions, creating self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Biased expectancies inﬂuence how perceivers behave, causing targets, often without full awareness, to conform to perceivers’ expectations (e.g., von Baeyer, Sherk, & Zanna, 1981). In addition, language plays an important role in the transmission of stereotypes. When communicating, people focus on the traits viewed as the most informa- tive. Because stereotypical traits are distinc- tive to a group, people are more likely to use them in social discourse than traits perceived as unrelated to group membership. Stereotyp- ical traits are generally high on communica- bility (viewed as interesting and informative), contributing to persistent use (Schaller, Con- way, & Tanchuk, 2002). A further insight of social-psychological research on stereotypes is that the traits that tend to form their core are characterized not only by high central ten- dency (e.g., the British are verycold), but also by low variability (e.g., most British occupy the ‘cold’ end of a warm–cold continuum; see Ford & Stangor, 1992; Judd & Park, 1993).

Whereas psychological research on stereo- types has traditionally focused on the per- ceiver, work in sociology, stimulated by Goffman’s (1963) classic book,Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, has emphasized the experience of targets of stereotypes. As psychology has increas- ingly turned to understanding the effects on targets, two inﬂuential directions have emerged: tokenism and stereotype threat.

Kanter (1977a, 1977b) provided a pioneeringsociological analysis of the consequences of group proportions such as skewed sex ratios which, at the extremes, involve very small numbers of the minority group, even a sole individual. When people are tokens, one of relatively few members of their group in a social context, they feel particularly vulnerable to being stereotyped by others.

This occurs especially when the individual is the only member of their group (solo status) in the situation. Tokens or solos experience high levels of self-consciousness and threat, which reduces their ability to think and act effectively (Lord & Saenz, 1985; Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2003).

More recent research has identiﬁed the phenomenon of stereotype threat that occurs when members of a stereotyped group become aware of negative stereotypes about them, even when (a) a person holding the stereotype is not present and (b) they personally do not endorse the stereotype. Thus, making group membership salient can impair performance by producing anxiety and cognitive preoc- cupation with a negative stereotype (Steele, 1997).

In sum, stereotypes represent a set of qualities perceived to reﬂect the essence of a group. Stereotypes systematically affect how people perceive, process information about, and respond to, group members. They are transmitted through socialization, the media, and language and discourse. For the present volume, we deﬁne stereotypes as associations and beliefs about the characteristics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people think about and respond to the group. Discrimination In the context of intergroup relations, dis- crimination has a pejorative meaning. It implies more than simply distinguishing among social objects, but refers also to inappropriate and potentially unfair treatment of individuals due to group membership.

Discrimination may involve actively negative behavior toward a member of a group or, more subtly, less positive responses than those PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION9 toward an ingroup member in comparable circumstances. According to Allport (1954), discrimination involves denying ‘individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish’ (p. 51). Jones (1972) deﬁned discrimination as ‘those actions designed to maintain own-group characteris- tics and favored position at the expense of the comparison group’ (p. 4).

Discrimination is generally understood as biased behavior, which includes not only actions that directly harm or disadvantage another group, but those that unfairly favor one’s own group (creating a relative disadvan- tage for other groups). Allport (1954) argued that ingroup favoritism plays a fundamental role in intergroup relations, taking psycho- logical precedence over outgroup antipathy.

He noted that ‘in-groups are psychologically primary. We live in them, and sometimes, for them’ (p. 42), and proposed that ‘there is good reason to believe that this love-prejudice is far more basic to human life than is … hate-prejudice. When a person is defending a categorical value of his own, he may do so at the expense of other people’s interests or safety. Hate prejudice springs from a reciprocal love prejudice underneath’ (p. 25).

In the 50 years since Allport’s observation, a substantial body of research has conﬁrmed that intergroup bias in evaluations (attitudes) and resource allocations (discrimination) often involves ingroup favoritism in the absence of overtly negative responses to outgroups (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Otten & Mummendey, 2000).

Even though much of the traditional research on bias has not made the distinction between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation a central focus, the distinction is crucial, and each of them requires method- ological concision and has distinct practical consequences. Methodologically, to separate the two components of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation we need to include an independent assessment of ingroup and outgroup evaluations, and a control condition.

Practically, the bias uncovered in much social-psychological research predominantly takes the mild form of ingroup favoritism,rather than outgroup derogation (see Brewer, 1999, 2001). This raises the question of when ingroup favoritism gives way to dero- gation, hostility, and antagonism against out- groups (e.g., Brewer, 2001, Mummendey & Otten, 2001).

A number of analyses argue that the constraints normally in place that limit intergroup bias to ingroup favoritism are lifted when outgroups are associated with stronger emotions (Brewer, 2001, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, et al., 1998; Mackie & Smith, 1998; Mummendey & Otten, 2001).

There is ample scope for these emotions in the arousal that often characterizes intergroup encounters, which can be translated into emotions such as fear, hatred, or disgust (Smith, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and emotions experienced in speciﬁc encounters with groups can be an important cause of people’s overall reactions to groups (e.g., Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). As part of a shift from exclusive concern with cognition in intergroup bias, Smith (1993) differentiated milder emotions (e.g., disgust) from stronger emotions (e.g., contempt, anger) most likely to be aroused in an intergroup context, and linked speciﬁc emotions, perceptions of the outgroup, and action tendencies (see Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Thus an outgroup that violates ingroup norms may elicit disgust and avoidance; an outgroup seen as beneﬁting unjustly (e.g., from government programs) may elicit resentment and actions aimed at reducing beneﬁts; and an outgroup seen as threatening may elicit fear and hostile actions. Thus, weaker emotions imply only mild forms of discrimination, such as avoidance, but stronger emotions imply stronger forms, such as movement against the outgroup, and these latter emotions could be used to justify outgroup harm that extends beyond ingroup beneﬁt (Brewer, 2001). This is not, however, to imply that pro-ingroup biases need not concern us.

They can perpetuate unfair discrimination by advantaging dominant ingroups, often with less personal awareness and recogni- tion by others, making them as pernicious as discrimination based on anti-outgroup 10OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC orientations (Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, et al., 1997).

For the present volume, we deﬁne dis- crimination by an individual as behavior that creates, maintains, or reinforces advantage for some groups and their members over other groups and their members.

Explicit and implicit bias Whereas discrimination can occur toward a speciﬁc member of a group or the group as a whole, stereotypes and prejudice are intrapsy- chic phenomena. That is, they occur within an individual and may vary not only in their transparency to others but also in the level of awareness of the person who harbors stereo- types and prejudice. Traditionally, stereotypes and prejudice have been conceived as explicit responses – beliefs and attitudes people know they hold, subject to deliberate (often strategic) control in their expression (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, et al., 1995). In contrast to these explicit, conscious, and deliberative processes, implicit prejudices and stereotypes involve a lack of awareness and unintentional activation. The mere presence of the attitude object may activate the associated stereotype and attitude automatically and without the perceiver noticing.

Although implicit attitudes and stereotype measures are now commonly used (Fazio & Olson, 2003), researchers continue to debate their psychological meaning. Some contend that implicit measures of bias primarily represent overlearned and ‘habitual’ cultural associations rather than attitudes (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Others argue that implicit and explicit measures assess a single attitude measured at different points in the process of expression, with social desirability concerns more strongly shaping overt expressions (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, et al., 1995). And still others consider implicit and explicit measures to reﬂect different components of a system of dual attitudes, with implicit responses often representing ‘older’ attitudes and stereotypes that have been ‘overwritten’ by newer, explicit forms of bias or incom- pletely replaced by individuals who strive for egalitarian beliefs (Wilson, Lindsey, &Schooler, 2000), or reﬂecting different aspects of attitudes, such as affective and cognitive components (Rudman, 2004). Nevertheless, there is consensus that implicit manifestations of attitudes and stereotypes exist and reliably predict some behaviors, often independently from explicit attitudes and stereotypes. We purposefully avoided reference to intention- ality or personal endorsement in our working deﬁnitions of prejudice and stereotypes to accommodate implicit biases. Institutional and cultural discrimination Although psychologists have historically focused on the individual-level processes in intergroup relations, newer research informed by approaches from sociology, Black psy- chology, and cultural psychology illuminate how, independent of individual efforts or orientation, institutional and cultural forces maintain and promote intergroup bias and dis- parities. Institutional discrimination, which may originally stem from individuals’ preju- dices and stereotypes, refers to the existence of institutional policies (e.g., poll taxes, immigration policies) that unfairly restrict the opportunities of particular groups of people.

These laws and policies foster ideologies that justify current practices. Historically, for example, White Americans developed racial ideologies to justify laws that enabled two forms of economic exploitation: slavery of Black people and the seizure of lands from native peoples. Similarly, until relatively recently, immigration policies in many parts of the world favored White immigrants over immigrants of racial minorities.

Although individual prejudice and stereo- types may produce actions, such as political support for laws and policies that lead to institutional discrimination, institutional discrimination can operate independently from individual discrimination. Institutional discrimination does not require the active support of individuals, their intention to discriminate, or awareness that institutional practices have discriminatory effects. Indeed, people often do not recognize the existence of institutional discrimination because laws PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION11 (typically assumed to be right and moral) and long-standing or ritualized practices seem ‘normal.’ Furthermore, ideologies – whether explicitly prejudicial or obscuring prejudice (e.g., by suggesting that if discriminatory effects are unintended, there is no ‘problem’) – justify the ‘way things are done.’ The media and public discourse also often direct attention away from potential institutional biases.

Because institutional discrimination is not necessarily intentional or dependent on the overt efforts of individuals, it often must be inferred from disparate outcomes between groups traced back to differential policies, even those that might appear to be unrelated to group membership. These effects may appear economically (e.g., in loan policies after controlling for differences in qualifying con- ditions), educationally (e.g., in admission and ﬁnancial aid policies), in employment (e.g., height requirement for employment as a police ofﬁcer), in the media (e.g., exaggerating the association of minority groups with violence or poverty), in the criminal justice system (e.g., group differences in incarceration rates for similar crimes), and in mental and physical health (e.g., social stress or lesser care) (see Feagin, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Whereas institutional discrimination is associated with formal laws and policies, cultural discrimination is deeply embedded in the ﬁber of a culture’s history, standards, and normative ways of behaving. Cultural discrimination occurs when one group exerts the power to deﬁne values for a society.

It involves not only privileging the culture, heritage, and values of the dominant group, but also imposing this culture on other less dominant groups. As a consequence, every- day activities implicitly communicate group- based bias, passing it to new generations.

We thus deﬁne cultural discrimination as beliefs about the superiority of a dominant group’s cultural heritage over those of other groups, and the expression of such beliefs in individual actions or institutional policies.

Under some circumstances, members of a minority group may adopt system-justifying ideologies propagated by the dominant cultural group that distract attention fromgroup-based disparities and inequities. Thus, members of a disadvantaged group may develop a ‘false consciousness’ in which they not only comply with but also endorse cultural values that systematically disadvantage them.

For example, an exclusive emphasis on indi- vidually oriented meritocracy may obscure cultural and institutional discrimination and lead to an over-reliance on individual rather than collective action to address discrimi- nation. Thus, the unique power of cultural discrimination resides in its power to shape how members of different groups interpret and react to group disparities, fostering compliance to the status quo without explicit intentions, awareness, or active support for these group-based disparities.

Each form of bias – prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination – can occur at the indi- vidual, institutional, and cultural levels. Fur- thermore, these biases are often perpetuated by habitual practices and even formal laws, and justiﬁed by ideologies (some of which may obscure the existence of discrimination).

In the next section, we consider the social- psychological assumption that, despite all of the various forms bias may take, some basic and fundamental processes generally foster and reinforce stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. BASIC PROCESSES IN PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION Summarizing the extensive research on social biases with a limited number of themes, Haslam and Dovidio (2010) identiﬁed basic factors that foster and maintain bias:

(a) personality and individual differences, (b) group conﬂict, (c) social categorization, and (d) social identity. We review each below.

Personality and individual differences Responding to the Nazi’s rise to power in Germany and the subsequent horrors of the Holocaust, psychologists initially focused on 12OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC understanding ‘What type of person would harbor the kinds of prejudices and stereotypes that would lead to genocide?’ Given its prominence in psychological thought at the time, many of the answers relied on Freudian psychodynamic theory (see Allport, 1954).

These approaches proposed that (a) the accumulation of psychic energy, due to frustration and guilt inevitably produced by society’s restrictions on instinctual drives for sex and aggression, power intergroup bias and hostility; and (b) an individual’s expression of prejudice has an important cathartic function in releasing pent-up energy and restoring the individual to a state of equilibrium.

Other approaches adopted elements of psy- chodynamic theory with critical variations.

In their Frustration–Aggression Hypothesis, Dollard, Doob, Miller, et al. (1939) presented a drive-reduction model that included Freud’s proposition that drives sought discharge in behavior, but characterized aggression as a response to circumstances that interfered with goal-directed activity, not as an innate drive.

Dollard et al. in their account of scapegoating, further hypothesized that aggression is often displaced onto an innocent target if the true source of frustration is powerful and poten- tially threatening (see Glick, 2005). Hovland and Sears (1940) argued that historically the relationship between economic downturns (a source of frustration) and the lynchings of Black people (1882–1930) in southern states in the United States provided support for this account of scapegoating (see also Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998).

Both of these accounts of scapegoating have been challenged recently. Using the Stereotype Content Model perspective, Glick (2005) argued that successful minorities, stereotyped as competent but cold competitors (not as weak and vulnerable) are most likely to be scapegoated. Only envied minorities are viewed as having both the ability (competence) and intent (coldness) to have deliberately caused widespread misfortunes (e.g., the Nazis blamed the ‘worldwide Jewish conspiracy’ for causing Germany’s collapse, citing the Jews’ relative success in banking, industry, the media, and government). Thismodel, then, focuses on collective attributions rather than Freudian psychodynamics.

The most inﬂuential work within the psy- choanalytic tradition was Adorno, Frenkel- Brunswik, E., Levinson, et al.’s (1950) research, represented in their classic vol- ume,The Authoritarian Personality. These researchers conducted extensive qualitative and quantitative work on the psychological substrates of anti-Semitism and susceptibil- ity to fascistic propaganda. Adorno et al.

identiﬁed patterns of cognition differentiating prejudiced (authoritarian) individuals from others who were more tolerant or open- minded. Speciﬁcally, prejudiced individuals exhibited intolerance of ambiguity, rigidity, concreteness (poor abstract reasoning), and over-generalization. Such individuals were thus portrayed as seeing the social world in black-and-white terms – evincing strong and disdainful rejection of others perceived as inferior to themselves and their ingroup.

The origins of the authoritarian personality were also traced to individuals’ childhood experiences, speciﬁcally to hierarchical rela- tions with punitive parents. In contrast, liber- als (non-authoritarians) were believed to be the product of a more egalitarian upbringing that fostered more cognitive ﬂexibility and rejection of stereotypic representations of others (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, et al., 2003). In response to subsequent methodolog- ical and conceptual challenges, ideas about authoritarianism evolved to emphasize the role of social norms and standards, rather than Freudian dynamics. The most current conceptualization, Right-Wing Authoritarian- ism (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998), focuses on worldviews, and predicts negative attitudes toward a variety of groups, particularly those socially rejected by society (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Esses, Haddock, Zanna, et al., 1993).

Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) represents another recent approach to social biases, containing a focus on individual differences, which has similarly eschewed psychodynamic theory.

This theory focuses on individual differences in whether people view intergroup relations as a competition in which it is appropriate for PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION13 some groups to dominate others. People who score high in Social Dominance Orientation endorsing items such as, ‘Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups’ and ‘Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place,’ show more prejudice and discrimination toward a range of outgroups.

Social Dominance Theory, while including an individual differences approach, focuses on an enduring theme in the study of social biases – the degree of competition between groups. This concern has been an abiding theme in understanding intergroup bias.

Group conﬂict The early representation of prejudice as reﬂecting a dysfunctional personality was highly inﬂuential, not least because it ﬁt with lay theories that viewed social biases as abnormal, a form of social pathology.

However, a number of researchers argued instead that social biases are not restricted to a small group of people and represent a group-levelphenomenon, and thus developed theories focusing on the functional relations between groups.

Theories based on functional relations often point to competition and consequent perceived threat as fundamental causes of intergroup prejudice and conﬂict. Realistic Group Conﬂict Theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966) posits that perceived group competition for resources leads to efforts to reduce the access of other groups to resources. Classic ﬁeld work by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, et al., 1961) examined intergroup conﬂict at a boys’ camp adjacent to Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma (United States).

In this study, twenty-two 12-year-old boys attending summer camp were randomly assigned to two groups (who subsequently named themselves Eagles and Rattlers). When the groups engaged in a series of competitive activities (a tug-of-war and baseball, and touch football games), intergroup bias and conﬂict quickly developed. Group members regularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g., ‘sissies,’ ‘stinkers,’ and ‘cheaters’), and eachgroup conducted raids on the other’s cabin, resulting in property destruction and theft.

The investigators then altered the functional relations between the groups by introducing a set of superordinate goals (goals that could not successfully be achieved without the full cooperation of both groups). Achieving these goals together led to more harmonious rela- tions and large reductions in intergroup bias.

Sherif, Harvey, White, et al. (1961) proposed that functional relations between groups strongly inﬂuence intergroup attitudes.

When groups are competitively interdepen- dent, the success of one group is contingent on the failure of the other. Thus, each group’s attempt to obtain favorable outcomes for itself is also realistically perceived to frustrate the goals of the other group. Such a win-lose, zero-sum competitive relation between groups initiates mutually negative feelings and stereotypes toward the members of the other group. In contrast, cooperatively interdependent relations between groups (i.e., needing each other to achieve common goals) reduce bias (e.g., Blanchard, Adelman, & Cook, 1975).

Functional relations do not have to involve explicit competition to generate biases. In the absence of any direct evidence, people typi- cally presume that members of other groups will act competitively and hinder the attain- ment of one’s goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001). In addition, individual differences in intergroup perceptions (e.g., Social Dominance Orien- tation) can moderate responses regardless of the actual functional relations between groups (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, et al., 2001a). It was also recognized that social biases can serve less tangible or symbolic collective functions such as garnering prestige or social status, in addition to instrumental objectives such as obtaining economic advantage (Allport 1954; Blumer, 1958a). Indeed, it has been suggested that symbolic, psychological fac- tors are typically more important sources of intergroup bias than is competition for tangible resources (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, et al., 2005). Thus, additional themes in the study of social bias have focused on the 14OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC psychological consequences of seeing others and oneself in terms of group membership.

Social categorization A further critical step toward recognition of prejudice as an aspect of normal rather than diseased minds was taken by Allport (1954). Allport’s answer to the question, ‘Why do human beings slip so easily into ethnic prejudice?’ was that ‘They do so because [its] two essential ingredients – erroneous generalization and hostility – are natural and common capacities of the human mind’ (p. 17). Central to the ﬁrst point, Allport recognized that prejudice relies on people’s propensity to categorize, reacting to other people based on their group membership, rather than as individuals. He observed that the ‘human mind must think with the aid of categories,’ and ‘Once formed categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it’ (p. 20).

Tajfel (1969), in his highly inﬂuential paper on the ‘Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice,’ elaborated on the role social categorization plays in intergroup biases. Like Allport, Tajfel rejected the idea that prejudice and stereo- typing must be irrational and pathological.

Instead, he argued that these social biases reﬂect the importance of people’s group memberships and their attempts to understand features of the social world (in particular, the actions of other groups) that impinge upon their groups. This analysis opened the door to a ‘cognitive revolution’ that informed the greater part of social psychological research into prejudice and stereotyping during the 1970s and 1980s. This approach paved the way for viewing prejudice as an aspect of generalsocial cognition.

Since then, a large body of research has demonstrated that social categorization pro- foundly inﬂuences social perception, affect, cognition, and behavior. Perceptually, when perceivers categorize people or objects into groups, they gloss over differences between members of the same category (Tajfel, 1969), treating members of the same group as‘all alike,’ while between-group differences become exaggerated (Abrams, 1985; Turner, 1985). Emotionally, people spontaneously experience more positive affect toward mem- bers of their ingroup than toward members of outgroups (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), particularly toward ingroup members who are most prototypical of their group (Hogg & Hains, 1996). Cognitively, people retain more and more detailed information for ingroup than for outgroup members (Park & Rothbart, 1982), better remember ways in which ingroup members are similar to and outgroup members are dissimilar to the self (Wilder, 1981), and remember less positive informa- tion about outgroup members (Howard & Rothbart, 1980).

In terms of behavioral outcomes, people help ingroup members more than outgroup members (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, et al., 1997), and work harder for groups identi- ﬁed as ingroups than outgroups (Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, et al., 1998). When ingroup– outgroup social categorizations, rather than personal identities, are salient, people behave in a greedier and less trustworthy way toward members of other groups than when they respond to others as individuals (Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001). Thus, although functional relations between groups can further inﬂuence the degree to which dis- crimination is manifested (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966), the process of social categoriza- tion itself provides the basis for social biases to develop and persist. Social identity While Tajfel’s ideas spawned social cognitive approaches to stereotyping and prejudice, his own work developed in a somewhat different direction based on the results of his minimal group studies. In the early 1970s, Tajfel showed that artiﬁcial groups created in the lab, devoid of naturalistic meaning and a history of functional relations, nevertheless showed at least mild forms of prejudice and discrimination. This work inspired Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which characterizes social bias PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION15 as a context-speciﬁc response to the position of one’s group within a particular system of intergroup relations.

Both Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the related Self- Categorization Theory (Turner, 1985; see also Onorato & Turner, 2001) emphasize the distinction between personal and social identities (see Spears, 2001). When personal identity (the self perceived as an individual) is salient, a person’s individual needs, standards, beliefs, and motives primarily determine behavior. In contrast, when social identity (the self perceived as a member of a group) is salient, ‘people come to perceive themselves as more interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities deﬁned by their individual differences from others’ (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, et al., 1987:

50). Under these conditions, collective needs, goals, and standards are primary.

This perspective also proposes that a person deﬁnes or categorizes the self along a continuum that ranges from seeing the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements to viewing the self as an embodiment of a social collective or group.

At the individual level, one’s personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. At the group level, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one’s own (see Brown & Turner, 1981), and the group’s welfare is paramount. At one extreme, self interest is fully represented by the ﬁrst- person pronoun ‘I’ and, at the other extreme, group interest is fully represented by the collective pronoun ‘We.’ Intergroup relations begin when people think about themselves, and others, as group members rather than as distinct individuals.

Illustrating the dynamics of this distinction, Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) found that when individual identity was primed, individual differences in authoritarianism strongly predicted Dutch students’ prejudice toward Turkish migrants. In contrast, when social identity (i.e., national identity) was made salient, ingroup stereotypes and stan- dards primarily predicted prejudiced attitudes.

Thus, whether personal or collective identityis more salient critically shapes how a person perceives, interprets, evaluates, and responds to situations and to others.

In summary, whereas the section on Key Concepts emphasized distinctions between various forms of social biases, this section considered common elements that produce prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination.

Prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are complex, multi-determined processes.

Therefore, basic factors related to individual differences, group conﬂict, social categoriza- tion, and social identity should not be viewed as competing but rather as complementary explanations, which can combine and operate in different ways under different conditions.

In discussing key concepts and underlying processes, we have illustrated how appro- aches to understanding prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination have evolved such that different facets of social bias and different inﬂuences have been emphasized at different times. The history of research on bias is explored in more detail in Duckitt’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 2). In the next section, however, we offer our own historical perspective, looking forward as much as back. THE PAST AND THE FUTURE Building on Duckitt’s (1992) insightful histor- ical analysis, Dovidio (2001) identiﬁed three general ‘waves’ of scholarship, reﬂecting different assumptions and paradigms, in the social psychological study of social biases.

The ﬁrst wave, from the 1920s through the 1950s, portrayed social biases as psy- chopathology, with prejudice conceived as a kind of social cancer. Research during this wave focused ﬁrst on measuring and describing the problem and monitoring any changes (e.g., Gilbert, 1951; Katz & Braly, 1933), and then on understanding the source of the problem (e.g., in family relations, feelings of personal inadequacies, and psychodynamic processes; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, et al., 1950). If the problem was conﬁned to certain ‘diseased’ individuals (much as a cancer begins with diseased 16OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC cells), prejudice might be localized and removed or treated, containing the problem and preserving the health of society as a whole. Thus, researchers concentrated on identifying, through personality and attitude tests such as the authoritarian personality scale, prejudiced individuals so that remedial efforts could be focused on this subset of the population. This approach also directed attention toward a traditional, conservative, and not highly educated segment of the population – a group comfortably (for the researchers themselves) unlike the academics studying prejudice.

The second wave of theorizing and research began with an opposite assumption: prejudice is rooted in normal rather than abnormal processes. Thus, the focus turned to how normal processes, such as socialization into prevailing norms, supports and transmits prej- udice. This approach revealed that changing general social norms, not simply targeting interventions toward a subset of ‘abnormal’ individuals, is necessary for combating prej- udice. The typical focus of social psychology in North America on the individual in a social context was complemented by two other approaches in the 1970s. On the one hand, at a more macro level, Tajfel’s work (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) persuasively demon- strated the important role of social identity, as well as individual identity, in producing prejudice. Evidence that assigning people to temporary groups based on arbitrary criteria was sufﬁcient to produce ingroup-favoring prejudices (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1970), and, when other factors (e.g., competition) were added, outgroup hostility reinforced the emerging conception of prejudice as a normal mechanism.

On the other hand, at a more micro level, the development of new theories and instrumentation for investigating social cog- nition further emphasized the normality and, some argued, the inevitability of prejudice.

Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination were conceived as outcomes of normal cog- nitive processes associated with simplifying and storing the overwhelming quantity and complexity of information people encounterdaily (see Hamilton, 1981). To the extent that social categorization was hypothesized to be a critical element in this process (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986), this cognitive, intra-individual perspective complemented Tajfel’s motivational, group-level approach in reinforcing the normality of prejudice.

Together, these orientations helped to divert the focus away from the question, ‘Who is prejudiced?’ – the answer seemed to be ‘everyone.’ If prejudice reﬂects normal cognitive processes and group life, not just personal needs and motivations, bias should be the norm. Researchers therefore turned to examining bias among the ‘well-intentioned’ and to the apparent inconsistencies between self-reported attitudes, which suggested that the vast majority of Westerners were non- prejudiced, and the continued evidence of dis- parities and discrimination (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The key question therefore became, ‘Is anyone trulynotprejudiced?’ Theories of racial ambivalence (Katz, 1981; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986) and of subtle and unintentional types of biases, such as symbolic racism (Sears, 1988; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), and aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kovel, 1970) emerged during this period. These theories all proposed that changing social norms in the United States (after the Civil Rights era) had driven racism ‘underground,’ either because of people’s genuine desire to be egalitarian or a simple realization that overt racism would elicit social disapproval. While the theories disagree on whether racism has merely become covert or individuals are truly conﬂicted about their attitudes, all agree that a lifetime of exposure to negative stereotypes fuels the persistence of prejudiced attitudes that are not readily apparent.

The third wave of research on prejudice, beginning in the mid-1990s and characteriz- ing much current research, emphasizes the multidimensional aspect of prejudice and takes advantage of new technologies to study processes that earlier theorists hypothesized but had no way to measure. For example, aversive racism, modern racism, and symbolic PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION17 racism – distinctly different theories about contemporary racial prejudice – all assumed widespread unconscious negative feelings and beliefs by White people toward Black people.

However, it was not until the 1990s that new conceptual perspectives (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and technologies (e.g., response latency procedures; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) emerged, allowing researchers to measure implicit (i.e., automatic and unconscious) attitudes and beliefs. These new technolo- gies permit the assessment of individual differences in implicit, as well as explicit, racial attitudes and may thus help distinguish traditional racists, aversive or modern racists, and the truly non-prejudiced White people.

These methods also open doors for developing ways to combat subtle forms of prejudice.

The adaptation of fMRI procedures to study brain processes involved in social phenomena promises further links to cognitive neuropsy- chological processes and a more compre- hensive, interdisciplinary, and multidimen- sional understanding of prejudice (Phelps, O’ Connor, Cunningham, et al., 2000).

Besides addressing the multidimensional intrapersonal processes associated with preju- dice and racism, the current wave of research more explicitly considers the interpersonal and intergroup context. That is, whereas pre- vious research focused largely on perceivers’ attitudes and how these attitudes biased their evaluations, decisions, and behavior, third- wave work considers how targets respond and adapt, and how prejudice unfolds in interac- tions between perceivers and targets. Targets are no longer viewed as passive victims of bias, an assumption implicit in Allport’s (1954) question, ‘What would happen to your personality if you heard it said over and over again that you are lazy and had inferior blood?’ (p. 42) and explicit in his answer: ‘Group oppression may destroy the integrity of the ego entirely, and reverse its normal pride, and create a groveling self-image’ (p. 152).

Current work demonstrates that minorities to some extent internalize social biases and implicit stereotypes (Johnson, Trawalter, & Dovidio, 2000), which can become activated(even in the absence of interaction with Whites), with detrimental consequences (e.g., on academic tests) (Steele, 1997). However, the consequences of stigmatization are now understood to be more dynamic and complex than Allport and his contemporaries assumed (see Crocker & Major, 1989; Miller & Myers, 1998).

What, then, lies ahead? Each chapter in this volume speciﬁcally addresses this question.

Here, we consider the broad picture and suggest eight general trends, ranging from the intra-individual (in fact, the intra-cranial) to the societal. The ﬁrst trend is a more elabo- rated conception of the neuroscience of bias, which can help distinguish the underpinnings of different types of bias. Whereas social psychology operationalizes ingroup-outgroup relations in a variety of different ways (e.g., sex, race, age, weight), neuroscience points to fundamental differences in various forms of categorization. Racial categorization relates to structures that have evolved for sensitivity to novelty or threat (amygdala) and neural systems that track coalitions and alliances (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003), but sex and age are encoded in other regions of the brain (frontocentral regions).

Thus, although racism and sexism may share some similar behavioral dynamics and social consequences, social neuroscience data suggest fundamental differences in perception and encoding. Such different neural under- pinnings may have critical implications for cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007).

A second emerging trend is closer attention to understanding how interpersonal inter- actions relate to larger-scale social biases.

As Shelton and Richeson (2006; see also Shelton, Dovidio, Hebl, et al., 2009) have argued, interpersonal interactions between members of different groups represent crit- ical encounters. Such encounters not only reﬂect contemporary group relations but also produce impressions and outcomes that can reinforce or diminish further bias.

Interpersonal interactions between members of different groups are highly susceptible 18OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC to communication problems and misunder- standings. They are fraught with anxiety over how one is being perceived, making them highly cognitively demanding both for majority group members, who often strive to behave in an unbiased manner (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Shelton & Richeson, 2005), and for minority group members, who are vigilant for cues of bias (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, et al., 2005). These demands can arouse intergroup anxiety and its behavioral manifestations (Stephan & Stephan, 1985).

Because many signals of anxiety are also cues for dislike, expectations of rejection by members of another group (Shelton & Richeson, 2005) can lead to misattributions to unfriendliness that exacerbate interpersonal and, ultimately, intergroup tensions (Pearson, West, Dovidio, et al., 2008). Thus, understand- ing how and why intergroup misunderstand- ings develop during interpersonal interactions can complement structural and intergroup approaches aimed at alleviating intergroup conﬂict and achieving stable harmonious intergroup relations.

A third recent trend that is likely to broaden future research is the internationalization of psychology and the resultant focus on groups other than Whites and Blacks in the United States. As a result of these broadening horizons, research is increasingly examining such relations as those between immigrants and members of host nations (e.g., Esses, Dovidio, & Dion, 2001b), between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (e.g., Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, et al., 2004), between groups identiﬁed on the basis of religious afﬁliation (e.g., Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005), between homosexuals and heterosexuals (Gabriel, Banse, & Hug, 2007), and between ethnic groups other than Whites and Blacks (e.g., Zick, Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008). In addition to examining the applicability of theories developed to explain relations between Whites and Blacks (e.g., Bell & Esses, 1997), these expansions provide new understandings of the basis of prejudice, and point to new foci for intervention (e.g., Nickerson & Louis, 2008).

The continent of Europe, for example, isreplete with examples of interactions between members of different ethnic and religious groups coming together in differing circum- stances with different norms, and against the backdrop of different legal and political systems.

A fourth focus likely to generate consider- able future research is a variation on an older theme. Since Allport’s pioneering work, social psychology has focused on how to reduce bias in the most effective, generalizable, and enduring way. For over 50 years, intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Williams, 1947; see also Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998) has represented one of psychology’s most effective strategies for reducing bias and improving intergroup relations. This framework proposes the con- ditions under which intergroup contact can ameliorate intergroup prejudice and conﬂict.

Much of the research on this topic has been devoted to establishing that intergroup contact does indeed reduce bias and to evaluating the relative importance of the conditions speciﬁed in Contact Theory (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In recent years, however, work has moved beyond specifying the conditions that reduce bias to understanding the underlying processes (e.g., changes in social categorization) by which they work (see Pettigrew, 1998). A number of empirically- supported category-based alternatives have been proposed that involve de-emphasizing group membership and establishing personal- ized relations (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Miller, 2002; Wilder, 1986), recategorizing groups within a common group identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), or maintaining distinct group identities but within the context of positive interdependence between groups (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Future research will likely examine more closely the implications of various mediating processes for better under- standing the conditions under which contact is more effective (e.g., for mild intergroup tensions versus open hostility) and how various types of contact and their result- ing cognitive representations may operate sequentially, in a complementary fashion, to reduce bias. PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION19 More generally, future research is likely to investigate the effectiveness of other strategies for reducing bias. For example, because of world events, recent attention has turned to considering whether multicultur- alism is effective for promoting intergroup harmony within a nation (e.g., Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008). Similarly, social cognitive associative training has been harnessed for reducing the application of stereotypes (e.g., Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2007).

These strategies take advantage of knowledge of the sources of prejudice to develop strategies for counteracting such effects.

Thus, as knowledge and understanding of the neurological and other bases of prejudice accrues, so too should new strategies be developed and evaluated that target such processes.

Two key aspects of this future work on bias reduction constitute independent themes in their own right; they can be illustrated with reference to intergroup contact, but are by no means exclusive to it. A ﬁfth recent trend is shift from a static to a dynamic approach.

At one level this is seen in the relational approach taken to intergroup interactions by Richeson, Shelton and their colleagues (see Shelton & Richeson, 2006). How one person perceives and interprets an interaction partner has a direct impact on how that partner interprets and responds. Thus how behavior unfolds over time becomes a critical focus. At another level, static, cross-sectional analyses of intergroup relations are no longer seen as sufﬁcient to understand what are, essentially, dynamic phenomena. To give one example, more than 70 percent of the research on intergroup contact reported in a meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) involved respondents retrospectively reporting prior or current levels of contact. This reliance on cross-sectional, correlational studies needs to be gradually replaced with more complex longitudinal studies (e.g., Binder, Zagefka, Brown, et al., 2009; Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003).

A sixth, also methodological, focus, barely in its infancy, is for social psychology to com- plement its long-held expertise in laboratoryresearch with adventurous excursions outside the lab, where members of different groups live, work, cooperate and sometimes ﬁght with each other. In one example, Pettigrew (2008) recently called for a greater focus on the multi-level nature of intergroup contact where, for example, members of different groups may inhabit different neighborhoods, but come together in common classrooms, in different schools. Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-analysis of intergroup contact included no multi-level studies, yet these are crucial for practical applications (see Pettigrew, 2006).

Integrating the traditional social psycholog- ical emphasis on intra-individual and interper- sonal processes with macro institutional and societal factors that have been the province of sociology and political science represents a seventh fertile area for future research. Recent social phenomena, such as unprecedented rates of international immigration and the pur- ported clash of eastern and western cultures, highlight the importance of multi-disciplinary approaches to social problems. The com- plexity of these issues speaks to the need to adopt truly multidisciplinary approaches that incorporate the different perspectives and methods of ﬁelds such as economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and anthropology (Esses, Semenya, Stelzl, et al., 2006). Initiatives in this area will likely require greater investment in ﬁeld research, studying actual groups in extended conﬂict, than has been the case in recent years in psychology.

A ﬁnal future direction we would like to see unfold is a greater input from social psychological research on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination to relevant policy. The ﬁndings reviewed in the chapters in this volume have important and multiple implications for government policy, ranging from increasing the educational aspirations of minority youth, to providing equal access to health care irrespective of ethnic group, to promoting effective interventions to improve social harmony. A case in point is the burning question of whether residential diversity is associated with reduced levels of trust, as 20OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC claimed by political scientist Robert Putnam (2007), and what to do about it. Ensuing debate, drawn from multiple disciplines, has failed to reach agreement on the reliability of the ﬁndings (see, for example, Briggs, 2008; Dawkins, 2008; Lancee & Dronkers, 2008).

One reason why Putnam’s main pessimistic ﬁnding should be considered premature is that it largely neglects to measure actual face-to- face contacts between members of different groups, as opposed to merely living in the same neighbourhood. This is a conﬂation of opportunity for contactandactual contact.

Social psychologists have long appreciated that living in a street or neighbourhood peopled by members of different ethnic groups does not constitute contact until and unless there is actual face-to-face interaction between them (see Hewstone, Tausch, Voci, et al., 2008; see also Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, et al., 2009; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Yet perhaps it was easy to overlook social psychology’s contribution because so little of it dealt with the complexities of diversity and intergroup interaction outside the laboratory, or at least the campus, and in the community, and because social psychologists have sometimes been rather reluctant to press home the policy impact of their research. We hope that our discipline will be more effective in the future, and that a volume such as this one will help, as will the recent founding of social psychological journal outlets with an explicit focus on policy (e.g.,Social Issues and Policy Review).

The purpose of the current volume is to provide a comprehensive summary of theory and research on prejudice, stereotyp- ing, and discrimination that establishes a solid foundation for identifying and pursuing new work on intergroup bias. The scope of the volume is broad, and it adopts a multi-level perspective. Still, we acknowl- edge the coverage is far from exhaustive.

Nevertheless, the chapters in this volume illustrate the landscape of social psycho- logical work on intergroup bias, drawing on the expertise of international scholars who have made signiﬁcant contributions to this area. ORGANIZATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME The current volume is organized into six discrete sections. The ﬁrst section, which contains the present chapter, represents an overview of the topic. The present chapter introduced basic concepts that will be referred to across the chapters, summarized the major conceptual approaches in this area, and iden- tiﬁed promising directions for further study.

The next chapter, Historical Overview by John Duckitt, describes historical developments, conceptual and empirical, in the study of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.

Duckitt emphasizes the interplay between society and science. He proposes that these paradigmatic transitions did not simply rep- resent a systematic evolution of knowledge, but rather reﬂected responses to speciﬁc social and historical circumstances. Then Correll, Judd, Park, and Wittenbrink in their chapter, Measuring Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination, review the methodolog- ical challenges and tools associated with research in this area. Beyond describing different techniques for studying bias, the authors argue that measurement itself has fundamentally affected theories of the nature and origins of prejudice, stereotypes, and dis- crimination. These three chapters combined thus not only review basic issues for studying prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, but also they illustrate the importance of social context for theory and research in this area.

The second main section of this volume is Basic Processes and Causes of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination. This is the largest section of the volume and includes 12 chapters that explore the origins of different forms of bias. The section begins with a chapter on processes at the most micro level, neural processes, and ends with macro processes, the inﬂuence of mass media.

In the ﬁrst chapter of the second section, Social Cognitive Neural Processes, Quadﬂieg, Mason, and Macrae describe the latest ﬁndings from studies on intergroup bias in social cognitive neuroscience, considered PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION21 in light of current theoretical models of person perception, social cognition, and social categorization. Next, Schaller, Conway, and Peavy, in their chapter Evolutionary Processes, identify two kinds of evolutionary processes contributing to bias, one genetic and the other social that relate to how knowledge is selectively transmitted between individuals.

Killen, Richardson, and Kelly then discuss, in Developmental Perspectives, how intergroup attitudes emerge, change, and are manifested throughout development.

The next three chapters in the section examine cognitive, affective, and motiva- tional processes in prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. In their chapter, Cog- nitive Processes, Fiske and Russell review social cognitive perspectives on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, focusing on underlying thought processes that create and maintain bias. Smith and Mackie follow with a chapter on Affective Processes. The authors explore ways that incidental affect, affect arising from an interaction, and affect experienced when they think of themselves as a member of a social group inﬂuences cognitive processes and behavioral reactions.

Yzerbyt attempts to integrate research on cognitive and affective processes in bias in his chapter; he analyses bias from the perspective of fundamental integrity concerns to know and to control, to be connected with others, and to have value.

The volume then moves from intrapersonal processes to a focus on the individual.

The chapter, Individual Differences, by Son Hing and Zanna, identiﬁes ideological and dispositional inﬂuences that shape the degree to which different people harbor intergroup biases. Abrams and Hogg consider the roles of identity, personal and collective, in their chapter, Social Identity and Self- Categorization. From the perspective of social identity theory, the authors explain how pre- judice, stereotypes, and discrimination arise and are maintained. The next two chapters, Group Realities by Leyens and Demoulin and Intergroup Competition by Esses, Jackson, and Bennet-AbuAyyash, demonstrate how groups inﬂuence the way individuals perceiveeach other and develop social relations that both create and justify intergroup bias. The chapter, Social Structure, by Diekman, Eagly, and Johnston examines prejudice as resulting from social cognitive elements, such as attitudes and stereotypes, and social structural elements, such as roles and contexts, and they offer an integrative perspective, the role congruity model of prejudice. In the ﬁnal chapter of the section, Mass Media, Mutz and Goldman consider how the ways different groups are portrayed in the media can inﬂuence intergroup attitudes and beliefs.

They outline the contributions and limitations of past work on this topic, and point to the most promising theoretical frameworks for studying media inﬂuence on outgroup attitudes. Thus, this section spans different levels of analysis for understanding prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.

The third section of the volume is Expression of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination. This section explores how bias is expressed sometimes subtly but other times blatantly in attitudes, interpersonal interactions, and intergroup relations. The chapter, Attitudes and Intergroup Relations by Maio, Haddock, Manstead, and Spears, which begins this section, reviews research on the content, structure, and function of attitudes in general and their relationship to intergroup biases. Richeson and Shelton focus on the role of prejudice in interpersonal interaction. They consider how the reciprocal ways stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals inﬂuence each other in interactions shape intergroup perceptions and outcomes. Dancygier and Green focus on one extreme outcome, Hate Crime. They explore motivational inﬂuences and contextual factors (including political, historical-cultural, sociological, and eco- nomic circumstances) that elicit hate crimes.

The next four chapters in the section discuss four different forms of intergroup bias. The ﬁrst three explore well-known ‘-isms’; Glick and Rudman focus on sexism; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kawakami discuss racism; Hebl, Law, and King consider heterosexism.

In the following chapter Wagner, Christ, and Heitmeyer examine anti-immigration bias. 22OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC Although far from exhaustive, these four chapters provide ‘case studies’ illustrating both common elements and unique aspects of discrimination toward different groups.

The fourth section of the volume is Social Impact of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination. Quinn, Kallen, and Spencer, in their chapter, Stereotype Threat, review the general evidence on stereotype threat, discuss potential underlying processes, and consider the role of varying group identities in stereotype threat outcomes. The chapter, Inter- nalized Devaluation and Situational Threat by Crocker and Garcia examines research and theory on the idea that prejudice and discrimination lower the self-esteem of people with stigmatized identities and these authors identify moderating factors. They view the stigmatized as caught between protecting self- esteem at the cost of learning, relationships, and/or motivation versus sustaining learning, motivation, and relationships at the cost of self-esteem. Major and Townsend’s chapter, Coping with Bias, attempts to strike a balance between acknowledging the negative impact of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination on the lives of the stigmatized and recog- nizing the multiple strengths and resilience that stigmatized individuals and groups also display.

The next ﬁve chapters in the section consider the impact of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination institutionally, organiza- tionally, and socially. Henry describes the dynamics of Institutional Bias generally.

Smith, Brief, and Collela study the operation of intergroup bias in organizations, whereas Schmukler, Rasquiza, Dimmit, and Crosby examine bias in public policy. The impact of intergroup bias on a key area of society, health care, and outcomes, is reviewed by Penner, Albrecht, Orom, Coleman, and Underwood.

The ﬁfth section of the volume is Com- bating Bias. It contains seven chapters that present a range of perspectives, conceptual and practical, for controlling and eliminating prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.

Monteith, Arthur, and Flynn, in their chapter on Self-Regulation, discuss motivational factors inﬂuencing regulatory inclinationsand explain how suppression of prejudi- cial biases often backﬁres. In the chapter, Multiple Identities, Crisp provides a review and integration of research into how the recognition and use of multiple identities in person perception can encourage reductions in intergroup biases. Gaertner, Dovidio, and Houlette explore how social categorization, which often produces intergroup bias, can be redirected through recategorization to reduce bias. Tausch and Hewstone present an overview of the vast literature on intergroup contact, highlighting recent developments in the ﬁeld, and identifying moderating factors and mediating mechanisms.

Ellemers and van Laar consider individual mobility, while Wright discusses collective action. Speciﬁcally, Ellemers and van Laar argue that individual mobility beliefs and behaviors tend to reinforce rather than chal- lenge group-based inequality. Wright, in his chapter, Collective Action and Social Change, describes four psychological processes that underpin collective action: collective identity, perceived boundary permeability, feelings of legitimacy/injustice, and collective control (instability/agency). He concludes the chapter by contrasting the psychology of collective action with that of prejudice reduction.

The ﬁnal ‘Commentary’ section of this volume features a capstone chapter, written by the senior scholar in this ﬁeld who brings over ﬁve decades of experience to this task. This chapter, Looking to the Future, by Thomas Pettigrew identiﬁes conceptual threads that run through the chapters of this volume and discusses a series of pressing concerns for future work, including the need for more integrative, multi-level, and contextually sensitive analysis.

Taken together, the chapters in this volume provide a broad overview of classic and current research and theory on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Each of the chapters is integrative and reﬂective.

Moreover, and most importantly, they are collectively generative. The chapters offer critical analysis and insights that reveal gaps in what we know about intergroup bias and they highlight promising directions PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION23 for future work. They map the extensive knowledge base on this important issue and provide a blueprint for researchers to pursue individually and collectively, not only to better understand the phenomena of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination but also to develop new techniques for eliminating intergroup bias.

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