Maths Quiz
Question 13 pts
An election consists of four candidates A, B, C, and D. The candidates are ranked in order of preference by each of the voters. The preference schedule for this election is given below.
Using the Borda Count Method, how many “points” does candidate B have from the following election?
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 | |
1st choice | A | C | D | C | |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B | |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D | |
4th choice | D | A | C | A | |
93 |
72 | |
97 |
88 |
Flag this Question
Question 23 pts
An election consists of four candidates A, B, C, and D. The candidates are ranked in order of preference by each of the voters. The preference schedule for this election is given below.
Using the Borda Count Method, rank the contestants.
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 | |
1st choice | A | C | D | C | |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B | |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D | |
4th choice | D | A | C | A | |
A, B, C, D |
A, C, D, B | |
C, A, D, B |
B, A, C, D |
Flag this Question
Question 33 pts
According to the preference schedule of the following table, who is ranked third using the plurality with Elimination Method?
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 |
1st choice | A | C | D | C |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D |
4th choice | D | A | C | A |
There is a tie. | |
Flag this Question
Question 43 pts
According to the preference schedule shown below, how many 1st place votes does candidate C have?
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 | |
1st choice | A | C | D | C | |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B | |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D | |
4th choice | D | A | C | A | |
14 |
10 | |
13 |
Flag this Question
Question 53 pts
According to the preference schedule shown below, who is the winner of the election using the Plurality Method?
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 | |
1st choice | A | C | D | C | |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B | |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D | |
4th choice | D | A | C | A | |
Flag this Question
Question 63 pts
According to the preference schedule shown below, how many points does candidate C have using the Borda Count Method?
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 | |
1st choice | A | C | D | C | |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B | |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D | |
4th choice | D | A | C | A | |
76 |
88 | |
48 |
60 |
Flag this Question
Question 73 pts
According to the preference schedule shown below, who is the winner of the election using the Plurality with Elimination Method?
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 | |
1st choice | A | C | D | C | |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B | |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D | |
4th choice | D | A | C | A | |
Flag this Question
Question 83 pts
According to the preference schedule shown below:
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 |
1st choice | A | C | D | C |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D |
4th choice | D | A | C | A |
When you use the Method of Pairwise Comparisons, how many “pairwise” comparisons do you have?
10 | |
Flag this Question
Question 93 pts
According to the preference schedule shown below:
Number of voters | 14 | 10 | 8 | 3 |
1st choice | A | C | D | C |
2nd choice | B | B | A | B |
3rd choice | C | D | B | D |
4th choice | D | A | C | A |
When you use the Method of Pairwise Comparisons, who is the winner?
There is a tie. | |
Flag this Question
Question 103 pts
An election is held among five candidates (A, B, C, D, and E). There are 37 votes. Using the Method of Pairwise Comparison it is found that A, B, and C each win one pairwise comparison while D wins four. If E wins the remaining comparisons in this election, then which statement is true?
D is the Condorcet candidate. | |
E is the Condorcet candidate. |
Both D and E are Condorcet candidates. | |
There is no Condorcet candidate. |
Flag this Question
Question 113 pts
A violation of the Monotonicity Criterion occurs when
the increase in preference, among voters, of the winning candidate causes the outcome of the election to change. | |
the removal of a losing candidate from the election causes the outcome of the election to change. |
the winning candidate is not Condorcet. | |
the winning candidate receives less than a majority of 1st choice votes. |
Flag this Question
Question 123 pts
A violation of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion occurs when
the winning candidate is not Condorcet. | |
the winning candidate receives less than a majority of 1st choice votes. |
the removal of a losing candidate from the election causes the outcome of the election to change. | |
the increase in preference, among voters, of the winning candidate causes the outcome of the election to change. |
Flag this Question
Question 133 pts
An election is held among five candidates (A, B, C, D, and E). There are 37 votes. Using the Method of Pairwise Comparison it is found that A, B, and C each win one pairwise comparison; D wins four and E wins the remaining comparisons in this election. How many “pairwise” comparisons did A lose?
Flag this Question
Question 143 pts
Tim and his three friends Beth, Jane, and Sam pool their money to buy a pizza. Tim gives $4; Beth gives $3; while both Jane and Sam each give $2. If there are two choices for pizza and each person gets to vote proportionally to the amount of money he or she gave, then which weighted voting system models scenario if the quota is a simple majority of votes?
[6: 3, 2, 1, 1] | |
[8: 4, 3, 2, 2] |
[6: 4, 3, 2, 2] | |
[5: 4, 3, 2, 2] |
Flag this Question
Question 153 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [40: 20, 18, 12, 8, 7, 5].
What's the weight of P2?
40 | |
12 |
18 | |
20 |
Flag this Question
Question 163 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [40: 20, 18, 12, 8, 7, 5].
In a coalition of {P2, P3, P4, P6, P5, P1} find all the pivotal players.
P2, P3, P4, P6 | |
All of the players. |
P5 | |
P6 |
Flag this Question
Question 173 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [40: 20, 18, 12, 8, 7, 5].
In a coalition of {P2, P3, P4, P5}, find all the critical players.
P2, P3, P4 | |
P4, P5 |
P2, P3 | |
P2, P3, P4, P5 |
Flag this Question
Question 183 pts
An election with four candidates (A, B, C, and D) and 200 voters will use the Plurality Method to choose a winner. How many first-place votes are needed for a majority?
99 | |
200 |
100 | |
101 |
Flag this Question
Question 193 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [11: 7, 5, 2, 1]. Which player(s), if any, have veto power?
P2 | |
P1 & P2 |
All of the players. | |
P1 |
Flag this Question
Question 203 pts
A committee consists of four members. How many different coalitions are possible?
31 | |
16 |
15 |
Flag this Question
Question 213 pts
In a weighted voting system, when the quota is too small, it’s possible for both YES’s and NO’s to have enough votes to a certain issue. For example, [10: 8, 7, 3, 2], one can see a mathematical version of ________________________. Fill the blank.
dictator | |
anarchy |
gridlock | |
veto |
Flag this Question
Question 223 pts
On the other hand, if the quota is too big, you can never have enough votes to pass a motion. For example, [22: 8, 7, 3, 2], one can see a ________________________. Fill the blank.
anarchy | |
dictator |
veto | |
gridlock |
Flag this Question
Question 233 pts
In the weighted voting system [13: 10, 6, 5], consider a sequential coalition <P2, P3, P1>. Who is the pivotal player?
All three players. | |
P1 & P2 |
P3 | |
P1 |
Flag this Question
Question 243 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [13: 10, 6, 5]. What is the Shapely-Shubik Power of P1?
2/6 | |
1/5 |
4/6 | |
3/6 |
Flag this Question
Question 253 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [20: 13, 11, 8].
In a coalition of {P1, P2, P3} who is the critical player(s)?
P1 | |
P3 |
P1 & P2 | |
P2 |
Flag this Question
Question 263 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [20: 13, 11, 8]. What is the Banzhaf Power of P3?
1/4 | |
2/5 |
1/5 | |
1/6 |
Flag this Question
Question 273 pts
If there are 16 teams to play in a tournament, where each team will play every other team once. Then how many matches will take place?
16 | |
15 |
120 | |
240 |
Flag this Question
Question 283 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [q: 6, 4, 2, 2].
Find the smallest value that the quota q can take.
12 | |
Flag this Question
Question 293 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [q: 6, 4, 2, 2].
What is the largest value that the quota q can take?
15 |
14 | |
Flag this Question
Question 303 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [q: 8, 6, 4]. Find the smallest value of q for which all three players have veto power.
16 | |
14 |
13 | |
15 |
Flag this Question
Question 313 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [q: 8, 6, 4]. Find the smallest value of q for which P2 has veto power but P3 does not.
13 | |
14 |
12 | |
15 |
Flag this Question
Question 323 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [18: 12, 10, 6].
Consider a sequential coalition {P1, P3, P2}. Who is the pivotal player?
P3 | |
P1 |
P2 | |
P1 & P3 |
Flag this Question
Question 334 pts
Consider the weighted voting system [18: 12, 10, 6].
What is the Shapley-Shubik Power of P3?
1/6 | |
1/5 |
2/7 | |
2/6 |