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© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/156852709X405008 Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 www.brill.nl/nu Th e Buddhist Hell: An Early Instance of the Idea? Jens Braarvig Department of Cultural Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1010 Blindern, 0315 Oslo, Norway [email protected] Abstract In spite of the modern idea that Buddhism is too rational a religion to have a concep- tion of hell, the case is just the opposite. Th e Buddhists promoted this idea very early.

Th is is not really surprising, since the idea of hell is closely connected with the concept of kamma, action, and its fruit or result. Every living being is what it is by the force of its actions in this or earlier lives: good actions entail rebirth in heaven or as a human, while bad actions have as their result rebirth as an animal, a ghost, or worst of all, in hell. In the Buddhist hell one is thus punished by the evil actions themselves, not by some sort of divine justice. Although life in hell is not eternal in Buddhism, it can still last for an enormous time span until the bad actions have been atoned for and one is reborn to a happier state of existence. Th us hell plays a great part in the Buddhist system of teachings, and it is a favourite topic in the monastic rules as well as in the narrative literature of the Jātakas, the subject of which is the Buddha’s earlier lives. Hell is discussed as a topic already in the Kathāvatthu, the ﬁ rst scholarly treatise of Bud- dhism with a named author, datable between 250 and 100 bc. Th e discussion in the Kathāvatthu represents what may be seen as a fully developed conception of hell, and thus the Buddhist hell as described by its earliest canonical literature predates the appearance of the idea in most, if not all other religious traditions.

Keywords Buddhist hell, Buddhist ethics, Buddhist monastic rules, the early Buddhist canon, Jātaka literature, Buddhist cosmology According to Max Weber, the Buddhist theodicy contained the most rational formulation of why men suﬀ er, or are what they are. He called it “the formally most perfect solution of the theodicy problem.” 1 Th e 1) “Die formal vollkommenste Lösung des Problems der Th eodizee ist die speziﬁ sche J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 255 doctrine of kamma — that every living being has to reap the fruits of his own actions, whether in this life or in one of the innumerable lives that all beings have lived through successive reincarnations since time immemorial — says that every human being is what he is because of his past actions: “A living being is what he is by the force of his own deeds, my brahman friend, beings are heirs to their deeds. Th us deeds are their womb, deeds are kin, deeds are the only thing they can rest upon. Deeds divide being into lowness and excellence.” 2 Every god (deva), human being (manussa), animal (tiracchāna), restless ghost ( peta) or habitant of hell (niraya, naraka) has been born in exactly that state because of his or her earlier actions, and not because they are punished or rewarded by a god or divine being. Any living being is totally responsible for his own fate, or rather state, since we are all the result of what we ourselves have done, and these worlds continue to exist because the beings in them continue to act. 3 Leistung der indischen ‘Karma’-Lehre, des sog. Seelenwanderungsglaubens. . . . Der Einzelne schaﬀ t sich seinen eigenes Schicksal im strengsten Sinne ausschließlich selbst.

Der Seelenwanderungsglaube knüpft an sehr geläuﬁ ge animistische Vorstellungen von dem Übergang der Totengeister in Naturobjekte an. Er rationalisiert sie und damit den Kosmos unter rein ethischen Prinzipien. Die naturalistische ‘Kausalität’ unser Denk- gewohnheiten wird also ersetzt durch einen universellen Vergeltungsmechanismus, bei dem kein ethische relevante Tat jemals verloren geht. . . . Diese Konsequenz der Seelen- wanderungslehre hat in vollem Sinne nur der Buddhismus gezogen . . .” (Weber 2001:299–301 [“Das Problem der Th eodizee”]; cf. also ibid. 438: “Auch diese Ethik ist ‘rational’ im Sinn einer stetigen wachen Beherrschung aller natürlichen Triebhaftig- keit, aber mit gänzlich anderem Ziel,” where Weber is writing on Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese Volksreligiosität.

2) Th is is the classical formulation of the Buddhist theodicy: kammasakkā māṇava, sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhu kammapaṭ isaraṇā. kammā satte vibha- jati yadidā hīnappaṇītatāyāti, is found in MN III.4.5, Cūḷ akammavibhaṅ ga, p. 204; cf. also AN IV.2.1.7: kammassakombhi kammadāyādo kammayoni kammabandhu kammapaṭ isaraṇo yā kammā karissāmi kalyāṇā vā pāpakā vā tassa dāyādo bhavissāmī’ti abhiṇhā paccacekkhitabbā itthiyā vā purisena vā gahaṭ ṭ hena vā pabbajitena vā, “ . . . what- ever deed I do, whether good or bad, I shall become heir of it! Th is ought to be contemplated by woman or man, layman or monk.” See further references in AN tr. III.59, note 3 and passim. On the endlessness of the cycle of birth and death, cf.

SN III.2.4–10 and passim: anamataggoyā bhikkhave, saṃsāro, pubbā koṭ i na paññāyati, “Saṃsāra is impossible to imagine, it is not possible to form a concept of its begin- ning.” Cf. also Nidd II.10 where the numbers are even much higher.

3) yathā yathāyaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathā taṃ paṭ isaṃvedissati, A.1.249, “In 256 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 Th us, the above list of states of existence ( gati) corresponds to ﬁ ve worlds, where beings are reborn as the result of what they did during their innumerable earlier lives: bad deeds make you an animal or a hun- gry ghost, but a really bad deed brings you to hell — these three states are called bad states (duggati). Good actions, on the other hand, lead to rebirth as a human or a god, which are good states (sugati). Birth as a god, though, does not preclude a later birth in hell, since when the good deeds are consumed in the pleasurable existence in heaven, one may easily fall into hell, or be reborn as an animal or a ghost, because earlier karma by its latent force creates rebirth in these states, condi- tioned as they are by past deeds of evil, or lust (rāga, lobha), ill-will (dosa) and bewilderment (moha). Being reborn as human, though, is in general seen as a very good rebirth, 4 because in this state the Bodhisatta is born, to be fully awakened as a Buddha, who can teach the end of all the suﬀ ering entailed by the unending cycle of rebirth, the end of which is nibbāna, cessation of action, kammanirodha or kammakkhaya.

In the human state one is able — that is, if one hears the teachings of the Buddha — to realize, through insight and meditation, that every- thing is impermanent and selﬂ ess, empty and brings only suﬀ ering; then, one does not seek rebirth again neither as humans, gods, or for that sake as animals or in hell, because having given up attachment to a self, and thus any attachment to life in the ﬁ ve states of existence, in saṃsāra, one will reach ﬁ nal extinction in nibbāna.

Th us, in Buddhist rationality, hells of many types, or, for that matter, heavens of various sorts, are an integral part of, and organically con- nected to, the doctrine of karma and reincarnation. Th e ideas and images of hell are also recurrent parts of Buddhism as it unfolds his- torically and geographically throughout the whole of East Asia in its more than two thousand years of history. It is thus interesting to note that Buddhism has at times in modern Western societies been preferred over Christianity as a particularly rational religion because, among whichever way this man does a deed, in the same way he will experience it.” kammanā vattati loko kammanā vattati pajā, kammanibandhanā sattā rathassāṇiva yāyato, Sn 625, “By actions the world goes round, by actions all created beings go around [in the round of rebirth], beings are fastened to their actions as the wheel is to its axle as it revolves.” 4) And hard to attain, see below, p. 270 and n.26, and p. 272. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 257 other things, it is perceived as not believing in such Christian irration- alities as an eternal hell. But our sources for the idea of hell in Bud- dhism are very rich, and they also seem to be anterior to the development of this idea in Christianity. One of the main diﬀ erences between the Christian and the Buddhist hell is that the ﬁ rst is eternal, while the second is not — Buddhism teaches that everything is impermanent.

Even so, rebirth in a Buddhist hell may last for prolonged periods. 5 It is likely that this is why many of the early translators of the Buddhist Canon have preferred using the term “Purgatory” rather than “hell.” What is similar in the two traditions, however, is that stories about hell are very popular and in diﬀ erent ways illustrate the doctrines of the two traditions with very powerful images. Hell is, therefore, an ever-recurrent motif in the Buddhist tradition, as in the Christian, and forms part of edifying story-telling for the sake of the religious education of the lay community. 6 5) “By the ripening of that deed, for many years, for many a hundred, for many a thousand, many a hundred thousand years he suﬀ ered [or: is cooked] in Purgatory [or:

hell] . . .,” stock phrase passim in KN, MN, SN and Vin: so tassa kammassa vipākena bahūni vassāni bahūni vassasatani bahūni vassasahassāni bahūni vassasatasahassāni niraye paccittha, etc. Th e numbers are not consistent or accurate, but only express a very long duration: Kokālika (see below) is born in the Lotus Hell, indeed for long:

“‘Long, monk, is the term of life in the Lotus hell. It is not easy to reckon it by so many years, so many thousands of years, and by so many hundreds of thousands of years.’ ‘Is it possible to give a simile, sir?’ ‘It is possible, monk,’ he replied. ‘Suppose there were twenty Kosalan cartloads of sesamum seed and at the end of every hundred years a man were to take out a seed, just one; well, sooner, monk, would those Kosalan cart- loads of sesamum seed be used up and exhausted in that way — and that’s not one Abbuda hell! Monk, as twenty Abbuda hells are one Nirabbuda hell, as twenty Nirab- buda hells one Ababa hell, as twenty Ababa hells one Ahaha hell, as twenty Ahaha hells one Aṭ aṭ a hell, as twenty Aṭ aṭ a hells one Kumuda hell, as twenty Kumuda hells one Sogandhika hell, as twenty Sogandhika hells one Uppalaka hell, as twenty Uppalaka hells one Puṇ ḍarīka hell, as twenty Puṇ ḍarīka hells one Paduma (Lotus) hell. Verily, monk, the monk Kokālika was born in that hell because of the illwill he bore towards Sāriputta and Moggallāna.’” In contrast to the eight hells mentioned below, which are warm, these are the cold hells, as implied by the sounds of freezing contained in the names of the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve. On the cold hells in general see Feer 1892:211 ﬀ . It is not attested explicitly in the earliest texts that they are cold, this is said only in later com- mentaries, cf. ibid. 220 ﬀ . Th e rest of the names are related to variants of lotus ﬂ owers.

SN I.6.1.1 ﬀ .: Kokālivagga, quotation from SN I.152, also in AN 174.

6) On Indian and Buddhist cosmology in general, including the systems of kalpas, 258 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 And indeed story-telling has been crucial to the propagation of Bud- dhist doctrines. Th e tipiṭ aka, “the three baskets,” as the canonical scrip- tures of the Buddhists are called, consist traditionally of the sutta section, viz., the speeches of the Buddha, the vinaya, the rules regarding monastic life, and the abhidhamma section, which is a systematic exposé of Buddhist psychology and the philosophy of the dhamma, the teach- ings of the Buddha. Th e written versions of these scriptures, many of which are extant today, underwent constant transformation through- out history with diﬀ erent sects reinterpreting the “true words of the teacher.” Now, ideas on the infernal regions of the universe were of course found in India before Buddhism, and the king of the netherworld, Yama, ruled over the deceased, who could enjoy their afterlife if they were oﬀ ered enough sacriﬁ ce from their living descendants — indeed the ideas of karma and retribution originated from this sacriﬁ cial cult.

Originally karma denoted mainly the sacriﬁ ce, and its result was not computed so much in terms of abstract ethics as in terms of material compensation — the dead would have resources to live on after death only to the extent that their progeny and kin could perform sacriﬁ ces on their behalf. As Buddhist and Jaina ascetics brought in with them the idea of ethical conduct, the infernal regions, or, for that matter, other regions of the cosmos, changed into places of reward or retribu- tion for those engaged in moral or immoral conduct. In the same proc- ess, Yama underwent a transformation from being the king of the forefathers to become the ruler of hell. Th is oﬀ ers us an example of the transformed netherworld with a richness of imagery to describe the various punitive states of hell. 7 Th e process of transformation from the world of deceased forefathers to a “fully developed hell” — as a cosmic yugas and hells, see the still authoritative work of Kirfel 1920, further McGovern 1923 and Kloetzli 1983. For later Buddhist views on hell see Lamotte 1949:955 ﬀ .

with notes. It should be pointed out that the numbers used to describe distance and time in the Buddhist sūtras and commentaries are fanciful numbers used only to describe rhetorically very long duration, and not to be taken as accurate numbers.

On the motives of Buddhist narrative motifs in general, see Grey 2000, with updated bibliography.

7) On Yama as the king of hell in general Indian tradition see Kirfel 1920:147–73, and 198–206 for list of the names and duration of punishments also from later sources in Buddhism. For Jaina hells see ibid. 315–29. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 259 region which has as its purpose the punishment of sinners — has its parallels in the Mediterranean regions, and even in Iran.

Th e word for hell in early Buddhism is niraya. Th e etymology is not quite clear; nir-i- means to “go out,” or to “go asunder” — the last ety- mology is usually preferred to explain hell as a place where beings are destroyed, or their bad actions are destroyed. 8 A nerayika is an inhabit- ant of hell. Less used in early tradition is naraka, another name for hell frequent in later literature.

If we address the question of hells in Buddhism from the perspective of origins, and ask when the idea of hell took root in Buddhism, we encounter some diﬃ culties of dating, since the dates of Buddhist texts are very often uncertain, and scholarly opinions on the question to some extent diverge. Th e question is further complicated because Bud- dhist teachings, not yet written texts, were transmitted orally probably up to about 100 bc, at which time they were written down in Ceylon. 9 Th ere is, however, scholarly agreement on the whole that the Pāli canon is fairly formalized from this time, and thus a reliable source for early Buddhism.

Th us, it would be fairly safe, from the perspective of dating the ideas of the Buddhist hell, to start our investigation with the Kathāvatthu, which is the earliest Buddhist scripture with a named author, and which also is the ﬁ rst scripture to be dated by the Buddhist tradition itself.

10 8) Th ere are also indigenous etymologies from the Buddhist commentaries, for the ones in the Pāli tradition, see PTSD s.v.

9) On the earliest date of the written codiﬁ cation of the Buddhist canon, see von Hinüber 1996:88 with references; Norman 1983:10–11. By very recent discoveries of Buddhist manuscripts in Afghanistan and Pakistan edited in projects led by Harry Falk and Richard Salomon, Buddhist literature, even Mahāyāna, written in Kharoṣ ṭ hī char- acters, has been dated well before the Common Era.

10) Th us, the Pāli tradition (Atthasālinī 4.25) asserts that the Kv was composed by the Elder Mogalliputtatissa 218 years after Nirvạ̄ na, which places it during the reign of emperor Aśoka (273–232 bc.). Th ere is considerable disagreement on the date of the Buddha in the last two decades of research on Buddhism, but most scholars now believe the date of the Buddha to be later than was earlier thought. Th us, while the number 18 of the “218 years” may be correct, and indicate that the council, on which Kv is a “report,” was held some years after the beginning of Aśoka’s reign, “200 years” may seem to indicate only “a long period.” On the problem of dating early Buddhist history, see Bechert 1991–97. Later Pāli commentaries ascribe the various viewpoints discussed in the council also to the traditional sects of Buddhism, which must be later 260 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 Th e Kathāvatthu discusses various points of disagreement within the clergy, and, in this context, it depicts a council in the middle of the 3rd century bc, where one the topics discussed is hell. Going by this date, we can, with some caution, date the earliest conceptions of hell in this period too. However, since the concept of hell was part of a fairly com- plex discussion, there is good reason to believe that the basic ideas on this issue were somewhat older than the discussion that took place at that date. At any rate, these ideas are an integral part of the doctrines discussed by the Kathāvatthu.

Th e ﬁ rst and second discussions in the Kathāvatthu of hell (I.1.161, 210–11), or Purgatory, as the translator wants it, refer, ﬁ rst, to the ques- tion of karma and, then, to the personality, puggala, the questions being whether it is the same personality or a diﬀ erent one that is reborn. Th e orthodox view seems to be that it is a diﬀ erent personality, since the stream of conscious states is constantly changing — into a yakkha, a semi-divine being, a peta, hungry ghost, an animal, or an inhabitant of hell, nerayika. At any rate, karma, actions, clearly is the force that drives a sentient being from state to state in the system of worlds. Later, there is a discussion as to whether the action itself is hell, or whether rebirth in hell is the result of a particular bad action, like murder. Th is is of course a theme much developed upon in later Buddhist philosophical traditions, which tend to see the world as a projection of the collective mental states of living beings. Th e position of the orthodox in the fol- lowing quotation from Kathāvatthu (VII.10.4) seems to be that hell is indeed a state to be experienced in another life as the result of action:

than the Kathāvatthu. According to the northern sources of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Tibetan, Chinese), the ﬁ rst schism between the Mahāsāṃghika and the Th eravāda (Pāli, Sanskrit: Sthāviravāda) took place during Aśoka’s reign, and many of the disagre- ments described in the Kv are in accordance with the disagreements leading to this schism as described in the northern sources. Th e main topics of the Kv are the status of the self, and how perfect is the arhat, the Buddhist Saint, though many other points of controversy are referred to as well. Th e Kv refers to canonical statements, and if these are not to be considered later interpolations, they show that a Buddhist canon was in existence at that time, though most probably only in oral form. So with some scepticism we should have a source on Buddhist hells, thought of as places of retribution for bad deeds, dating from the middle of the 3rd century bc. On the Kathāvatthu, see Norman 1983:103–5, and passim, index s.v.; and von Hinüber 1996:70–73, and passim. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 261 “Again, do you mean that a given bad mental state is its own result, a given good state its own result? Th at the consciousness with which we take life is the very consciousness with which we burn in Purgatory?

Th at the consciousness with which we give a gift of merit is the very consciousness with which we rejoice in Heaven?” Th is heretical view was that of the sect of the Andhakas, according to the commentaries.

We see that speculation on both Heaven and hell is clearly connected with the retribution for bad and compensation for good actions.

Th e next chapter of the Kathāvatthu starts out with a discussion as to whether there are ﬁ ve or six worlds. Th e commentaries state that the sects of the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas held that the Asuras also had a world of their own — the Asuras being the Vedic Asuras, warlike gods, something like the Titans or Giants of Greek mythology — in addition to the ﬁ ve subscribed to by the orthodox Th eravādins, as men- tioned above, hell being one of them. 11 An essential part of the discus- sions of the Kathāvatthu concerned the ideals of sainthood and religious perfection, and, thus, there was a discussion about whether a person with correct views on selﬂ essness, etc., could commit bad deeds, even the ﬁ ve deadly sins — sins “having no intermediate” (ānantarika), that is, no intermediate state between the deed and rebirth in hell. Th ese are: 1) matricide, 2) patricide, 3) killing a perfected saint (arahant), 4) wounding the Tathāgata, the Buddha, with evil intent, and 5) creat- ing schism in the sangha, the Buddhist order of monks. Th ese sins, according to the orthodox view, could not be committed by a person with a ﬁ rm understanding of the true doctrine. Others, however, held the opposite view. 12 Th e prolonged periods of suﬀ ering, such as for an “aeon,” kappa, were also addressed, with reference to the canon: “One 11) Kv VIII.1.1: Controversial point. — Th at there are six spheres of destiny. Did not the Exalted One name ﬁ ve destinies — purgatory, the animal kingdom, the Peta- realm, mankind, the devas? cha gatiyo ti? āmantā. nanu pañca gatiyo vuttā bhagavatā, nirayo, tiracchānayoni, pettivisayo, manussā, devā, no vata re vattabe “cha gatiyo ti.” Th e argument goes on, pro et contra, though in later tradition, at least, the Asuras were usually counted as a sixth world, even though somewhat contiguous with the Devas.

Th e question was not controversial in later tradition.

12) Kv VII.7; Vinaya iii.303 is quoted as support for the orthodox view; thus those “inside” the faith were safe to reach salvation, a view, of course, which may have served to protect orthodoxy. 262 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 who breaks up the concord of the order is tormented in purgatory for a kappa.” 13 Even unintentionally committing any of the ānantarika incurs the most terrible suﬀ ering in hell. Th e last is a controversial point in the Kathāvatthu, and though opposed by several sects, it is still believed by the orthodox, notwithstanding the principle stated in many places in Buddhist philosophy, that action is mainly intention (Kv XX.1).

Two further problems concerning hell are discussed in the Kathā- vatthu, problems also intimately connected with other Buddhist doc- trines: namely, whether hell has guards that torture the inmates of hell (XX.3), and whether the Bodhisatta, or the Buddha to be, can be reborn in the bad and lower states of existence (apāya, duggati or vinipāta), that is, undergo hell, or being born as a ghost or an animal (XXIII.3).

Th e ﬁ rst problem is connected to the one mentioned above, whether one, as it were, is in hell when committing the evil deed, that the con- sciousness of the act is the same as the suﬀ ering. Th is is a view, the commentaries say, held e.g. by the Andhakas (again!), who suppose that there are no guards in hell charged with torturing and punishing; rather, these torturers are nothing but the bad actions themselves, committed in the “shape of hell-keepers who purge the suﬀ erers.” Th e orthodox protested, and did so with canonical quotations: 14 Him, bhikkhus, Hell’s guards torture with ﬁ vefold punishment; they trust a hot iron stake through one hand, then another through the other hand, then one through the foot, then another through the other foot; they thrust a hot iron stake through the middle of the chest. And he thereupon feels painful, piercing, intoler- able suﬀ ering, nor does he die till that evil deed of his is cancelled.

Him, bhikkhus, Hell’s guards make to lie down and ﬂ ay him with hatchets . . .

they place him head downwards and ﬂ ay him with knives . . . they bind him to a chariot and drive him to and fro over burning, blazing glowing ground . . . they lift him up on to a great hill of burning, blazing, white hot coals and roll him down a ﬁ ery slope . . . they double him up and cast him into a hot brazen jar, burn- ing glowing where he boils, coming up like a bubble of foam, then sinking, going now to this side, now to that. Th ere he suﬀ ers ﬁ erce and bitter pain, nor does he die till that evil karma is cancelled. Him Bhikkhus, they cast into the Great Purgatory.

In districts measured out four-square four-doored, Iron the ramparts bounding it, with iron roofed, 13) Itivutaka, §§13 and 18: Saṅ ghā samaggā bhetvāna kappā nirayamhi paccatī’ti.14) Majjhima iii.166–67, 182–83; Anguttaranikaya 1.41, translation from Kv tr.

p. 346–47. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 263 Iron its soil welded by ﬁ ery heat, Spreading a hundred leagues it stands for aye. With this display of canonical and orthodox rhetoric the article ends, leaving no doubt that the orthodox view is that hell is real. Moreover, it is a hell of the type we may call fully developed, where moral frailty and bad deeds are punished: “Hence there surely are guards in purgatory.” Th e views of the Andhakas, however, who were heirs to the Mahāsāṃghika, point in the direction of the relativist and mentalist views of later Mahāyāna literature. Th is is also the case with another Andhaka view, this time about the Bodhisatta: though he is a perfected being, he can still, by his own will, seek rebirth in the vinipāta, a lower state of existence. Th e idea of Mahāyāna Buddhism is that the Bodhisatta (or Bodhisatva in Buddhist Sanskrit — in modern works often Bodhi- sattva), should by expedient means (upāya) seek rebirth where there is most suﬀ ering, so that he can consume more quickly his bad karma from earlier lives, and thus speed up his development of good action and wisdom in order to attain complete awakening as a Buddha. Th e ortho- dox view in the Kathāvatthu objects to that kind of rebirth for the Bod- hisatta, as he is seen as a superior moral being who cannot, by the force of his own good action, be reborn in such low states of existence as hell, as a spirit or as an animal. In the Mahāyāna, however, the Bodhisatva is reborn in the lower states not because of his attachment to these states, but because of his compassion and his promise to save all living beings.

Th is cosmic mobility of the Bodhisatta is a key point in the later discus- sions between the Mahāyāna and the Th era/Sthāvira positions, discus- sions, though, that have mostly been initiated by the Mahāyāna side.

But we ﬁ nd disagreement on this issue already in the Kathāvatthu: [Controversial Point:] Th at a Bodhisatta goes to an evil doom, enters a womb, performs hard tasks, works penance under alien teachers of his own accord and free will.

[Question from the orthodox position, implying that the opponent is wrong:] Do you mean that he so went and endured purgatory, Th e Sañjīva, Kālasutta, Tāpana, Patāpana, Sanghātaka, Roruva, and Avīci hells? Can you quote me a Sutta to support this? . . . . (Kv XXIII.3) 15 15) Th e paragraph goes on to discuss the other related questions. Th e Mahāyāna view is found in a number of sūtras and commentaries, and is summarized e.g. by the 264 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 In this paragraph we also note that the eight departments of hell are already in place at the early date of the Kathāvatthu, a fact that under- scores that a very developed and systematic view of hell existed in this period. Th e names of the hells, however, vary to some extent in the literature, but the eight hells constitute a basic list. 16 Generally, the names of the various hells denote suﬀ ering and torture, expressive of the torture going on there when kamma is “matured” or, literally, “boiled” (Pāli: paccati) — implying on the one hand that the suﬀ erer is puriﬁ ed of his bad deeds, but also playing on the word to indicate that boiling is part of the torture.

From what we, with some argumentative force, may call a very early source of Hell in Buddhism, we will go on to treat other sources. Th ere is no doubt that Buddhist literature has developed through repeated processes of canonization, but, as mentioned above, there is some schol- arly agreement that the Pāli canon was ﬁ xed about 100 bc. However, the suttas and the vinaya ﬁ xed in writing deﬁ nitely build on earlier oral tradition, and, as we have seen, the Kathāvatthu also quotes earlier Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (XIII.14–15): “Indeed, great pain suﬀ ered during a sojourn in Hell is never an obstacle to the sons of the Victorious, as it is suﬀ ered for the sake of [all] beings. But all kinds of thought-constructions in the inferior way (hīnayāna) concerned with purity — arising from [reﬂ ections on] the good qualities of peace and the bad qualities of existence — are an obstacle to the intelligent. Indeed a sojourn in hell is never a hindrance to the intelligent in attaining the undeﬁ led and extensive awakening. But the thought-constructions consisting in the absolute coldness of one’s own good only, which are found in the other way, make hindrances to staying in the absolute joy.” Th e Mahāyāna criticized the śrāvakayāna, or hīnayāna — which our Pāli literature on the whole may be said to represent, being the literature of the Th eravāda — for their selﬁ sh seeking of their own salvation. Th e Bodhisatta’s rebirth in hell is, however, still found in the Pāli Jātakas. In Ja no. 538 the Bodhisatta is described as a king in Benares, then he stays eighty thousand years in the Ussada hell, after which he is reborn as a god in Indra’s heaven, where Indra asks him to take rebirth again as a human. Th e Ussada hell is “twice eight times more in number, a kind of minor hell” ( Ja V.137). In general there is also talk of the Great Hell, and the sixteen lesser hells (e.g. Ja no. 142); other numbers in Cowell 1895–1913:index, s.v. Hell.

16) Seven of them are mentioned in Kv: sañjīva: “reviving,” implying that suﬀ ering has no end because one does not “die” in hell; kālasutta: “thread of time,” probably also to express how suﬀ ering goes on continuously; tāpana: “suﬀ ering”; patāpana: “exces- sive suﬀ ering”; sanghātaka: “crushing”, “beating”; roruva: “roaring”, and avīci: (suﬀ er- ing with) “no intermission,” evidently hot hells. Th e mahāroruvaniraya “hell of great roaring” is not mentioned in the Kv list, but is usually included to make up a list of eight hells. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 265 canonical works, which may thus be surmised to be older than the Kathāvatthu. If we use the argument of the written canon as a terminus a quo, this would bring the Buddhist ideas of a developed hell back more than a century bc, and the concept of hell also suﬀ uses the canon- ical scriptures of Buddhism. Our next area of investigation would then, naturally, be the monastic ordo, the vinaya, and the speeches of the Buddha, the suttas.

Now, the vinaya is naturally most concerned with punishing people, or rather the monks and nuns, in this life rather than the afterlife. Th e reactions of the Buddhist monastic order to wrongdoings were of eight sorts. Th e most serious was expulsion from the order, the pārājika oﬀ ences. Second are those wrongdoings punished by suspension (saṅ ghādiśeṣ a), and then there are six types of oﬀ ences atoned for by expiation and confession, and no further punishment. However, the pārājika oﬀ ences may also entail rebirth in hell, and the ﬁ rst oﬀ ence mentioned is sexual conduct of any sort — for this, if it is intentional, the monk or nun is expelled from the saṅ gha. Not having sexual rela- tions is closely connected with the very identity of monastic life, not only in Buddhism, and is thus punished very hard, through exclusion or excommunication; it is the pārājika oﬀ ence ﬁ rst mentioned in the Pāli Vinaya. All the rules are illustrated by long narratives throughout the Vinaya. Th e main story illustrating what is considered to be a sexual oﬀ ence is the story of the monk Sudinna, who was seduced by his for- mer wife, because her family wanted an heir to their properties. In the end Sudinna gave in, and he was scolded by the Buddha: It is not ﬁ t, foolish man, it is not becoming, it is not proper, it is unworthy of a recluse, it is not lawful, it ought not to be done. . . . It were better for you, foolish man, that your male organ should enter the mouth of a black snake than it should enter a woman. It were better for you, foolish man, that your male organ should enter the mouth of a charcoal pit, ablaze aﬁ re, than it should enter a woman. For that reason, foolish man, you would go to death, or to suﬀ ering like unto death, but not on that account would you pass at the breaking up of the body after death to the waste, the bad bourn, abyss, hell. But for this reason, foolish man, at the breaking up of the body after death you would pass to the waste, the bad bourn, abyss, hell. (Vin. Su. P. I.5.11) 17 17) . . . na tv eva tappaccayā kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā apāyā duggatiṃ vinipātā nirayā upapajjeyya. ito nidānañ ca kho moghapurisa kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā apāyā duggatiṃ vinipātā nirayā uppajjeyya. (We write Vinaya with a capital when referring to 266 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 Sexual oﬀ ences were evidently not forgiven, even if they were uncon- scious or unwilling, as some of the other stories illustrate. Real sexual oﬀ ences would lead not only to exclusion from the order, however, but at death to lower existences and hell. Th ere is no lack of creativity, though, in the description of the various sorts of sexual oﬀ ences in the Vinaya.

Th e ﬁ rst of the four pārājikas, then, is sexual oﬀ ence (methuna- dhamma), which is also punished in hell. Th e other three pārājikas of stealing, or, “appropriating what is not given” (adinnādāna), killing of human beings ( jīvitā voropana), and the claiming of magical abilities (uttarimanussadhamma), be they true or not, were not as such con- nected to additional punishment in hell by their interpretative narra- tives in the Vinaya. Th ere is, however, a story (Vin. Su. P. IV.1.2) that those claiming supernatural powers for the sake of extracting alms from the laity end up in hell. And in general all the sins subsumed under the category of parājika would lead to hell.

Th e ﬁ fth ānantarika sin, causing schism in the monastic order (saṅ ghabheda), is not mentioned as a break of a pārājika rule, entailing automatic expulsion, but as entailing suspension for a period to be decided by the saṅ gha (saṅ ghādiśeṣ a). 18 Th is is illustrated by the narra- tive about the Buddha’s cousin, Devadatta, who tried to usurp the lead- ership of the saṅ gha from the Buddha. Devadatta wished to split the monastic community by proposing a more strict discipline, by which he aimed at attracting more disciples, e.g. the prohibition of ﬁ sh and meat, which were allowed by the Buddha if the meat given to the monk came from animals killed without the monk’s knowledge, and some other measures stricter than those taught by the Buddha. 19 Th is was the texts of the vinaya rules.) Th e monks and nuns were expected to know all these rules, and every fortnight they were recited during the uposatha ceremony. If anybody had committed a sin, they should show it with a sign, and receive the allotted punish- ment. Th e vinaya of the nuns included eight pārājika rules, the additional ones not surprisingly connected with sexual misconduct; see Bikkhunivibhaṅ ga I.1–IV.2.

18) See von Hinüber 1996:10. Norman (1983:18) uses the older translation “formal meeting” for saṅ ghādiśeṣ a.

19) Five rules: “Th e brethren shall live all their life long in the forest, subsist solely on doles collected out of doors, dress solely in rags picked out of dust-heaps, dwell under trees and never under a roof, never eat ﬁ sh or ﬂ esh.” Cullavagga VII.3.14. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 267 reported to the Buddha, who asked whether it was true, and when it was conﬁ rmed, he made the rule that splitting the saṅ gha with such views was an oﬀ ence entailing suspension if the monk, after being admonished three times, did not give up his views. Th is would also, by the next rule, be the reaction against monks supporting the schismatic view (Vin. Su. S. X–XI).

However, Devadatta went further than only sowing disagreement in the monastic community, and his personality became emblematic of trea- son against the Lord, against Truth and Awakening itself (Vin. Culla- vagga VII.2.1–4.8.): To usurp the leadership of the community — his motive is stated to be gain and honour — he even tried to kill the Lord with an aggressive elephant named Nālāgiri. But the Lord “suﬀ used the elephant Nālāgiri with loving kindness of mind. . . . Th en the Lord, stroking the elephant Nālāgiri’s forehead with his right hand. . . . Th en the elephant Nālāgiri, having taken the dust oﬀ the Lord’s feet with his trunk, having scattered it over his head, moved back bowing while he gazed upon the Lord. . . . ‘Some are tamed by stick, by goads and whips.

Th e elephant was tamed by the great seer without a stick, without a weapon.’” But the end for Devadatta was incumbent on him. Two of the Lord’s main disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, came to see Devadatta, who asked Sāriputta to entertain the defecting monks with a talk on the dhamma, since he himself was tired and his back was ach- ing. Sāriputta convinced the 500 monks lead astray by Devadatta to return to the Lord, and when Kokālika, Devadatta’s main follower, woke him up, “at that very place hot blood issued from Devadatta’s mouth,” and he was reborn “in a bad state of existence, as an inhabitant of hell for an aeon, incurable” (āpāyiko nerayiko kappaṭ ṭ ho atekīccho).

Th e Devadatta story in the Vinaya ends with a verse: Never let anyone of evil desire arise in the world; And know it by this: as the bourn of those evil desires.

Known as “sage,” held as “one who made the self become,” Devadatta stood shining as with fame — I heard tell.

He, falling into recklessness, assailing the Truth-ﬁ nder Attained Avīci Hell, four-doored, frightful. Th us we learn in the Vinaya that the sin of splitting the community of monks ended up in hell in Devadatta’s case, but, as we saw above, the 268 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 sin is one of expulsion decided by a formal meeting, and the Vinaya discusses in this perspective the diﬀ erence between dissension (saṅ gharāji) and schism (saṅ ghabheda), the second of course being the most heinous sin in that it attacks the very identity of the monastic order — and, therefore, the only appropriate punishment would be in hell, and the narrative on Devadatta illustrates this.

Kokālika, the main follower of Devadatta, died of ulcers all over his body and was reborn in the Lotus hell because he spoke ill about the Buddha’s disciples Sāriputta and Moggallāna. His punishment is in accordance with his evil slandering: In sooth to every person born An axe is born within his mouth, Wherewith the fool doth cut himself Whereas he speaks evilly. (SN I,149) 20 Devadatta is described as the main culprit also in the Suttas, the speeches of the Buddha, as deserving the worst of punishment in the deepest of the hells, Avīci, for his saṅ ghabheda, but most of all for his thirst for gain, honour and praise (lābhasakkārasiloko) — the topic of the Devadat- tasutta in the Aṅ guttaranikāya. 21 But it is not the Buddha, of course, who punishes — one is punished by the force of one own actions — the Bud- dha is only forgiving and friendly, even when the elephant attacks him.

Niraya and the duggati are frequent themes in the suttas as places for gruesome punishments: we have already seen quotations in the Kathāvatthu above, and Th e Stupid and the Wise, and the following Th e Messengers of the Gods, 22 are suttas in particular devoted to the subject.

Th e Stupid is of course the sinner who is stupid enough to incur only suﬀ ering by sins in body, speech and mind — as the sins are ordered in Buddhism, similar to the Christian formula “thoughts, words and deeds.” Th e ﬁ ve basic sins out of which the whole morality of Buddhism is generated are all committed by the Stupid, the fool, who is “one who 20) purisassa hi jātassa kuṭ hārī jāyate mukhe, yāya chindati attānaṃ bālo dubbhāsitaṃ bhaṇaṃ . Cf. above, note 5, same verse in AN V.174.

21) IV.2.2.8, but cf. Purisindriyañānasutta (VI.2.1.8), and Devadattavipattisutta (VIII.1.1.7) mentioning also his hellish career, similar in SN V.4.2; VI.2.2; etc.

22) Bālapaṇḍitasutta and Devadhūtasutta, MN. III.3.9–10. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 269 made onslaught on creatures” ( pāṇātipātī ), “a taker of what had not been given” (adinnādāyī ), “behaving wrongly in regard to sense-pleasures” (kāmesu micchācārī ) — i.e. sexual misconduct, mainly — “a liar” (musāvādī ), and “one given up to occasions for sloth consequent upon drinking arrack, toddy and strong liquor” (surāmerayamajjapamādaṭ ṭ hāyī ) — fairly close to what are regarded as sins by most cultures, religious or not, universally. 23 Such thieves and evildoers are punished in this world by kings ordering for them tortures, as our sutta says, citing the stand- ard catalogue in Pāli literature of such punishments, excelling in the (un)aesthetics of gruesomeness: “ﬂ ogging him with whips, with canes, with cudgels, cutting of his hand, his foot hand and foot, his ear, nose, ear and nose, torturing him with the gruel-pot, with the chank-shave,” and so on. 24 But, indeed, he also ends up in hell: “He, monks, who is a fool, having fared wrongly in thought, at the breaking up of the body after dying arises in the sorrowful ways, the bad bourn, the Downfall, Niraya hell.” 25 Th ese sins are, of course, punished much harder in hell 23) Sometimes the arrack and toddy is left out and there are only the four sins, as in the Lesser and Greater Analysis of Deeds, the Cūḷ akammavibhaṅ gasutta and the Mahākammavibhaṅ gasutta, MN III.4.5–6. Th e ﬁ ve are mentioned passim. Th e com- mitter of the third sin is often called abrahmacārī.

24) Th e commentaries explain: gruel pot: they took oﬀ the top of the skull and, taking a red hot iron ball with pincers, dropped it into it so that the brains boiled over; chank- shave: sandpapering the scalp with gravel until it became smooth as a sea-shell; Rāhu’s moth: Rāhu the Asura swallowed the moon and caused its eclipse; they opened his mouth with a skewer, inserted oil and a wick and lit it; ﬁ re-garland: the body was smeared with oil and set alight; ﬂ aming hand: the hand was made into a torch with oil-rags and set alight; hay-twist: the skin was ﬂ ayed from the neck downwards and twisted below the ankles into a band by which he was hung up; bark-dress: the skin was cut into strips and tied up into a sort of garment; the antelope: the victim was trussed up, spitted to the ground with an iron pin and roasted alive; ﬂ esh-hooking: he was ﬂ ayed with double ﬁ sh-hooks; disc-slice: little discs of ﬂ esh the size of a copper coin were cut oﬀ him; pickling process: the body was beaten all over with cudgels and the wounds rubbed with caustic solution by combs; circling the pin: the body was pinned to the ground through the ears and twirled round by the feet; straw mattress:

the body was beaten till every bone was broken and it became limp as a mattress. See AN tr. p. 42–43 with notes and references. One is struck by the imaginary power of cruelty and the highly developed ancient science of torture.

25) Standard phrase with few variations passim in the Pāli canon: Sa kho so bhikkhave bālo kāyena duccaritā caritvā vācāya duccaritā caritvā manasā duccaritā caritvā kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā apāyā duggatiṃ vinipātā nirayā upapajjati. 270 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 than here in the human world, and the Lord can only describe them with similes: a thief is stabbed with a hundred spears in the morning, midday and in the evening by the king’s orders, but if one compares the suﬀ ering of this man with a small stone, the suﬀ erings of hell would be comparable to a Himalaya mountain of such stones. Th en follows a vivid description of hell as quoted above from the Kathāvatthu, and also a depiction of the various animal existences the sinner may incur because of his bad deeds — the deeds themselves attract him to these states of existences, horses and cattle being among the better states, followed by dogs and jackals, etc., and in the end he may be born among beetles, maggots and insects, or, worst of all among the animals, rotting ﬁ sh.

Th ere is every reason to avoid the duggattis, as they are extremely hard to get out of: it is very diﬃ cult to again attain human birth — which of course is a great privilege, because you then may receive the teaching of the Buddha and be liberated from the horrors of saṃsāra. Th e simile given to illustrate this concept is that of a man who throws a yoke with a hole in it into the sea and it ﬂ oats everywhere: it is more diﬃ cult for a being born in the lower states of existence to attain human birth than it is for a blind turtle coming to the surface of the ocean every hundred years to put its neck through the hole of the yoke. 26 Th e reason is that “there is no dhamma-faring there, no even-faring, no doing of what is skilled, no doing of what is good. Monks, there is devouring of one another there and feeding on the weak.” It is also diﬃ cult to practice good kamma there, which is necessary if the unfortunate being is to move upwards into better states of existence. Even if born as a human again, he would be born among the low, where it is also diﬃ cult to perform good deeds to improve one’s karmic lot (MN III.169). So the advice is to act well with regard to our fellow beings and keep our morality clean. Th e wise man, of course, is the opposite of everything appertaining to the stupid: he will be born in the divine world, where the pleasures are as indescribable as the suﬀ erings of hell.

Th e king of Niraya, hell, is Yama. In the sutta Th e Messengers of the Gods 27 the sinner is questioned by the king, being brought before him 26) For the simile, cf. also SN I.5.7–8.27) MN III.3.10, abridged version in AN III.1.4.6. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 271 by the guardians of hell: “Th is man, sire, had no respect for his mother, no respect for his father, he does not honour recluses, he does not hon- our brahmans, he does no pay due respect to the elders of the family.

Let your majesty decree a punishment for him.” 28 King Yama then interviews him on whether he has not seen the messengers of the gods, the Devadhūtas, who are personiﬁ cations, depicted in a very sombre way, of the ﬁ ve situations of suﬀ ering of existence: birth, old age, ill- ness, a thief punished by whipping, then a rotting corpse. We recognize the concluding elements of the chain of dependent origin. 29 Th e situa- tions are depicted in the sutta as divine messengers of the qualities of saṃsāra, nothing but impermanence and suﬀ ering. But the man before the king had not taken heed of these reminders, he still acted badly, and “King Yama, monks, having cross-questioned him, questioned him closely and having spoken to him concerning the ﬁ fth divine messen- ger, was silent.” An ominous silence, evidently, because then the guards drag the poor man oﬀ to his punishments. Th e favourite piece quoted in the Kathāvatthu concerning punishments (see above) is given. But the Devadhūtasutta has more details. Th e unfortunate is hurled around the Great Hell against the four gates, burned and tortured. And then: Monks, there comes a time once in a very long while when the eastern gateway of this Great Niraya Hell is opened. He rushes there swiftly and speedily; while he is rushing swiftly and speedily his skin burns and his hide burns and his ﬂ esh burns and his tendons burn and his eyes are ﬁ lled with smoke — such is his plight. And though he has attained much, the gateway is nevertheless closed against him.

Th ereat he feels feelings that are painful, sharp, severe. But he does not do his time until he makes an end of that evil deed. 30 28) MN III.180: nirayapālā nānābāhāsu gahetvā yamassa rañño dassenti ’ayā deva, puriso amatteyyo apetteyyo asāmañño abrahmañño na kulejeṭ ṭ hāpacāyī, imassa devo daṇḍā paṇetuti.

29) Th e ﬁ nal elements of the paṭ iccasamuppāda, the result of ignorance, avijjā, are birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation suﬀ ering, depression and despair:

jarāmaraṇasokaparidevadukkhadomanassa’ ūpayāsa. Th e devadhūtas also correspond to the objects of meditation, as meditation on the impure creates disgust for existence and makes one seek the good, and ultimately nibbāna.

30) Th e commentary on the sutta: “After saying that ‘he has attained much,’ that is, having attained many hundred thousand years in Avīci, [it says] that it takes him all this time to work oﬀ the ripening of his evil deed” (abbreviation of MA 4.235 as in MN III, tr. p. 227 n.5). Th e Buddhist “Judas” occupies, expectedly, the lowest and most terrible hell. 272 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 Not unexpectedly, he experiences the same at the other gates, but, in the end, the eastern gate is open for him, but only for him to be reborn in another hell: the Great Filth Hell, where his skin, ﬂ esh and bones are cut oﬀ . Th en he is reborn the in Ember Hell, the Forest of Silk-Cotton Trees, which he has to climb — they are of course burning — and then the Hell of burning water. He is hungry, asking for food, and the guards haul him out with a ﬁ shhook and ﬁ ll his mouth with glowing copper pellets that burn his chest and stomach before they pass out with his bowels and intestines. When daring to say he is thirsty, he gets a similar treatment.

Th e end of this text, though, shows that there is after all a way out of hell, and that even its ruler Yama is reborn in inferno because of his own actions: even he would like to be born as a human to hear the teachings of the Lord Buddha and thus be liberated from suﬀ ering. So Yama is not an eternal ruler of the Netherworld, he is in principle a liv- ing being transmigrating like any other, who, because of his actions, has become what he is, in accordance with the kamma principle, which is universal: Once upon a time, monks, it occurred to King Yama: “Th ose that do evil deeds in the world are subjected to a variety of punishments like these. O that I might acquire human status and that a Tathāgata might arise in the world, a perfected one, a fully Self-Awakened One, and that I might wait on that Lord, and that that Lord might teach me dhamma, and that I might understand that Lord’s dhamma.” (MN III.187) Th us, there is indeed mobility in the Buddhist universe, but at a fairly slow rate, given the particular understanding of time in classical India, where the age of the universe was not counted in millennia, as in ancient western traditions, but in kappas, aeons, time periods of enormous length 31 — which length, however, varied according to 31) Cf. SN III.1.6: Dīgho kho bhikkhu kappo. So na sukaro sākhātuṃ ettakāni vassānīti vā, ettakāni vassasatāni iti vā, ettakāni vassasahassāni iti vā, ettakāni vassasatasahassāni iti vāti. “A kappa is long. It is not easy to calculate how many years it is, how many hundreds of years it is, how many thousand of years it is, how many hundred thousands of years it is.” Later, and particularly in the Mahāyāna, the num- bers of years in a kalpa tended to reach unthinkable and immeasurable ﬁ gures. Se also notes 2, 5 and 6. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 273 various traditions. Th e kappas would also be eternally recurring. Th e Buddha would remember these kappas, because of his divine vision, and his advanced students would also remember some. But only the Buddha could recount all his previous births, and also all the births of others, and that is the rationale given in the Jātakas. Remembering one’s former lives, and being able to relate to all the sins one has committed during the innumerable previous births, is the clue to get rid of their results and be freed from being reborn again in the duggati, and in the end to be liberated from saṃsāra.

In the Dhammapada, it seems, it is still mainly the monks, who are exhorted to perform good deeds and are threatened with hell, who are targets of the preaching, and the theme of monastic hypocrisy and cor- ruption is emphasized — a frequent theme both in Buddhism and in other monastic traditions: “Who speaks untruth to purgatory goes; he too who says ‘I do not’; both these, in passing on, equal become, men of base actions in another world. Many about whose neck is a yellow robe, of evil qualities and uncontrolled, wicked by wicked deeds, in hell they’re born.” 32 In the Jātakas, though, the layperson is more often part of the story, and it is in the Jātrakas that the exuberance of early Buddhist narratives unfolds fully — also concerning the subject of hell. Th e Jātakas are a vehicle of Buddhist preaching. Th ey narrate how bad actions entail bad results, and the good the opposite, and that across the borders of death, as the fruits of kamma appear in many lives after the act was commit- ted. Th us the Jātaka stories illustrate how the Buddha, being ﬁ rst a Bodhisatta, incarnated in all kinds of existences throughout his devel- opment before becoming a complete Buddha, cultivated his wisdom and compassion and his good actions. Th ey also show how incidents in the Buddha’s “present” life are connected to all the people he related to in his former lives, and thus the workings of kamma from life to life, and the connections between the dramatis personae throughout the chains of reincarnation, are brought into focus. Th us the Jātakas have a common formal structure: (1) story of the present ( paccupannavatthu, 32) Dhp XXII, 306 ﬀ ., Th e Hell Chapter, nirayavaggo 1–2: abhūtavādī nirayaṃ upeti yo cāpi katvā na karomīti cāha, ubho’pi te pecca samā bhavanti nihīnakammā manujā parattha. kāsāvakaṇṭ hā bahavo pāpadhammā asaññatā, pāpā pāpehi kammehi nirayaṃ te upapajjare. 274 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 an incident from the life of the Buddha); (2) a past event (atītavatthu, giving the reason for the incident, by way of the kamma that would be the cause of it in lives past); (3) the connections (samodhāna) between the dramatis personae in the present with those in the past lives, their “identiﬁ cations,” so to say (von Hinüber 1996:56). A mnemonic verse contains ﬁ rst the title, then the present, and then the past, and then the connections and the verse are expanded on through a commentary on each of the words in the verse, and we have a full story.

As the Buddha in the stories most often was reborn as a layman, the Jātakas were always important in lay Buddhism; thus, they are close to the Mahāyāna literature, which also underlines the lay ideals at the expense of monasticism, often described as corrupt and decadent. Th ere are, however, few, if any, explicit Mahāyāna dogmas in the Pāli Jātaka collection that we are employing here to describe early Buddhist views on hell. Th us the Jātakas describe not only the Buddha’s previous lives, but also the moral ideals and ethical self-sacriﬁ ce he practiced in these earlier lives, as models for the Buddhists, and how he developed, by his behaviour, into the perfected man and laid down the path to be fol- lowed by others. Th us the ethics of the Buddha and his former incarna- tions are described, but also the other personalities he meets, and how they acted in former lives — good actions causing good rebirths, and bad ones causing rebirth as animals, spirits and not the least in hell, all according to the law of kamma. Th us the Jātakas became a source of entertainment as narratives, and were always an important instrument in the hands of the monks in their eﬀ ort to educate the lay people with edifying storytelling. On the whole, the descriptions on hell in the Jātakas are the same as those given in the earlier Vinaya and Sutta lit- erature. Th e earliest Jātakas are a formalized part of the Tipiṭ aka, and were written down in verse for memorizing. Th e Jātaka collection of the Khuddakanikāya consists of such verses, which are the nuclei of the developed stories as we have them. Th e total number of Jātakas was originally 550 (von Hinüber 1996:54–58, Norman 1983:77–84). Th e verses are, as often in Buddhist literature, mnemonic, containing only a reference to the story, while the stories themselves were probably orally transmitted and written down at a later stage. 33 33) Other (and later) Vinayas often integrated more of the Jātakas into the Vinaya J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 275 Our topic is of course important in the Jātakas, since many of the persons the Buddha meets throughout his career of rebirths are described as having had a stay in hell — as well as in the other states of existence — the cycle of rebirth being unending without the teachings of a Buddha.

For our survey of hell in the Jātakas we may start again with Devadatta, the main villain of the Buddhist drama and the foremost candidate for punishments in hell. He goes to the deepest hell, and his mode of dying is expanded upon compared to the earlier sources. He falls ill, and blood issues from his mouth, but he somehow repents and wishes to be rec- onciled with the Lord. But the Lord does not wish to see him, and Devadatta, lying on a litter, wishes to ease his pains with drink and a bath. He gets up, but before he can drink, ﬁ res ﬂ are up from the deep- est hell, Avīci. Th e earth opens, and even though he takes refuge in the Buddha in that moment, he is swallowed by the earth, and with ﬁ ve hundred families of his followers he is reborn in the deepest hell. 34 Evi- dently, in early Buddhism, contrary, e.g., to Christianity, to express your faith in the last moment before death has no eﬀ ect on your fate in the afterlife — the principle of kamma is merciless and impossible to change. 35 However, it still seems possible to avoid hell, if the Way of Truth is followed. King Ajātasattu, who had killed his father, king itself, like that of the Sarvāstivāda, which is completly extant in Tibetan and partly in Sanskrit. A number of indices exist for the Jātakas e.g. Cowell 1895–1913, with its ample indices in vol. VI, as well as electronic editions. We are using Cowell’s transla- tions and references to them.

34) Th e idea connected with it is that the earth is not able to carry the weight of such misdeeds — even though it can carry the weight of Mt. Sumeru. Devadatta also died in that way in former births (e.g. Ja no. 72, 358), and this is the mode of dying for very great sinners. A woman who tried to lie about a sexual relation with the Lord, to harm him so that rival ascetics would get more alms, dies in the same way: the earth opens, ﬂ ames encompass her and she falls into Avīci. Th ere was a background to the story, though: in a previous incarnation the evil woman had made sexual advances on her son, the Bodhisatta, who of course rejected her ( Ja no. 472).

35) Ja no. 467: Samuddavāṇijajātaka, which illustrates a present event, as usual, with a previous birth, a story however fairly unrelated to the present apart from the ever-recurrent dichotomies of stupid and wise, bad and good, as in several other stories on Devadatta in previous lives, like that of “Luckie and Blackie” — as Cowell translates — in Ja no. 11. Further references to Devadatta’s death and repeated con- demnation to hell is found in Cowell 1895–1913: index, s.v. Devadatta. 276 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 Biṃbisāra, on Devadatta’s advice, has unbearable visions of hell in his dreams, and fears the consequences of his ill deed. Humbly he approaches the Tathāgata, and, “listening to his sweet discourse on the Law and consorting with a virtuous friend, his fears abated and his feel- ing of horror disappeared, and he recovered his peace of mind and hap- pily cultivated the four ways of Deportment.” Th e story is underlined with an atītavatthu, where, in another life, the Bodhisatta tells another king who also committed patricide, of the horrors of hell: Bright jets of ﬁ re on every side shoot from his tortured frame, His very limbs, hair, nails and all, serve but to feed the ﬂ ame.

And his body burns apace, racked through and through with pain, Like a goad-stricken elephant, poor wretch, he roars again.

Whoso from greed or hatred shall, vile creature, slay his sire, In Kālasutta Hell long time shall agonize in ﬁ re. Consolation is evidently possible, especially through being scared away from bad ways by hellish visions and stories, but the story remains silent on the afterlife of king Ajātasattu. Th ere is evidently hope, however, if one follows the right path, and thus the Bodhisatta ends his versiﬁ ed sermon with a heavenly vision: Th rough virtue stored on earth of old the good to Heaven attain, Here Brahmas, Devas, Indra, lo! ripe fruit of Virtue gain.

Th is then I say, bear righteous sway throughout thy realm, my king, For justice done is merit won, nor e’er regret will bring. 36 But, of course, attaining heaven by good acts is not the aim of Buddhist practice, which is nibbāna, attained by kamma neither moral nor non- moral, the complete freedom from rebirth in the whole system of ﬁ ve worlds.

Another Jātaka that describes a fully developed hell with all its qualities and paraphernalia is the Mahānāradakassapajātaka, where Devadatta again is one of the persons in the paccupannavatthu (vol. VI, no. 544). Th e Jātaka also puts its description of hell into the context of Indian philosophy of the day, which very often discussed actions and 36) Further in Cowell 1895–1913:iv, 137–40; Ja no. 530, where the eight classical hot hells are mentioned, and others are referred to. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 277 their fruits. As we have seen, the Buddhists took a ﬁ rm stance on the principle that kamma never disappeared, that actions always had conse- quences, and in this Jātaka that principle is contrasted with the view that destiny, or necessity, niyati, always decides our lives, and even though we might reincarnate, our actions mean nothing: we are not puriﬁ ed or deﬁ led by our actions, only time will purify us, and in the end, at the world conﬂ agration, our actions will be puriﬁ ed anyway. 37 In the present story king Aṅ gati is a recent convert of the Buddha, and identical to the famous Uruvela-Kassapa, whom the Buddha wishes to show as his convert — and not the other way around, since Uruvela- Kassapa was a great teacher and magician. One evening king Aṅ gati considers what to do for entertainment and counsels with his ministers.

One of them, Alāta, who was a former incarnation of Devadatta, wishes to make war with the neighbouring state to entertain the king, but another minister suggests it would be a better idea to listen to a sage.

Th e sage they choose, though, teaches the doctrine of no retribution and of universal necessity, contrary to the teachings of the Buddha.

Alāta agrees, since in his former life, which he remembers, he was a butcher, killing a lot of living beings, but now he is a great general — thus his former bad actions have meant nothing for his status in this life. Another poor man there, an ascetic keeping all his vows and fasts, gains nothing, even though he practiced the same virtuous life also in his former reincarnation — thus he also decides to give up that hard ascetic life for pleasures. Th e story ends with the king being convinced by the doctrine of no retribution, and orders his retinue and palace to produce for him only pleasure and entertainment, so that he can give up his administrative duties, which provide him with no fun.

It took his delightful daughter, named Rujā, to get him onto better ways: she was born from his main queen — all his other sixteen thou- sand other wives were barren. “She had oﬀ ered prayers for a hundred thousand ages,” she kept the fasting days and gave away all her riches to the poor. Useless, said the king, because good actions have no eﬀ ect. Th e kamma, however, is accumulated gradually, and eventually, like when the load of a ship is too heavy, it sinks, just as one gradually 37) Such views are in Buddhism usually called ucchedavāda, “school of discontinuity,” but in general also kālavāda, “school of time.” 278 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 accumulating bad kamma in the end will sink into hell. Likewise, a pair of scales, when ﬁ lled on one side, will gradually rise like a good person to heaven. It took, however, a tale of her former incarnations, and a sermon of the Bodhisatta on hell, to persuade the king to give up his wrong views and destructive ways.

To illustrate her point she recalled her seven last incarnations. First, she was the son of a smith who committed much evil with his friend — corrupting other men’s wives as if he were an immortal. Th e next incar- nation was not that bad, as the son of a rich merchant family, fostered and honoured, learned and devoted to good works. In the next rebirth, though, came the full force of kamma: she was reborn in the Rorava Hell for an extended period, and after that as a monkey whose father bit oﬀ his testicles, as a result of touching other people’s wives. 38 Th en, before being born as a human again, she was successively a castrated ox, a human neither man nor woman, then a goddess at the court of the king of the gods, and in the end she was born as Rujā, as the bad results waned. She would be born as a woman, though, for seven more rebirths, since to be born as a man is more diﬃ cult. She tried to persuade her father with her sermon on kamma, but it did not work, and it took the Bodhisatta to depict the punishments of hell and scare him before the king was put on the right track again. Th e Bodhisatta was then named Nārada and incarnated in none less than the creator god Brahma. Th us the story illustrates the mobility of the cosmos: the creator god is also a particular being in a particular incarnation, not some kind of eternal divine entity. Th e god took pity on the worshipping girl who wanted to save her father from hell, he assumed the looks of an ascetic in this world and then convinced the king that there indeed are other worlds, like heaven and hell, contrary to the ucchedavāda of the teacher Guṇ a Kassapa, the materialist, nihilist and believer in necessity, fate. Th e ser- mon on hell given by the Bodhisatta spares nothing by way of depicting the worst punishments ( Ja IV.124–25). In this sermon on hell we notice the dogs of hell, reminding us to some extent of Cerberus: “Two dogs Sabala and Sāma of giant size, mighty and strong, devour with their iron teeth him who is driven hence and goes to another world.” Also 38) More detailed punishment for such sinners in hell, and the diﬃ culty of escaping it, in Ja no. 314. J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 279 the river of hell has similarities with Lethe, etc., though in the Buddhist version the river of hell is a poetic image rather than a cosmologically signiﬁ cant entity: “On ﬂ ows the river Vetaraṇ ī, cruel with boiling water and covered with iron lotuses and sharp leaves as he is hurried along covered with blood and with his limbs all cut, in the stream of Vetaraṇ ī where there is nothing to rest upon — who would ask him for his debt?” Th us the king was saved.

Another widespread motif in the narratives of hell is the visit to the infernal regions. It is found in Buddhism in the Nimijātaka (Ja no. 541).

King Nimi, again a former incarnation of the Buddha, is the Buddhist Dante, and Mātali, the charioteer of the god Indra — Ānanda, the Buddha’s main disciple, in the present life — plays the part of Vergil.

Th e gods in Indra’s heaven are so impressed by king Nimi, his generos- ity and his pure behaviour, that they wish to see him in heaven. He is sent for with Indra’s chariot, and on the way to heaven he is shown ﬁ rst the infernal and then the celestial regions by his guide and driver Mātali, who explains the tortures of the sinners in hell. Th e catalogue is long:

misers and those with bad language are eaten by dogs and other ani- mals; those hurting and tormenting people without sins lie on the ground pounded with red-hot irons; those bribing witnesses and deny- ing debts are burned in coal-pits; those hurting ascetics or brahmins are ﬁ red in an iron cauldron; those killing birds are boiled in hot water; those cheating by mixing chaﬀ in the grain try, thirsty, to drink from a river, but the water turns into chaﬀ ; thieves are pierced by arrowheads and spikes; hunters are fastened by the neck and their bodies are torn to pieces; those harming their friends must lie in a stinking lake; matri- cides and patricides are punished in a lake of blood; dishonest traders have their tongues pierced with hooks and must live like ﬁ sh on land; women who leave their husbands to satisfy their lust are buried down to their waists, and men seducing other people’s wives are taken by their legs and thrown headlong into hell; and, the worst of all punishments, which is not speciﬁ ed, though, is for heretics. Indra in his heaven is worried that Nimi would consume all his life in his cosmic travel, so he instructs Mātali to show him the whole universe in a ﬂ ash, since a small moment in other worlds, like heaven, is like a month for humans, even though at the time the story unfolds, humans lived four times eighty four thousand years — again an example of the enormous time-spans 280 J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 imagined in Indian mythology. However, Nimi arrives safely in heaven after visiting a number of heavenly abodes and being explained how the extreme happiness experienced by the inmates there is the fruit of good actions. Nimi gives a sermon in heaven on the balance between good deeds and ascetic penance, and then goes back to his kingdom to make his son the new king. He would himself spend his last eighty-four thou- sand years as an ascetic, as had his eighty-four thousand predecessors.

Th e Buddhist Jātaka literature may, with a certain right, be regarded as the ﬁ rst ﬁ ction literature. Th e stories usually seem to have an enter- taining character, and may not be intended to be taken as absolutely serious — indeed this tendency develops from the more realistic story- telling in the speeches of the Buddha, via the Jātakas, to the Mahāyāna sūtras, which deﬁ nitely were not intended to be read as anything but ﬁ ctitious literature into which the dogmas of Buddhism were woven.

Th e transformation of the Netherworld from an often sad place for the deceased forefathers into a place of retribution and punishment for bad behaviour constitutes a problem in the study of religions. And it is not easy to explain how the idea of hell was propagated. If our under- standing of the dates is correct, the Buddhist idea of hell is historically prior to the same idea in the Mediterranean cultures. Th us the follow- ing question may be posed: did the idea of hell originate in India with Buddhism and then spread to the West, or did the idea originate inde- pendently in the Mediterranean world? Clearly, there was ample com- munication between India and the West over sea and land during the centuries before and after Christ. Th us the diﬀ usion of the idea of hell from the East to the West is historically and geographically possible.

One cannot but notice that the “fully developed hell” originates in the West much at the same time as monastic institutions and practices, and one can argue, even with simple Freudian arguments, that monks and nuns are psychologically inclined to condemn to eternal punishments the sinners practising what they are themselves denied. Th e monastic institutions and lifestyle “need” hell, one might say. And Buddhism was indeed the earliest and most important tradition to institutionalize monastic life. Th us it is quite possible that both hell and monastic dis- cipline were, if not necessarily “imported,” at least inﬂ uenced from India when they suddenly became popular in fourth century Egypt and elsewhere around the Mediterranean. In the present paper we have J. Braarvig / Numen 56 (2009) 254–281 281 limited ourselves to the description of the Buddhist hells as they appear in the Pāli sources. Since, however, the original function of hell in Buddhism was to illustrate the workings of kamma, the later Buddhist tradition, with all its variants on the theme, largely built on the same principles as the ideas about hell in early Buddhism.

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