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1 LECTURE NOTES/ Explanation of the Reading: HUME (pages 9 -37; 39 -42) (As you are reading these notes and the text, you will find that they are wordy , and somehow , they make the same point over and over again. This is do ne for emphasis and understanding — that is, if you did not get it the first time, may you will the second or third time. ) Hume was an empiricist. This means that he believed that all substantive knowledge comes primarily from the senses. This also means that every kind of knowledge can be proved or verified empirically by the senses. Hume beli eves that we have reason and that humans can use their rational abilities to prove some kind of knowledge. Such knowledge, such as 2+2=4, is usually obvious or self -evident. Moreover, after one acquires knowledge from the senses, it can be manipulated by reason and our imagination. SECTION II: Of the Origin of Ideas To demonstrate that all forms of substantive knowledge come from experience, he wants to explore the origin of human ideas, that is, where ideas come from. He says everyone will agree that th ere is a difference between, (1) what one perceives with the mind when one immediately feels pain, excessive heat, cold and so on, and (2) when, perhaps, some moments later on, one recalls from and to memory such sensations of pain, heat or cold, or when one imagines such sensations. What we perceive immediately he calls SENSATION , and what the mind remembers or imagines, he calls THOUGHT. He says the mind or THOUGHT (via memory and imagination) may copy o r mimic what the senses perceive, but such copy can never have the same kind of force, energy, clarity, sharpness, strength, and vibrancy as what the senses perceive immediately. What one perceives with the senses immediately represents the objects that ca use them in a lively manner. We usually are able to distinguish between what is seen immediately and what we imagine or remember based on their liveliness and vibrancy. Thus he says that the MOST LIVELY THOUGHT is inferior or not as strong as the DULLEST S ENSATION . For instance, when we reflect on our past feelings and emotions of love or anger, they usually mirror very closely, copy or represent the objects that gave rise to them. But they are usually not as sharp as the original feeling or emotion. We u sually know clearly the difference between them. Hume then distinguishes between IDEAS, which are the products or content of THOUGHT (the mind via memory and imagination), and IMPRESSIONS, which are the products or contents of SENSATION (what we immediatel y perceive from the senses). The major difference between IDEAS and IMPRESSION is the difference in their degree of liveliness, sharpness, and clarity. Hume indicates that the mind is unrestrained in its power to think of or imagine things. But it is impo ssible for the mind to think of, make up, or imagine things that we have never seen or heard. For instance, the mind can think of monsters it has never seen or join ideas together to form new ideas. He says the only thing s that are beyond the power of the mind to think of are ideas that involve absolute contradiction . For instance, the mind cannot think of the idea that “Today is Monday” and “Today is not Monday.” This is a contradiction. This is one way in which the mind is limited in what it can think of. The power of the mind may be confined to the narrow limits of having the ability to COMPOUND, 2 TRANSPOSE, AUGMENT, and DIMINISH ideas that we get from the senses and experience. In other words, if we get ideas from the senses, we can put those ideas together in different ways to form some new ideas that we have never seen. The mind is unlimited in what it can do with ideas, in terms of how it can infinitely compound ideas. For instance, one can form the idea of a golden mountain even if on e has never seen a golden mountain . One can form such an idea based on the fact that one has seen gold and a mountain . We have the impression of gold , the impression of a mountain , and then we form the idea of a golden mountain . From the power of the mind to compound, we can also form the ideas of different mythical figures or objects that do not exist, which we have never seen, such as a CENTAUR (an object with a human head, trunk and arms, and the body and legs of a horse), PEGASUS (a winged horse), and U NICORN (a single long -horned horse with the tail of a lion). Hume insists that we have SIMPLE IDEAS and COMPOUND IDEAS. Any compound idea can be broken down into simple ideas, in the sense that the compound idea of a golden mountain can be broken down i nto the simple ideas of gold and mountain . Any idea we have is a copy of or must originate from an impression . If we have never seen a mountain and gold , we cannot form the idea of a golden mountain . This is another sense in which the mind is limited in wh at it can imagine. (The first sense in which the mind is limited is that it cannot imagine a c ontradic tion). The mind is limited in a second sense by the raw materials it gets from the senses, since only those raw materials can be manipulat ed by the mind. In an indirect criticism of Descartes, Hume argues that the idea of God as having infinite qualities is something that we manufactured based on the power and ability of the mind (thought) to augment things. Thus, from the idea that things are imperfect and finite, we augment by contrast ing to form the ideas of a perfect and an infinite being. The ideas of perfection and the infinite originate from impressions of imperfection and the finite. He says anyone who has any idea must be able to indicate the impression(s) from which such an idea originates. Thus, if someone has defective sense organs such that he cannot perceive with the senses or have impressions of a certain object, then such a person also cannot have or form an idea of such object. Hence a blind person cannot have or form ideas of color, and a deaf person cannot have or form ideas of sound. However, if these senses are restored to this person, he will be able to have sense impressions and then the corresponding ideas. And a p erson who has never felt a sentiment or passion is also not capable of fully having such a passion. A person who has never felt love, anger, or hatred cannot have the passion of love, anger or hatred. Hume argues that there is one situation or an example that contradicts the above principle, that is, a situation where one can have or form an idea that does not come from some sense impressions.

He argues that we usually have different ideas of different colors but also see their similarities.

The impressio n of each shade of color produces an idea that is different from other shades. Let us imagine someone who has a sense of sight for thirty years and in his life time saw different shades of color. But he never saw one shade of blue. If all the shades of blu e color are placed in front of him with the exception of this shade, Hume argues that he would notice that there is a shade missing or that there is a blank space by considering the gradual descending order of the shades. He would notice that there is gre ater distance between one shade and another, where this particular shade is missing from. Hume argues that this person will be able to supply the shade of blue that this missing from the space even though he has never seen that particular missing shade. Th us , he can imagine the missing shade and supply it by using his mind and thought to add and subtract from the two shades of blue on both sides of this missing shade. Hume argues that this example proves that simple ideas may not necessarily or always in every singl e 3 instance derive from or correspond to an impression . However, this example alone, because it is unusual, is not enough to alter the principle that every idea must come from or correspond to an impression . Hume argues that this principle that every idea must come from or correspond to an impression is his foundation for his empiricist doctrine. This empiricist doctrine and the principle on which it is based imply that we should consider all metaphysics and purely abstract ideas as unintelligible, insofar as they have no origin in any sense impression. It is in this sense that Hume argues that all knowledge or ideas must be empirically testable or verifiable –based on their corresponding sense impression. It is in this regard that Hume is considered to be th e forefather of logical positivism , the 20 th Century philosophy that says that in order for anything to be considered meaningful or for something to be considered a meaningful knowledge, there must be a way or method of verifying or testing it empirically. Hume argues that the mind has difficulty with abstract ideas because they are naturally faint, obscure, and confusing to the mind. They are not comprehended or understood clearly, except to the extent that they are conceived of as similar to other ideas that we are more clear about. They also do not have anything determinate that we associate with them. When contrasted with impressions that we get externally and internally, abstract ideas are not as strong or vivid as what we get from the senses: impressi ons or sensations. Impressions are stronger, more vivid and clear, and we are less likely to be in error or mistaken about our impressions, compared to our abstract ideas, which are dull and faint; hence, we are prone to be mistaken about them. He indicate s that if we have any suspicion about any philosophical idea or term, or how it is used, one way to approach the issue or problem is to ask: from which impression is the idea in question derived ? By asking and trying to address this question, we may be abl e to clarify, illuminate, and remove all the dispute or confusion regarding its nature and relevance to reality. Hume indicates this as an empirical way or approach to resolve philosophical disputes. SECTION III: Of the Association of Ideas In this section, Hume indicates that there are principles regarding how the mind associates and makes connections between and among ideas. He says when we have thoughts or form ideas in our mind (via memory or imagination), we bring with those ideas or introduce i nto our mind some method of thinking about and making connections between and among them. We notice that there is succession of ideas , in that one idea or thought leads to or follows from another. We also find a way of putting ideas together or compounding them. These connections represent ways of making sense of and understanding these ideas. He says there are three principles of making connections between or among ideas, which are: 1. Resemblance ; 2. Contiguity (closeness) in time and space; and 3. Cause and effect . (1) With respect to the principle of resemblance , he says when we think of or have the idea of a picture, we think of the original object which the picture is an image of. We think that the picture or the image resembles or looks like the obj ect that it represents. (2) When we also think of an object or form ideas about it, we think of the space it occupies and what it is close to in terms what is in front of it, behind it, or beside it. These other things that it is close usually help us to f rame our thoughts about it. (3) When we also have ideas about or think of an object, we think of what caused it, how it came about, who made it, and what effects in can bring about or cause. He argues that we also have the principle of CONTRARY as a way we make connection between ideas or think about things. We see or think of things in terms of their opposites, in terms of what they are not. When I see a pen, I think of it as not being a pencil or a book. Moreover, we also think 4 of things in terms of how o ne idea causes the destruction of another. Section IV: Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operation of the Understanding: Part I Hume argues that the products of the human mind or inquiry involve two kinds: (1) Relation of Ideas and (2) Matters of Facts . Relation of ideas involves how the mind connects ideas together. These kinds of ideas are intuitively demonstrable or proven by the mere operation of the mind or by thinking the ideas through. These kinds of ideas involve mathematics and logic. For insta nce, the idea that “all triangles have three angles” is obvious and can be proven by thinking about the meaning of the words alone in order to see how the idea of a “triangle” is related in meaning to the idea of “three angles.” Another example is the idea that 2+2 = 4; that is, the idea (or value) of “2+2" is related to the idea (value) of “4" by the idea of “=” (equality). The truth of these ideas does not depend on anything in reality or how things truly are. But matters of fact involve ideas whose tru th must be verified by knowing the real world and how things are in reality. The contrary (opposites) of statements or ideas involving matters of fact can be true depending on the situation. We can imagine or think of the opposite of such statements or ide as as being true. But we cannot think of the idea of relations of ideas such as 2+2=4 as being false. Denial of statements involving relations of ideas such as “all triangles do not have three angles” involves a contradiction. It is like saying that “all t riangles are not triangles” or that “2+2 is not equal to 2+2." For instance, the truth of the idea that “the sun will rise tomorrow” depends on what actually happens in reality. It may be true that the sun rises tomorrow and it may not be true that the sun ris es tomorrow –that is, it may be totally cloudy all day. Moreover, the idea that “today is Tuesday” is true because, perhaps, today is really Tuesday. But this statement can be false or we can think of it being false if today is not Tuesday but Friday or Mon day. Hume goes on to raise the fundamental question of whether besides what we get from our senses or what we recall from memory, we have evidence to prove that there is actually something in reality, i.e., as a matter of fact, which gives rise to or caus es our sensation. He argues that this issue has not been explored in philosophy and, that when we explore it we may be able to avoid some of our errors or mistakes which have derived from our faith in the ideas that there are things outside that give rise to our sensations. He argues that all our reasoning about matters of fact are based on our idea of cause and effect: that things cause our sensation . In other words, our sensations are the effects of something that causes them. This idea of cause and effort goes beyond what we get from our senses and memory. He says if you ask someone why he believes some fact that is not currently present to the senses, such as, the fact that his friend is in France, he would rely on some other facts such as the letter he received from him. In this case, the person believes that there is a causal connection between the fact o f the existence of the “the letter”, and the inference, which is , “his belief that his friend is in France.” Without this connection, the inferen ce becomes questionable. For instance, hearing a voice leads us to the inference that there is a person. We automatically rely on this idea in our reasoning. We believe that heat and light are the effects of fire, and that the idea of heat can be inferred from fire. He questions how we arrive at that knowledge of cause and effect, and the nature of the evidence that tells us that there is a cause behind an effect. Hume argues that the knowledge of cause and effect is not attained a priori (prior to or inde pendent of experience) from the mere abstract reasoning that is not based on facts in reality. (Check the meaning of a priori in your dictionary). Rather, such knowledge of cause and effect is attained solely from experience. The things we get from experie nce are the following: (1) we see 5 that two things are constantly conjoined , in that when we see one, we also in addition always see the other. If someone sees for the first time an object he has never seen before, he would not be able to tell by simply examining t he object what it is that caused it. For instance, from seeing the fluidity and transparency of water for the first time, we can never tell that it could cause someone to suffocate. Thus we could never foretell or forecast what would happen or what the eff ects are that an object can cause by merely looking at the object. We usually attribute to an object some intricate machinery or secret structure or power that allows it to be able to bring about some effects. Such attribution comes from what we have seen before based on our experience. Besides our experience, we cannot provide any reason why we believe that milk and bread will give us nourishment or nutrient, or that a lion or a tiger can kill us. We usually rely on the CUSTOM/HABIT of the mind . (Hume use s ‘custom’ here in terms of what we are ‘used to’ or ‘accustomed to’, in terms of how we think). We have seen or experienced things and see one thing follow from another, and the mind becomes accustomed to and has the habit of thinking that one is the caus e of the other. We can never find the idea of an effect inherent in the object that is considered the cause by merely examining the object alone without relying on past observation. This is because the idea of the cause and the idea of the effect are total ly different and one is not contained in or related to the other. The two (cause and effect) are two distinct, perhaps, unconnected events. We simply use our minds to connect them based on what the mind has acquired by HABIT or CUSTOM from experience. Besi des what experience teaches us, we can always reason to the conclusion that a different effect could arise from a particular cause. We can think of different possible effects from a cause. A number of variables can occur in reality to make it possible in u nusual situations that fire does not burn something. For instance, we can think of fire turning paper into gold or fire making things cold. It is not a contradictio n to think so. Yet we do not think so because we have never seen it happen. Thus, Hume as ks, why is it that we stick to one possibility, such as that fire will cause heat or something to burn? Why not otherwise? The only reason why we do not think otherwise, Hume argues, is experience or observation (what we have seen over and over again) whic h is the basis for our habit of the mind in our reasoning that a particular effect will arise from a particular cause. Hume argues that we have such a habit of the mind because of our efforts to make things simple to understand. As such, we come up with t he idea of an ultimate cause and the idea that such a cause has some power that it uses to bring about certain effects in the world. We are always looking for general principles that will help us to explain, make sense of, and understand things in nature a nd reality. We come up with the idea of cause and effect as a general principle to help us to explain what happens in reality and why they happen –based on some cause. In spite of these efforts to understand things, we keep finding out things we are ignoran t about. The goal of philosophy, in particular, moral philosophy and metaphysics, has been to try to explore all these issues and to find out what we do not know . But we keep realizing based on philosophical inquiry that such knowledge of things elude us a nd that we cannot avoid errors. Not only can philosophy not give us knowledge or help us to avoid errors, but geometry or mathematics also cannot help us in understanding nature and in our search for the knowledge of ultimate cause. This is in spite of th e fact that geometry or mathematics is noted for being a way of reasoning accurately. Hume argues that when we have certain laws, principles and facts, we may be able to reason logically from them to arrive at accurate results or conclusion. However, he argues that our knowledge of the laws or principles we rely on in such logical reasoning usually come from experience. We have knowledge of these laws or principles and their effects in the world in specific instances based on experience. When we use experie nce to discover, say, the 6 law of motion, then we are able to use geometry to calculate and reason how such law may affect specific things in reality. Reasoning alone can never tell that there are causes. Without experience of the nature of objects, humans could never know by reasoning alone that crystal is the effect of heat, and that the effect of extreme cold is the formation of ice. PART II Hume reiterates that our reasoning about matters of fact is based on the relation of cause and effect . And that th e basis of our reasoning about cause and effect is based on experience . He says questions regarding the basis for the conclusions that we derive from experience is more difficult to answer. Hume makes a similar point that we saw Socrates make in the Apol ogy and Euthyphro, which is that philosophers, and perhaps, people who think they know a lot and have superior knowledge are usually uncomfortable when they encounter someone who is curious and is willing to question them and engage them in critical reflec tion. He says such questioning usually results in confusion and frustration. Hume therefore advises that the best way to avoid such confusion is to be modest and humble in our knowledge claims. And that people should learn to be self -critical of themselves so that they can identify errors in their thinking or beliefs before others point them out to them –which may embarrass them. This is an important lesson we should learn from philosophy as involving critical thinking and reflection . When we critically refl ect, then we will be able to show the merit of acknowledging our ignorance in terms of our willingness to inquire and find out the truth. This point made by Hume reflects the essence of philosophy that we talked about before as the pursuit of wisdom by a process of crit ical self -reflection . This point also teaches us the virtue of intellectual humility and modesty, which requires us to avoid arrogance and not to be too cocky about what we believe we know. We may find out that we are wrong and do not know what we think we know. This reminds us of the qualities of a critical thinker we saw before. Hume suggests that the basis for the conclusions that we draw from experience is not reasoning or any process of understanding. With respect to what the real basis is, he argues that we do not quite know because nature has prevented us from knowing many things about nature or the secrets of how nature really operates. Nature allows us to know some superficial qualities of objects like colors or weight of, say, bread. However, natu re conceals from us the powers and principles underlying objects in terms of how they really operate, behave, or bring about certain effects. Our reason and senses can never give us any information regarding the power or ability of bread to nourish. The qu ality of nourishment of bread is never revealed to us by the senses or mere reasoning alone. We are able to see an object move but we don’t ever see the power in the object that makes it move. In spite of the fact that we never see in objects their actual power and are thus ignorant of these qualities in objects, we always assume that they have secret powers by which they are able to bring about certain effects. As such, whenever we see objects, we think of them as causes and expect certain effects t o derive from them, even though we do not see the powers by which they bring about the effects we expect. Usually, we expect such effects based on prior experience, in that we have seen such objects before bring about certain effects, such that whenever we see the objects, based on prior experiences, we automatically expect the same effects that we have seen before from the objects. Hume indicates that we do not know that there is any connection between what we see in the objects and the secret powers that we attribute to them by which they bring about or cause certain effects. The mind forms the idea of such a connection based on experience, in that we have seen them together before on a number of occasions. Hume argues 7 that we see things in terms of consta nt and regular conjunction based on experience. Hume argues that, truly, we cannot rely on experience to prove such a connection , because what we got from experience or saw before , were specific information about those specific objects at a particular time, and in a particular space or place. We saw those objects in the past. The objects we see now are new except that we see similarity between the new objects and the old ones we saw before. The question is: why do we extend that past ex perience to the present experience and to future experience in order to think that the object we see presently and the object we will see in future are similar to and will behave the same way ? The bread I ate in the past nourished me. The fire I saw in the past burnt me. These I know. But, why do we think that this new bread I see right now will nourish me now or that the one I will see in future will nourish me in future? It is a different and a new bread, but is similar to the past bread. Why should I think tha t this fire I see now will burn me or the fire I see in the future will burn me too? What evidence do I have for the present or the future behavior of the bread and fire? It cannot be based on past experience or past behavior because we do not know that th ere is a connection between the past and future. Hume argues that this kind of reasoning from the past to the present or future involves the mind inferring a consequence or a connection. It involves a process or step that needs to be explained. Such infere nce, process or step is not intuitive or obvious. And Hume says he does not understand the process or step, and he cannot provide an account of the process.

Those who argue that such a process or step exists, and that it is the basis for our reasoning abou t matters of fact, have a responsibility to provide or prove it. Hume argues that his denial that there is no connection between the past and future, and that we cannot draw any inference about the future from our experience of the past, may be convincing if people try to find or provide the basis for it and cannot find one. He also argues that if we examine the different branches of knowledge, we will find that none can provide the basis for the Principle of Induction , which involves our thinking that we can draw an inference about the future from our past experience . He argues that all our reasoning can be divided into two types: (1) Demonstrative Reasoning , which involves relation of ideas or mere operation of the mind, and (2) Moral Reasoning , which inv olves matters of fact or things that exist in reality. Hume argues that we cannot prove the principle of induction (that we can draw an inference about the future from our past experience) based on demonstrative reasoning . This is because a denial of this principle does not involve a contradiction. Its contrary can be true because the course of nature may change, such that fire may no longer burn in future. It is intelligible to say that trees will bloom in January and shed leaves in July. We can imagine it as a possibility, and such imagination does not involve a contradiction. It cannot be proved false by mere simple abstract or demonstrative or a prioi reasoning, or the operation of the mind alone. The idea that we must trust our past experiences as the basis on which we predict the future, which is the nature of reasoning about matters of fact, is only likely or probable . In other words, the idea or reasoning that the future will be like or resemble our past experience or that a particular cause will br ing about a certain effect is not guaranteed, but it is only likely. Such (inductive) reasoning is probabilistic. The idea that the future will resemble the past cannot be proved conclusively. Any efforts to prove it will lead us going around in circles be cause we will rely on experience to prove it. But we cannot rely on our experience to prove our experience. This involves using an idea to prove itself, and it involves reasoning in circles. Such reasoning, which is called circular reasoning or begging the question, is not an adequate way to reason or prove something. I cannot use the idea that “Today is Monday” to prove adequately that “Today is Monday.” However, all arguments from experience rely on our experience of the similarities that 8 we see among objects or causes, on the basis of which we expect the same or similar effects. If the fire I see today is similar to the fire I saw last week, I will expect it to burn me today because it burnt me last week. We rely on experience and use it to guide our lives. Only a fool or madman will reject or dispute experience and refuse to use it to guide his conduct. However, he says philosophers are allowed to question the validity of our reliance on experience, perhaps, only in an effort to provide the basis for such a belief. This is what we saw with Descartes and Socrates in the books we have read before. Although we rely on experience for the prediction of the future, we allow for variations. When we see eggs, it is similar to the eggs we have seen before. But we may expect that there could be a difference in taste if there is a difference in the seasoning that is used to prepare the eggs. It is usually after so many uniform experiences in the past that we can firmly expect a similar experience in the future. It is usually difficult to draw a conclusion that a different effect will occur if we have had so many uniform instances in the past that have been similar.

There is no solid basis in reasoning that will lead us to expect a different effect in future when we have not seen such a different effect in the p ast. While Hume cannot imagine the reasoning or basis for such a belief, he is , however , open to the possibility , i.e., in case anyone has it. Hume argues that the issue and problem he has raised with respect to the basis and proof for the principle of induction , which makes us believe that the future will resemble our past experience , is also similar to the issue or problem of causality . The problem of causality involves our belief that because we see some qualities in objects, we infer that there is some secret power in the object on the basis of which it is able to bring about certain effects . Hume argues that we have no basis for such reasoning or inference. For instance, the qualities that we see in fire do not ha ve any connection to any secret power it may have that makes it to cause things to burn. Similarly, the qualities we see in bread do not have any connection to the idea that it has the secret powers to provide nourishment. Without prior numerous experience s (or tests in the lab), we are usually not able to infer this idea of secret power or nourishment. Hence, we do not infer anything about an object the first time we see it, until we have experienced it many times and then experience what it can do and the effects it can bring about. It is only after such numerous experiences that we expect certain effects next time we see the object by assuming that the object has some secret power to bring about some effects. The inference from the idea that you s aw a cau se and effect in the past , to the idea that there will be a cause and effect in the future , is not intuitively obvious. It cannot be proven by abstract a priori demonstrative reasoning alone. If it is not based on demonstrative reasoning , what then is the basis for this idea of cause and effect or the principle of causality ? For Hume, to say it is based on experience is, again, to be involved in circular reasoning or begging the question. It involves the idea of using experience to prove experience, which is not a good way to provide a proof. If it is possible that nature can change and that things may turn out differently, then past experience cannot conclusively prove the principle of causality. Past experience and similarities in past experiences can onl y prove past experiences and past similarities; it cannot prove future experiences or future similarities because any future experience may change and may be different from the past. Nature may change and objects may cause different effects in future. We h ave no evidence that nature will continue to be regular and that objects will continue to have their secret powers, in order to make the future resemble the past and make certain causes to continue to bring about certain effects. Hume suggests that one mi ght argue that his doubts about the principles of causality and induction have no merit or basis because he himself does not behave as if he himself believes in 9 his own doubt . He does not be have as if he is not expecting the future to resemble the pas t or that he does not expect certain effects to result from certain causes. It appears that his own actions disprove his questions and skepticism. He says if anyone says this, then the person has simply misunderstood his point. He says he distinguishe s between himself as a person who acts based on commonsense and himself as a philosopher who is curious, inquiring and questioning in order to provide answers for deep fundamental questions. (Note the goal and subject matter of philosophy that we talked ab out before.) NOTE: As a person with commonsense, he is quite satisfied to accept the principles of induction and causality in order to live a meaningful life. But as a philosopher, he is not satisfied but interested in finding the foundation for these beliefs an d principles. It is in this regard that he is raising the issue to seek a solution ; that is, by acknowledging our ignorance , we can inquire in order to improv e our knowledge. He argues that it is arrogant of anyone to think that because he is not aware or is ignorant of something, therefore it does not exist. It is true that we as humans can improve our knowledge by experience, and by seeing the nature of objects and the effects that re sult from objects. A child learns to avoid fire by experiencing pain from the burning effect of fire. Upon experiencing this pain, he is likely to expect a similar pain in future upon seeing fire. It is unclear how a child arrives at this conclusion. If one insists that it is based on reasoning, then we need to know what the nature of that reasoning is. One cannot say th at such reasoning is complex and hard to understand , because if this was so, it would be difficult for a child to comprehend it. But it does not appear that difficult for a child to comprehend and understand. If one tries to provide an intricate and complicated argument or reasoning as a basis for this belief, one will give up and find out that such a belief is really not based on any reasoning . He says if he is correct in his view, then it is not as if he has made a major discovery. But if he is wrong, it just proves that he is not a very good or smart scholar since he cannot find an argument for an idea that he has understood and lived by sinc e he was a child. SECTION V: Sceptical Solution to these Doubts Hume indicates that philosophy, similar to religion, has a problem, which is that, in trying to correct our habits, commonsense, and normal ways of doing things, it seems to only push us to a ccept what our natural tendencies tell us. He says one branch, approach or method of philosophy seems to have less of this problem. This he calls academic or sceptical philosophy , which involves critical examination, being tentative in our beliefs, and ack nowledging our fallibility –that we as humans make mistakes. As such, this approach to philosophy seeks to suspend judgment, engage in rigorous inquiry, and critically examine our commonsense beliefs, before accepting them. This approach to philosophy is in terested in finding out the truth and highlighting our errors. Hume indicates that this approach is generally disliked because it deviates from general attitudes or commonsense. It is usually hated by many people. This approach to philosophy that Hume descri bes is similar to what we saw in Socrates and Descartes in seeking to question commonsense and indicate the errors associated with it. However, this approach to philosophy is never meant to undermine our commonsense reasoning or beliefs. He insists that ou r natural tendencies will always have priority over any abstract philosophical reasoning . As Hume indicated, what he seeks to examine is the nature of the step in the process of reasoning and understanding that allows us to conclude, (1) that there are se cret powers in objects in virtue of which they cause or bring about effects, and (2) that the future will resemble the past, such that we can draw inference about the future from our past experience. (1) He says if someone with good faculties of reason an d reflection is suddenly brought 10 into the world, he would notice or observe that objects or events appear in CONTINUAL SUCCESSION. He would not be able to observe anything else. He would not be able to reason that some things are causes of other things bec ause he would not observe or see some secret powers in the objects or things. And simply because one thing, object, or event comes after another (in CONTINUAL SUCCESSION), he would not be able to conclude or infer that one thing causes another. Without mor e experience, he would not be able to conclude anything about any matters of fact beyond what he is able sense or recall from memory. (2) However, if this person has more experience by living long in the world to see many similar objects, then he would be able to see or observe that some objects are CONSTANTLY CONJOINED. By seeing many times this constant conjunction between objects , he is then able to infer that one object will follow from another. He would not see the secret power in objects (cause) on t he basis of which it is able bring about another object (effect). Hume argues that the principle which allows this person to draw the inference about one object from seeing another is CUSTOM or HABIT. We acquire this custom or habit by seeing things repea tedly, which then gives the mind the inclination to expect certain things. He argues that this tendency to expect things based on what we have seen before is part of human nature. After seeing heat or burn associated with fire over a number of times, we no w form the tendency to expect heat or burn whenever we see fire. One could not draw that inference by seeing only one instance; it is only after one has seen many instances. This proves that our reasoning or inference about cause and effect or induction is based solely on HABIT or CUSTOM, and that it is not based on a priori REASONING alone or mere operation of the mind . He argues that CUSTOM is the way we use experience to guide our lives and conduct. It makes our experience useful and relevant to how we l ive our lives, in terms of trying to use certain means to achieve some desired goal, aim, or end. Without such custom and habit, we will not be able to make sense of our lives and what we see in our everyday lives –we will be ignorant of matters of fact and how to reason practically. Hume argues that although custom and habit allow us to reason in ways that go beyond what we perceive with our senses and recall from memory, it is absolutely necessary that we must have some facts based on the senses. The mind is then able, based on custom and habit, to manipulate and work on the ideas that we acquire by the senses to draw conclusions that are themselves not acquired by the senses. For instance, if someone finds himself in a desert and finds the remains of s ome sophisticated buildings, he would conclude that the place was once occupied or inhabited by civilized people. He is able to arrive at this conclusion because he has seen buildings before which are products of human civilization. A historian can constru ct a history of such people based on such remains, but the idea or informatio n will be more robust if there are eye -witnesses to corroborate what he sees. Without evidence from memory and the senses, our knowledge or conclusions from objects will only be hypothetical or a speculati on about nature. We accept beliefs about matters of fact because there other facts that may help to support such beliefs. This process of reasoning, proof, and providing evidence can go on infinitely or indefinitely because the experi ence that we use as evidence or proof for another experience may also need to be proved. In order to avoid this infinite process (infinite regress) of using experience to prove experience, we must stop somewhere with the evidence that we perceive with the senses or recall from memory. Otherwise, we will face the difficult position of accepting that our beliefs have no final foundation or ultimate proof. Hume concludes that the simple lesson that we can learn from these inquiries are as follows: (1) all our beliefs about matters of fact or existing things in the real world are derived from objects which are seen directly or recalled from memory . (2) That custom or habit of the mind allows us to 11 connect or conjoin objects or events as cause and effect. In other words, because we have seen things or objects repeatedly, whe n one is conjoined with another, we have the tendency based on our natural instincts or acquired habit to expect one thing or object whenever we see another. This idea is not based on a ny abstract reasoning, but is based on experience. PART II Hume argues again that it may appear that the mind has limitless ability to freely imagine different things. He says that such freedom to imagine is, however, limited by the original ideas that th e mind gets from internal and external senses. In other words, the mind is unlimited in its ability and power to mix, compound, separate, and divide various ideas in different ways to form new ideas. Whatever ideas the mind has, it has the unlimited power and ability to do anything to them. But if the mind does not have any ideas, it will have nothing to mix, compound, separate, and divide. It is in this sense that the mind is limited by the original stock of ideas it has. The ability of the mind to imagin e gives rise to Hume’s distinction between BELIEF and FICTION. All t he idea s that we voluntarily, rationally, and deliberately ACCEPT or assent to , are BELIEF S. However, FICTION is any imagined idea which we do not necessarily accept as TRUE. For instance, we can imagine the FICTION of a CENTAUR by joining the head of a man to the body of a horse. However, we may not believe that such an object exists or ever existed, and as such, it does not qualify as a BELIEF. So, a BELIEF is characterized by the sentiments or feelings of deliberate, rational, or voluntary acceptance that is associated with an idea. Such a feeling or sentiment has to do with the reason for accepting the idea as TRUE. When an idea or object is presented to the senses or memory, based on custom and habit, our mind imagines the idea in terms of the features, quality, and characteristics that are usually attached to or associated with the idea. Based on these features and quality, the mind deliberates in order to decide whether to believe or accept it as real or true. Some ideas are accepted while some ideas are rejected by us with reasons. As Hume indicated, we can always imagine the contrary or opposite of any matter of f act, and the ability to do this to any idea or object has a part to play in whether we accept or reject it. If we see a billiard ball moving toward another ball on a flat surface, we can always imagine (without being absurd or involved in a contradiction) that it will not hit the other ball and that it will stop. This idea does not involve a contradiction. But we usually believe that it is likely that the first ball will hit the next ball. Hume argues that a BELIEF involves a more vivid, lively, forceful, firm, steady conception of an object. This suggests that our belief is something we consider to be firm, true, and we are sure of it, based on its vividness and liveliness. This must be contrasted with a mere imagination that we are not sure of and do not consider to be true. We can imagine, conceive of or have ideas of fictitious objects. But such objects are never things we accept as true in order to believe them or consider them worthy of acceptance. Hume argues that a BELIEF has nothing to do with the peculiar nature of an object or the order of an idea. Rather, a BELIEF involves the MANNER in which we conceive of it and the sentiment or feeling we have about it, in terms of it being true and worthy of acceptance. Hume agrees that the precise nature of t his feeling or sentiment associated with belief is difficult to explain. However, he insists that this feeling or sentiment is characterized by a kind of JUDGMENT regarding the vividness of the idea, which distinguishes it from the fictions of our imaginat ion. In other words, BELIEF involves a judgment that an idea has more weight and influence, and that it has a greater importance. As such, we are able to use it as a guide for our actions. If we hear the voice of someone we are familiar with giving instruc tions, we consider it real and form the BELIEF that it is coming from that person, and that he means the instructions. Then we may go ahead to respond and act accordingly. The BELIEF 12 involves a CUSTOMARY CONJUNCTION between the object (person) and what is presented to the senses or memory (voice heard). The feeling associated with this belief is more intense. The feeling and response will be different if you were only imagining the voice and instruction of someone who is dead. The feeling here is less inten se. Again, Hume indicates that we can reduce the connections among ideas, or between ideas and object, to three types of reasoning : (1) Resemblance, (2) Contiguity, and (3) Causation. These are the principles that help our minds to unite our thoughts by h elping us to make connections between or among ideas. Hume argues that the belief which arises from the idea of cause and effect is such that we usually arrive at a stronger and steadier conception of an object beyond what is presented to the senses and me mory. For instance, we arrive at the belief that fire will burn us, which is a stronger and steadier belief than what we get from the senses and memory of fire. Hume argues that the ability to do this may be seen as a general principle of how our mind oper ates. (1) To illustrate this principle of resemblance, he says that when we see the picture of a dead friend, we immediately have a lively idea of him by remembering things about him. This idea of him may give rise to, or make more vigorous and forceful, the passion of sorrow or loss. If we see a picture that does not show a resemblance of this dead friend, these ideas and passion will not arise. He says the same thing happens in Catholic ceremonies where certain images or practices remind practitioners o f their faith and also increases their devotion. (2) Hume uses a similar example to illustrate this point regarding the principle of contiguity. He says distance usually diminishes or reduces the force or liveliness of an idea. If we are closer to an obj ect, then the idea of th at object that is created in our mind will be livelier . For instance, when you are hundreds of miles away from your lover, the idea of kissing her is less vivid. But when she is in front of you, you have a more vivid idea of kissing her. (3) He argues that the principle of causation works in a similar way to the principle of contiguity and resemblance. Based on cause and effect, religious people are usually affected (in terms of strengthening their faith and devotion) by the relics and images of holy people who live exemplary lives, in that these are the people they want to imitate. Similarly, the picture of a dead friend may also cause you to feel sorrowful. Hume says in all these examples regarding contiguity and resemblance that we have the BELIEF that an object has the ability to bring about an effect. You have beliefs that your dead friend existed and had some cherished qualities. You also believe that your lover really exists.

Without these beliefs, the ideas will not have any effect. When we throw a piece of wood into fire, our mind will immediately go to the idea that the piece of wood will make the fire burn more and that the fire will not go out. Again, this idea of cause: that the piece of wood will make the fire burn more is not based on reason, but is based on prior experience and the habit or custom of the mind to associate the two ideas, that is, of wood and helping fire burn. This idea involving th e association of ideas (cause and effect) is derived partly from the imp ressions of the wood and fire, and the custom and habit of the mind to associate them based on prior experience. Hume argues that nature is such that there is a pre -established harmony, connection, order, or arrangement in nature that exists among some things which allow one thing to give rise to another. Such relationship exists with some things and not others. For instance, there is some pre -established connection, order, or harmony between fire and wood, which does not exist between fire and steel. Su ch connection of burning also exists between fire and human flesh, which does not exist between water and human flesh. He makes this point again: the idea that there is secret power in an object (fire) to bring about an effect (burn human flesh) is somethi ng 13 we do not know or get from our senses. He says again that we introduce such pre -established harmony into our thoughts based on custom and habit that are formed by seeing such harmony between things over and over again in our experience. Without this hab it of the mind, we will rely solely on our senses and memory. Then we will not be able to live our lives more meaningfully by using objects as means to achieve certain results, such as using fire to heat our homes.

Moreover, we are able to avoid fire and b urns, and the pain associated with it. Because this idea is very important to human life, we cannot conclude that the reasoning from cause to effect is a major error in our reasoning. Although we do not have the knowledge of the relevant facts about the po wer in any cause, nature has given us the instincts to know what causes what, and how to act accordingly. Hume argues that we know how to use our limbs based on our natural instincts, even though we do not have the knowledge of how our muscles and nerves f unction to bring about movement in our limbs. SECTION VII: Of the Idea of Necessary Connections Hume indicates again that whenever we see a cause (fire) we always think of the effect (burning) in a way that suggests that the two are necessarily connected . This connection suggests that we cannot have one without the other. Hume is asking where we get this idea of necessary connection from. He suggested earlier that we should not think that we cannot have one without the other. Instead, we should only think in terms of the high probability or likelihood that fire will cause something to burn. This is because nature may or could change; hence past experiences cannot guarantee the future. The idea that fire will not burn is possible. It is not a contradiction t o say that fire will not burn. There are many variables in reality that we cannot predict. You may strike a match and put it in gasoline and expect it to burn. It may not burn. You will be surprised and shocked. You may investigate to find out that there i s no oxygen. Why? We don’t know! And you could not predict this. Hume argues that the difference between mathematical sciences (relating to abstract and theoretical ideas) and moral sciences (relating to practical or empirical ideas) is that the ideas of mathematical sciences are clear and determinate. For instance, the truth of “2+2 =4" or that “all triangles have three angles and three sides” is clear and obvious. The idea of which action is right or wrong, and whether telling lies is a virtue or vice , is not as clear and obvious if you tell lies to save someone’s life. Moreover, if we see an object, we may mistake it for something else or we may not remember someone because we cannot recall how he looks. He argues that in some cases, the awareness of these two possible situations m ay force one to ensure clarity. Some statements of mathematics may be complex for one to figure out and the features of some objects or some practical ideas may be so clear that no doubts can be raised about their truths. One of the problems we may have in our abil ity to make progress in the practical sciences and metaphysics is that of ambiguity of language and obscurity in our use of concep ts. The problem we may have with mathematical sciences is the length and complexity of inferences or reasoning that is required to arrive at some truth or final conclusion. We need to be very careful in our inquiry and reasoning in order to avoid problems and make progress in these disciplines. Hume argues that some of the most difficult and unclear concepts in metaphysics are the concepts of POWER, FORCE, ENERGY, and NECESSARY CONNECTION. He wants to examine in order to state more clearly what the meaning s of these concepts are and how we should use them in our talk and reasoning. He has already established as a principle of reasoning or how we acquire ideas or knowledge, that all our ideas are copies or products of sense impressions. In which case, we can not think of anything or have idea s of something that we did not first get from our internal or external sense impressions. His hope is that in using this principle 14 we may be able to arrive at a greater clarity with respect to our ideas and knowledge. Thus , all our complex ideas (e.g., golden mountain) can be broken down to simple ideas (gold and mountain) and simple ideas come from simple impressions of seeing gold and a mountain. We will need to always find the original, clear, and strong impression from which an idea is derived. Usually, there is no ambiguity with respect to simple impressions. It is important to examine these simple ideas in moral (practical) sciences in order to understand the most complex ideas which our minds are able to compound out of the simple ideas. In order to understand the idea of necessary connection that we attach to or associate with objects regarding cause and effect, it is necessary to find out the sense impression from which it is derived. He repeats again that when we l ook at external objects, we are never able to see any power in a cause or a necessary connection between objects which we call cause and effect. We usually think that the effect is a consequence of the cause, and that we cannot be wrong about such connecti on. It is true that one object such as the motion of a billiard ball (effect) usually follows from the motion of another or a prior billiard ball (cause). But the idea of a necessary connection or power is never seen in the first billiard ball. From the seein g one object, we can never speculate or predict accurately that a certain effect will necessarily follow. If I fire a gun at someone, we can never predict with exactitude or accuracy that it will cause death or injury. It may not. One may be lucky that the bullet may not cause death. Why? We don’t know! Again, there are many variables in nature that we cannot predict. If it were possible for the mind alone to discover such a power or necessary connection, we could predict with some exactitude, certainty or accuracy the effect, even without any prior experience. We have knowledge of the features of objects such as solidity, extension, motion, but we cannot know what the effects of these features are. Nature or reality is always changing. We see objects follo wing another object but we do not ever know or see in the object themselves what makes or causes things to happen as they do. The idea of power that we associate with objects cannot be discovered by merely thinking about the object and its qualities and th ey do not come to us from the senses by seeing the objects. Hume suggests different ways by which we may have gotten the idea of power in a cause to bring about effect, such that there is a necessary connection between cause and effect. (1) One might argu e that the idea of such power is derived from our reflection when we see how internally our will makes our body to move. In other words, our body parts or body move based on our internal command of our will. We are conscious of this internal process of the mind and our volition, and from this we form the idea of power. Reading/Reflection/Review Questions: HUME (pages 9 -37; 39 -42) 1. What, according to Hume, is the difference between impressions/sensations and idea s/thoughts ? What examples can be used to illustrate this difference? 2. What are impressions? What is Hume’s definition of ‘impression’? 3. What is a simple idea , a simple impression , a compound/complex idea , a compound/complex impression ? What are examples of each? (See pp. 10 -11). 4. How do we form ideas, where do they come from? How can we form ideas or have thoughts of 15 things we have never heard or seen or touched? 5. Does Hume place imagination and memory in the category of ideas/thoughts or impressions? What is the difference between im agination and memory ? (See pp. 9 -10 & 31). Illustrate the difference with an example. 6. How does the creative power of the mind (in compounding, mixing, transposing, augmenting, diminishing, separating, or dividing) create a complex but fictitious idea s of something like ‘a golden mountain’ or centaur? 7. How/Why is the creative power of the mind unlimited in its ability to create ideas including fictional ideas? 8. How/Why is the creative power of the mind also limited in its ability to create those idea? 9. What is the nature of the limitations on the mind’s ability to create ideas? What kind of ideas or thoughts is impossible for the mind to have? 10. How, according to Hume, can/do we have the idea of God? How does Hu me’s view differ from Descartes’ view of how we acquire the idea of God? 11. Why is it that a person who cannot have sensation also cannot have ideas? What is the exception that Hume provides to this principle or rule that, if there are no sensations then no ideas, or that an idea must come or derive from an impression? See pp. 12 -13. 12. What are the principles of resemblance , contiguity , and causation ? 13. How do these principles of resemblance , contiguity , and causation help the mind to make connecti ons and associations in thought or ideas regarding matters of fact? What examples can be used to illustrate the role of these principles? 14. What are matters of fact and relation of ideas ? How are they different? What are examples of each? (To test your understanding of this distinction, if I provide some examples in an exam, you should be able to indicate whether they are matters of fact or relation of ideas). 15. How do we acquire knowledge of matters of fact and relation of ideas ? Does the knowledge of relation of ideas come from sense impressions or reason alone? 16. What is the basis of our reasoning about matters of fact ? 17. How do we acquire knowledge about cause and effect ? Is it based on a priori reasoning (based solely on reason) or is it bas ed on the senses? Explain! 18. Why is Hume skeptical about the view that there is a secret power in the idea of a cause that enables it to necessarily bring about a certain effect ? Is it true that a man who has never seen fire before will not have the ide a that it can burn? Explain! (See p. 50 for the example of a man seeing billiard balls for the first time.) 19. Whenever we see one thing (a cause) and another thing (an effect), what precisely do we see or have impression of? Do we have any impression or see the idea of a necessary connection or 16 a secret power? Where does the idea of a secret power or necessary connection come from? 20. What does Hume mean when he says that when we see cause and effect , all that we really see are two things that are constantly conjoined . That is, we do not see any secret power in the cause by which it brings about an effect ; and we do not see any necessary connection between the cause and effect . Or that the idea of the effect cannot be found or is not contained in th e idea of the cause . 21. What is Hume’s view of the nature of custom or habit ? What role does custom or habit play in how we come to have the idea or think of a necessary connection between cause and effect? 22. How, according to Hume, do we acquire the custom or habit in how we think about matters of fact? What role does experience or past experience play in such custom or habit ? 23. What is the nature of and the distinction between demonstrative reasoning and moral reasoning . What are examples of each? 24. What is the principle of induction? (See bottom of p. 22). What role does this principle play in how we form and try to prove our ideas of cause and effect and the necessary connection between them? 25. When we reason from past experiences in order to arrive at an inference about the future, what is the nature of that inference? It is guaranteed or probable? Explain. In what way is such an inference based on the idea of SIMILARITY and the expectation of similarity of events that one has experienced i n the past? 26. What are the problems with the principle of induction? In what way is the principle of induction circular or question begging ? Why is it not possible to prove this principle? (See pp. 24 & 30). 27. Why is it not possible for us to use the principle of induction to prove or provide a foundation for the idea of the necessary connection between cause and effect ? How will doing this lead to infinite regress? (See p. 30). 28. What does Hume consider to be the passion, virtue, advantage or goal of Philosophy or doing philosophy? How is this goal similar to what we saw in Socrates and Descartes? 29. What does Hume see as the danger of Philosophy, especially, the danger of engaging in skepticism and doubt about reality and the implications fo r how we live our lives? How, in his view, can we overcome or mitigate this danger? (See pp. 25 -26). 30. According to Hume, the idea of cause and effect is nothing more than either (a) constant or regular or customary conjunction , or (b) temporary succession , or (c) contiguity in space . (See pp. 34 -35 for contiguity.) What does he mean and why does he say this? Why is it that we cannot infer the idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect or some secret power in the cause from these idea s conjunction, succession, and contiguity? 31. What role does his idea of custom play in how we reason play and how we are able to live life meaningfully? Explain! How does it help us to make predictions or have expectations? How are such predictions and expectations helpful in how we live our lives? (See pp. 28 -29 & 36). 17 32. What, according to Hume, is the nature of and the difference between a belief and fiction ? (See p. 31 -32). What is the role of imagination in creating fiction ? What does he mean by t he manner of conception and feeling of the mind in relation to the nature of beliefs? 33. What problems does Hume have with moral and metaphysical sciences, especially the ideas of power , force , energy or necessary connection in metaphysics?. How are these problems related to his empiricism and the idea that all abstract ideas must come or derive from the senses, sensation or sense impressions? (See pp. 40 -41). 34. What does Hume say about the idea of human volition or will as one of the sources or interna l sense from which we got the idea of necessary connection? What is the knowledge of our will or volition based on? Is it based on consciousness or impression ? (See p. 42).