D2Week7 - For REY WRITER
Spirituality is not an easy word to define these days, as it has become a buzz word to signify the individual approach to one’s quality of life or one’s personal metaphysical beliefs or ethical practices, as opposed to some religious adherence (Vernon, 2010, p. 222). When referring to individual relationships, there is a whole culture around the notion of “soulmate” and what this entails, but a lot of this falls outside of the deeper contemplations of negotiating the ambiguities of friendship. Indeed, “spirituality” is a word that has been hijacked by marketers of our consumerist culture. As Vernon states:
Type soulfriends, or even worse ‘soulmate’ into an internet search engine and some of the most syrupy aphorisms on friendship will be returned for your edification… the trouble with this sentimental haze and commodification is that it cheapens an idea of enormous human value: the spirituality of friendship is not something that can simply be ceded to the market (p. 222).
From a deeper, philosophical perspective, Aristotle offers guidance on what a soul friendship entails, defining a soul friend as “another self” (p. 223). What this means is that individuals respect each other as separate people, while also recognizing a commonality and bond in sharing similar beliefs and feelings. Such a soul friendship is not easy to describe; it can only be experienced. “Soul friendship is fundamentally the unrepeatable experience of knowing, and being known, by that one, particular person” (p. 225).
This type of “spiritual” friendship contrasts significantly with the commercial interpretation of it, as portrayed in our popular films, for example. Often, this type of soul friendship is characterized as displaying the same passion of a romance, where two people are connected by a codependent need, rather than a respectful and healthy companionship. Jealousy and fear drive the relationship, as does pain when the two are apart. In contrast, a soul friendship is one where individuals do not mind being physically apart for periods of time, and there is implicit trust (p. 223). Vernon shares, “the source of delight of soul friends is that the recognize not only themselves but another human being… they never seek to consume each other or fall into a perpetual embrace” (p. 223). In short, this understanding of soul friendship might represent a more ethical approach to friendships. It is not a friendship of codependent need, as discussed in previous modules, but a friendship of genuine respect and healthy boundaries.
Philosophers generally consider these soul friendships to be rare, and Aristotle believed them to be possible only between very unique individuals who are at peace with themselves, secure in themselves, virtuous, and able to befriend themselves first (p. 224). Most of our time-consuming relationships with family and romantic involvements do not necessarily entail friendship. They often entail obligation and role fulfillment, but not necessarily deep friendship, let alone soul friendship.
The French writer Michel de Montaigne proposed that soul friendship is so rare, it may only appear once every three centuries (p. 225). He feels he was fortunate enough to have experienced such a friendship himself, though he argues that historic timing and circumstance play a significant role in setting up the right conditions for such a friendship to flourish. The implication is that most friends will not “know friendship’s greatest potential, or know its deepest loves” (p. 228). The philosopher Saint Augustine of Hippo had the experience of a powerful and unique friendship; however, his view of friendship was completely transformed by his conversion to Christianity. Indeed, his own perspective on friendship greatly influenced the Christian West’s general distrust of friendship for many centuries. Augustine came to disavow his former friendships:
Ours was not the friendship which should be between true friends… for though they cling together, no friends are true friends unless you, my God, bind them fast to one another through that love which is sown in our hearts by the Holy Ghost (Vernon, p. 125).
Indeed, Augustine believed that one’s love for God was primary, and friendship often hinders this experience of divine love. Further, only when people love God can they renounce love for themselves (p. 126). This is in direct contradiction to Aristotle, who embraced the notion that self-love and love for another are inextricably linked, for if one cannot befriend oneself first, one can never be a true friend to another (p. 127).
Further, unlike his Greek predecessors, who believed that the fragility of friendship is something to value and honor, Augustine believed that God’s love underscored our need not to place our faith in people. We should love one another through God alone, and any form of self-love should be completely renounced, as any love of this world is bound to fail (p. 128). Indeed, once subsumed in Christian love, friendship itself is not that important (p. 129).
Again, for Aristotle, this kind of self-renunciation would have been too extreme, as he was a proponent of a middle path between self-denial and self-conceit. As well, Aristotle, like his contemporaries, lived in a pagan world with gods and not one God. They did not connect friendship to the divine. They believed the gods to be superior to humans, and, as such, one could not have a friendship with a god because it would constitute an unequal relationship, which was inherently inimical to friendship (p. 129).
While Augustine did have a great impact on the Christian view of friendship, the actual roots of Christianity were more supportive of friendship, where Jesus is claimed to have said that “there is no greater love than to lay down one’s life for a friend” (Vernon, p. 129).
As well, centuries later, Christian philosopher Thomas Aquinas managed to marry the philosophy of Aristotle and Christian ethics in a way that was supportive of friendship. Aquinas believed, like Aristotle, that it is only natural for one to love oneself, and that love can help us to learn to love others, as well as God. Similarly, God is not abstract, but is also accessible enough to us so that we can experience close friendship with the divine directly. Further, rather than viewing the ambiguities of friendship as threatening to our relationships with God and with one another, he saw them as useful. Vernon summarizes:
In short, friendship is always a question of give and take, and even when the taking is more in evident than the giving, it can be regarded positively to a degree, for it is never just on the take—or at least, if it is, it is already ceasing to be friendship (p. 140).
Aquinas felt that it is friendship that often encourages our ability to transcend our egoistic desires for more altruistic results. Indeed, it is through our ability to love those around us intimately that we learn the nature of true love. Vernon shares:
Thomas is able to say that selfless acts can emerge from self-love, and that altruism and egoism are not opposing opposites, because his idea of individuality is blurred at the edges (p. 147).
But, in the 19th century, Soren Kierkegaard reinforced Augustine’s train of thought, essentially arguing that friendship tends to bring out all of the worst traits in us, such as jealousy and possessiveness, very similar to erotic love (p. 130). Indeed, people fall into friendship love the same way they fall into romantic love, becoming prey to all kinds of negative emotions. As Vernon summarizes:
And then friendship gets caught up in all kinds of little acts of pride in the way that people congratulate themselves on the friends they have; they admire themselves for being so clever as to have such admirable friends, and so on. Friendship is a Vanity Fair (p. 130).
Kierkegaard proposes that we simply cultivate a neighborly love for all people, not preferring one over another. In fact, we do not even have to like or admire one another; indeed, it lets us off the hook from having to cultivate friendship at all (p. 131). As Vernon summarizes, we must simply cultivate a “selfless passion” to obey God, rather than follow our selfish passions for friendship (p. 131).
Vernon argues that this general mistrust of friendship has carried over into secular society, as well (p. 132). Modern philosopher Immanuel Kant essentially reinterprets Augustine through a secular lens. Indeed, Kant is so suspect of friendship that he posits a time when people will have so few needs that friendship will cease altogether (p. 136). This “heaven on earth” will have “transcended” the need for friendship (p. 136).
Kantian ethics is not the only ethical theory unsupportive of friendship. The popular ethical theory of utilitarianism, or the philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest number of people, is also antithetical to the principles of friendship. Similarly, our democratic egalitarian philosophy, which is about universal fellowship, is not supportive of friendship, which is viewed as being prone to partiality. According to Vernon, friendship, then, essentially exists in an “ethical-no-man’s-land” (p. 135). That is why in modern society, “friendship is routinely treated as if it were questionable” (p. 137). He shares:
The contemporary reliance on the ethics of rights and egalitarianism, and the ugly associations that accrue to nepotism and cronyism, is proof enough: friendship is thought to offend absolute ideals (p. 150).
As discussed in previous modules, friendship has often been seen as a threat to the nuclear family, which is why marriage vows include the promise of “forsaking all others” (p. 138). Infidelity can be defined as a close friendship which interferes with this vow. (p. 138).
However, a new consciousness around “connectedness” seems to be arising, particularly in the collective discussions around environmental concerns and social alienation (p. 147). Vernon contends that that we must continue to deepen our dialogue around the ethics of friendship, as the institution of marriage is quickly reforming, and people do seem to be revisiting the value of friendship (p. 139).
In our modern world, if we are more religiously inclined, we might align ourselves with Aquinas’ notion of God as friendship, or, according to Vernon, the non-religious can draw upon the Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics. Friendship ranks high on the list of these virtues and helps to foster the good life. He shares:
The idea is that instead of thinking of moral philosophy as a series of problems that need to be solved by sets of rules or decisions, one thinks of moral philosophy as nurturing a way of life organized around certain virtues that nurture human potential (p. 149).
In short, for Aristotle and Aquinas, friendship nurtures some of our highest potential. Vernon shares that, just as Aquinas attempted to restore our trust in friendship, we need such a renewal in our trust of friendship today. He clarifies that this does not mean in the sense that friends trust each other, but in the sense that “moral philosophy itself needs to trust friendship as a way of life and guide to action” (p. 150). Vernon explains why this is important to our ethical behavior:
[I]t is worth trusting compromised situations, like those in which friendship is operating, whilst exercising powers of discernment, because clearly good behavior may arise from equivocal and mixed motives (p. 150).
Similarly, to regain this trust means to understand the complexity of our motivations, as Aquinas encouraged us to do, not viewing them as always either solely altruistic or egoistic. It means to recognize that the love of a few individuals deeply does not preclude us from loving all expansively (p. 151). In fact, it can help. We might also try to draw upon some of the rich guidelines provided by previous philosophers.
One such great thinker is writer Ralph Waldo Emerson, who also acknowledged the existence of what he coined “divine friendship,” (p. 235). The joy in such a friendship, he claims, is that you experience another human being who is both like you and unlike you, in that you are completely comfortable being with this person while also excited to learn how he or she might be unlike you (p. 229).
Emerson believed that much of what challenges us in experiencing deeper friendships is that we often go for the more shallow relationships that yield quick and instant gratification. There are many opportunities to enjoy the niceties of friendship without having to open oneself up to the true ambiguities of friendship and all of the discomfort and growth that it invites. We might ask, is there a higher ethical dimension to pursuing such a friendship? Vernon explains Emerson’s view that “it is only natural to want to pick the beautiful flowers thrown up by the majority of friendships, and to hope that the wiry roots buried in the damp, dark soil of another’s character, soul or mind do not come with them” (p. 233).
For Emerson, divine friendship incorporates a “godlike honesty” and “godlike affection” (p. 236). One can be so honest as to “think aloud” in a friend’s presence. Godlike affection refers to pure, unconditional love. Often our ties with one another are multilayered and involve money, lust, or blood relations, to name a few (p. 236). It is seldom that we can experience love in its purest state. Loving someone without any “compromised affection” is the highest state (p. 236). Essentially, Emerson believed it takes courage to recognize the limitations of shallow friendships and invite deeper friendships, which “can cope with the rougher, tougher exchanges of transformative, significant relationships” (p. 234). Emerson suggested:
It is only by entering into the ambiguities of friendship that its higher possibilities may be discerned; it is only then the weaknesses of character and the contingencies of time would inhibit it are overcome (p. 234).
In the poem “Friendship,” Emerson underscores the restorative and uplifting power of friendship and the way that the very best qualities in the friend serve to elevate the soul to loftier heights.
These spiritually elevated friendships are not easy to acquire, and most philosophers count them as quite unique. The paradoxical goal is to be able to do without them completely, but still be open to their occurrence, as Emerson suggests: “The condition which high friendship demands is the ability to do without it” (Vernon p. 237). One must not search for it, but simply show up in life as honest as one can be, with friends who do come and go, to attract the opportunity for such a precious friendship.
In conclusion, soul friendship is dynamic as it moves through the complexities and ambiguities of friendship. Those who embrace a “dynamic doctrine” of friendship will better enjoy all types of friendship, noting the experiences of deeper connection that may arise. Accordingly, someone who has a gift for friendship is someone who may not necessarily experience a soul friend, but will know how to “value friends” (p. 241). Further, for those who experience such a soul friendship, the experience extends well beyond the two friends. These experiences stay with the individuals forever and the memory of the friendship itself becomes as important as the moment of connection (p. 241).
References:
Emerson, R. W. (2009). Emerson, R. (2009). Essays. Waiheke Island: The Floating Press
Vernon, M. (2010). The Meaning of Friendship. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
