Write a five page (or more) paper on the topic of `Risk Assessment and Environmental Ethics'. Utilize at least two readings from `Resources'. You will be graded on content and clarity of expression. The paper should be at least five pages in length do

ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE:

THE CASE OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette Abstract:

Despite significant scientific uncertainties and strong public op- position, there appears to be an "iron triangle" of industry, government, and consultants/contractors promoting the siting of the world's first per- manent geological repository for high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel, proposed for Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Arguing that representatives of this iron triangle have ignored important epistemological and ethical difficulties with the proposed facility, I conclude that the business cli- mate surrounding this triangle appears to leave little room for considera- tion of ethical issues related to public safety, environmental welfare, and citizen consent to risk. If my analysis of the Yucca Mountain case is correct and typical, then some of the most pressing questions of busi- ness ethics may concern how to break the iron triangle or, at least, how to expand it into a quadrilateral that includes the public.

Introduction I N late 1991 someone leaked a confidential letter written by Allen Keesler, President of Florida Power and Chair of the utility industry's American Committee on Radwaste Disposal. Keesler's letter to other US utility execu- tives revealed that nuclear utilities in the US were about to begin a $9 million "advertising blitz in Nevada designed to overcome its resistance to serving as the dumping ground for other states' nuclear wastes." Recognizing that the profits of nuclear utilities are tied to the existence of radwaste repositories, Keesler was eager to promote the proposed Nevada repository. He also re- vealed, in his letter to the other nuclear-utility executives, that the federal waste-disposal program being run by the US Department of Energy (DOE) is progressing only "because of the active support, guidance, and involvement of our industry" in re-educating the people of Nevada.' According to Keesler's plan, each utility owning a nuclear unit in the US would be assessed $50,000 per year, per unit, for the cost of Nevada advertising designed to "convert" the Nevada citizens to favoring the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level nuclear waste repository. For the 112 commercial nuclear reactors in the US, this assessment comes to $5.6 million annually. Keesler asked the executives to keep his letter "confidential" because "all costs for the utility campaign" are to be charged to utility "customers, not stockholders."^ Keesler's actions raise a host of ethical questions.^ Central among them is whether a particular industry ought to attempt to coerce both citizens of Nevada ©1995.

Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 4. ISSN 1052-150X. 0753-0777. 754 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY and the US DOE to accept a risk (the repository) whose central benefits accrue to that industry. Another question is whether such one-sided "educational" ef- forts (directed by a regulated monopoly) ought to be funded by the ratepayers, without their knowledge, when a subset of these ratepayers are those likely to be put at risk because of the repository. A broader question is whether the behavior of the nuclear-utility representatives points to the failure of profit- based market allocation."^ An equally broad question is whether Keesler's plan takes adequate account of public welfare and public consent to industrial risks.

Or, is the public effectively shut out of the "iron triangle" of industry, govem- ment, and contractors/subcontractors—an iron triangle of cooperation, influ- ence, persuasion, and money that is "beyond the control of existing laws"?^ In this essay I argue that there appears to be an "iron triangle" promoting the siting of the world's first permanent geological repository for high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel, proposed for Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Government con- tractors, scientists and consultants, US DOE officials, and nuclear industry representatives are all eager to build Yucca Mountain. Noting that 80 percent of Nevadans are opposed to the proposed facility, I argue (1) that scientists cannot guarantee Yucca Mountain safety; (2) that uncertainty regarding Yucca Moun- tain is so great that it is not quantifiable; (3) that no other country in the world is moving to permanent geological disposal of radioactive waste as quickly as the US; and (4) that ethics requires, in such a situation of uncertainty, that industry, government, and scientists attempt to limit false negatives (type-II risks), false assurances that Yucca Mountain will cause no serious harm. More- over, I conclude that, because the "iron triangle" of industry, govemment, and consultants/contractors is heavily promoting Yucca Mountain, despite significant scientific uncertainties, the business climate surrounding this triangle appears to leave little room for consideration of ethical issues related to public safety, environ- mental welfare, and citizen consent to risk. If these speculations about the "iron triangle" are correct, then some of the most pressing questions of business ethics concem the acceptability of the industry-govemment-contractor triad.

Historical Background For nearly four decades, virtually all scientists and public policymakers have agreed that permanent geological disposal is the preferred method of dealing with high-level radioactive waste during the 10,000 years that it remains a serious threat to health and safety. Because Yucca Mountain, Nevada has been proposed as the location of the first permanent geological repository for high- level radioactive waste anywhere in the world, the US is spending billions of dollars to study and engineer the site. Indeed, during the last five years, the formalities of site study and selection have cost more than $2.5 billion,^ and the US government is nowhere close to final approval of a single site. Because of the scientific and financial preeminence of Yucca Mountain, it provides a para- digm case of the ethical, policy, and scientific questions associated with perma- nent disposal. Although the US Department of Energy (DOE) studies of the ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 755 Nevada location are state-of-the-art quantitative risk assessments, this essay argues that the optimistic assessment conclusions about site suitability both conflict with fundamental scientific uncertainties about Yucca Mountain and raise questions about how far the "iron triangle" (of industry, govemment and contractors) controls repository siting.

As early as 1955, researchers representing the US National Academy of Sci- ences (NAS) recommended permanent isolation of high-level radioactive wastes in mined geological repositories, a position the NAS spokespersons hold today.^ This basic approach to disposal of high-level radioactive wastes is still being pursued in virtually every nation in the world. As Don U. Deere, Chair of the US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board of the NAS, expressed this position in 1990:

"There is currently a world-wide scientific consensus that a deep geologic repository is the best option for disposal of high-level waste. The Board believes that there are no insurmountable technical reasons why an acceptable deep geologic repository cannot be developed."^ The most fundamental reason that virtually all govemments and nuclear-risk experts have pursued a policy of developing repositories for permanent geologi- cal disposal of high-level radioactive wastes is that they wish to maximize waste isolation. Other arguments in favor of permanent geological disposal are that it minimizes both costs and hazards, especially transport risks to and from a storage facility. Still other reasons for permanent disposal are that we, members of the present generation, should solve the high-level radioactive waste problem, not merely store the waste and thus leave the burden to members of future generations.^ The underlying assumption of this rationale for disposal is that only a permanent geological repository addresses important ethical obligations to future persons. The technical disadvantages of permanent geological disposal of high-level radioactive wastes are the lack of experience with long-term iso- lation and the difficulty of knowing geological features and processes at the great depths and over the long time periods required. Some persons also oppose permanent geological disposal because they claim that it is impossible to assure isolation of the wastes underground. Other arguments against permanent dis- posal focus on technical uncertainties, on political difficulties associated with siting the facilities, on ethical problems related to imposing such a risk on members of future generations, and on the importance of the retrievability of the waste, so as to leave open the options for future storage or disposal.'" In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy (NWPA), perhaps the single most important piece of legislation affecting high-level radioactive-waste disposal. The act mandated permanent disposal of radwaste, a policy that had for years been the conventional wisdom. Containing timetables for the Department of Energy (DOE) to accomplish permanent, underground disposal of high-level waste, the NWPA govems commercially generated materials but allows for disposal of defense wastes, given Presidential approval. The NWPA also requires an Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, with its director reporting to the Sec- retary of Energy. Perhaps most importantly, the act provides guidelines for site selection of possible high-level radioactive-waste repositories." 756 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY Under the guidelines of the 1982 NWPA, the DOE selected a number of sites as potentially acceptable for the first permanent high-level radwaste repository in the US. They were in Washington, Utah, Texas, Mississippi, Louisiana, Ne- vada, the Great Lakes area, and the Appalachian range. In 1987, the choice of sites was narrowed to Hanford (Washington), Yucca Mountain (Nevada), and Deaf Smith (Texas). After much political compromise, the US Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987; one of its main provisions was to mandate study of only one site. Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Other special features in the act are the requirements to create a Nuclear Waste Review Board in the National Academy of Sciences; to ship spent fuel in NRC-approved packages, with state and local authorities notified of shipments; and to provide an analysis, between the years 2007 and 2010, of the need for a second reposi- tory.'^ Only if the Nevada site is found unacceptable will other possible loca- tions be considered. Currently scientists and engineers are studying the hydrogeology, seismicity, volcanism, and climate of the Nevada location. How- ever, on January 5, 1990, the Nevada Attorney General filed a court petition seeking a "notice of disapproval" of the Yucca Mountain site under the NWPA.

The petition failed, and Nevada has appealed it to the US Supreme Court.'^ The US Supreme Court, however, denied further review. It said that discussion of constitutional issues (related to Nevada's support of an absolute right to veto the selection of the Yucca Mountain site) was premature. In other words, Nevada's alleged right to veto the site can be discussed only after the site is formally selected for a repository, after all licensing and permitting procedures are com- pleted.'"* Hence, the DOE plans for Yucca Mountain remain in question.'^ Some persons have even argued that the DOE may have to abandon its current plans and consider other options, such as sub-seabed disposal or above-ground stor- age.'^ Evaluation of the Yucca Mountain site continues, however, despite the opposition of 80 percent of Nevadans to the repository.'^ Site studies will cost several billion more before site evaluation is complete.'^ Part of the controversy driving the opposition of Nevadans to the proposed Yucca Mountain facility is not only the possibility of repository failure and radioactive contamination but also the questionable way in which the nuclear industry, the DOE, and its contractors—the iron triangle—are performing the Yucca Mountain environmental risk assessments. At the heart of this controversy is disagreement over the assessment methods and the data that are being used.

Assessors Cannot Guarantee Yucca Mountain Safety The authors of a recent US Geological Survey (USGS) study of the proposed Yucca Mountain site warned that site "data are not sufficient to predict accu- rately rates of [ground] water movement and travel times."'^ One question raised by the USGS warning is whether the Yucca Mountain predictions, al- though inaccurate, are accurate enough for us to build the repository. Are the questionable inferences in the repository risk estimates and evaluations signifi- cant? Or, are the quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) nevertheless accurate enough to justify permanent geological disposal of high-level radwaste? ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 757 If no scientific result is ever certain or completely objective, and if no policy is ever perfectly just, a reasonable person ought fault neither science nor policy merely for uncertainty, subjectivity, or incomplete justice. The real issue is the significance of the apparent problems in the Yucca Mountain assessments. How objective is objective enough? How certain is certain enough? How just is just enough? Do the available data and site characteristics lead one to believe that QRAs of Yucca Mountain can be done with sensitivity and precision adequate to insure credible regulation and long-term safety?

Many risk assessors believe that the data and the site are adequate to insure safety. They say that Yucca Mountain would comply with the regulations.^** This judgment, however, is quite controversial given all the ways in which incom- plete data, inadequate theory, uncertainty, and site heterogeneity threaten accu- rate knowledge of Yucca Mountain. Even US DOE assessors use language that suggests their largely qualitative and imprecise knowledge of the site is a prob- lem. Note, for example, the US DOE's use of the terms 'estimate,' 'likely,' and 'significant' in the following claim:

estimates of groundwater travel time along any path of likely and significant radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment are more than 1,000 years.

Therefore, the evidence does not support a finding that the site is disqualified.^* Presumably, if DOE officials were more certain about Yucca Mountain safety, they would speak of "calculations" or definite "probabilities" of certain ground- water travel times and not of "estimates." Likewise, if their data were more accurate, presumably they would speak of threats posed by "any path of radionu- clide travel," rather than of threats "along any path of likely and significant radionuclide travel." As the DOE's own works illustrate, its claims of safety are laden with methodological judgments about "likely" travel, for example, and with language that avoids assigning any probabilities to regulatory compliance.

The DOE officially admits, for example:

The characteristics of the Yucca Mountain site and the processes operating there permit, and probably ensure, compliance with the limits on radionuclide release to the accessible environment.

When one is considering a potentially catastrophic threat to health and safety, however, one requires a very high probability that the site in question will comply with regulations. One of the main reasons why the methodological judgment—that site knowledge is adequate for regulation and for safety—is questionable is that the various DOE probabilities allegedly associated with site characteristics are already very close to the limits of regulatory acceptability. We shall argue that, given a variety of questionable inferences, assumptions, and value judgments made by assessors,^^ actual site characteristics might not com- ply with regulations. Changes of only one order of magnitude in some of the parameters dealing with fracture flow, infiltration, precipitation, or volcanic and seismic activity could initiate disastrous changes—such as flooding or unaccept- ably rapid groundwater transport—in the Yucca Mountain repository. As Amory 758 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY Lovins warned, an error factor of two at each stage of a twenty-step methodol- ogy permits a possible millionfold mistake.^'* For example, increasing the al- leged percolation rate by only one order of magnitude could initiate fracture flow and speed groundwater-travel time.^^ Such sensitive numbers, together with the two to six orders of uncertainty of characterizing many risk assess- ments, show that the margin for error at Yucca Mountain may be too slim to insure adequate government regulation and safety. Even the US National Acad- emy of Science (NAS) noted that the DOE assumes, incorrectly, "that the prop- erties and future behavior of a geological repository can be determined and specified with a very high degree of certainty. In reality," said the NAS, "the inherent variability of the geological environment will necessitate frequent changes in the specifications."^^ But if geological variability necessitates changes in repository specifications, then there is question whether a facility like Yucca Mountain can meet the pre-determined US safety regulations.

Porous flow alone onsite would mean leachate could reach the water table at Yucca Mountain in 10,000 to 20,000 years.^' Fracture fiow, however, could enhance transport of water and radioactive leachate, above the flux at Yucca Mountain, by as much as 5 orders of magnitude.^^ Assessors have confirmed that "fractures do exist of sufficient width to allow significant water flow in the unsaturated region."^^ Moreover, with a large fracture-fiow rate,^'C, ^^^, and 237 Np could get through to the water table in less than 10,000 years.3° Hence, understanding fracture fiow is a crucial determinant of site safety. Yet, knowl- edge of fractured zones, particularly for unsaturated regions, is very limited.

Likewise, the seismicity at Yucca Mountain, prior to 1960, is virtually unknown even though seismic failure is possible.3' One wonders how a possibly seismic, fractured site, even in an arid climate like Yucca Mountain, could be acceptable if volcanism, intruding water, and seismic activity were not highly improbable during the life of the repository.^^ At Yucca Mountain, these conditions do not appear to be highly improbable.

A person who makes the value judgment that site knowledge is sufficient for regulation and for safety is in the questionable position of knowing that signifi- cant problems could occur with fracture flow, seismicity, and volcanism, yet not being able to predict any of them accurately—because of numerous difficulties with modelling, sampling, extrapolation, and so on. Even the Nuclear Regula- tory Commission (NRC) officials recognized some of these problems when they complained that the Yucca Mountain risk assessments fail to recognize ade- quately the uncertainty in the data. Likewise, the US NAS warned that "uncer- tainty is treated inappropriately" in the Yucca Mountain assessments.^^ Indeed, the NRC said that the environmental assessments of the DOE for its proposed radwaste facilities are, in general, "overly optimistic."^'^ Such optimism often appears almost gratuitous, because it is not based on precise, quantitative pre- dictions. For example, an official DOE document claims that the site can protect the safety of ail future generations from radiological hazards: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 759 The quality of the environment during this and future generations can be adequately protected. Estimates of radiation releases during normal operation and worst-case accident scenarios provide confidence that the public and the environment can be adequately protected from the potential hazards of radio- active-waste disposal.

Equally gratuitous is the DOE claim that no future groundwater conditions will disrupt the site:

Currently available engineering measures are considered more than adequate to guarantee that no disruption of constniction and operation will occur be- cause of groundwater conditions at Yucca Mountain.'' Such assurances are highly questionable, given DOE assessors' admissions of uncertainties about basic hydrological and geological conditions at the site. For example, at Yucca Mountain, "in most cases, hydraulic data are insufficient for performing geostatistical analyses,"^' and "traditional fiow path chemical evalu- ation does not directly apply to tuffaceous volcanic environments."'^ Likewise, there is "no known mechanical model that describes nonuniform corrosion well enough to use in performance assessment" of the waste canisters.^' In areas of hydrology, geology, canister security, climate, volcanism, and seismicity, no techniques exist, at the present time, that are adequate for removing the uncer- tainties at Yucca Mountain or even for quantifying them.'*'' Basic questions conceming the reliability of the studies remain unanswered.^^ Indeed, how could significant uncertainties be removed if one required precise predictive power and regulatory guarantees regarding the site for 10,000 years?

The long time period of storage is one reason that Yucca-Mountain reviewers have claimed that "compliance with US [radiation-dose] limits cannot be shown objectively by PRA [probabilistic risk assessment] methods."^^ One reason for this problem is that the precise, probabilistic standards of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the management of spent fuel and high-level and transuranic radioactive wastes cannot be confirmed with current data. The stand- ards set limits for releases when events have more than a 1 in 10 chance of occurring over the 10,000 years.''^ Such precise probabilistic standards cannot be guaranteed for so long a time, however. As one DOE reviewer put it: "no assurance can be given that all significant factors have been examined here.'"*'* Other reviewers maintain that it is doubtful whether we can model or predict long-term behavior at all, given the heterogeneities and uncertainties at the site.'*^ Still other evaluators, including those from the utility industry and the NAS, have proclaimed that the limits of environmental science have been ex- ceeded by the goals set by the nation's radioactive waste program.^* Perhaps the most significant analysis of how scientific uncertainties undercut assurances of repository safety is that of the DOE team of 14 peer reviewers who in 1992 analyzed the DOE's Early Site Suitability Evaluation for Yucca Mountain. The "consensus position" of the 14 DOE-selected peer reviewers is telling:

It is the opinion of the panel that many aspects of site suitability are not well suited for quantitative risk assessment. In particular are predictions involv- ing future geological activity, future value of mineral deposits and mineral 760 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY occurrence models. Any projections of the rates of tectonic activity and vol- canism, as well as natural resource occurrence and value, will be fraught with substantial uncertainties that cannot be quantified using standard statistical methods.

If uncertainties at any proposed site are so severe that they cannot be quantified, then it is arguable that they force those who currently favor a permanent reposi- tory—some members of the iron triangle—into either begging the question or appealing to ignorance in defending site suitability. Indeed, anyone who main- tains that there is, at present, a compelling scientific basis for permanent geo- logical disposal is unavoidably forced to use incomplete and short-term data (on seismicity, volcanism, hydrogeology, and so on) as a basis for extraordinarily precise, long-term predictions—tens of thousands of years—about site suitabil- ity. We are able to make general predictions about the future, of course, and geologists do so all the time. Precise predictions, however, are a problem. Be- cause of the imprecision of our hydrogeological and climate models, we are at present unable to predict the geological and hydrological situation at Yucca Mountain with any degree of reliability and precision, 10,000 years into the future. As a result, we cannot quantify the claim that we shall be able to meet current US repository standards for safety 10,000 years from now. We cannot be reasonably assured that a permanent repository might not cause catastrophe hundreds or thousands of years into the future. Indeed, to claim the ability to predict very precise geological events, 10,000 years into the future, when one's precise, site-specific evidential base for doing so covers only tens of years, has little scientific justification. Although we can reconstruct geological histories spanning millions of years, geology is primarily an explanatory and not a pre- dictive science, as we argued earlier. Hence, it seems prima facie evident that one ought not base arguments for the safety of a permanent repository on an uncertain judgment about our ability to make precise geological predictions.

Another reason that it is difficult to know the distant future in great detail is that we humans and our institutions are not precisely predictable. Anyone who argues for permanent geological disposal must discount the effects (on reposi- tory safety) of human error and the social amplification of risk that might occur in thousands of years. Discounting these effects is problematic, as the Chair of the US NAS overview committee (for the WIPP project for storage of weapons- related radwaste in New Mexico) noted before Congress:

current feeling is that the WIPP site could probably meet EPA standards with the exception of the so-called "human-intrusion" scenario.

This is the idea that some- time in the future somebody comes and drills directly into a repository. . .'* As the NAS committee warned, dismissing the effects of human activities such as terrorism, sabotage, or ignorance, tens of thousands of years into the future, is highly problematic. Indeed, given the prevalence of fiaws in humans and their institutions, it might be more reasonable to assume that terrorism or ignorance would be a major problem for a facility storing radiotoxic materials. Moreover, whether about climate and hydrogeology, or about human errors and institutions. ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 761 precise predictions about the long-term future are highly questionable, at least at present, because our generalizations are built on such a limited empirical base.

If it is impossible to know the long-term future with great precision, then any claims to precision (as US radwaste regulations require) about the long-term future must rely in part on ignorance. Yet, from ignorance about a particular claim, it is logically invalid to conclude that the claim is either true or false.

From our ignorance about future, long-term, repository safety, it is logically invalid to conclude that a repository would be either safe or unsafe. Like many scientific claims, conclusions about the safety of repositories—tens of thou- sands of years into the future—are uncertain. Based on data from the present or even from several decades, there can be no empirically compelling argument for the safety of such repositories in the distant future. The best our experiments can do is to confirm that, if permanent repositories meet certain safety standards in the future, then our current experiments are likely to exhibit these same features. Be- cause affirming the consequent does not invariably lead to valid conclusions, how- ever, the reverse is not true.

We cannot infer that because of the success of current, short-term experiments, therefore repositories will avoid catastrophic releases of radionuclides and will meet safety standards thousands of years from now.

Because of all the uncertainties in the Yucca Mountain data and methods, assessors typically are not able to determine the degree of accuracy in their models.'*' They are able, for example, merely to say that there is a "high level of probability" that groundwater travel time to the water table will exceed 10,000 years.^*^ In other words, the degree of uncertainty regarding groundwater travel time is very great. Likewise, the margin of safety necessary to prevent signifi- cant problems, such as fracture flow, is quite slim. Yet, despite this narrow "window," some persons appear to believe that Yucca Mountain will be predict- ably safe or in compliance with govemment regulations requiring a groundwater travel time greater than 1,000 years.^' There is also only a "narrow window," or slim margin, of safety because groundwater travel time is extremely sensitive to fracture flow, and fracture flow is extremely sensitive to percolation rate. If either flow or percolation increase by even a small amount, then the travel time of leachate from the waste will increase significantly.^^ In the world of ground- water flow, where risk assessments "are highly uncertain,"^^ a factor of 10 as a window of safety is quite small. Indeed, in some of the simulated cases, water travel time from the repository to the water table is less than 1,000 years.5^* Hence, the methodological judgment that current and near-future knowledge about Yucca Mountain can guarantee safety and compliance with govemment regulations—for example, requiring groundwater travel time of more than 1,000 years—may be questionable.

The judgment about travel time is not only factually questionable but also inconsistent. One well known group of assessors, for example, found that, ac- cording to their models, some calculated groundwater travel times are less than 10,000 years. They also admitted that hydraulic data were insufficient, and that there has not been enough time to estimate cumulative radioactive releases.^^ 762 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY Nevertheless, they concluded that the "evidence indicates that the Yucca Moun- tain repository site would be in compliance with regulatory requirements,"^^ and that "no radioactivity from the repository will migrate even to the water table immediately beneath the repository for about 30,000 years."^'' How do some migration values of less than 10,000 years translate to a migration time of "about" 30,000 years? How can the same DOE assessors claim that the reposi- tory will be in compliance with govemment regulations^* when they also assert that low flux "will probably limit fiow velocities to the extent that no leachate will reach the water table for tens to hundreds of thousands of years"?^^ Such poorly grounded "probable" knowledge of something that may occur within tens to hundreds of thousands of years (a wide range) is hardly consistent with precise claims about safety and regulatory compliance! Likewise, how can the same DOE assessors conclude, with confidence, that no radioactivity will mi- grate to the water table for at least 30,000 years,^° and yet claim: "Because data and understanding about water flow and contaminant transport in deep unsatu- rated fractured environments are just beginning to emerge, complete dismissal of the rapid-release scenarios is not possible at this time"?^' How is the 30,000- year claim consistent with the assertion about not dismissing the rapid-release scenarios?

Assessors investigating the uncertainties in the Yucca Mountain hydro- geological data also have admitted that, for the unsaturated zone, uncertainties in groundwater velocities may be as much as 100 percent above or below the mean value.^-^ They likewise claim that a change in percolation of a factor of only 10 is sufficient to initiate fracture fiow, that groundwater travel time is extremely sensitive to fracture flow,^^ and that heat from the waste could cause fractures.^'* Given such admissions, how can the same DOE assessors consis- tently claim that fracture fiow is not a credible process,^^ and that groundwater flow will be "well within the limits set by the NRC"?^^ Similar inconsistencies appear, when the same assessors, after acknowledging (1) that they have incom- plete data,^^ (2) that they have had no time to estimate cumulative radioactive releases,^^ and (3) that they may "have underestimated the cumulative releases of all nuclides during 100,000 years, by an amount that is unknown,"^^ never- theless draw a contradictory conclusion. They conclude that only one ten-mil- lionth of allowable releases of radionuclides will reach the water table.™ Likewise, Yucca-Mountain assessors admit that solubility limits and retarda- tion factors are site- and (radioactive) species-dependent.''' They also claim that they may have underestimated radioactive releases.^^ If the same DOE assessors do not know the degree to which they may have underestimated radioactive releases,^' how do they know so precisely that only one ten-millionth of allow- able releases will be released? Similar inconsistencies and unsupported extrapo- lations occur throughout the Yucca Mountain analyses, with DOE assessors confidently affirming that there will be "less than one health effect every 1,400 years."^'^ A more precise and consistent appraisal, given the problems with the data and models at Yucca Mountain, might be that of the assessors who con- ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 763 eluded: "Even though we have tried to use the best data and models available at this time, we make no claims that these results have any value in the perform- ance assessment of the Yucca Mountain repository site."'* Instead of using such precise language, however, the DOE's final 1992 Early Site Suitability Evaluation (ESSE) for Yucca Mountain continues to formulate site risks in terms of words such as "likely" and "unlikely," rather than by using numerical probabilities.^*^ Similarly, when DOE reviewer M. T. Einaudi com- plained that the ESSE had vaguely defined the "foreseeable future" as "the next few years to 10 years, and occasionally as long as 30 years,"^' the DOE ESSE team responded by removing from the document all language mentioning the number of years. Next the team noted:

The evaluation and definition of the terms, such as "reasonable projections" and "likely future activities" will receive considerable attention in the future and is likely to utilize the review of a panel of experts.

This response, however, does not solve the problem with vague language, both because the DOE team uses the language to argue for site suitability, and pre- sumably such usage must have implications. Indeed, if the language did not have certain implications regarding future time periods, then it would not be part of an effective argument for site suitability. Hence, if the terms are used effectively, they must have some precise, implicit meaning. If they do not have a precise, implicit meaning, then it is arguable that they are not effective in supporting the site-suitability conclusions and ought not be used. Indeed, by using indefinable terms to defend conclusions about site suitability, the ESSE renders its conclu- sions nonfalsifiable and therefore ineffective, because vague claims cannot be falsified. And if the ESSE site- suitability claims are not falsifiable, then this suggests that they are a priori rather than empirical and scientific.

Another reviewer (of the 1992 ESSE for Yucca Mountain), J. I. Drever, also complained about the failure of the ESSE to provide rigorous definitions of words such as "likely" and "significant."^^ Again, the final ESSE document did not alleviate the difficulty. Instead the ESSE Core Team responded to Drever's criticism:

The terms 'likely' and 'significant' should be defined in the context of the overall postclosure performance objectives. Because the evaluations of sys- tem performance cannot be definitive at this time, the ESSE Core Team be- 80 lieved it inappropriate to define those terms precisely for this evaluation.

This response by the DOE team, however, creates more questions than it an- swers.

For one thing, to say that terms like "likely" should be defined in terms of overall postclosure performance is not coherent, because the term "likely," for example, is rarely if ever used in the context of "total system performance." Rather, it is used in radically different, but specific contexts, such as probability of human interference at the site, or the probability of a route of radionuclide transport.*' Hence, terms like "likely" not only do not refer to "overall perform- ance," as the DOE team claimed, but, second, they are not univocal. They clearly mean different things in different ESSE contexts.

Third, although the ESSE team says that such terms cannot be defined precisely because the system evaluations 764 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY are incomplete, this response is puzzling because the ESSE team obviously has already used the terms to mean something. Fourth, if the system-performance evaluations are not definitive enough to allow the ESSE team to define the very terms that it uses, then it is unclear why the system-performance evaluations are definitive enough to support a lower-level suitability finding, rather than an unsuitability finding, for Yucca Mountain. Fifth, contrary to the response of the DOE ESSE Core Team, the terms used by the team clearly presuppose some precise meanings, because words like "likely" are often used in precise regula- tory contexts, such as "not likely to exceed a small fraction of [radiation dose] limits."*^ If such terms were not used somewhat precisely, then it would be impossible for the claims in which they are imbedded not to be false. Likewise, the ESSE Core Team claims, for example, that "although confidence is substan- tial, it is not yet sufficient to support the higher-level suitability finding for this qualifying condition."^^ Such a claim appears to presuppose some precise level or cut-off of confidence or likelihood. It appears to presuppose that lower-level findings are justified below this level, and that higher level findings are justified above it. For all these reasons, there appears to be a mismatch between the science and the regulations discussed in DOE assessments such as the ESSE.

Because of this mismatch, it is questionable whether the science discussed in repository assessments is adequate to the regulatory task.

Previous experiences at the Maxey Flats low-level radwaste facility show that similar problems with value judgments about hydrogeological accuracy—and the ability of QRA to meet regulatory guidelines—may have occurred there. Envi- ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) assessors believed that the knowledge of the Maxey Flats site was adequate to insure containment, credible regulation, and safety, largely because "the general soil characteristics" at the facility have been "very impermeable."^'* Yet, such general assurances failed to address the problem of leachate migration with sufficient precision and accuracy. Other US EPA geolo- gists noted that precise determination of hydraulic conductivity is impossible at a site, like Maxey Flats, with fractures.^^ US Geological Survey (USGS) scientists claimed that the Maxey Flats hydrogeology, because of the fractures, was "too complex for accurate quantitative description."^^ Given the complexity and uncer- tainty associated with much information about Yucca Mountain, there is reason to believe that optimistic judgments, about the accuracy of site studies, may err just as they did at Maxey Flats. Because inaccurate knowledge of the Yucca Mountain facility prevents scientists from being able to predict precisely migration rates of the waste thousands of years into the f^uture, it also prevents them from guarantee- ing that the proposed repository will comply with very specific, US radiation- dose limits. Because compliance with government regulations is unknown, and because the consequences of repository failure could be catastrophic, it is argu- able that tbe Yucca Mountain facility ought not be built, at least not until there is significantly more knowledge about the future risks likely to be associated with the installation. The fact that nuclear industry, DOE, and contractor repre- sentatives support siting the facility suggests that this "iron triangle" may be taking inadequate account of scientific concerns about the site. ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 765 4, Nonquantifiable Uncertainty at Yucca Mountain Argues Against Disposal US NAS panelists said that perhaps the US should delay any permanent radwaste facility until we have more knowledge about long-term repository behavior. Likewise, a major US government commission, studying policy for dealing with high-level radioactive waste, concluded recently that Congress should reconsider the subject of interim [rather than permanent] high-level rad- waste storage by the year 2000 so as to "take into account uncertainties that exist today and which might be resolved or clarified within 10 years." Indeed, said the commission, "despite the considerable time and money already expended to site a repository, none has been sited yet, and the date by which a permanent repository will be available is uncertain...the most notable uncertainty" is the "date of opening a permanent repository" in the US.*'' At least part of the reason for the commission's worries, it appears, are the scientific uncertainties associated with the proposed facility at Yucca Mountain, some of which have been outlined in the preceding section. Moreover, to the degree that this nonquantifiable uncertainty precludes assurance that precise radiation-control standards can be met during the thousands of years of opera- tion of the proposed Nevada repository, to that extent it is arguable that we cannot yet guarantee the safety of permanent waste disposal. And if we cannot guarantee the long-term safety of proposed repositories, like Yucca Mountain, then the "dig now, pay later" approach of repository supporters is highly ques- tionable. Part of the rationale for delay or avoidance of a permanent US reposi- tory is a basic legal premise: res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet: no one ought to suffer from what others have done.** Unless we can guarantee that many others in the future will not suffer unreasonably from what we have done in building a permanent repository, then our scientific uncertainty may be suffi- cient to argue against building the Yucca Mountain permanent repository.

Why does our uncertainty about whether Yucca Mountain will lead to catas- trophe in the future argue against the facility? Brian Berry has provided one of the simplest rationales for the claim that the possibility of causing future catas- trophe is a decisive reason for not acting in the present. He argues that, (1) in the case of an individual making a possibly lethal choice that affects only himself we should regard anyone who chooses the potentially fatal action—who claims that uncertainty makes it premature to decide against the action—as crazy. Likewise, says Barry, (2) when we change the case to one that involves millions of people and extends over many centuries, the same reasoning applies with increased force. Barry's rationale for (1) is that no rational person gambles with his own life except to gain a comparable benefit, to save it. Rock climbers, sky divers, and other risk enthusiasts, however, might claim that they are skilled and well trained and hence not gambling with their lives since the probability of death for such a skilled person is low. Risk enthusiasts probably would also argue that they gain great benefits from their activities. Both Barry and these enthusiasts would likely agree, however, that as the benefits decreased, and as 766 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY the probability of death increased, the risky actions become more foolish.

Hence, (I) is reasonable. Barry's rationale for (2) is that, because the numbers of persons potentially at risk of death are larger, the impetus for choosing against the risk is likewise even greater. Despite reasoning such as Barry's, official US DOE documents have argued for permanent repositories on exactly the grounds that Barry says are most questionable. He claims that anyone in this position —who argues that uncertainty makes it premature to decide against a potentially catastrophe action—is "crazy." Yet, the US DOE repeatedly has argued for such a claim, for example:

A final conclusion on the qualifying condition for climatic changes cannot be made based on available data. However, the evidence does not support a finding that the reference repository location is not likely to meet the qualify- ing condition.

In other words, DOE officials have used uncertainty about climatic changes as an argument for the thesis that the repository ought not be disqualified. Such an argument, an appeal to ignorance, is problematic on both logical grounds and for the ethical reasons outlined by Barry. Moreover, in cases of future catastrophic risk, Barry's reasons (1) and (2) likewise are compelling, because a repository catastrophe presumably could wipe out an entire culture, not just many persons, and destroying a culture may be worse than merely killing many people. Also, in the case of our threatening future generations, the repository risk is imposed without the consent of the possible victims, and it is not confined to the benefi- ciaries—a point that we shall not take time to discuss here. For all these reasons, scientific uncertainty raises numerous questions regarding siting permanent rad- waste facilities like Yucca Mountain.^° 5.

Uncertainty and Permanent Disposal: Other Countries Despite the uncertainties associated with Yucca Mountain, the US could have a permanent geological facility for storage of high-level radioactive waste there as early as 2010.^' No other country is moving so quickly to permanent reposi- tories.

Officials in other nations have openly admitted that they are proceeding more slowly with high-level radioactive waste disposal, precisely because of the scientific uncertainties involved. As the Board on Radioactive Waste Manage- ment of the National Research Council of the US National Acadethy of Sciences (NAS) put it:

The US program is unique among those of all nations in its rigid schedule, in its insistence on defining in advance the technical requirements for every part of the multibarrier system, and in its major emphasis on the geological com- ponent of the barrier as detailed in 10 CFR 60. Because one is predicting the fate of the HLW into the distant future, the undertaking is necessarily full of uncertainties.... It may even tum out to be appropriate to delay permanent closure of a waste repository until adequate assurances concerning its long- term behavior can be obtained through continued in-situ geological studies....

There are scientific reasons to think that a satisfactory HLW repository can be built and licensed. But for the reasons described earlier, the current US pro- gram seems unlikely to achieve that desirable ^^ ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 767 What can we learn about the likelihood of success in permanent geological disposal, on the basis of activities in the various countries considering the repository option?

In eight of the nations with the most radioactive waste, uncertainties have forced the countries to postpone permanent geological disposal. In Canada, for example, although nuclear reactors supply about 13 percent of the country's electricity, there has been no decision about spent reactor fuel, although Canada will have approximately 34,000 MTU by the end of the century. Given no decision about permanent disposal, the earliest Canadians could have such a repository is 2010, even assuming that it wanted one.'^ Similarly, the French plan to use interim storage for a minimum of 20 years before moving to permanent disposal. Nuclear reactors currently supply more than 70 percent of French electricity. The earliest a permanent facility could be ready in France is 2010. The French rationale for delaying decisions about permanent storage is that cooling the waste would reduce the thermal impact on the host rock where it might be stored. In the Yucca Mountain studies, many problems have arisen because of the ability of the high-temperature wastes to induce thermal fractures in the host rock, thereby increasing the probability of fracture flow of the leachate. Because of such diH'iculties, "the French believe that the period [of interim storage] could be extended as long as needed because of the safety of monitored storage."'"* Nuclear reactors supply approximately 40 percent of electricity in Germany.

Like France, Germany is building interim storage facilities for high-level radio- active wastes, although the Germans hope to use deep geological disposal at the Gorleben salt dome. Even if the German plans are not delayed, the earliest a permanent repository could be ready is 2008.

The Gorleben facility was licensed in 1983, but litigation conceming safety and scientific uncertainty has, so far, prevented its use as repository for spent fuel.^^ In Japan, approximately 32 percent of the nation's electricity is supplied by nuclear reactors. Despite this fact, the Japanese appear to be quite concemed about a premature leap to an inadequately tested technology for permanent waste disposal. They plan to store their vitrified waste for 30 to 50 years before considering deep geological em- placement. In fact, the Japanese do not plan even to try to develop regulations for siting a permanent repository until after the year 2000. Hence, if approved, the earliest date at which a Japanese repository could operate is 2030.'^ Spain is following a strategy similar to that of its European neighbors. With 36 percent of its electricity supplied by nuclear reactors, the Spaniards plan to store spent fuel at the reactors for 10 years, and then to use interim storage for another 40 years. Sometime around the tum of the century, they plan to consider possible candidate sites for permanent geological disposal. Their explicit strat- egy is to gain more experience dealing with the wastes before deciding what to do with them.^' In Sweden, approximately 50 percent of electricity is supplied by nuclear reactors. Because of scientific uncertainties and because they want to achieve a 768 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY tenfold reduction in radiation and heat output from the waste, the Swedes are storing their spent fuel for 30 to 40 years in centralized, interim storage facili- ties.

They do not expect to have a permanent facility available until some time after 2020.^* Like the Swedes, the Swiss plan to store their spent fuel in interim facilities for 40 years. Approximately 38 percent of electricity in Switzerland is supplied by nuclear reactors. The earliest a permanent repository could be avail- able in Switzerland is sometime after 2025. Like the Swedes, the Swiss have laws and regulations that make it impossible to site a new commercial nuclear plant unless operators can demonstrate safe disposal of spent fuel. As a result, no new plants have been sited in either country.^^ The United Kingdom (UK), with 17 percent of its electricity coming from nuclear reactors, has one of the longest periods of interim storage of spent fuel, 50 years. Using interim storage at Sellafield has been necessary, in part, because of opposition in the UK to permanent disposal and because of scientific uncer- tainties associated with deep geological facilities. The earliest date by which the British could have a permanent repository ready is 2030, although the have not begun the siting process.'*^° Although all eight countries just surveyed are some of the world's major users of nuclear electricity, and even though all of them plan to use permanent geo- logical disposal of spent fuel in the future, none of them expects to do so as quickly as the United States. Indeed, the preferred altemative is to reduce uncer- tainties about behavior of the waste. As the US review commission put it: "In general, deferred disposal is viewed as beneficial because it reduces the heat output of the wastes." As a result, centralized, monitored, interim storage facili- ties have been built or planned in all but one country, Canada, where plans are to use at-reactor interim storage."" If the experience of eight major nuclear countries is correct, then one powerful argument (for not pursuing permanent disposal at present and for postponing a decision about a geological repository) is that no nation, except the US, has plans for rapid permanent disposal of nuclear waste. If the plans of most countries refiect a scientific consensus about our inability, at present, to handle the uncertainties associated with permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste, then these uncertainties may undercut arguments for permanent disposal anywhere at present.

6. Uncertainty and Permanent Disposal: An Objection In response to these arguments about the scientific uncertainty associated with the safety of permanent geological disposal, a proponent of the repositories could argue that no science is ever certain, and that scientific certainty is not always required before one acts.

In other words, one could argue that reasonable assurance of safety, not scientific certainty, is a precondition for ethically defen- sible behavior. On this view, one could argue that certainty is impossible, and therefore that one need merely follow the best available scientific opinion or the course of action leading to the best estimated results.

The heart of this objection to our analysis is correct. One does not need certainty before one acts, because certainty is unattainable. Our argument, how- ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 769 ever, is not that permanent disposal requires certainty. Rather, the argument is that permanent disposal requires more certainty than we have now, and that at present, the uncertainties associated with permanent disposal are extreme. For now, we wish to raise the issue of what behavior is ethically defensible under conditions of uncertainty. Following Barry's insights already mentioned, our presupposition is that, in cases of extensive scientific and probabilistic uncer- tainty—like those concerning precise geological predictions 10,000 years from now or like those concerning events whose uncertainty cannot be quanti- fied—we ought to behave in an ethically conservative way. But what is ethically conservative behavior? On one view, ethically conservative behavior, in a situ- ation of uncertainty, is behavior that does not reject the null (no-effect) hypothe- sis.

That is, if we are uncertain about a catastrophic event in the future, for example, ethical conservatives do not assume there will be no effect. In other words, we ought to minimize type-II statistical errors. Although we shall not take the time to provide the arguments in full here,'"^ there are a number of reasons for minimizing type-II error in situations of uncertainty, like those associated with permanent geological disposal of radioactive waste.

Uncertainty and Permanent Disposal: Type-II Error In a situation of uncertainty, errors of type I occur when one rejects a null hypothesis that is true; errors of type II occur when one fails to reject a null hypothesis that is false. (One null hypothesis might be, for example, "the pro- posed Yucca Mountain repository will secure high-level radwastes so that only one ten-millionth of allowable releases of radionuclides will reach the water table over 100,000 years.")i«>3 Given a situation of uncertainty, which is the more serious error, type I or type II? An analogous issue arises in law. Is the more serious error to acquit a guilty person or to convict an innocent person? Ought one to run the risk of rejecting a true null hypothesis, of not using the Yucca Mountain technology that is really acceptable and safe? Or, ought one to run the risk of not rejecting a false null hypothesis, of employing the Yucca Mountain technology that is really unac- ceptable and unsafe? The basic problem is that to decrease type-I risk might hurt the public, especially members of future generations, and to decrease type-II risk might hurt both present persons and especially those dependent on the industries promoting the permanent repository.

In the area of pure science and statistics, most persons believe that in a situation of uncertainty one ought to minimize type-I risks, so as to limit false positives, assertions of effects where there are none. Pure scientists often attach a greater loss to accepting a falsehood than to failing to acknowledge a truth.'""^ Societal decisionmaking under uncertainty, as in cases involving siting perma- nent radwaste facilities, however, is arguably not analogous to decisionmaking in pure science. Societal decisionmaking involves rights, duties, and ethical consequences that affect the welfare of persons, whereas purely scientific deci- sionmaking involves largely epistemological consequences. For this reason, it 770 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY is not clear that in societal cases under uncertainty, one ought to minimize type-I risks.

Instead, there are a number of prima facie reasons for minimizing type-II errors.

For one thing, it is arguably more important to protect the public from harm (from possible catastrophic radwaste releases) than to provide, in some positive sense, for welfare (building permanent repositories), because protecting from harm seems to be a necessary condition for enjoying other freedoms.'^^ Admittedly, it is difficult to draw the line between providing benefits and pro- tecting from harm, between positive and negative laws or duties. Nevertheless, just as there is a basic distinction between welfare rights and negative rights,•"^ so there is an analogous distinction between welfare policies (that provide some good) and protective policies that prohibit some infringement). Moral philoso- phers continue to honor related distinctions, such as that between letting die and killing someone. It therefore seems more important to protect citizens from public hazards, like a catastrophic leak at a permanent radwaste facility, than to attempt to enhance their welfare, over the short term, by implementing a tech- nology such as permanent geological disposal of radwaste."'^ A second reason for minimizing type-II errors under uncertainty is that the public typically needs more risk protection than do the industry or government proponents of the risky technology, like Yucca Mountain. The public usually has fewer financial re- sources and less information to deal with societal hazards that affect it, and laypersons are often faced with bureaucratic denials of public danger. Certainly members of future generations are likely to have less information to deal with a permanent repository since, by definition (US regulations), it will not be moni- tored. Hence, their needs for protection seem larger, and the importance of minimizing type-II errors appears greater."*^ Third, it is more important to minimize type-II error, especially in cases of great uncertainty, because laypersons ought to be accorded legal rights to pro- tection against technological decisions that could threaten their health and physical security. These legal rights arise out of the considerations that everyone has both due-process rights and rights to bodily security. In cases where those responsible or liable cannot redress the harm done to others by their faulty decisions—as they cannot in the case of repositories' harming future genera- tions—there are strong arguments for minimizing the public risk. Industrial and technological decisionmakers cannot adequately compensate or insure their po- tential victims from bad consequences in the case of permanent disposal, be- cause the risks involve death. Therefore, they are what Judith Jarvis Thomson calls "incompensable." Surely incompensable risks ought to be minimized for those who fail to give free, informed consent to them. Whenever risks are incompensable, (e.g., imposing a significant probability of death on another), failure to minimize the risks is typically morally unjustifiable without the free, informed consent of the victim.

"'^ A final reason for minimizing type-II error in cases of uncertainty is that failure to do so would result in using members of future generations as means to the ends of present persons. It would result in their bearing a significantly higher risk from radwaste than members of present generations, despite the fact that present persons have received most of the ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE ' 771 benefits associated with generating the waste. Such discrimination (in this case, against future persons), as Frankena has pointed out, is justified only if it would work to the advantage of everyone, including those discriminated against. Any other attempt to justify discrimination fails because it would amount to sanction- ing t he use of some humans as means to the ends of other humans. *'° Because the imposition of Yucca Mountain risks discriminates against future persons, it would not work to the advantage of everyone. Because it would not, discrimination against members of future generations likely to be affected by Yucca Mountain appears not to be justified. And if it is not justified, then failure to minimize type-II errors—that cause such discrimination—is also not justi- fied. Hence, in situations of uncertainty, such as those concemed with perma- nent radwaste disposal, the ethically preferable course of action is to minimize type-II, rather than type-I, error. This course of action, in a situation of uncer- tainty, requires us to run the risk of rejecting the null hypothesis, to run the risk of not using permanent, high-level radwaste repositories, at least not until sig- nificant uncertainties are removed.

8. Conclusions If the arguments of this essay are correct, then permanent geological disposal of radwaste is highly questionable on epistemological, ethical, and political grounds. The epistemological grounds are the tremendous uncertainties associ- ated with permanent disposal, uncertainties arising because of the 10,000-year time frame, the precision of safety predictions required by existing regulations, and our inability even to quantify these uncertainties. The ethical grounds are the necessity to behave in a morally conservative way and to minimize type II errors in situations of uncertainty. The political grounds are the fact that other countries are postponing decisions about permanent disposal of nuclear wastes.

All of these grounds raise questions about the fact that members of the "iron triangle" appear to be promoting permanent disposal at Yucca Mountain.

These questions are especially troubling because it is impossible to justify building a permanent radwaste repository, at present, without employing at least two logically invalid inferences: the appeal to ignorance and affirming the con- sequent. Policy based on questionable logical and scientific inferences is highly problematic. Hence, all those who currently support using permanent radwaste repositories—especially representatives of nuclear utilities, the DOE, and DOE contractors—appear to err. Their behavior in the Yucca Mountain case suggests that, in such situations, the iron triangle needs to be either broken or expanded to include the scientific and ethical concerns of the public.

University of South Florida Notes 'Olinger, D.: 1991, "Nuclear Industry Targets Nevada," St. Petersburg Times (Dec. 1), p.

Dl.

See also Keesler, A.: 'Testimony,' in C. Fairhurst: 1990, Board on Radioactive Waste 772 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY Management, National Research Council, The Federal Program for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Nu- clear Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, 101 Congress (U.S. Govemment Printing Office, Washington, DC), pp. 01-02, and Schneider, K.:

1991, 'Nuclear Industry Plans Ads to Counter Critics,' New York Times (Nov. 13), p. A18.

^Olinger, op. cit., p. DL ^See Shrader-Frechette, K. S.: 1993, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case Against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste (University of Califomia Press, Berkeley).

'*See Sen, A.: 1993, "Does Business Ethics Make Economic Sense?," Business Ethics Quarterly 3 (Jan.), no. 1, pp. 45-54.

^SeeMarquiss, K.:

1991, "Defense Contracts:

Operation III Wind," in Case Studies in Business Ethics, T. Donaldson and A. R. Gini, eds. (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ), p. 90.

^Rosen, M. E.: 1991, "Nevada v. Watkins: Who Gets the Shaft?," Virginia Environmental Law Journal 10, pp. 239-309.

'Fairhurst, C: 1990, "National Research Council and National Academy of Sciences, 'State- ment'," in US Congress, The Federal Program for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, US Senate, Wist Congress, Second Session, October 2, 1990 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC), p. 18.

^Deere, D.: 1990, "US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 'Statement'," in US Congress, The Federal Program for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of Committee on Environment and Public Works, US Senate, 101st Congress, Second Session, October 2, 1990 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC), p. 18. The position in favor of permanent geological disposal is also confirmed by Blowers, A., D. Lowry, and B. Solomon:

1991, The International Politics of Nuclear Waste (St. Martin's Press, New York), p. 318, and by the US National Academy of Sciences, Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, National Research Council: 1990, Rethinking High-Level Radioactive Waste Dis- posal (National Academy Press, Washington, DC), pp. v, 6. See Waste Isolation Systems Panel, Board on Radioactive Waste Management: 1983, A Study of the Isolation System for Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (National Academy Press, Washington, DC).

^Blowers, Lowry, and Solomon, op. cit., pp. 318-19.

l^Murray, R. L.: 1983, Understanding Radioactive Waste (Batelle Press, Columbus), p. 127, p.

142; Blowers, Lowry, and Solomon, op. cit., p. 318.

"For discussion of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, see US Congress: 1978, High-Level Nuclear Waste Issues, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, US Senate, 100th Congress, First Session, April 23.

June 2. 3, 18. 1987 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC). See also US Congress: 1981, Radioactive Waste Legislation Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 'House of Representatives, 97th Congress, First Session, June 23, 25; July 9, 1981 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC).

'^For discussion of the 1987 Act, see Raeber, J. D.: 1989, "Federal Nuclear Waste Policy as Defined by the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987," Saint Louis University Law Journal 3A, no. 1 (Fall), pp.

111-31.

•^US DOE: 1991, Site Characterization Progress Report:

Yucca Mountain, Nevada, DOE/ RW-0307P (US DOE, Washington, DC), p. xiv.

'''Swainston, H. W.: 1992, "Yucca Mountain: A Study of Conflicts in Federalism," Inter Alia 57, no. 1 (October), pp. 11-16. Sawyer, G. and the State of Nevada Commission on Nuclear ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND THE IRON TRIANGLE 773 Projects:

1992, Report of the Nevada Commission on Nuclear Projects (Nuclear Waste Project Office, Carson City), pp.

57-58.