FINAL ESSAY ETHICS FOR REY WRITER
In this learning module, we are introduced to the ethical study of friendship. Ethics is a branch of philosophy, also known as moral philosophy. In the study of ethics, we have the opportunity to explore fundamental questions about what is good or bad, right or wrong. We investigate whether there is a universal standard or objective notion of morality. Ethical theories provide us with guidelines on our motives, behavior, or the consequences of our actions. With this framework, we specifically examine how the study of ethics applies to our friendships.
We examine philosophical definitions of friendship, as well as the paradox and ambiguities of friendship. We examine how romance affects our understanding of friendship and shapes our contemporary expressions of both friendship and marriage.
◾Philosophers ask some of the following questions about friendship:
◾What is the nature of friendship?
◾What are its rules? Promises?
◾How does one differentiate its many forms?
◾How does friendship compare to romantic and family connections?
◾Does friendship provide a viable solution to the human need for belonging and connection?
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche tells us that “Friendship is ‘a problem worthy of a solution.’” (Vernon, 2010, p. 9). While philosophers may not have an actual “solution” to the ambiguities and various understandings of friendship, their exploration of the questions themselves produces significant insight. In this quest, we discover some factors that aid friendship and some factors that hinder it.
Philosophers do agree that friendship is not easily defined and is often a fluid concept that changes over time, varying among different age groups, cultures, and historical periods. Generally, friendships lack clear boundaries, unlike the more defined relationships found in marriage, family dynamics, or work relationships. Ultimately, friendship boundaries are to be defined by the individuals within the friendship, which is a strength—because it allows for a lot of freedom in terms of the relationship—as well as a weakness—because the friendship can easily lose its way or dissolve because of differing interpretations. Specifically, different interpretations of a friendship can lead to an imbalance, with unequal feelings and expectations.
Most philosophers believe that friendship is essential for a happy and fulfilling life. The Greek philosopher Aristotle contributed significantly to our understanding of friendship, which he defined as a “relationship of goodwill between individuals who reciprocate that goodwill” (in Vernon, p. 4). In Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, he places close friendship at the top of the hierarchy of friendship. He posits three types of friendship:
•Friends of Utility
•Friends of Pleasure
•Friends of the Soul
Friends of utility get something from each other and friends of pleasure enjoy certain activities together. These first two friendships are casual and instrumental. They are also vulnerable, because if we take away the element of utility or pleasure, the friendship will not last. Friendship with a sexual component fits into the second category, defining those who seek a shared pleasure. Thus, if the friendship is based on sexual attraction, then it is vulnerable and subject to disintegrate. The friendship of the highest form, or friendship of the soul, is free of these external factors. Accordingly, in this profound type of friendship, the friends love each other for who they are in themselves.
Intense friendships, imbued with erotic elements, though not sexual, had a long tradition up through the 17th century. Intense friendships among the opposite sex were not uncommon, either. Today, many sociologists believe that friendship is becoming the relationship of choice. As well, traditional marriage has been reconceived as focusing on friendship first. People are now waiting longer to get married because they want the best of both: a great friendship and a sexual relationship.
Overall, there are many similarities and many differences between romance and friendship. Both are voluntary, sharing trust and understanding, but they can also experience jealousy and enmity. They are also quite different, in that passions can drive a romance to realms of irrational and spontaneous behavior. Of course, romantic love involves the element of physical lust and expression. Often, emotional affections are monitored between friends, sometimes to the detriment of friendship, simply for the sake of not veering into erotic territory. The fear of homosexual tendencies can exacerbate this distancing effect, especially between men. Not crossing the line from friendship into romance can sometimes generate tensions.
The Greek philosopher Plato had hope that a romantic relationship could produce a genuinely worthy friendship, as the couple learns to focus on shared passions, rather than on erotic passions for one another. For Plato, it takes some effort to not let the sexual eclipse the friendship. Indeed, time itself often tempers the erotic elements, and the opportunity for a deep friendship to flourish becomes more possible.
Plato focuses on how one can love “expansively and wisely” by focusing on the nature of eros (Greek for intimate love). For Plato, sexuality is a fundamental component of human experience, but it is only one component of eros. Vernon explains:
Eros “drives us to penetrate more profoundly into things, to reach beyond ourselves, and to attempt to integrate and unify. It is a power of the mind and spirit as well as the body. It is the source of creativity and innovation. It lies behind the scientific quest of discovery and the religious impulse for meaning. So sex is part of eros, perhaps the part of which we are most conscious; but it is only a part” (p. 55).
Indeed, Plato believes that eros could be the driving force of our friendships and also lead to philosophy, or the love of wisdom, as much as sexuality. According to Plato, they both aim for immortality. “For Plato, love roots us in our bodies and transcends the purely material. It’s both/and, not either/or” (p.55). While total immortality is not possible for humans to achieve, glimpses of it are possible, in these forms. The dangers, though, are also readily available, if eros is not tempered. Plato warns that our erotic passions could become obsessive and bypass our passion for wisdom.
Similarly, Nietzsche believes that although we do not fully know ourselves or our friends, through our friendships, we can acquire more wisdom, particularly in our opportunity to know them better and thereby understand ourselves better, too. He is particularly keen on friendships that embrace the future. Vernon explains:
We agree to move into the future together, in directions not always foreseen. We agree to take the risks of showing more of ourselves to each other, and thereby to ourselves. That should deepen our humanity, all being well. And it is that deepening—that brave turning to the truths of the human condition—which inspires Nietzsche, and with him those who love friendship as a way of life (p. 79-80).
Nietzsche posits two kinds of friendship: ladder types and circle types. Ladder types make different friends along the way, mirroring their own evolution in life. They often move on from friendships that no longer serve where they are in life. Circle types cultivate friendships with all kinds of people and attempt to maintain them. These friendships tend to be longer lasting, but perhaps more shallow.
A shared past is not enough to sustain a friendship. Time can drain the authenticity out of friendship, and the friendship becomes idle. These are what some might call “flabby” friends. Nietzsche finds that these friendships can be untrustworthy, for, in order to maintain a connection, they attempt to reminisce about the past. Vernon suggests, “this is a sign that habit has become a substitute for any real affection or closeness.” (p. 79) Whereas the past can constrain us, the future is full of new possibilities. Therefore, it is important to see friendships as future-oriented. Vernon adds:
We must gather the past into the present and be drawn into what lies ahead. Therein lies the vitality of life, for the future is that which we do not possess. That makes it frightening, though invigorating too—invigorating of the friendships that move into the morrow as well (p. 79)
Paradox is also a common theme among philosophers of friendship. Novelist Patrick White wrote: “Friendship is two knives. They will sharpen each other when rubbed together, but often one of them will slip and slice off a thumb” (p. 74).
This paradox often presents itself in dissimulation, a form of deception whereby one hides his or her thoughts or feelings from another. Philosophers agree dissimulation is an experience common in friendships, as even the best of friendships cannot bear the weight or intensity of consistent honesty. This begs the question: If friendship is grounded in ethics, can we call it friendship if there is an element of dishonesty involved?
William Shakespeare stated that “most friendship is feigning.” (p. 80). Vernon echoes this by stating that: “In fact, when you start to look, it quickly becomes apparent that in a million little ways, as well as some large ones, friendship is often a matter of nothing less than faking it” (p. 80). This leads to an obvious ethical dilemma: Is it ethical to be somewhat dishonest, at times, especially with those with whom we are close? Many of the philosophers we explore seem to suggest that it is.
This dissimulation that philosophers refer to is not the same thing as generic politeness one might receive from a salesperson or cashier. Dissimulation in friendship might include not sharing one’s full range of honest feelings about one’s friend’s partner, their parenting style, or fashion sensibility. While Cicero and Aristotle argues that true friendship demands honesty, even if it is hurtful, contemporary understandings of friendship view dissimulation as acceptable, appropriate, and generally not hurtful to friendship. Even with the closest friends, it is believed we must engage in a bit of this. Feigning helps us to determine the right timing of when and how to present honest feelings.
Vernon posits that because we do not know ourselves, we could also be completely off the mark in our assessments of our friends. It is generally thought to be better to avoid offending our friends, by being evasive or not sharing all of our immediate thoughts, than divulging what we are feeling and create an unnecessary upset. Additionally, we often project our perceptions onto others; so, what we feel about another might really be what we feel about ourselves. Since we do not fully know ourselves, and even deceive ourselves about our own behavior at times, it is only natural that we might do the same with our loved ones.
References:
MacKinnon, B. (2013). Ethics: Theory and contemporary issues—Concise Edition (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
In this module, we explore the role of social media in the development and expression of friendship. We explore some of the strengths and weaknesses of online friendship, evaluating some of the contradictory research surrounding it. We apply philosophical reasoning to analyze theories regarding the connection between the Internet and friendship.
In today’s world, more people are putting their social energies into online forums, rather than face-to-face interaction. Philosophers differ in their opinions regarding how beneficial or not this is to friendship overall. The more negative aspects are easily measured and readily apparent. Online bullying is quite common, and many misperceptions and miscommunications occur through the written word. More people are using online media to break up, end friendships, and dismiss people from contractual agreements. All of this leads to a less personalized interaction.
Some psychologists contend that up to 40% of the information put up on social networking sites might be fabricated (Vernon, 2010, p. 105). Alternatively, because of the anonymity that the online environment affords, some people might be inclined to be too honest and over share, not having the advantage of reading the body language and social clues of their receivers. Many are often subsequently blindsided by sudden rejection or harsh replies. Because it is difficult to be subtle and gentle without body language aids, people can often be more harsh and abrasive online.
Sociologist Sherry Turkle expresses concern that we are becoming socially inept, not learning to conduct skillfully face-to-face interaction (p. 106). As well, we are not giving ourselves enough time alone, where we learn to integrate and manage our emotions throughout the day. She describes a “tethered self” that is “dependent upon being wired and feels most intimate when relationships are mediated by machines” (p. 106).
There are additional concerns that this environment is altering human psychology altogether. The online environment can often lend itself to more superficial interactions because it does not require any real time commitment of being in the same physical space. Because it is about sharing bits of information, a lot of which can be wrong, it often lends itself to knee-jerk, reactionary responses, rather than fostering deeper, abiding connections.“Hence, online chat is mostly about gossip, bullet point profiles and instant reactions, whereas conversation grips the whole individual, nurtures a natural sense of reserve, and requires a deeper commitment to each other” (p. 106).
Similarly, neuroscientists are concerned that an emphasis on online engagement can alter the structure of the brain, shorten our attention spans, and even lead to a “psychotic disregard” for others (p. 107). Author Michael Bugeja writes: “‘Friending really appeals to the ego, where friendships appeal to the conscience” (p. 107). Vernon adds that friending is a quantitative activity, where having more friends means more. Befriending is a qualitative activity that requires more depth and more of a time commitment. Many scientists are hopeful that people understand the difference between “friending,” forming virtual links, and “befriending,” forming real connections.
Still, addiction to collecting friends online is a major concern among those who study the impact of social media. The Journal of Psychiatry lists eight key questions to determine if one is an addict (p. 108). According to researchers, millions of people are Internet addicts, an addiction similar to shopping addiction. In part, this transpires from a consumeristic culture that promotes the idea that more is better. Indeed, more often means less. People compulsively collect friends to boost their egos and fill the void of not having deeper or more profound friendships. Of course, there is the positive impact of the Internet on friendship. Following Aristotle’s model of friendship, we can glean some of the benefits of online connections. At the second level of friendship, where friends connect over shared interests, the Internet can provide many opportunities. A lot of people are now able to connect over shared hobbies, passions, and beliefs, when they might not have otherwise found each other in person.
Additionally, Aristotle felt that it was crucial to spend non-instrumental time with friends, or time that was not structured or purpose driven. A lot of our outings with friends, especially in today’s busy world, are geared toward eating, shopping, or various activities. Online interaction is often non-instrumental, extending time spent with friends, rather than pursuing a specific goal. Aristotle felt this kind of non-instrumental time together helps to foster deeper connections.
Another positive benefit is that many people are being exposed to new cultures they might not normally encounter. One has the opportunity to engage with people of different perspectives from around the globe. In a sense, the human connection becomes more universal.
Research studies indicate support for both sides of the argument. Some studies suggest we are “losing close friends.” (p. 117). Other studies suggest we are gaining more friends. The average American claims they have two close friends, and a quarter suggests they do not have any at all (p.117).
Vernon suggests that both the critics and the supporters of the Internet are right: “…whenever human beings come together it precipitates loneliness and belonging in equal measure, and heightens both. We should only expect that for every positive story of virtual amity, there is a negative story of virtual animosity, too” (119).
References:
Vernon, M. (2010). The Meaning of Friendship. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
In this module, we explore the role of disabilities in the development and expression of friendship. We explore some of the barriers to friendship for those who are differently abled, evaluating some of the research surrounding it. We apply philosophical reasoning to analyze some of the challenges that those are differently abled experience, particularly in a classroom environment.
Those who have disabilities often prefer to be referred to as “differently abled,” rather than disabled. Differently abled simply means that one has different abilities. For example, if one is without sight, one may have the ability to sense things more tactilely or auditorily. Indeed, one may have more of an astute awareness of how things feel or even sound than one who has complete vision. The point is that one enjoys a different ability, rather than a lack of ability.
Research is limited in the area of critical friendships and the differently abled community. We do know that differently abled people have the same desire for affection and companionship as anyone. They also have additional needs around cultivating friendships, wanting less dependency on their families and service care providers (Hutchinson, 2010).
Studies indicate that the majority of differently abled individuals have no or few friends among those outside of this community. Differently abled individuals are often challenged to cultivate friendships, in part because of the perception that they need services, rather than friendships. A lot of people in this community feel lonely and isolated, and sometimes become overly dependent on their service care workers and families for companionship (Hutchinson, 2010). Part of the challenge is that the family members and service care workers do not often actively support these friendships with persons outside of the community, believing that there would not be much of an interest. As well, there are few opportunities for people who are differently abled to actually interact with those outside their community. Finally, time and energy is spent more on the basic, physical needs of those from this community, rather than focusing on cultivating friendships with those outside of the community. Some families and providers are fearful that this would be viewed as an interference with the natural process.
The Ward article focuses specifically on the classroom setting, where many of our friendships are fostered and nurtured. Research suggests that those who are differently abled are quite disadvantaged in their ability to make friends and sustain them. Research indicates that there are three primary themes that aid in student friendships: proximity, opportunity, and facilitation. Students often make friends with those who are simply near them in the same class, age group, or environment. Students also need the opportunity to share similar interests and experiences. Finally, especially with younger children, parents often participate in helping to facilitate friendships. In a school environment, instructors often need to take on this facilitation role. Research indicates that this often does not occur, with secondary instructors particularly focused more on teaching the curriculum than addressing student needs (Ward, 2010, p. 23).
According to researchers, there are four key factors that serve to inhibit friendships for those who are differently abled, particularly in a classroom setting. The first are physical barriers, such as narrow doorways or isolated seating. Intentional attitude barriers entail isolation, bullying, or cruel treatment. Unintentional attitudinal barriers include a lack of knowledge or awareness and physical limitations of the student, such as visual impairment (Ward, 2010, p. 24).
Additionally, some of the stereotypes are that differently abled people are unable to reciprocate equally in a friendship, having more needs. Reciprocity is understood as key to a healthy, flourishing friendship. Caretakers need to learn to help facilitate these friendships by being less patronizing and more empowering (Hutchison, 1990). Another barrier has traditionally been a reliance on one caregiver as the primary friend. Like the rest of the population, those who are differently abled need a range of friendships outside of the connections they share with their families and caregivers. The movie, Inside I’m Dancing explores this idea and underscores some of the challenges to friendship faced by persons with disabling conditions. In the movie, Michael is befriended by Siobhan, who has been hired as his and Rory’s personal assistant. His inexperience with friendship leads him to view the relationship as more than friendship. It also leads to Rory’s jealousy and conflict.
The research consensus is that there needs to be greater awareness about the value of friendship, in general, and how it contributes to a better quality of life. There also needs to be more awareness that those who are differently abled need and thrive off of friendships as much as the rest of the population. Understanding that special services, aids, and caregivers cannot and should not provide the primary means of socialization for those from this community is essential. Facilitating friendships outside of services, recreation programs, and those offerings that aim to cultivate socialization, but which seldom succeed, is important. Basically, creating more inclusive and less segregated environments, and treating everyone as capable of genuine, reciprocal friendship is essential (Hutchinson, 2010).
As discussed in Module 1, Aristotle proposes three levels of friendship, including utility, pleasure, and soul connection. For Aristotle, work friendships satisfy the first level of friendship, one of utility. In work friendships, colleagues are often friendly, without really knowing each other at all. It is generally a “lesser” kind of friendship because it is based on a mutual activity, in this case work. Friendships based on activities, according to Aristotle, are easy to form. They can also be confused with deeper friendships, which they are not, because they do not really require that you share too much of yourself. The focus is on the task at hand. Aristotle explains:
Those who are friendly with each other because they are useful to each other do not like each other for the person each one is in themselves. They like each other only insofar as it does them some good. They are friendly because it is beneficial to be so (Vernon, p. 23).
Of course, a friendship of utility could ultimately turn into a friendship of the soul, Aristotle’s third level of friendship. More often they do not, though, and people find that when the activity is removed or one leaves a place of employment, any friendship with those colleagues will likely dwindle (p. 22). A colleague is useful in many ways, such as providing an entertaining distraction from work. Take away the utility, though, and the substance of the friendship itself may not persist.
The idea of working toward a goal is inherent in the work environment, so having a friendly environment aids this endeavor. Yet, it presents the dilemma of knowing truly how genuine the friendship is in itself. A work friendship can even feel close for the duration of time two people work together, but if the common activity is removed and someone leaves the job, often the friendship is completely void. This presents an ethical challenge, though. To what extent do we share ourselves, or exercise friendliness, in a workplace environment? As Vernon explains:
It’s good to be able to draw distinctions between the ways in which we might profit from the friendliness of other people, on a scale from out-and-out exploitation, through mutual benefit, to an encounter we might come to count as providential (p. 23).
He adds,
Unmoderated exploitation is never going to provide fertile grounds for friendship. But soft mutual benefit is not only bearable in work relationships but also actually common to all friendships (p. 23).
Indeed, in our closest friendships, we often enjoy a level of mutual benefit. Good friends meet some of our basic needs, like running an errand for us or being an ear when we are in crisis. Vernon shares: “Some would say that the defining mark of a good friend is that they are always there for you and thus have a kind of unconditional utility” (p. 23).
Generally, though, most friendships at work operate on the idea that you are first liked for the services you provide, not for who you are. Friendliness serves an important function at work, helping to keep harmony in the work environment and keeping productivity high. On a grander scale, the contemporary workplace fosters a “powerful culture of instrumentality” which can challenge and even undermine the cultivation of these deeper connections with others (p. 25). A genuine friendship, though rare, is possible, keeping in mind the following:
[T]he point is that these relationships are always, at least initially, influenced by the utility factor. The trick is to ensure any nascent friendship is not determined by it (p. 24).
Workplace friendships can also be weak because people get different things out of the relationship. This is especially true if one is the superior and the other is an employee. Work friendships are also quite vulnerable, because if one person feels that the other is not delivering the expected goods, then the friendship can quickly turn volatile. Career prospects and advancements are on the line, and for this reason, sociologists often report that people will more likely fake their friendships at work not to upset their career prospects (p. 27).
Many self-help books actually encourage one to avoid workplace friendships and simply work amicably with one’s colleagues (p. 27). Still, this can further the confusion and promote the ambiguity around workplace friendship. Being friendly may seem like an effort at friendship when it is really an attempt to promote a productive work environment.
The ambiguities of this utility-based friendship are most apparent when bumping into someone outside of the work environment. Oftentimes, this experience can feel uncomfortable or unpleasant. There is an awkwardness that is not always so understandable. Vernon explains that stripping the relationship of the environment in which it normally thrives strips it of its “raison d’etre” (p. 20):
So, outside work, people find it hard to know how to relate to one another. Typically, they revert to work: talking about what you do together, though, you are not actually doing it, feels right, feels friendly. People become awkward because the framework in which they conduct the friendship is gone (p. 20).
Vernon adds, of course, one simply may not want to be reminded of work by running into a colleague outside of it. Similarly, political friendships, online friendships, and volunteer work friendships often have the shared component of utility. When the utility is removed, so is the friendship, even if there are fond memories of the experience itself.
Workplace friendships can be one of the more interesting interactions we have with people because we spend more time with our colleagues than our friends or family, yet we often do not really know them. Or, as Vernon posits, we experience a pseudo-intimacy, whereby “colleagues can know so much about each other but can care so little” (Vernon, p. 15):
If friendship is about knowing someone truly and being known by them, it is also about knowing which relationships are likely to foster good friendships; the relationships that contain the seeds of deeper friendship, as opposed to shallow, instrumental friendliness. It all depends on the attitude people have to their tasks and what they expect of others. And perhaps when genuine good feeling rises above the quest for jolly camaraderie, or devious influence, an admiration for character over professional achievement—a virtuous spiral of regard—can blossom into friendship (p. 29).
Professionalism itself can be antithetical to forging true friendships. People often want to maintain a level of privacy at work. As well, work attire itself is not generally reflective of a person, but of one’s disposition toward one’s work, and even his/her position in the work environment. Dressed down days are often a source of anxiety for people because they create stress in terms of how one wants to present oneself to one’s colleagues. “The fear is of revealing too much, and that mitigates against friendship” (p. 28).
On a larger level, our consumeristic and commercially minded culture, with its emphasis on utility and competition, profit and utility has a great impact on the nature and condition of friendships. Adam Smith, one of the founding fathers of the modern workplace, had faith that friendship would be positively impacted by commercial life, which is democratic and egalitarian.
Many companies are aware of the research that indicates that friendships at work increase productivity and overall job satisfaction (p. 17). People with friends at work are even twice as likely to believe they are well-paid (p. 17). Those who share friendships at work are more likely to share ideas, be innovative, and feel like their work has real meaning and purpose (p. 17).
In reality, commercial society encourages friendliness but not strong alliances, which can undermine the authority of industry. In short, strong friendships can prove time consuming and produce less productive workers, as well as contribute to nepotism and cronyism (p. 39). Other thinkers and critics have noted the drive toward individualism and competition that commercialism promotes, which undermines genuine connection.
Consider the concepts from the Module 4 readings as you participate in the module’s discussions and complete the poll. Be sure to cite the textbook or other sources in your work.
References:
Cooley, D. R. (2002). “False Friends.” Journal of Business Ethics. (195-207). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Vernon, M. (2010). The Meaning of Friendship. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 1: Friends at Work
In line with our observations from the last module about the growing consumeristic culture in which we live, many observe that our value as people stems from what we can produce, not from who we are as human beings. Essentially, we are a culture of workers valued for our utility, rather than a community of close friends. This lack of community coherence impacts our friendships. Our environments influence how we feel about ourselves and our roles in our society and how we are able to connect to others and forge lasting friendships, or not.
In this module, we explore two specific periods in history where friendship seemed to enjoy a more elevated status, as reflected in the writings of the philosophers of those eras. Specifically, we review the ancient and medieval periods, surveying some of the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers, including Aristotle and Epicurus, Cicero and Seneca. In the Middle Ages, we observe the works of Aelred de Rievaulx and Thomas Aquinas. In Ancient Greece, there were key differences in how friendships were viewed and valued. Being an active participant in the city is part of what it meant to be a citizen. It is a way one built social standing in the community, and forging friendships aided this endeavor. It is important to note that these citizens were men, and a small minority of them, so friendships among them were even more essential. Vernon writes: “one of the reasons why an image of friendship resonated so strongly with the Athenian taste for freedom was that the experience of being a citizen was closely interwoven with the experience of being a friend” (Vernon, p. 158).
In this environment, public displays of loyalty were common and necessary. “Gold can be put to the proof by fire, but goodwill among friends is tested by circumstance” was one of the common aphorisms at the time (p. 159). It is in this era that Aristotle proposed his three types of friendship, discussed in Module 1. He parallels these three types of friendship to three types of government. He writes about how the kind of community one builds is reflected in the kinds of friendships one builds. Aristotle believes it is important that we feel collective pride when our citizens make notable achievements, or feel collective shame when they engage in unethical behavior. The Olympics provide a great example of this reflection in a culture’s unity and ethos.
The Symposium best represents the interplay of citizenry and friendship during this time. The Symposium, meaning “drinking together,” is our version of a dinner party (p. 161). Guests were invited into a private home to drink and bond, engage in deep and quality conversations. The room was intimately arranged with facing couches, and a shared drinking cup, known as the “cup of friendship” (p. 161). Songs of friendship were even sung, with lyrics such as: “He who does not betray a man who is his friend has great honour among mortals and gods” (p. 161). In sum, it was an opportunity for forging both alliances and friendships. Vernon notes that it provided a “bridge” between public and private arenas (p. 161).
This kind of “civic affection” advocated by philosophers like Aristotle is not as present in our world today. Vernon writes, “Our relationships as citizens are mediated between by impersonal institutions, like the law, possibly with detrimental effects on our affections for one another as a result” (p. 162). This raises the obvious ethical dilemma around the nature of our institutions and whether they are morally in line with our deepest desires for strong human connection and interaction. Vernon cautions us, though, that friendship in previous times is not necessarily friendlier. He writes:
In fact, if more friendship-friendly times did exist in ages gone by, we would expect them to be characterized by outbreaks of animosity too, such are the ambiguities of friendship: to claim someone as a friend is not much different from declaring someone else as an enemy (2010, p. 155).
Indeed, other philosophers at the time of Aristotle raised criticisms and concerns about the strength of politics and friendship. Plato expressed similar concerns, revealing ambivalence towards friendship in politics. In some of his writings, he supports it; in others he cautions against it. The philosopher Epicurus, living at a time when Alexander the Great had come to power and the polis was weakening, was skeptical of the nature of such friendships, believing politics to be more corrosive to true friendship. Vernon observes:
Individuals like Epicurus tended to regard themselves as citizens of the world, though with perhaps no place they could call home, and few compatriots they might call friends. The situation was more like our own (p. 163). A few hundred years later, in Rome, friendship once again enjoyed an elevated status, though, the ambiguities were often recognized and pondered by contemporary philosophers. Rome was a Republic and required high participation from its citizens. So, like Athens, having good support helped one to gain public standing. Vernon writes:
In fact, public abuses of friendship could have serious repercussions for someone’s political standing to an extent that is, again, hard to imagine given the private nature of friendship today: to be accused of being a poor friend, and bad at friendship, was to lose public standing (p. 165).
Cicero, a famous politician and philosopher at this time, wrote quite a bit about friendship. He, himself, is accused of betraying a good friendship with Mark Anthony, the lover of Cleopatra, and wrote a posthumous work to counter the claims. The fact that he sought to avenge his reputation, even after his death, reflects the great lengths people went to in order to maintain their honor around their virtues in friendship (p. 166). Cicero also wrote an imaginary dialogue where he espoused some of his philosophy of friendship:
Friendship is… complete sympathy in all matters of importance, plus goodwill and affection, and I am inclined to think that with the exception of wisdom, the gods have given nothing finer to men than this (p. 167).
And:
Whoever is in possession of a true friend sees the exact counterpart of his own soul… They can scarcely, indeed, be considered in any respect as separate individuals, and wherever the one appears the other is virtually present (p. 167).
Cicero was careful to address the ambiguities of friendship, as well, warning people not to be too needy in their friendships. He also advocated for strict ethical behavior in friendship, encouraging complete honesty and respect for differences in social standing, if there were class differences between friends, for example. The friend with more status must not exploit these differences, nor should the friend with less power feel bothered by the inequalities. Not long after this golden era of friendship came the rise of Imperial Rome, and once again, friendships were negatively impacted by the new environment of distrust and a lack of public participation.
At this time, the philosopher Seneca wrote about this demoted status of friendship and essentially grieves its loss in his society. Still, he spoke of a new turn in the experience of friendship that may have shocked his Greek predecessors, which includes more friendships between slave and master and between women and men. In one of his writings, he compliments one of his contemporaries for enjoying a friendship with his “slaves” (p. 170). Vernon observes that because friendship has become more private in this time, one might be able to enjoy a more extended range of friendships, where people are less concerned with public appearance. Vernon observes that, just as our friendships shape social conventions, societal expectations impact our friendships: “We see as much to this day, inasmuch as friendships across social classes and ethnic divides are relatively rare” (p. 171). During the Middle Ages, we observe a renewed elevation in the status of friendship, due in part to some of the religious influences and politics of the time. Kissing, sleeping, and eating together had completely different social boundaries. Indeed, “semi-institutionalized forms of marriage” between friends were not uncommon (p. 172). Friendships were so honored that even shared graves were a regular occurrence, especially among men who fought alongside one another in the battlefield. As well, “sworn brotherhoods” commanded great respect during this time in history and were even sanctioned by the church (p. 179). We have copies today of written prayers from this period that sanction the union of sworn brothers and sisters (p. 179).
Inspired by the writings of Cicero, medieval writer and saint, Aelred of Rievaulx, echoed the friendship sentiments of his time in his work Spiritual Friendship (p. 183). He believed that friends should be willing to die for one another. The Christian influence on friendship draws upon the life and teachings of Jesus: “A man can have no greater love than to lay down his life for his friends” (p. 183). Aelred also believed that love between friends should be undying and should share all things in common. This is essentially an appeal to the shared “doctrine” of Christianity and the common bond of love for God and the church. Like Thomas Aquinas, Aelred believed that God is friendship, and a “friend is a guardian of heavenly love and friendship is a taste of paradise” (p. 184).
Additionally, Aelred shared that the death of a friend is “the culmination of love, witnessed to by the love that lives on in the heart of the surviving friend. For all the agony of mourning, the death of a friend is an experience of eternity in the present” (p. 185). As Vernon summarizes: “Friendship’s greatest gift is, thus, that it lifts the veil between this world and the next and provides a foretaste of the everlasting love of heaven here and now” (p. 185). Thus, the shared grave of close friends during this period was a not just a gesture of strong bonds, but was also “a foretaste of the love to be shared in eternity” (p. 186).
Public displays of affection, dining, and sleeping arrangements also signaled a deeper reflection of social bonds during this period when the Catholic church and its rituals were quite prominent in daily life. Mirroring the kiss of peace at the Eucharist, people greeted one another with a kiss as a sign of Christian unity. Vernon explains:
This same kiss in the social setting expressed a reality that says “we are united even as God is united.” It may or may not express a narrower sentiment and add ”I am fond of you.” (p. 173).
The dining table was placed in the middle of the medieval home, representing its value as the center of activity. Here, everyone ate together, including the lords and the serfs, though the designations were clearly demarcated. Vernon writes:
Communal eating constituted those relationships in the same way that the food which was eaten changed into the bodies of those who ate it. To be called up higher was to be called into a deeper connection. And if that included friendship, that relationship was given a corresponding boost in its social standing too (p. 174).
Sleeping together was a similar activity, where people in the household shared a large bed or slept on pallets in the same room. Sleeping together also reflected social standing at this time. There are historical records indicating people’s desire to sleep in the same bed with those of a higher social standing, longing for this kind of friendship. Today, in places like Africa and Asia, people still participate in these socially connective activities. It is not unusual for several women and children in the household to share a bed, or several men to a share a bed. Eating from one bowl or large plate is also common, with the only real division coming between the genders. Similarly, sharing kisses as a greeting, and men and women holding hands with friends of the same sex is a regular occurrence.
However, in Western societies in the modern world, these activities have become a bit taboo. Many historians have attempted to speculate about some of the reasons for the changes. There were changes in the living quarters, where bodily rituals, such as the bathroom, became more privatized. In the Middle Ages, there were high rates of infant mortality, and men might marry several times, so extended families living together were a practical consideration. Whatever the causes, by the late seventeenth century, “public institutions of friendship were replaced by the private institution of the family” (p. 175). Marital bonds and the institution of the nuclear family took root, and the past activities of sleeping, eating, and kissing became confined to the romantic union between a husband and wife.
As well, as the industrialized societies took hold and individualism took root, friendship became more privatized and, subsequently, more marginalized. Changes in marriage laws occurred, too, shifting from informal unions to more institutionalized arrangements. Vernon summarizes our current state: “society is conceived of as an ominously bureaucratic entity that has few means of understanding, let alone nurturing, friendships” (p. 178).
References:
Vernon, M. (2010). The Meaning of Friendship. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 6: Politics of Friendship.
Some feminists argue that a lot of our modern problems surrounding relationships and connection are traceable to individualism and capitalism. We live in a highly competitive and individually driven world where we aim to maximize our individual comforts and profits, often at the expense of others. Our entire existence revolves around optimizing our own personal pleasure and undermining our role in community. As mentioned in previous modules, modern Western society encourages such behavior. Indeed, it supports utility-based friendships and marginalizes anything other than that. Basically, one typically lives in such a way that “Any consideration of others is judged by the disadvantage, inconvenience, or pain such an action would cause to him. He operates as a social atom” (Vernon, pg. 196). The idea of social atomism essentially places all emphasis on the individual, whereby all social structures revolve around the individual’s interests and actions with little regard for the impact on the whole group or community. Communitarianism is the opposite model, whereby by individuals make decisions based on their social identities and attachments to their families and friends. Some feminists challenge this model, as well, believing that such attachments can sometimes be oppressive, such as the relationship between a husband and wife or a white majority and the racial minority. Without being aware of it, such attachments can sometimes serve to promote and encourage these unequal relationships. Out of loyalty to the community, people may not always fight against such oppressive experiences:“[I]t risks sidelining those values in the effort to shake off social atomism; valorizing social networks like family, school, church or nation can validate the relationships out of which injustice can grow by taking them as ‘the given’ of life” (p. 198).
In looking for alternatives to these two models of individualism and communitarianism, feminists often herald the model of friendship. Particularly in our urban communities in the West, friendship, unlike the other two models, is based on voluntarism or choice. While still acknowledging that friendship itself is not ideal and comes with many challenges, it does offer the following:
1.It promotes networks of support. People can gravitate toward different communities of friends who support their personal interests or help them to “reinvent themselves without having to deal with the intolerance of crabby families or insular neighbors” (p. 198).
2.These networks encourage some to engage in political activities, uniting in solidarity against various forms of oppression, whether racial, religious, or otherwise.
Feminist philosopher Mary E. Hunt proposes that particularly for women, friendship provides the opportunity to experience “mutuality, equality and reciprocity,” in ways that can become political and liberating (p. 199). Indeed, such friendships make women “relationship experts” and they then pass on this knowledge to the world, impacting every facet of social and political spheres. For Hunt, such “right relationships” will entail the following:
1.Love; feeling connected, not separate
2.Power; empowering one to fight for choice
3.Embodiment; learning to love ourselves, another and our bodies
4.Spirituality; focusing on the quality of life (p. 199).
When friendships become the “ethical norm,” they serve to undermine the paradigm of the social atom, or the highly individualized, utility-based interactions (p. 199). They serve as a more engaging and inspiring model that can help to inspire such relationships in many forums, including the work environment. The friendships between men are often more problematic. Men are acculturated to be less affectionate towards one another, especially in public, as, historically, such behavior has been viewed as less masculine. Even so, we can see the positive impact of male friendships, especially in terms of support during recovery, as the video clip Circle of Friends [Video, 2:48 mins] explores.
In contemporary society, with gay rights on the rise, public displays of affection and connection between men as friends has become more commonplace. Indeed, popular vernacular, such as “bromance,” to describe the affection that men feel for one another as friendsserves to illustrate this point. As well, we witness the emergence of the “meterosexual” male, “who ‘consumes in all the best gyms, clubs, shops and hairdressers’ because whether gay, straight or bisexual, his image of his own masculinity allows him to do so” (p. 203). Significantly, “his sense of self revolves around circles of friends” (p. 203).
Watch this funny episode of Seinfeld, where Jerry struggles to break it off with his so-called friend. Although humorous, this Seinfeld episode underscores the centrality of friendship to life and the importance of honesty in friendship. Click here [Video, 6:24 mins] to view the video.
Indeed, it is the meterosexual male who is interested in the marriage of friendship, not so much the older model of marriage based on specific gender roles. “The meterosexual male is less interested in blood lines, traditions, family, class, gender, than in choosing who they want to be and who they want to be with” (p. 204). Still, many contemporary men continue to struggle with notions of affection, as they are often more pressured by the patriarchal, capitalist model that promotes a high level of individual drive and competition.
Some believe that gay men help to set the standards for friendship for all of us by being good at it. After all, they often learn to value friendship when the opportunity arises because of the oppression they face in the world from being gay. When they develop friendships, they become “allies against the world” (p. 205). Some philosophers, such as Michel Foucault, believe that gay men and women’s liberation means liberation for everyone. Gay liberation does not just mean more gay rights, or more relationship expressions for heterosexuals, it means a liberation from needing to define one’s sexuality at all. Foucault states: “Society and the institutions which frame it have limited the possibility of relationships (to marriage) because a rich, relational world would be very complex to manage” (p. 207).
It is a mistake to think of this in purely sexual terms. One challenge is how to experience deep, same-sex friendships without always needing to label them as heterosexual or homosexual. It is an opportunity to expand our notion of friendship and create new categories of relating. Vernon shares:
Therein lies the creative iconoclasm of friendship—its contemporary subversiveness. It presents a challenge that is more than just the introduction of another category of partners; the coupledom of the nuclear family could readily embrace more couples. Rather it opens up the far larger matter of how men and women relate to one another (p. 209).
Essentially, philosophers like Foucault argue that there is a “new ethic” that can develop by expanding our limited notions of what friendship entails. Indeed, it is not just homosexual relationships that offer this opportunity to encourage us to rethink friendship. As we considered in the previous module, relationships with those who are of a different race, creed, class, or even age can challenge some of the status quo ideas about friendship and are therefore significant.
With studies showing that the majority of people are now single (Miller, 2014), and with many people choosing to cohabitate over marry, and alternative unions on the rise, a new understanding of contemporary friendship may be emerging. Although our institutions still support an individualized, competitive society, our needs for connection may undermine some of the traditional messages we receive from our society about forging deep and abiding connections.
References:
Vernon, M. (2010). The Meaning of Friendship. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 6: Politics of Friendship.
Spirituality is not an easy word to define these days, as it has become a buzz word to signify the individual approach to one’s quality of life or one’s personal metaphysical beliefs or ethical practices, as opposed to some religious adherence (Vernon, 2010, p. 222). When referring to individual relationships, there is a whole culture around the notion of “soulmate” and what this entails, but a lot of this falls outside of the deeper contemplations of negotiating the ambiguities of friendship. Indeed, “spirituality” is a word that has been hijacked by marketers of our consumerist culture. As Vernon states:
Type soulfriends, or even worse ‘soulmate’ into an internet search engine and some of the most syrupy aphorisms on friendship will be returned for your edification… the trouble with this sentimental haze and commodification is that it cheapens an idea of enormous human value: the spirituality of friendship is not something that can simply be ceded to the market (p. 222).
From a deeper, philosophical perspective, Aristotle offers guidance on what a soul friendship entails, defining a soul friend as “another self” (p. 223). What this means is that individuals respect each other as separate people, while also recognizing a commonality and bond in sharing similar beliefs and feelings. Such a soul friendship is not easy to describe; it can only be experienced. “Soul friendship is fundamentally the unrepeatable experience of knowing, and being known, by that one, particular person” (p. 225).
This type of “spiritual” friendship contrasts significantly with the commercial interpretation of it, as portrayed in our popular films, for example. Often, this type of soul friendship is characterized as displaying the same passion of a romance, where two people are connected by a codependent need, rather than a respectful and healthy companionship. Jealousy and fear drive the relationship, as does pain when the two are apart. In contrast, a soul friendship is one where individuals do not mind being physically apart for periods of time, and there is implicit trust (p. 223). Vernon shares, “the source of delight of soul friends is that the recognize not only themselves but another human being… they never seek to consume each other or fall into a perpetual embrace” (p. 223). In short, this understanding of soul friendship might represent a more ethical approach to friendships. It is not a friendship of codependent need, as discussed in previous modules, but a friendship of genuine respect and healthy boundaries.
Philosophers generally consider these soul friendships to be rare, and Aristotle believed them to be possible only between very unique individuals who are at peace with themselves, secure in themselves, virtuous, and able to befriend themselves first (p. 224). Most of our time-consuming relationships with family and romantic involvements do not necessarily entail friendship. They often entail obligation and role fulfillment, but not necessarily deep friendship, let alone soul friendship.
The French writer Michel de Montaigne proposed that soul friendship is so rare, it may only appear once every three centuries (p. 225). He feels he was fortunate enough to have experienced such a friendship himself, though he argues that historic timing and circumstance play a significant role in setting up the right conditions for such a friendship to flourish. The implication is that most friends will not “know friendship’s greatest potential, or know its deepest loves” (p. 228). Read Montaigne’s description of his friendship with Étienne de La Boétie on page 445 of his essay The philosopher Saint Augustine of Hippo had the experience of a powerful and unique friendship; however, his view of friendship was completely transformed by his conversion to Christianity. Indeed, his own perspective on friendship greatly influenced the Christian West’s general distrust of friendship for many centuries. Augustine came to disavow his former friendships:
Ours was not the friendship which should be between true friends… for though they cling together, no friends are true friends unless you, my God, bind them fast to one another through that love which is sown in our hearts by the Holy Ghost (Vernon, p. 125).
Indeed, Augustine believed that one’s love for God was primary, and friendship often hinders this experience of divine love. Further, only when people love God can they renounce love for themselves (p. 126). This is in direct contradiction to Aristotle, who embraced the notion that self-love and love for another are inextricably linked, for if one cannot befriend oneself first, one can never be a true friend to another (p. 127).
Further, unlike his Greek predecessors, who believed that the fragility of friendship is something to value and honor, Augustine believed that God’s love underscored our need not to place our faith in people. We should love one another through God alone, and any form of self-love should be completely renounced, as any love of this world is bound to fail (p. 128). Indeed, once subsumed in Christian love, friendship itself is not that important (p. 129).
Again, for Aristotle, this kind of self-renunciation would have been too extreme, as he was a proponent of a middle path between self-denial and self-conceit. As well, Aristotle, like his contemporaries, lived in a pagan world with gods and not one God. They did not connect friendship to the divine. They believed the gods to be superior to humans, and, as such, one could not have a friendship with a god because it would constitute an unequal relationship, which was inherently inimical to friendship (p. 129).
While Augustine did have a great impact on the Christian view of friendship, the actual roots of Christianity were more supportive of friendship, where Jesus is claimed to have said that “there is no greater love than to lay down one’s life for a friend” (Vernon, p. 129). As well, centuries later, Christian philosopher Thomas Aquinas managed to marry the philosophy of Aristotle and Christian ethics in a way that was supportive of friendship. Aquinas believed, like Aristotle, that it is only natural for one to love oneself, and that love can help us to learn to love others, as well as God. Similarly, God is not abstract, but is also accessible enough to us so that we can experience close friendship with the divine directly. Further, rather than viewing the ambiguities of friendship as threatening to our relationships with God and with one another, he saw them as useful. Vernon summarizes:
In short, friendship is always a question of give and take, and even when the taking is more in evident than the giving, it can be regarded positively to a degree, for it is never just on the take—or at least, if it is, it is already ceasing to be friendship (p. 140).
Aquinas felt that it is friendship that often encourages our ability to transcend our egoistic desires for more altruistic results. Indeed, it is through our ability to love those around us intimately that we learn the nature of true love. Vernon shares:
Thomas is able to say that selfless acts can emerge from self-love, and that altruism and egoism are not opposing opposites, because his idea of individuality is blurred at the edges (p. 147). But, in the 19th century, Soren Kierkegaard reinforced Augustine’s train of thought, essentially arguing that friendship tends to bring out all of the worst traits in us, such as jealousy and possessiveness, very similar to erotic love (p. 130). Indeed, people fall into friendship love the same way they fall into romantic love, becoming prey to all kinds of negative emotions. As Vernon summarizes:
And then friendship gets caught up in all kinds of little acts of pride in the way that people congratulate themselves on the friends they have; they admire themselves for being so clever as to have such admirable friends, and so on. Friendship is a Vanity Fair (p. 130).
Kierkegaard proposes that we simply cultivate a neighborly love for all people, not preferring one over another. In fact, we do not even have to like or admire one another; indeed, it lets us off the hook from having to cultivate friendship at all (p. 131). As Vernon summarizes, we must simply cultivate a “selfless passion” to obey God, rather than follow our selfish passions for friendship (p. 131). Vernon argues that this general mistrust of friendship has carried over into secular society, as well (p. 132). Modern philosopher Immanuel Kant essentially reinterprets Augustine through a secular lens. Indeed, Kant is so suspect of friendship that he posits a time when people will have so few needs that friendship will cease altogether (p. 136). This “heaven on earth” will have “transcended” the need for friendship (p. 136).
Kantian ethics is not the only ethical theory unsupportive of friendship. The popular ethical theory of utilitarianism, or the philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest number of people, is also antithetical to the principles of friendship. Similarly, our democratic egalitarian philosophy, which is about universal fellowship, is not supportive of friendship, which is viewed as being prone to partiality. According to Vernon, friendship, then, essentially exists in an “ethical-no-man’s-land” (p. 135). That is why in modern society, “friendship is routinely treated as if it were questionable” (p. 137). He shares:
The contemporary reliance on the ethics of rights and egalitarianism, and the ugly associations that accrue to nepotism and cronyism, is proof enough: friendship is thought to offend absolute ideals (p. 150). As discussed in previous modules, friendship has often been seen as a threat to the nuclear family, which is why marriage vows include the promise of “forsaking all others” (p. 138). Infidelity can be defined as a close friendship which interferes with this vow. (p. 138).
However, a new consciousness around “connectedness” seems to be arising, particularly in the collective discussions around environmental concerns and social alienation (p. 147). Vernon contends that that we must continue to deepen our dialogue around the ethics of friendship, as the institution of marriage is quickly reforming, and people do seem to be revisiting the value of friendship (p. 139).
In our modern world, if we are more religiously inclined, we might align ourselves with Aquinas’ notion of God as friendship, or, according to Vernon, the non-religious can draw upon the Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics. Friendship ranks high on the list of these virtues and helps to foster the good life. He shares:
The idea is that instead of thinking of moral philosophy as a series of problems that need to be solved by sets of rules or decisions, one thinks of moral philosophy as nurturing a way of life organized around certain virtues that nurture human potential (p. 149).
In short, for Aristotle and Aquinas, friendship nurtures some of our highest potential. Vernon shares that, just as Aquinas attempted to restore our trust in friendship, we need such a renewal in our trust of friendship today. He clarifies that this does not mean in the sense that friends trust each other, but in the sense that “moral philosophy itself needs to trust friendship as a way of life and guide to action” (p. 150). Vernon explains why this is important to our ethical behavior:
[I]t is worth trusting compromised situations, like those in which friendship is operating, whilst exercising powers of discernment, because clearly good behavior may arise from equivocal and mixed motives (p. 150).
Similarly, to regain this trust means to understand the complexity of our motivations, as Aquinas encouraged us to do, not viewing them as always either solely altruistic or egoistic. It means to recognize that the love of a few individuals deeply does not preclude us from loving all expansively (p. 151). In fact, it can help. We might also try to draw upon some of the rich guidelines provided by previous philosophers. One such great thinker is writer Ralph Waldo Emerson, who also acknowledged the existence of what he coined “divine friendship,” (p. 235). The joy in such a friendship, he claims, is that you experience another human being who is both like you and unlike you, in that you are completely comfortable being with this person while also excited to learn how he or she might be unlike you (p. 229).
Emerson believed that much of what challenges us in experiencing deeper friendships is that we often go for the more shallow relationships that yield quick and instant gratification. There are many opportunities to enjoy the niceties of friendship without having to open oneself up to the true ambiguities of friendship and all of the discomfort and growth that it invites. We might ask, is there a higher ethical dimension to pursuing such a friendship? Vernon explains Emerson’s view that “it is only natural to want to pick the beautiful flowers thrown up by the majority of friendships, and to hope that the wiry roots buried in the damp, dark soil of another’s character, soul or mind do not come with them” (p. 233).
For Emerson, divine friendship incorporates a “godlike honesty” and “godlike affection” (p. 236). One can be so honest as to “think aloud” in a friend’s presence. Godlike affection refers to pure, unconditional love. Often our ties with one another are multilayered and involve money, lust, or blood relations, to name a few (p. 236). It is seldom that we can experience love in its purest state. Loving someone without any “compromised affection” is the highest state (p. 236). Essentially, Emerson believed it takes courage to recognize the limitations of shallow friendships and invite deeper friendships, which “can cope with the rougher, tougher exchanges of transformative, significant relationships” (p. 234). Emerson suggested:
It is only by entering into the ambiguities of friendship that its higher possibilities may be discerned; it is only then the weaknesses of character and the contingencies of time would inhibit it are overcome (p. 234). These spiritually elevated friendships are not easy to acquire, and most philosophers count them as quite unique. The paradoxical goal is to be able to do without them completely, but still be open to their occurrence, as Emerson suggests: “The condition which high friendship demands is the ability to do without it” (Vernon p. 237). One must not search for it, but simply show up in life as honest as one can be, with friends who do come and go, to attract the opportunity for such a precious friendship.
In conclusion, soul friendship is dynamic as it moves through the complexities and ambiguities of friendship. Those who embrace a “dynamic doctrine” of friendship will better enjoy all types of friendship, noting the experiences of deeper connection that may arise. Accordingly, someone who has a gift for friendship is someone who may not necessarily experience a soul friend, but will know how to “value friends” (p. 241). Further, for those who experience such a soul friendship, the experience extends well beyond the two friends. These experiences stay with the individuals forever and the memory of the friendship itself becomes as important as the moment of connection (p. 241).
References:
Emerson, R. W. (2009). Emerson, R. (2009). Essays. Waiheke Island: The Floating Press
Vernon, M. (2010). The Meaning of Friendship. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
In this course, we had the opportunity to explore the nature of friendship through an ethical lens. We began by defining friendship and uncovering the moral challenges of dissimulation that arise in our connections with others. We asked difficult questions, such as: Does being a true friend always mean telling the truth? How does feigning help to nurture a closer connection at times? We learned that “even virtuous individuals find blunt honesty too harsh all of the time… dissimulation can give way to honesty, given the right circumstances, time and care. Candid friendships can transform a life with truthfulness” (Vernon, 2010, p. 253).
At the same time, we learned from some of the great, ancient philosophers, like Cicero, that we should indeed choose friends who are “frank” and who offer and receive advice freely, “for in friendship the authority of friends who give good counsel may be of the greatest value” (On Friendship, p. 13). Indeed, truth can be hurtful, especially if it is not coming from a loving place, but “much more offensive is complacency, when in its indulgence for wrong doing it suffers a friend to go headlong to ruin” (p. 24).
We continued our exploration of the inherent ambiguities in friendship by identifying some of the ethical challenges of our changing and unclear perceptions of friendship in comparison to romantic relationships. We discovered that the highest form of friendship, where a common passion is shared by the two individuals, is the goal to creating a sustainable friendship; indeed, it is not distinguishable among friends or lovers.
We also looked at the ethical dimensions of the impact of the Internet on friendship, reviewing its benefits and challenges and the research surrounding its contemporary expressions. We learned that although many shallow bonds form in this medium, there is an opportunity for genuine connection, as long as we remember that “…screens screen, that friending is not the same as befriending, and that it is quite possible to seek a crowd and feel lonely, not loved” (Vernon, p. 253).
We had the chance to dive deeply into some of the more common barriers and challenges to friendship, which may show up in different abilities, class, race, and sexual preferences. We learned how the role of friendship can actually serve to undermine oppressive and conventional structures. Similarly, we examined the intersection of religion and friendship and the “spiritual” dimensions of friendship, specifically following Montaigne and Emerson. We expanded our understandings of “soul” or “divine” friendship and how we can cultivate it, if at all, and what contributes to its uniqueness.
We also researched an ethical framework for the experience of friendship within the workplace. We examined the inherent obstacles that come with forming genuine friendships in a work environment and how friendships are often confined to being instrumental. We analyzed friendship through the utility lens of our modern culture and the inherent ethical dilemmas around viewing friends as commodities. We explored how many of our friendships in the modern world meet Aristotle’s criteria for friendships of utility. We asked if genuine friendship can exist in the workplace and discovered it is possible, with a true consciousness and ethical awareness around the value we place on others outside of their roles in the work environment. Interwoven in our many discussions on the various factors that impact friendship, we had the opportunity to review some of the prominent periods in history where friendship enjoyed an elevated status; namely, Ancient Greece and the Middle Ages. We looked at the influence of politics and religion on collective perceptions and the development of friendship within a society. The Roman philosopher Cicero offered us specific guidelines when it comes to friendship, proving as useful to us today as in ancient Rome. He was concerned that we do not give enough attention to our friendships, caring more about “all other matters” (On Friendship, 2014, p. 17). Like the other philosophers we studied, Cicero believed that attaining a deep and abiding friendship is rare, mostly because we often wish our friends to be what we ourselves are not, and we expect of them things we are not willing to offer in return (p. 22).
He encourages us to be selective in our friends and take a lot of caution in forming our friendships. He warns us to cultivate any judgment towards a friend before the love develops, not the other way around. Ultimately, “firm, steadfast, self-consistent men are to be chosen as friends, and of this kind of men there is a great dearth”(On Friendship, p. 17). Therefore, it is wise to monitor our affections and kindness, preferring a gradual build. Indeed, we should be mindful of “excessive fondness,” which can interfere with the proper functioning of a friendship (p. 20). Importantly, we can look to those who are virtuous to learn about examples of friendship. Virtue consists of “consistency of conduct and character” (p. 27).
Indeed, most of the philosophers we explored agreed on a similar prescription for cultivating a meaningful friendship. It begins with knowing oneself, first and foremost. For Socrates, Aristotle and Plato, the goal was to know oneself intimately in order to lead a good life. Indeed, Vernon contends that pursuing philosophy and pursuing friendship are the same pursuit for Socrates, who saw friendship as requiring the “roughest courage” (p. 255). Vernon explains:
Socrates thought that friends should not primarily hope for happiness in one another, though that might come, but should seek together to live fuller, truer lives. This happens, he believed, when individuals become wise to their ignorance; the wisdom gained when one understands the limits of one’s capabilities is of supreme value. It is best gained in discoursing with others, particularly when the exchange is marked by the kind of honesty that can exist between the closest of friends. Then the individuals have the opportunity not only to learn about the limitations of the beliefs that they hold true but also about the flaws in their character and the vulnerabilities of their temperaments. These are, after all, far deeper sources of delusion than mere rational confusion (p. 255).
Clearly, for most of these philosophers, virtue is the key to friendship success, and one should start by being a “good” person. Indeed, being a virtuous person is cultivating the optimal foundation for building a true friendship and makes one a better friend. Likewise, friendship itself helps us to be more virtuous. One will quickly learn which friends are indeed virtuous when some crisis arises to test the bond. Without friends, our own virtue might not reach “the summit of excellence,” but expressed and united in friendship, “it might reach that eminence” (On Friendship, p. 22). Indeed, friendship can lead us to the highest good. Therefore, we should be constantly vigilant and take it seriously.
This applies to those times when the need arises to dissolve friendship ties. Even among close friends, sometimes ending a friendship is unavoidable, and Cicero was of the belief that we should generally foster a more gradual dissolution rather than a harsh break, unless there was some serious offense. It should be “unstitched rather than cut asunder” (On Friendship, p. 21). He adds that great care must be taken so that the friendship does not lapse into “quarrels, slanders, insults” (p. 21). Again, to prevent these occurrences is to ensure that attachments are not formed too soon, as Cicero advises: "I exhort you that you so give the foremost place to virtue without which friendship cannot be, that with the sole exception of virtue, you may think nothing to be preferred to friendship" (On Friendship, p. 27) In this final module, we learn that in our modern society, when people want to explore the nature of friendship, instead of turning to the rich wisdom of philosophy, they often consult self-help literature (Vernon, 2010, p. 242). Some philosophers, like Vernon, believe that the self-help industry does friendship a disservice by placing the individual at “the centre of the universe” (p. 242). Subsequently, it ‘”treats everyone else in the universe as bit players in the story of your life” (p. 243). Rather than encouraging us to love others for their own inherent worth, the self-help industry tends to follow the capitalist, post-industrial model and encourages us to explore what we “get” from our friends, or how they serve our needs. We might come to see some friends as shopping friends or others as hobby friends. In this way, friends become merely “service providers” (p. 243). This speaks to our discussion in Module 4 of friendships of utility, a lesser type of friendship, in which a friend’s usefulness, or what they may bring to us, is the focus and impetus. But this is rife with problems, not the least of which is an important ethical consideration about valuing others vs. using them for our own rewards and purposes. As Cicero reminds us, “for it is not so much benefit obtained through a friend as it is the very love of the friend that gives delight” (p. 21). He further shares:
Thus they lack that most beautiful and most natural friendship, which is to be sought in itself and for its own sake, nor can they know from experience what and how great is the power of such friendship (p. 21).
Indeed, such friendships of utility are often not long-lasting, as Vernon suggests: “And as everyone knows, the minute your friends start to feel used, for all that they may otherwise be happy to be useful, is the minute your friendship starts to fall apart” (p. 243).
Indeed, the self-help industry may be destroying friendships in its focus on a self-centered, rather than other-centered, philosophy. It mirrors our modern Western society of individualism, where our worlds revolve around our personal interests, not community support and connection. Additionally, as Vernon suggests, as one becomes more focused on oneself, there is a cost-benefit analysis, a weighing up of benefits, and this opposes the idea of altruistic friendship (p. 248). The idea is that if you do for me, then I will do for you. In today’s society, when each individual is looking out for his/her own interests and friendships are not reciprocal in terms of giving and receiving, can friendship be sustained? Can true friendship be cultivated and exist in the less self-interested way that philosophers propose?
When we treat friends as a means to an end, can we truly consider them friends in a philosophical sense? Ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle and Cicero, would say no. Cicero shares: “and to love is nothing else than to cherish affection for him whom you love, with no felt need of his service, with no quest of benefit to be obtained from him” (On Friendship, 27).
Indeed, Cicero warns us against using friends for pleasure’s sake, and he is especially concerned about needing to follow some “rule of equality” where one calculates who gives what (On Friendship, p. 16). He shares:
To me friendship seems more affluent and generous and not disposed to keep strict watch lest it may give more than it receives and to fear that a part of its due may be spilled over or suffered to leak out or that it may heap up its own measure over full in return (On Friendship, p. 16).
Vernon contends that what we need is “compassion,” not ”calculation” (p. 252). From a biological perspective, Darwin believed that we are inherently altruistic, as we are social beings, and aim to cooperate naturally. Altruism is not something we do to get something back. According to Darwin, our “moral sense is fundamentally identical with the social instincts” (Vernon, p. 249).
Various religious traditions encourage us to be more selfless. Further, Vernon summarizes Aristotle as believing that the pursuit of a good life is the attempt to “live for others in life” (p. 243). Cicero similarly held:
One loves himself, not in order to exact from himself any wages for such love, but because he is in himself dear to himself. Now, unless this same property be transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found, for such a friend is, as it were, another self (On Friendship, p. 21).
Philosopher John Stuart Mill also felt that true happiness is found outside of oneself. He suffered from a massive breakdown early in his life, only to realize that he was mistaken in focusing on his own happiness. He soon realized he had to focus beyond himself. He wrote: “Those only are happy who have their minds fixed on some other project than their own happiness” (Vernon, p. 245). Similarly, psychologist Eric Fromm writes quite a bit about the difference of standing in love and falling in love, even in friendships (Vernon, p. 246). Falling in love is often not lasting because it is fueled by the simple excitement of knowing a new person. Once the newness wears off, often anxiety arises about the waning of the initial exhilaration, and then boredom sets in. One can easily experience falling out of love as quickly as one experiences falling in love (Vernon, p. 246). Vernon describes this paradox in detail:
The passion associated with falling in love is not actually a measure of true love, but rather is a measure of the speed with which you collapsed into the arms of a stranger. At best, falling in love is just one element of love. At worst, it has little to do with love at all—as the notion of “falling” might suggest. The danger is that individuals become addicted to the thrill of falling in love, much as they might to the heights induced by drugs. Such an individual has a series of relationships in succession or concurrently, and finds it hard to hold a relationship down. They are living a life of self-centered love affairs, where the determining factor is the pleasure or security of companionship their lover delivers to them (p. 246-247).
In contrast, standing in love is more about loving someone for who they are, not for who they might be or who you hope they might be. It is to love a person because “they are as well known to you as you are to yourself” (p. 247). While falling in love creates an excitement around the unknown, standing in love is the joy of the known—knowing another and being known by them (p. 247).
Vernon explains how it is easy to tell the difference between the couples who have fallen in love and those who are standing in love. The falling in love couples are often “annoying” to be around, so absorbed in one another that the rest of the world does not seem to exist (p. 248). It is unpleasant to be around their obsessive preoccupation with one another, and one will often feel lonely in their presence. Indeed, they are often possessive of one another’s affections, and they demand faithfulness based on insecurity rather than cultivating a faithfulness born from implicit trust (p. 248).
In contrast, the standing in love couple is delightful to be around, and they share their love with the rest of the world. Vernon explains:
The nicest people to know are those who are in love with each other and who make you feel part of their love. Standing in love bids you welcome too. Such lovers have learnt the art of love with each other and it results in generating a care and concern for others (p. 247).
Indeed, friendship is not about being knowledgeable or following a specific prescription for being a true friend. Summarizing Keats, Vernon holds that it is the “ability to live life without certainty, but with an expectant open-heartedness” (p. 254). It is about having a passion for wisdom and honesty, beginning with one’s own self-awareness (p. 256). Vernon shares:
Philosophy is not, therefore, just illuminating of friendship. The very possibility of friendship lies at the heart of philosophy. They come together partly because as Aristotle commented, “we are better able to observe our friends than ourselves and their actions than our own.” But more so because to truly befriend others is to stare life’s uncertainties, limits and ambiguities in the face. To seek friendship is to seek wisdom (p. 256).
References:
Cicero (2014). De Amicitia - On Friendship. Retrieved from http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_cic_friendship.htm
Vernon, M. (2010). The Meaning of Friendship. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
