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http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/utis20 Privacy and Narrativity in the Internet Era J. C. Buitelaar a a Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands Published online: 08 Jul 2014.
To cite this article: J. C. Buitelaar (2014) Privacy and Narrativity in the Internet Era, The Information Society: An International Journal, 30:4, 266-281, DOI: 10.1080/01972243.2014.915278 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2014.915278 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions The Information Society, 30: 266–281, 2014 Published with license by Taylor & Francis ISSN: 0197-2243 print / 1087-6537 online DOI: 10.1080/01972243.2014.915278 Privacy and Narrativity in the Internet Era J. C. Buitelaar Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands Individuals try to guard their right to privacy by exercising their right to informational self-determination. They thereby hope to retain control over their identity, which they construct over time by interpreting how their past relates to their present. In a similar vein, historians try to make sense of the past by way of interpreting past events. The theory of narrative identity helps to understand these processes. By an explorative discussion of nar- rative techniques, historiographical methods including the art of (auto)biography, and the role they play in identity construction, this article aims to give fresh insights into the theory of informa- tional self-determination. An analysis is presented of three types of attempts by individuals to gain control of their digital double, in an effort to maintain their personal dignity. With the lessons learned, an indication is given of the viability of the principle of informational self-determination in the Internet era. Keywordsprivacy, informational self-determination, human dignity, narrativity, identity construction, (auto)biography, histo- riography The roots of privacy lie in the principle of informa- tional self-determination, grounded in the concepts of hu- man dignity and autonomy (Buitelaar 2012). An essential element of informational self-determination is the control the individual has over the information that is available about her in the Internet environment, also known as her digital double. 1This digital double has evolved into more than a mere copy of the real-life person. In the Web 2.0 context, online identity is becoming something much more complex than a matter of authentication of an online actor to a real person.
Online identities are complex, multifaceted, and con- stantly developing (Bernal 2012). For many people, of ine identities are as real as their off-screen selves (Schechtman c J. C. Buitelaar Received 9 May 2013; accepted 27 March 2014 Address correspondence to J. C. Buitelaar, TILT, Tilburg Uni- versity, PO Box 90153, Tilburg 5000 LE, The Netherlands. E-mail:
[email protected] 2012). This is especially so in the world of Second Life and other virtual-world contexts such as multiplayer online games where users are said to have experiences through their avatars as real as their real-life selves (Schechtman 2012). This raises the question of what an online identity is, which is even more dif cult than the question of what identity is.
Identity is a social, psychological construct. This is also the case for online identities, as they are created in a social context, albeit a virtual context. Persons acting in the virtual environment put a lot of effort into authoring their online identity or, better put, composing a story of a life that has a credible personality. In so doing, they apply narrative techniques, 2which they apply with greater abundance in the virtual environment where they have much more freedom to express parts of their personalities, traits, and desires than they have in real life. 3Some people seek to adjust the Wikipedia article on them and make it more favorable to them. 4Others attempt to eradicate all information about them on the Internet. 5Yet others put the maximum amount of information about their private affairs on the Internet, reasoning that high exposure will enable them to keep those parts of their private lives they cherish most hidden from the public eye.
6At the same time, there is also a loss of control by the individual over identity construction in the online world, as anyone who so chooses can construct partially or even completely the digital double of someone else. This story may pretend to hold an equally valid claim of presenting the true story of that person’s life, as the story constructed by the person whose data circulate in cyberspace. How could the story that others construct of one’s life be closer to or further from the truth than how one wishes to present it oneself?
This question echoes an earlier debate with respect to rivaling interpretations of history.
Historians’ interpretations of past events take the form of a story or a narrative. To write a story (i.e., apply narrative techniques) is to re ect upon events in order to encompass them into a “successive whole” (Ricoeur 1981, 174). This con gurational arrangement makes the succession of occurrences in this story about past events into “signi cant wholes” (Ricoeur 1981, 175). For this 266Downloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 PRIVACY AND NARRATIVITY 267 con gurational effort, the historian must call upon their talent of imagination (Mink 1978). 7Individuals apply this same technique to make sense of their own lives. They do so in the form of biographies and autobiographies. Ac- cording to the identity theory (Atkins 2005), individuals construct their identity by using life stories or biographies (de Mul 2000). In this process of articulating their life histories, they exercise control over their personal data. In the Internet era, they exercise this control also with regard to the elements that make up their digital double.
In view of the fact that one of the basic rights a person is endowed with is the right to privacy or personal space, it is important to understand how the thus constructed online personality, which appears to be in many ways richer than a mere authentication of a real-life person to a virtual one, may assert a right to privacy. 8In this article I seek to explore this issue by drawing on the philosophy of history, with an emphasis on the theory of the narrative identity.
This article is structured as follows. First a brief note sets out my approach to privacy and the importance I attach to informational self-determination with its grounding in the values of human dignity and autonomy. Then three recent attempts to gain control of one’s digital double, in order to maintain one’s personal dignity, are analyzed.
Thereafter, the philosophy of history is examined to un- derstand what we can learn from the historian’s craft in seeking the truth about the past. After the philosophi- cal/ethical discourse about historiography, historical idea, and narrative identity building, the discussion turns to a more psychologically oriented discourse about how in- dividuals shape their identity by constructing their life’s history. Lastly, it is pointed out how the interrelationship between historiography, identity building, and the role of memory receives a clear expression in the art of autobiog- raphy.
In the conclusion, using the lessons learned from the historiographical, narrative, and biographical discourses as harmonizing and guiding arguments, an indication is given of the viability of the principle of informational self-determination in the Internet era. Some attention is also paid to the effectiveness of the existing and proposed legislative framework that undergirds and implements the right to privacy.
THEORETICAL BACKDROP There are manifold de nitions and views of privacy. A seminal starting point 9is that of Warren and Brandeis (1890), namely, that privacy should be regarded as a gen- eral right to the immunity of the person. The right to privacy, as part of the more general right to the immunity of the person, is related to the right to one’s personality. 10 From this point of view it can be argued that the valueof privacy is grounded in the principle of permitting and protecting an autonomous life (Kant 1996; R¨ ossler 2001).
The moral philosopher Kant was an early proponent of the view of the intrinsic value of human dignity (Kant 1996). Kant did, however, put a constraint on this view, namely, that humans owe themselves a duty of self-esteem but also a claim to and the duty to respect other hu- mans. In Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this Kantian principle of intrinsic human dignity is adopted, where the declaration states that all human be- ings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 11 This inherent dignity accounts for the possession of inalienable human rights. These rights nd their origin in the capacity of the human being to re ect and make choices. A. R.
Miller combines these two concepts to explain the impor- tance of informational self-determination for preservation of privacy: “the basic attribute of an effective right of pri- vacy is the individual’s ability to control the circulation of information relating to himself; a power that often is essential to maintaining social relationships and personal freedom” (Miller 1971, 25). If the individual can no longer determine to what extent they reveal themselves to the out- side world, privacy is robbed of its core value, which is the opportunity to freely decide for oneself.
The intrinsic dignity of the individual, from the liberal point of view at least, guarantees the autonomy to act freely and thus make the choices that allow a person to ourish and to develop their personality. 12This is also the principle of personal freedom enshrined in the German Constitu- tion. 13 Furthermore, privacy provides the individual with a safe place, where they can decide for themselves which relations they enter into. I maintain that they can only do so if they can control who has access to them. 14 When this situation exists, they have the assurance that they can control the patterns of behavior they want to adopt.
THREE EXAMPLES Here are three concrete examples of efforts to exercise control over the data available in cyberspace that affect the representation of a person.
The rst example is that of the legal actions by two convicted German murders against Wikipedia in 2009 to have their names erased from the online encyclope- dia (Schwartz 2009). The two killers, half-brothers, were given lifelong sentences in 1993 for the brutal murder of a famous German actor. 15 Allegedly, they had maimed and killed the actor, their former business associate, in July 1990. In 2007 one brother was released and in 2008 the other. They both have always claimed their innocence. 16 Although their names are a matter of public record, 17 lawyers for one of the convicted murderers sent the Wiki- media Foundation a cease-and-desist letter to have the man’s name removed from the English Wikipedia articleDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 268 J. C. BUITELAAR on the murdered actor, citing a German Federal Consti- tutional Court decision that allows the suppression of a criminal’s name in news accounts 18 once he is released.
The German law is geared toward making it easier for de- fendants to reintegrate into society, and publicizing a per- son’s past crimes interferes with the effort (Rosen 2012). 19 Also, the German law in general seeks to protect the name and likenesses of private persons from unwanted publicity.
Privacy advocates 20 interpreted the issue more broadly as one of an apparent con ict between freedom of speech and the right to the protection of the name and likenesses of private persons from unwanted publicity. 21 Interestingly, from the standpoint of our current discussion, privacy ad- vocates claimed that the integrity of history itself was at stake. 22 If all publications have to abide by the censorship laws of any and every jurisdiction, just because they are accessible over the global Internet, then how can we be sure that what we read on the Internet presents a picture that shows as closely as possible how events actually took place? After all, “he who controls the past, controls the future.” But this Orwellian slogan is anathema under U.S.
law, which takes it as an article of faith that people must be allowed to publish whatever they like about historical events. The German Federal Court decided on December 15, 2009, that the convicted murders did not have a right to have their names removed from Internet archives because it would entail an inadmissible curtailing of the freedom of speech and opinion. 23 The second example also concerns an attempt to eradi- cate online information that constitutes an identity a per- son desires to forget. This is a ctional case 24 constructed by Korenhof and Koops (Forthcoming) of a person—built on a real case in the pre-Internet era—who was assigned the male sex at birth due to bodily characteristics. In Ko- renhof and Koop’s rendering of this real case, Agnes, born as Andrew, felt since her early childhood that she was wrongly assigned the male sex and started presenting herself in all her social relationships as female from the age of 17. The real-life consequences of this gender-role change illustrate aptly the problems individuals face in managing their identity. One’s gender is, in fact, a very common piece of information, but in the case of gen- der change—both in the case of a social (gender role) or physical (gender) change—it becomes a very important and overriding issue in a person’s life. If individuals de- cide to adopt a gender identity that is not the same as the sex that was socially and legally assigned to them at birth and this decision is taken later on in life, it creates so- cial complications. In the pre-Internet era, it was already an arduous task to conceal the past gender identity—just consider the need to show diplomas. In the Internet era Agnes experiences much greater challenges.
Korenhof and Koops discuss a solution for Agnes’s problem in the legislative sphere—“right to be forgotten.”This right is part of the proposed new European Data Pro- tection Regulation 25 that gives Internet users the right to have personal data about them erased under certain condi- tions. If Agnes decides to invoke the right to be forgotten as it appears in the Proposal, she could ask for erasure of her data on the following grounds: 26 (1) The data are no longer necessary with regard to the purposes for which they were collected, (2) the data processing was based on consent and now that consent has been withdrawn or the time period for which the consent was given has ex- pired, and (3) the data subject can object to the processing because of a vital interest or the public interest or a pre- ponderant legitimate interest of the data controller.
In their analysis of the hypothetical case, Korenhof and Koops (Forthcoming) reach the conclusion that the right to be forgotten does little to help people to construct their identity, and conversely, to deconstruct a past identity, as in Agnes’s case. Agnes’s parents, for example, could avail themselves of the household exemption and invoke their right to maintain a website they had launched at Andrew’s birth. They could also invoke their right to freedom of expression on the basis of article 17(3)(a), which allows them to withstand Agnes’s claim to erase data about An- drew because these data are necessary for their artistic expression (Korenhof and Koops 2014).
27 Agnes’s parents might also argue that her birth web- site describes past events as they actually happened and thus are “part of the collective memory that serves his- torical purposes” (Korenhof and Koops 2014). Here the counterargument would be that even if Agnes became an important enough public gure to be of interest for future historians, lack of online information on Andrew would not hamper the historians. 28 She would also be traceable in governmental and medical records.
All in all, analysis of the introduction of the right to be forgotten in the proposed European Data Regulation will not solve the problems Agnes encounters in creating a new identity (Korenhof and Koops 2014). 29 It may be argued that the Proposal is suited for having a single action, utterance, or event forgotten but that it is not of any use for allowing people to construct an identity—an ensemble of facts that when welded together tell a story about a person on the Internet (de Andrade 2012). 30 The third example is that of how Angelina Jolie, the famous actress, deals with public spaces. It is not the fans that make the lives of celebrities miserable but rather the paparazzi. Some celebrities just accept their prying as a nuisance that is the price of celebrity. Ms. Jolie, on the other hand, publicizes almost every detail of her life.
When chided for this, she reportedly replied that the more she threw out to the public, the more the press stayed out of her face about what was truly private (boyd 2010a).
Ms. Jolie thinks that by choosing to be public in a cul- ture of publicity, she can attain privacy. However, she alsoDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 PRIVACY AND NARRATIVITY 269 experienced the risks of this approach when the spotlight of the paparazzi endangered her brother’s life. When her brother was returning after a visit to see her newborn twins, paparazzi followed him in a high-speed car chase and nearly killed him. The paparazzi assumed Ms. Jolie’s brother had photos on him. Consequently, Ms. Jolie re- leased the photos. Here we see an inversion of defaults with the rise of social media about what happens with what you say in public. In the pre-Internet era, what you said in public was private by default, public through effort (boyd 2010b). Today, what you say on Facebook is public by default, private by effort. To achieve this private space, one has to employ elaborate schemes (boyd 2010b). 31 The upshot of the analysis here is that it is very dif cult to control the data that constitute your digital double on the Internet. In the rst instance, while the German judicial tradition offers constitutional grounds for the principle of informational self-determination, it does not give a total warrant because it has to be balanced with the freedom of speech. In the second instance, the individual’s right to personal dignity and others’ right to freedom of speech need to be balanced. The attempt to create a new story of one’s life by erasing data about something as determining as gender does not get preferred treatment. In the third instance, we see this process of negotiation in the opposite sense, as Ms. Jolie did not construct a coherent story but instead off-loaded a lot of raw data.
Thus, the various attempts at identity management fail when they rely on the traditional conceptualization of pri- vacy as data management. A more tenable ground for identity construction on the Internet may well be found in considering identity as being part of personality rights, which derive from the fundamental right to dignity and self-determination (de Andrade 2012). More speci cally, identity construction could be conceived as the compos- ing of a story that we tell ourselves and share with others.
From this point of view, it can be argued that the au- tonomous individual is in constant negotiation with their online identity to bring it into line with their actual self- conceptualisation. The German killers tried to in uence the Wikipedia entry about them. Agnes, in a reimagined case study, tried to in uence the story of her past identity as a male. Ms. Jolie went to the extreme of not paying attention to story building at all but was not successful.
Moreover, the frequent con ict between privacy and free- dom of expression would stand a better chance of leading to a workable coexistence if identity construction in the ap- pearance of story building were envisaged from the more comprehensive perspective of a person’s autonomous right of identity or personal dignity.
The right to privacy and the right to identity are both part of the larger set of rights called personality rights (de Andrade 2012). These rights derive from the funda- mental right to dignity and self-determination. Conceivingthe right to identity in terms of having the right to have the attributes of personality that make a person unique, such as name, appearance, character, and their own particular life history, a different perspective can be adopted of how identity construction and more speci cally the creation of one’s life history occurs. It is believed that this may contribute to understanding how privacy is attained on the Internet (Benn 1984). 32 In other words, if the method used to create life stories is elaborated upon, this may add to the understanding of how in the Internet era the control of the data that constitute your data double, also known as the principle of informational self-determination, 33 could come about. This method is the method of narrativity and the adjoining concept of narrative identity. In the follow- ing, a brief explanation of this method and concept may help to better understand what is the meaning of informa- tional self-determination in the Internet era.
THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVITY Recently, in a variety of disciplines, the importance of narrativity has gained recognition. Apart from traditional disciplines such as history and literature, narrativity also plays a role in cultural expressions such as the arts and religion. It ful lls an innate psychological need. Hayden White notes: “To raise the question of the nature of narra- tive is to invite re ection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself ” (White 1980, 5). By imposing a form comparable to structures of meaning, narrativity translates knowing into telling.
34 It is in a way a code, which substitutes meaning for a copy of the events recounted.
The historian reports the events they construe as being truthful in narrative form. As such, historiography is a good ground to consider the nature of narrativity because, on the one hand, the historical craft deals with a recon- struction of events as the historian imagines them. On the other hand, the historian’s presentation of the way they imagined real events to have taken place contests in this way with the imperative of the real (White 1980). Real or actual events, unlike imaginary events, can be seen as historical representations. The effort to impose a narra- tive form on the jumble of real events is an arduous one.
After all, real events do not offer themselves in the form of a story. They are simply there. The task of imposing structure forms an inherent part of the writing of history.
Undoubtedly, the precondition for the writing of proper history is a concern for the judicious handling of evidence and the concern to honor the chronological order of events.
The historian superimposes on this chronological order of events a structure, which entails a meaning that these events would not possess when they were recited as a mere sequence of events (White 1980). 35 The historical form of narrativity summons the individual from afar, so to speak,Downloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 270 J. C. BUITELAAR to participate in a universe created in a real past. We would not have an inclination to attempt to understand this past if there were not a structure of meaning in the presented events.
Similarly, in philosophy, philosophers have had re- course to the theory of narrativity in the development of the narrative identity theory. In this theory it is posited that by the recounting of personal experiences in the nar- rative form, individuals give meaning to their lives and, at the same time, construct their identity (de Mul 2000).
Schechtman clearly expounds the narrative identity the- ory by contending that identity-de ning actions should be de ned in terms of narrative unity (Schechtman 2012). 36 Based on the Lockean assumption that the notion of per- sonhood entails a person as a self-conscious being with the capacity for moral responsibility and prudential self- interest, this person has a conception of themselves as living that kind of life. This, in turn, means having an autobiographical narrative (Schechtman 2012). When this kind of narrative view of the self is applied, persons are able to implicitly organize their experiences and undertake their deliberations. It is important to note that the person experiences what happens in the present in the light of what happened in the past and what is expected for the future. In this way, temporally remote times are brought into the person’s present experience. Indeed, the narrative self-conception in the form of a plot, in which past expe- riences of a person’s life are shaped (and come together) and constitute individual persons, can be understood as being of the same nature as the achievement of the his- torian, who becomes master of the events they recount in the form of a narrative.
IDENTITY AND NARRATIVE IDENTITY Identity stems from the Latinidentitas,which, in turn, de- rives from the wordidem, the same. In reference to a hu- man being, personal identity means “sameness of being,” “perfect harmony,” or “personal similarity.” In psycho- logical terms, identity is used especially to point toward sameness in diversity. Physical continuity of the individ- ual is shown by consistency in physiological measure- ments, while the individual’s psychological continuity is shown in the persistence of memories, expectations, voli- tions, desires, character traits, and so on (de Mul 2000). As Locke (1975) says, memory determines our personal iden- tity. “For, since consciousness always accompanies think- ing, and it is that, which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e.
the sameness of rational being, and as far as consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person” (335). We ourselves experience our spatial and temporal continuityand therefore our identity. Ontologically speaking, human continuity presents itself as such to us. The character of this identity is in philosophical terms often regarded as presenting itself as a thinking substance.
Themimesistheory of Ricoeur posits that the narrative model can be characterized as the imitation of an action (Atkins 2005). 37 According to Ricoeur, the temporal order of the events depicted in a narrative is simultaneous with the construction of those elements into a conceptual unity.
His model for this is a phenomenology of reading that he describes as the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader (Atkins 2005). As such, this mimesisor conversion imitates the continuity demanded by a life and makes the ideal model for self-understanding and identity construction. The person thus becomes one and the same as the story they tell of their life (de Mul 2000).
Ricoeur compares identity to the narrative plot. In a plot, a synthesis takes place of disparate elements, such as actors, actions and coincidences that together make up an individual’s life. This life story need not take on the form of a complex story crafted by a gifted author. It suf ces if it gives structure and meaning to a mere succes- sion of events (Rodogno 2012). This narrative structure is situated not in a time frame that passes, but in one that persists and is constantly with the individual. In this con- tinuous process of crafting the story of one’s life, new information forces a reinterpretation of the whole infor- mation ow. Or, as Floridi (2011) says, “Selves are the ultimate negentropic technologies, through which infor- mation temporarily overcomes its own entropy, becomes conscious, and is nally able to recount the story of its own emergence” (564). Correspondingly, construing nar- rativity from the point of view of the Medium Theory, a correlation between literacy, print, and a notion of self- hood that is primarily individual and rational (Ess 2012), emphasizes that the informational activity of constructing the story of one’s life thus gives it its meaning and also its unicity.
This holds the risk that a subject becomes robbed of their unicity by the continuous dialectic between the self (ipse) and the same (idem). 38 In an ontological sense, the self is in opposition to other persons and to its own con- stantly changing personality. However, the individual is in continuous communication and connection with these oth- ers. Moreover, our identity is permanently entangled with the stories of the lives of others. Indeed, this interaction with others in uences our epistemological self, or who we think we are, our self-conception. 39 This gives us the opportunity to constantly create new chances in life. It can be said that individuation is achieved by forms of infor- mation processing—not only in philosophical terms of the dynamic states of information as found in consciousness and memory, but also in a personal and social narrativeDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 PRIVACY AND NARRATIVITY 271 (Floridi 2011). This, in turn, ties in nicely and gives sub- stance to the fundamental view of privacy as permitting a person to experiment with their life, without constantly being hampered by records that mummify that person’s personal identity forever. “We never stop becoming our- selves, so protecting a person’s informational privacy also means allowing that person the freedom to change, onto- logically” (Floridi 2005, 197).
SCIENCE OF HISTORY AND NARRATIVITY Confronting these theses about the role of narrativity in constructing man’s identity and protecting his right to pri- vacy as grounded in his autonomy and dignity, it will be instructive to esh this out by taking a closer look at two methods that employ the narrative technique—the method of writing history and the method of writing (auto)biographies.
The Science of History Let us rst brie y look at the science 40 of writing history.
Undoubtedly, historians exercise the narrative art of re- constructing events by presenting a rhetorical and literary picture of the past. Often they seek to impose a certain synthesis or coherence on the sequence of these events.
Facts or events, as discovered by painstaking research, in themselves do not tell a story as a matter of fact. Facts by themselves do not constitute history (Carr 1961). As discussed earlier, historians employ the narrative art to impose a certain synthesis or coherence on the sequence of events. In effect, a historical account endows the events thus discovered with form, thereby imposing upon its pro- cesses a formal coherence (White 1980).
Does this narrative technique undermine objectivity?
This question concerns and troubles the historians, as they are deeply invested in making an objective record of the past. Historicists believe that the writing of history can present a view of the past that comes closest to objectivity.
They hold the rm view that all periods in time have their own character, values, and truths. Historicists even go as far as believing that they can let history speak through them in an objective fashion, which, in effect, means that they are able to suppress their subjectivity (Iggers 1995).
In effect, they see events as waiting there to speak them- selves. Historicist writers, such as Von Ranke, state that the historian should refrain from judging the past and that they should limit themselves to showing how things actu- ally happened. 41 History and Narrativity Some historiographers hold that the de ning characteris- tic of a good historian is their vision of the past, which isilluminated by insights into the problems of the present (Carr 1961). This presumes that the historian who is most conscious of their own situation is also more capable of transcending it (Carr 1961). From this it follows, that his- tory is neither the biography of great people nor a mere description of events brought about by vast impersonal forces such as those emphasized in Marxism. Neverthe- less, it is also true that this view entails that the historian must accept that there is a sense of direction. History is a dialogue between events of the past and progressively emerging future perspectives (Carr 1961). Most impor- tantly, the historian, being a product of their time, can only write history because they are conscious of a self, indeed, of themselves, and therefore also conscious of the fact that they have a past.
Historical Idea.As we have seen, the narrativist pre- sumes unity as a matter of course in their storytelling. The difference between historicism and contemporary narra- tivism shows itself as follows. “But where historicists thought of the historical idea as an entelechy 42 present in the past itself that has to be re ected in the historian’s language, narrativists believe that the historian’s language does not re ect a coherence but only gives coherence to the past” (Carr 1961, 79). I agree with Iggers that every view of the past is a construct of language but not an arbi- trary construct (Ankersmit 1995b), as language cannot be regarded independent of reality. In the end, the subject of historical change completely evaporates and all that is left is a jumble of fragments resisting every effort at synthesis (Ankersmit 1995a). Coherence can only be arrived at by the historical idea that links these events into a meaning- ful whole. It combines the uniqueness of a historical entity and a historical period. As such, it permits an explanation of an entity or a period (Ankersmit 1995a). The method that is most apt to achieve this is the narrative one.
Historical Facts and the Search for the “Truth.”The relation between the facts and the historian is a precarious one. Basic facts such as dates are not the primary concern of the historian. After all, accuracy is a duty, not a virtue.
Moreover, facts do not exist independently of the historian.
The decision to use certain facts as history is based on the historian’s decision to use them after a process of selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. This is what turns facts into historical facts. More succinctly, perhaps history is a hard core of interpretation surrounded by a pulp of disputable facts (Carr 1961).
As noted earlier, Leopold von Ranke was a very pow- erful advocate of the view that the historian should record events as they actually transpired. 43 He also placed an emphasis on context. Historicists, such as von Ranke, em- phasized the value of facts in order to attenuate the then- prevailing simplistic monistic belief that history is nothing more than a way of teaching people how they can achieve the perfect condition on earth.Downloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 272 J. C. BUITELAAR Bearing in mind what I observed earlier about the im- portance of the structure that is given to a narrative by a plot, I wish to underscore the notion projected there as well, that this narrative structure is situated in a time frame that persists with the individual. The notion of time in this respect can be called “historical.” The temporal structure at this level, in other words, can be understood as that of time “in” which events take place (Ricoeur 1981). His- toricality should here be understood in the sense of the emphasis it places on the weight of the past.
The events that get recorded by the historian in the form of a narrative are the ones the historian sees as worthy of recording. The historian selects these particular events by way of the preoccupation they have with them. Obviously, this presentation of the manner in which the historian deals with facts runs the risk of con icting with the historian’s aspirations to be true to the past. 44 Indeed, fact and value are as such inextricably linked.
The structuralist manner of presentation of events in the form of a plot permits the building of a bridge be- tween temporality and narrativity in which the individual as a moral being can play a signi cant role. All in all, the historian, who takes the mission seriously in their act of reconstruction and recreation, can do so only by an imaginative engagement with the mentality of the past.
Historians are then in need of an imaginative understand- ing of the minds of the people with whom they are dealing.
Or, as Collingwood said, history is the reenactment in the historian’s mind of the thoughts of those whose history they are studying. A fact in the past is dead unless the historian writes about it.
It can be asserted that history is, in fact, a synthesis between the past and the present. It provides a constantly deepening insight into a course of events. History hands down traditions, which in turn hand down lessons of the past to the future (Carr 1961). The function of the narra- tive form is to put human actions at the level of genuine historicality. 45 By this I mean that narrativity re ects the unity of time as future, past, and present. By the narrative form, the backward movement toward the past is retrieved in the anticipation of a future event (Ricoeur 1981). 46 This going back orR¨ uckgang 47 grants the narrated events a di- mension of historicality. Furthermore, by this repetition the person’s fundamental potentialities, as inherited from their own past in the form of personal fate and common destiny, are retrieved.
Thus, the interaction of the historian with the events he recounts re ects the narrative synthesis of the past with the present, which grants mere facts the character of his- toricality. Undoubtedly, the historian, as a product of a time and as an individual, in their professional work dis- plays the linkage between fact and value. If the historian attempts to consciously reenact the facts uncovered in their research, in their imagination, and puts them into a sensi-ble narrative structure, the historian will do justice to their aspirations of being true to the past. The historian is, after all, neither “a humble slave nor a tyrannical master of his facts” (Carr 1961, 29).
The Digital Double and Historical “Facts” It is clear that in the analogue age, forgetting was default, and remembering was the exception (Mayer-Sch¨ onberger 2009). In the Internet era the individual is confronted with a situation of what may be called a reversal of forget- ting. Digital memory offers a strategy of continuity and a preservation that transcends our human mortality. This, of course, was already the case with script, but now the past, captured in digital memory, is frozen in time (Mayer- Sch¨ onberger 2009). A person can no longer run away from their past. The problem with this past is that itappears to beprecise and objective but it is not.
If we compare the presentation of historical facts with the data that constitute our digital double on the Internet, it is rst of all evident that our past is constantly altered by our own memory of it. On the Internet, our past is a frozen digital past. Our past as it appears is inexorably available to all and consequently becomes shared infor- mation. Once it is shared, one loses control over it. The quandary is, of course, that in the Internet age one cannot refuse to communicate. Even worse, the digital memory exacerbates the dif culty of putting events in their proper temporal sequence. 48Digital data are stripped of their con- text; the depiction of time is collapsed. Thus, we eventually lose trust in our own remembering and are as such unable to construct our own identity. 49 The apparently perfect (digital) memory may ultimately make a person lose his fundamental capacity to live and act in the present because the person is constantly persecuted and hampered by their frozen past. 50 Adopting the historicist view of history that all events can best be understood in their context, it can be main- tained that the data that constitute a digital double can also best be understood in their context. It is at this point worthwhile to brie y look at this historiographical tech- nique from an information technology point of view. A valuable contribution is made here by Nissenbaum (2010), who introduces the concept of contextual integrity as a conceptual backdrop for informational norms. Moreover, she develops a conceptual framework that explains con- textual integrity. It consists of contexts, actors, attributes, and transmission principles. This framework is achieved through a harmonious balance of social rules and norms with local, general values and ends and purposes. 51 The theory of contextual integrity begins with a presumption in favor of entrenched social practices and then evaluates informational practices against a context’s internal dy- namics. In this way, Nissenbaum’s approach allows aDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 PRIVACY AND NARRATIVITY 273 better comprehension of how entrenched informational norms embody a scheme of settled informational prac- tices roughly centered on the values, ends, and purposes of a context. As such, these informational contexts are generally the structured social systems that have evolved to manage and accomplish aspects of social life recog- nized as fundamental in a given society (Nissenbaum 2010).
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity theory stresses the importance of focusing on how social norms govern the ow of personal information in distinct social contexts (Nissenbaum 2010). Her theory applies here as a transpo- sition of the historicist view of the importance of context to the sphere of privacy theorists in the Internet era. 52 The control the actors have over information within spe- ci c relational contexts as delineated in the framework of contextual integrity colors the concept of privacy along similar patterns as the historicist view of reciting events wie sie eigentlich gewesen sind(my translation: how they actually took place).
Employing narrative techniques—suffusing the ensem- ble of facts or data with an imaginative understanding while also synthesizing the past and present—may indeed re-endow the individual with their fundamental potentials.
Thus, the discourse about the role of narrativity in histo- riography may help in understanding how the individual can regain trust in their memory that the frozen past of the Internet had deprived the individual of. Just like a histo- rian, the individual will then have to engage in an active effort to present the bits and pieces that are present on the Internet, in a concerted presentation that describes the story of the individual’s life in a fashion as they consider it as being a truthful representation of that story. As has been noted, this will not be easy.
MEMORY, BIOGRAPHY, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY This study of the interrelationship between narrativity and historiography makes it possible to resolve the apparent con ict between the emphasis on the simplistic notion that writing of history basically entails getting the facts right and the misguided notion that all history is subjective. 53 The insights from the narrativity theory permit us to better understand how the historian, as a subjective human being, is able to reenact in her or his own mind the thoughts of the individuals, whose actions that took place in the past, they study. Here the historian and the individuals whose actions the historian recounts are recognized as conscious, self-acting individuals. The events described are no longer mere facts, but they are raised to the level of genuine historicality.
How does this view of the interrelationship between narrativity and historiography relate to the discipline of writing biographies and also autobiographies? This ques-tion is relevant because as such it places the theory of writ- ing stories of the past in the context of how a person builds their identity. Even more important are the consequences of this juxtaposition for safeguarding the autonomy of the individual and therefore the individual’s privacy. In the process of nding an answer to this question, the faculty of human memory plays an essential role. In fact, it can be maintained that the study of the historical memory is a study of the decisions about what should be remembered and how it should be remembered (Geary 1994). As it has been shown here, historians write for a purpose. This purpose is to shape the collective memory of the historical profession and ultimately of the society in which the histo- rian lives (Geary 1994). Historians especially believe that with the memory faculty the real past can be recovered.
Memory As will be clear from the preceding discussion, memory transforms its data by various processes of assimilation and selection. It is an intentional and manipulative process that uni es the past into one. Some historiographers claim that history is an abstract past whereas memory is a lived past (Assmann 2001). It makes more sense to say that memory has a constructive power in the writing of history.
Just as (collective) memory plays a role in the writing of history, it plays an important role in the writing of autobiographies. Use of memory in this sense, in fact, thus probes an essential source, namely, human experience.
Taking this one step further, it can be said that the memory faculty is a means by which a person appropriates traces of the past and by projecting these traces on their own personality makes it into that person’s own history. 54 This identity construction offers a person solidity and takes on the shape of a mix of self-consciousness and image, or rather, something with a narrative form. It becomes a story that you tell about yourself or others tell about you (Frijhoff 2011).
From the point of view of the development and the con- sciousness of the self, the interesting aspect of the autobi- ographical memory is that it can only come into existence when there is a personality—an “I” that amalgamates the experiences of one person into the memories of that per- son (Draaisma 2001). These remembrances are ordered into themes and other structuring principles, which are arranged in the context of a developmental perspective.
In old age, the storyteller tries to endow their life story with a coherence (Draaisma 2001) that it perhaps never had. By telling the story, the events are no longer a barren registration.
Research into the faculty of memory has shown that especially those memories of experiences that go back to the age period of 15 to 25 years are best remem- bered (Draaisma 2001). 55 This, in all likelihood, can beDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 274 J. C. BUITELAAR explained by the assumption that in that age period, one’s identity is built (Draaisma 2001; Fitzgerald 1992). 56With- out going into the subtleties of memory research, it is clear that every recall action connects two extremities in time: It is an action of the present that connects with an event in the past. Therefore, it is unavoidable that one’s emotions of the present color this recall of the past. One’s memory fur- nishes one with a past in which the actors, who act in that past, themselves have their character changed. Memories of memories are of necessity selective, incomplete, and colored because it is impossible to restore the perspective in which the events actually took place (Draaisma 2008).
It may be noted, then, that historical writing and autobi- ographical memory recall share the same approach and encounter the same problems in the quest for “truth.” Biography As was brie y alluded to in the introduction, in the Internet era anyone who feels so inclined can compose a life story of someone else’s life by putting together the pieces of the digital double of that person that circulate in cyberspace.
This is the modern version of what, for many centuries, has been known as the art of writing biographies.
57 Abi- ography is a creative and non ctional output devoted to recording and interpreting real lives (Hamilton 2007). It isusanceto limit the generic term “biography” to written lives, rather than including the entire eld of real-life hu- man depiction in various media (Hamilton 2007).
58 The question at hand is whether and to what extent biographi- cal writing shows a resemblance to historical writing.
59 The focus of the biographer’s efforts is directed at the recording and interpreting of the events that constitute the life that is the object of their biography. In this effort, biographers are confronted with a multiplicity of possible versions of a life. Just like historians, they have the arduous task of screening and selecting the pertinent events out of the multitude of facts associated with someone’s life.
From this selection they weave a plot, in the sense of the narrative technique, as set out earlier in this article, and give it a meaning.
In general, biographers seek to discover the truth, or at least “a truth,” about their subject’s life. In the past, bi- ographies had as their intention the telling of events in the sense of a historical account of a period. In the more re- cent past, biographies have increasingly become efforts of providing insights into personalities, the identity of indi- viduals. 60In so doing, the biographer also needs to possess artistic qualities that potentially make the biographer li- able to indulging in artistic license (Hamilton 2007). For the purpose of this article, it suf ces to draw attention to the comparable employment by biographers of narrative techniques in conjunction with imaginative and creative talents in the creation of life stories, just as historiansemploy these techniques in the writing of history. Biogra- phies, being expressions of life stories, are in this way a mark of the continuing fascination with individuality. The biographer tries to put this development of the individ- ual in the context of that individual’s cultural and social setting, 61 just like historicists did for the description of a historical period. However, the pursuit of biography has also been a controversial issue because it frequently chal- lenged received ideas of privacy and reputation. Today’s data matching procedures,which focus solely on individ- uals’ data doubles, go even further by marginalizing the notion of individual biographical truth. 62 Of course, today the problem has been aggravated because on the Internet anyone who feels so inclined can construct a partial biog- raphy of your life, selecting data that suit the intention of the self-appointed biographer of your life. The selection of these data may well be based on the results of the data matching procedures, which employ incomprehensible al- gorithms. A full and as truthful account as possible of your life will have to compete with these partial representations.
Autobiography A brief consideration of the art of writing autobiography is particularly apt here because in the autobiography, the au- thor has absolute control of the portrayal of their personal past. As such, the author comes closest to exercising the principle of informational self-determination. The facts written down by the individual in an autobiography are the facts they desire to present about themselves because these facts together convey an image of the individual’s life that they wish to have known. In an autobiography, it is by adopting narrativization techniques that the au- thor is able to provide themselves with an identity. In a way, the autobiography can be seen as a kind of therapy.
In the autobiographical approach, narrativity no longer holds just the function of serving an explanatory goal but it becomes more an interpretative art. The explanation, advanced earlier about events receiving their historicality by repetition (Ricoeur 1981), comes to the fore in the art of autobiography. It has been noted by J. M. Fitzgerald (1992) that the self-narrative is a set of stories, involving the individual, which are utilized for looking both forward and backward in time to provide a satisfactory account of past experience. This account receives the stamp of be- ing satisfactory when it seems to run parallel to actual events and to the plot structure of a narrative (Fitzgerald 1992).
It can be argued that in autobiography, historicality and narrativity are confounded and confused (Ricoeur 1981).
Indeed, the desire for imagining coherence in real events is ful lled by the author of an autobiography in the display of that image in their own life (White 1980). The re- ality of events, as written in an autobiography, rests onDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 PRIVACY AND NARRATIVITY 275 the fact that they were remembered and can be placed in an authentic, logical, and chronologically ordered se- quence. In this way, the representation of the personal past—the autobiography—presents a self-created linguis- tic construction imposed on the chaos of life (Lorenz 1998). The autobiographer tries, in writing these facts down about their life, as they perceive, remember, and order them, to make sense of that life (Hamilton 2007).
Thus, the hypotheses adduced here about the structural- ist narrativization techniques, discerned in the historio- graphical approaches, help to explain the achievement of the building of a true unique identity in the art of auto- biography.
This autobiographical approach to the building of a self- identity also helps in underscoring the theory I advocate about safeguarding the individual’s privacy, by basing it on the principles of human dignity and autonomy (Buite- laar 2012). From this point of view, the individual should be permitted to construct their own conceptual self, and to constantly maintain it and revise it. Psychological research has shown that this conceptual self, in the sense of how the individual sees themself, is built and maintained in a constantly ongoing reciprocal relationship between the self-concept and memory. 63 This the individual can only achieve by exercising their personal autonomy in shaping and molding the facts or—in psychological terms—the experiences of their life, as they appear in that individ- ual’s reminiscences. This article is not the place to seek an answer to the question of whether this (re)construction of the self-identity is part of the process that constructs knowledge and not reality (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2005). 64 In Western culture, the notion that each individual con- structs themself and that each individual’s story is their own unique story is a strong one. The art of autobiogra- phy may well be seen as a tting expression of individu- alism and self-determination. Thus, knowledge of the self is to be found in stories, written in autobiographical form (Fitzgerald 1992).
From a philosophical viewpoint it may be argued that the narrative approach gives some inclination of where the individual can nd a connective principle that binds all particular perceptions into a unity. These perceptions can be seen as bits or streams of information that an indi- vidual agent endowed with informational skills may use to attribute a uni ed self-identity to themselves, at least in the individual’s self-conception. It is, of course, a se- rious challenge to explain how all the bits of information that compose a self are held together if there is no narra- tor to keep these disjointed bits of information together.
Only presupposing a narrator would solve the problem, but this cannot be, because the narrative theory of the self describes the narrator as the narrative (Floridi 2011). Kant, on the other hand, has argued that the uni ed coherence of the informational bits could only be guaranteed by theunity of the agent’s self. 65 Assuming healthy individuals, it may still be asserted that a self-conscious individual has a notion of her or his personhood with a capacity for moral responsibility and prudential self-interest. In Lock- ean terms, this being employs normative judgments and recognizes themself as subject to those judgements. In the Narrative Self-Constitution View (Schechtman 2012) an individual has such a conception of themself. According to this view, we think of ourselves as beings who live such lives and are governed by such norms. This, in turn, entails having an autobiographical narrative (Schechtman 2012). These normative, informational activities thus per- mit a self-governing individual to constitute themself as a person and articulate their life stories continuously and implicitly in ongoing autobiographical narratives. The person thus achieves a structure of conscious experience and agential capacities that allows this person to interact with other individuals in meaningful and sensible ways (Schechtman 2012).
CONCLUSION It should be clear by now that I believe that the theories of narrativity and historiography, especially in conjunc- tion with the narrative identity theory, do indeed enrich the proposition that informational self-determination is important for safeguarding privacy, even—or perhaps par- ticularly so—in the Internet era. Indeed, the increasing pervasiveness of ICT technologies leads to unprecedented opportunities in the development of human identity by way of technologies of self-construction (Floridi 2011).
As such, the foundations I have laid for the theory of informational self-determination, which encompasses the values of human dignity and autonomy, show its appo- siteness all the more (Buitelaar 2012). The historical idea as a leading principle in attaining a plausible view of the past allows for the possibility of putting more emphasis on the free will of the individual as a human being. This human being plays the role of a determining factor in his- torical causation, in contrast to metaphysical or materialist grand schemes of history. Considering that historical sci- ences are sciences of understanding or interpretation, it is also true that by understanding history, the historical re- searcher also understands something that is ultimately her or his own, “the outcome of human freedom, goals and de- sires” (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2005). Active management of one’s presentation and memories online turns out to be increasingly important not only for protecting one’s infor- mational privacy but also for constructing one’s personal identity (Floridi 2011).
Historians try to make sense of the past by way of inter- preting events. By exercising their right to informational self-determination and grounding it in concepts of auton- omy and human dignity, individuals try to guard their rightDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 276 J. C. BUITELAAR to privacy (Buitelaar 2012). The theory of narrative iden- tity can be supportive of these theories. Narrative makes sense of the jumble of events that makes up the past just as well as that of an individual’s life. It is a vexing question whether the story told by the historian as the autobiog- rapher represents the truth. It is a plausible assumption that historical interpretations in the sense of a so-called ensemble of interrelationships of many different kinds of events, composed into a single whole, may hold a claim to an acceptable truth (Mink 1978). At least, this leads to a kind of truth that the autonomous individual (profes- sional historian or each and every individual) has a right to tell and to believe to come close to the truth. 66 The problem, however, with history as well as with biography is its discon rmability (White 1978). 67 Nevertheless, and as a matter of course, the narrative form is a product of individual imagination, an arti ce (Mink 1978). Schecht- man’s Narrative Self-Constitution View underscores that the unity of the self attained by the narrative effort presents a credible autobiographical artifact (Schechtman 2012).
This can also be called the historical idea by which past events are seen as a coherent whole (Ankersmit 1995a).
To elaborate on this conclusion, I will summarize brie y which insights can be gained from the consideration of narrativity, narrative identity, and historiography for our understanding of privacy in the Internet era. Most promi- nent has been the narrativity theory, in the sense of shaping a story and at the same time one’s identity, which could en- rich the search for privacy on the Internet by building it on the principle of informational self-determination. There- after come the methods of getting and maintaining control of your data.
In the legal sphere, the efforts of the German killers to erase their life stories in Wikipedia are a good case in point. They attempt to uphold their privacy, in the sense that they should be regarded as unique human beings, who should be given the chance to get a fresh start, without the encumbrance of a tainted past. 68 It is, however, very much the question whether addressing Wikipedia is an effective means to this end. After all, the article that is contested by the German criminals remained on Wikipedia during the trial and has been referred to in many other publications since. Moreover, on December 15, 2009, the German Fed- eral Court of Justice ruled that German websites do not have to check their archives in order to provide permanent protection of personality rights for convicted criminals. 69 Perhaps the clean-slate approach will only be success- ful if it is combined with an approach that allows for considering (the presentation of the) facts in their appro- priate context, also known as the contextual integrity ap- proach (Nissenbaum 2004; 2010). 70 This is, after all, what the narrativity theory in conjunction with the historicist approach in the writing of history also revealed as being of value.The hypothetical case of Agnes showed how the right to oblivion, as it is formulated in the right to be forgotten, being a part of the proposed European General Data Pro- tection Regulation, will only help if it is approached from the broader right to identity. In my opinion, this right to identity is closely related to the concepts of autonomy and human dignity. Taking these concepts into account may help legal attempts to regulate this very basic right to be put in a practical balance with the right to the freedom of expression. It is still an unresolved question how exactly these basic rights should be balanced. In the light of the discourse in this article, it might turn out that the outcome of this discussion will also be of importance for safeguard- ing the historian’s/biographer’s sources for the writing of the lives of the (micro)history of a period of time as it appears on the Internet. 71 The third example is the case of the actress who put all of her private data actively on the Internet. This can be called a very active way of implementing the informa- tional self-determination principle. It may very well be that the way Angelina Jolie attempted to achieve her right to privacy by putting the maximum amount of information about her private life on the Internet is in touch with to- day’s reality. In the light of the discourse of this article, it can be argued that she autonomously attempts to exercise her right to informational self-determination in the face of relentless sensation seekers while paying due attention to her right to her personal dignity. She seeks to do so, however, by turning the data protection principles of data minimization and purpose binding upside down (Koops 2011). This seems to underline that traditional data pro- tection measures alone are not adequate any more today.
From what has been discussed in this article about the value of the narrative identity theory, as it is buttressed by the memory faculty, in conjunction with the concept of the historical idea and the informational nature of the self, it may be suggested that the actress’s efforts would have stood a better chance of being successful if she had based her efforts on an active attempt to shape her personal data into a plausible story, rather than just throwing raw data on the Internet. It is suggested here that—just as with the editing of entries on Wikipedia—the form and veri - ability of the story should perhaps be bound by minimal rules (de Laat 2012). 72 The contextual integrity approach would likewise provide a helpful basis for identifying the roots of bewilderment and resistance to infringement of the minimalist form of privacy Ms. Jolie still treasured (Nissenbaum 2010). This calls for further research, which obviously could take as an interesting starting point the methods developed by the historian.
The explorative discussion of narrative techniques, historiographical methods including the art of (auto) biography and the role they play in identity construction, as presented in this article, provides fresh insights intoDownloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 PRIVACY AND NARRATIVITY 277 the theory of informational self-determination. In sum, the historian seeks a representation of the truth about past events by telling a story; the (auto)biographer seeks this representation of the truth in (auto)biography. The (auto)biographer in so doing tries to safeguard an/their identity. A conundrum emerges on the Internet where many are in a position to compose a picture of some- one else’s life. Putting it simply, who tells the story of your life that is the most truthful?
In the Internet context, the con ict between the freedom of expression and the right to privacy comes painfully to the fore. As has been argued, the narrative technique in combination with the historiographical methods helps us better understand why informational self-determination, with its constituent elements of human dignity and au- tonomy, will place the innate right of privacy in a fair positionvis-` a-visthe right to the freedom of expression.
Even though it is hoped that this article contributes to a better understanding of privacy on the basis of its ulti- mate root of informational self-determination, the article acknowledges how problematical it is to achieve privacy through informational self-determination in the Internet age. The staggering ow of information or narrative ele- ments as a distinctive element of the Internet environment requires at the very least a very active role on the part of the individual to achieve the right balance between their self-constitution and the liberal principle of freedom of expression.
NOTES 1. A digital double can also be called a digital persona. See Clarke (1994, 78), who de nes the digital persona as “a model of an individ- ual’s public personality based on data and maintained by transactions, and intended for use as a proxy for the individual.” Bernal sees the online identity “as an ‘extension’ of the of ine identity and personality of the individual concerned” (Bernal 2012, 6.) 2. Floridi (2011) points out that there are two approaches that are promising for understanding the nature of the self. First, there is the Lockean one according to which the identity of the self is grounded in the unity of consciousness and the continuity of memories. Second, there is the narrative approach as proposed by Schechtman, which holds that a self is a socio- or autobiographical artifact.
3. Floridi (2011) conjoins the Lockean and narrative approach by observing that this process presupposes the existence of individual agents endowed with the right sort of informational skills. I would say, these skills may also be called narrative skills.
4. As represented by Schwartz (2009). See also Kittur (2007) and de Laat (2012) for the internal processes of the editing of entries.
5. Even though it is a hypothetical case, it may well be assumed that the case of Agnes (Andrew), described in Korenhof and Koops (Forthcoming), may be said to be representative of the problems persons who have undergone a social gender change encounter in trying to carry this change through on the Internet.
6. As represented by Angelina Jolie, described in boyd (2010a).7. Mink (1978) argues that it is exactly the historian’s imaginative powers that make the story he constructs credible.
8. The right to online privacy of deceased persons calls for seri- ous attention. With the coming of age of social network sites, this is increasingly becoming a pressing matter. It only exacerbates the com- plexity of the issue under discussion in this article. I do not deal with it here. See Bollmer (2013), Hayles (1999), and Mayer-Sch¨ onberger (2009).
9. The scope of this article does not allow an in-depth comparison of the U.S. interpretation of privacy with the European approach (for an interesting account cf. Whitman 2003–2004; Cate 1994–1995), nor is it the aim of this article to discuss cross-cultural perspectives on privacy such as Scandinavian, Asian, or African. The purpose of this article is rather to concentrate on the assertion that privacy occupies a central place in the Western liberal tradition. It represents in that tradition an essential component of self-de nition or individual development. See for example Solove (2009, 1): “Commentators have declared it “es- sential to democratic government,” critical to “our ability to create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with different people,” necessary for “permitting and protecting an autonomous life,” and im- portant for “emotional and psychological tranquility.” It has been hailed as “an integral part of our humanity,” the heart of our liberty,” and “the beginning of all freedom.”” 10. Floridi (2011, 557) places this interpretation in the context of informational privacy by noting that the consequence of re- garding the concept of privacy in this manner would entail that a breach of one’s informational privacy would be similar to a form of aggression against one’s personal identity. Concomitantly, a dif- culty that arises is that the ow of information in itself cannot be consistently and nontransiently bound together as a whole. There- fore it would fail to form a coherent unity, let alone a conscious self. Floridi notes with some understatement that this creates an al- most insurmountable conundrum that “Plato, Hume and Kant left unsolved.” 11. The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) is even more unequivocal in its article 1, “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority” (translation by the of cial site of the German Parliament: http://www.bundestag.de).
12. I refer the reader to my article inGerman Law Reviewfor a more extensive analysis of the grounding of the right to informational self-determination or privacy in the basic concepts of human dignity and autonomy (Buitelaar 2012).
13. The German Basic Law reads at article 2.1: “Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the right of others or offend against the constitutional order or moral law” (translation by the of cial site of the German Parliament:
http://www.bundestag.de).
14. Thus, the concept of the personal sphere, which at rst was spa- tially de ned, that is, in terms of the integrity of the home, was extended to the personal sphere as it can be perceived in informational-processing terms. In the U.S. terminology, this is referred to as the Fourth Amend- ment protection against “unreasonable search and seizure.” See Debatin (2011), who gives a useful description of the roots of the U.S. approach to privacy. He points out correctly that the primary fundamental con- ict in the U.S. Constitution between freedom of speech and privacy arises from the First Amendment, which constitutionally prohibits the government from interfering with the ow of information, except in the most compelling circumstances (Debatin 2011). See also Whitman (2003–2004).Downloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 278 J. C. BUITELAAR 15. The actor was Walter Sedlmayr. He won the Outstanding Indi- vidual Achievement: Actor Deutscher Filmpreis in 1973 and played in lms of Rainer Werner Fassbinder. After his death, it became known that he was homosexual. A biographical lm (Wambo) based on his life was made in 2001. The investigation of his murder was a part of a German television series about great criminal cases in 2000.
16. http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/frei-nach-16-jahren- sedlmayr-moerder-aus-haft-entlassen-a-499192.html 17. Their names still appear in the English version, http://en.
wikipedia . org / wiki / Wolfgang We r l % C 3 % A 9 and Manfred Lauber, as well as in the German version, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter Sedlmayr 18. http://www.wired.com/images blogs/threatlevel/2009/11/stopp.
pdf 19. Rosen asserts that in Europe the intellectual roots of the right to be forgotten can be found in French law, which recognizesle droit` al’ oublior the right of oblivion.
20. Jennifer Granick of Electronic Frontier Foundation, November 10, 2009: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/murderer-wikipedia- shhh 21. According toThe Guardian, as it turned out, the lawsuit had the opposite effect because it created an upsurge in pub- licity: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/nov/13/wikipedia- sued-privacy-claim 22. Jennifer Granick of Electronic Frontier Foundation, November 10, 2009: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/murderer-wikipedia- shhh 23.Mitteilung der Pressestelle Nr. 255/2009. Bundesgerichtshof, December 15, 2009.
24. The real-life case is mentioned in H. Gar nkel,Studies in Eth- nomethodology(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967). This case took place in the 1960s. Korenhof and Koops (Forthcoming) attempt to situate the case in the Internet era. In this article the change in gender is accompanied by a corresponding change in rst name, i.e., Andrew becomes Agnes.
25. EU (2012). Article 17 of the Proposal is called “Right to be forgotten and erasure.” 26. EU (2012), Article 17, paragraph 1, a–d.
27. Korenhof and Koops (2014) point out that the use of the term exercising the right of freedom of expression is unclear in the proposal.
They suggest it should at least also entail that there is an intention of the speaker to be heard.
28. Of course, microhistory has an interest in the history of small communities, but this does not imply that the history of particular individuals needs to be preserved for purposes of (micro)historical writing Korenhof and Koops (forthcoming).
29. Korenhof and Koops (forthcoming) advise Agnes “to choose the path of least resistance and resign herself to information continuing to be online.” 30. De Andrade believes that the right to be forgotten may play an important role in allowing an individual to reconstruct an identity narrative, with the certainty that past ones will not undermine the process.
31. In her article, boyd argues that users of social media appear to have no problem with the fact that their personally identi able infor- mation (PII) is available online but they go a long way in negotiating with the medium’s architecture to keep their personally embarrassing information (PEI) private. I prefer not to use these terms because they give rise to an interesting but not useful de nition discussion aboutthe difference between PII/PEI and the more common term personal data. See also techniques such as sousveillance and inverse surveil- lance. These are terms coined by Steve Mann to describe the recording of an activity, typically by way of small portable or wearable record- ing devices that often stream continuous live video to the Internet:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sousveillance 32. Benn (1984, 288) contends that “respect for someone as a per- son, as a chooser, implie[s] respect for him as one engaged on a kind of self-creative enterprise, which could be disrupted, distorted, or frus- trated even by so limited an intrusion as watching.” 33. Rachels states that to have informational privacy is to have control over the access to and presentation of information about one’s self identity (Rachels 1975, cited in Buitelaar 2012).
34. On the same page, footnote 2, White sets out the etymologi- cal roots of the words “narrative,” “narration,” “to narrate,” and so on.
They derive from the Latingnarus(knowing, expert, skillful, and so on) andnarro(relate, tell) from the Sanskrit rootgna(know). The same root yieldsynoorimos(Greek for knowable, known). See E.
Boisacq,Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue grecque(Heidelberg, 1950).
35. White divides the historical method into three categories: an- nals, chronicle, and history proper. The annals and the chronicle show this mere sequence of events without attributing meaning to the events, not to mention the sequence of these events. The greatest problem with these two forms is that they lack a narrative disclosure, that is, they just stopin medias res. This goes to show that the structuralist-minded narrativity theory of history hinges strongly on the form with which nar- rativization molds real events into a historical story. In White’s words:
Narrativity dispels blindness with respect to reality.
36. Schechtman terms her theory the theory of the Narrative Self- Constitution View (NSCV).
37. In fact, Ricoeur argued that the narrative representation of the human world of acting depends on three stages of mimesis,namely, mimesis1 (pre guration of the eld of action),mimesis2 (con guration of the eld of action), andmimesis 3 (re guration of the world of action).
38. Floridi (2011) places a comparable distinction between the di- achronic self, which concentrates on the problems arising from iden- ti cation of a self through time or possible worlds, and a synchronic self, understood as an ontology of personal identity dealing with the individualization of a self in time or in a possible world.
39. This self is also called the social self (Floridi 2012).
40. I assume here the position that history is a science. This posi- tion is debatable but I wish to underscore it by reference to White’s structuralist theory that history became an objective discipline by its ad- herence to narrativity. “It was the narrativity of the historical discourse that was celebrated as one of the signs of historiography’s maturation as a science” (White 1980, 27).
41. See “Preface to the First Edition of Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations,” in L. von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History, ed. G. G. Iggers and K. von Moltke (Indianapolis, IN, 1973), p. 137. In Iggers (2005, 25, and 165, note 5).
42. In the sense of a ful llment.
43. He coined the aphorism about this adherence to objectiveness in history, “wie es eigentlich gewesen ist”(my translation: “how it actually took place”).
44. See the case of the two German killers who tried to manipulate their entry in Wikipedia.
45. Historicality should be read as the English translation of the GermanGeschichtlichkeit.Downloaded by [Portland State University] at 17:53 08 March 2015 PRIVACY AND NARRATIVITY 279 46. Ricoeur (1981, 177) leans strongly here on Heidegger, who grounds “the idea of history as a science in the existential structure of time.Geschehenis the mediating structure between temporality (as the unity of coming-forth, having-been, and making-present) and within-time-ness.” In other words, the emplotment technique of nar- rating events establishes human action not only within time but also within memory.
47. Ricoeur (1981) translates this German term by the English term repetition.
48. This is how data are dealt with in general on the Internet. Face- book, of course, offers a “timeline” to remedy this.
49. Draaisma (2001) observes that memories or reminiscences serve an individual’s self-preservation.
50. “A world in which there is no forgetfulness...is a world in which one must hesitate over every act because every act has per- manence, may be recalled and come back to haunt one, so to speak” (Blanchette and Johnson 2002, 36).
51. Nissenbaum (2010) contends that the contextual integrity framework does allow for novel ows of information trumping en- trenched ows when these ows are more effective in promoting gen- eral and context-relative values.
52. It should be noted that Nissenbaum holds a different view of privacy than the one articulated in this article. She ts it between privacy interest brawls and universal human values in the realm of the social (Nissenbaum 2010). I do, however, concur with her observation that people do not worry about restricting the ow of information as such but rather are concerned whether it ows appropriately.
53. In this respect, the following citation of Nietzsche is particularly pungent: A subject is no more than an illusion, created by language. “Es ist alles subjektiv aber schon das ist Auslegung, das ‘Subject’ ist nichts Gegebenes, sondern etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes, Dahinter-Gestecktes. – Ist es zuletzt n¨ othig, den Interpreten noch hinter die Interpretation zu setzen? Schon das ist Dichtung, Hypothese”(Nietzsche 1980, 315).
54. The self-narrative has close links to the development of one’s identity (Fitzgerald 1992).
55. Fitzgerald (1992) reports on tests that show a clear bias in the distribution of many more memories from the 11–20 and 21–30 year age ranges than could be expected by chance..
56. In addition, it may be noted that reminiscences of events that took place in one’s formative years may also be more lively because the stories of these events have been told so many times more than those that occurred in later years.
57. Biographies are stories of the life of someone else than the author. Autobiographies are written by the person in question him- or herself. An interesting variation is the ghost-writer, who writes a biography of the person in question, in the latter’s commission.
58. Hamilton makes a plea for granting the study of biography some more scienti c respect. He wonders why it is so neglected in an age in which individual identity has become the focus of so much discussion.
59. Just like the writing of history, the writing of biographies at rst served political and moral purposes. See, for example, the dis- cussion by O. Hekster (1998) of the development that the writing of biographies of Roman emperors went through from Roman times to the late 20th century. At rst, biographies of Roman emperors portrayed them as perfect monsters depending on whether they complied with the prevailing political opinions. With the advent of multidisciplinary historical reconstruction the presentation of these emperors (e.g., Nero) reached more nuanced views.60. I do not discuss here the stages in the development of biograph- ical writing, such as the tendency recently to turn biographies into becoming a record of the recent past and its move from card-induced research to the big screen. Obviously, the implications of this kind of biographical writing for the protection of privacy were immense.
61. In the late 20th century this often became a search combining scholarly judiciousness with the quickly changing public openness about sexual preferences of the life studied.
62. “The new logic of late-modern surveillance, typi ed by the data double, dehumanization of freedom and de-socialized criteria of sorting, suggest a special form of biographical uprooting” (Los 2006, 85).
63. The conceptual self is regarded by Fitzgerald (1992) as “a work- ing inventor, constantly attempting to construct an understanding of experience” (109–110).
64. The question is whether there can only be a conception of truth in terms of the methods provided by the natural sciences alone.
Heidegger argues that “the task of philosophy is to show the subject can rationally establish the norms of epistemic certainty whereby a given representation is judged to be true or false...we do not understand the world by gathering a collection of neutral facts by which we may reach a set of universal propositions, laws, or judgments that, to a greater or lesser extent, corresponds to the world as it is. The world is tacitly intelligible to us.” 65. Floridi (2011, 555–556) refers to Hume and Kant in an attempt to nd a way out of this dilemma. Hume confessed its insolubility by saying that “all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences [the infrastructure that keeps them together as a unity]” (note added by Floridi). Kant’s solution is, in the perception of Floridi, only a partial solution.
66. Obviously, for this representation of an individual “truth,” rea- sonable limitations apply. If someone wishes to edit his story in Wikipedia in the sense that he has been emperor of the world, this goes beyond the reasonable limitations. In history, the presentation of the Holocaust leads to much heated debate.
67. He argues that non-discon rmability of history testi es to the literary nature of historical classics.
68. It is a moot question which kind of wrongful representation in Wikipedia is the most harmful. See Priedhorsky (2007). See also the Mephisto case in which the German Constitutional Court de- fended the reputation of a deceased actor. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG–Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 435/68, 24 Feb. 1971, 30 BVerfGE 173 (Ger.).
69. May 17, 2010. BGH-Grundsatzurteil. Namen der Sedlmayr- M¨ order bleiben, online. S ¨ uddeutsche.de. http://www.sueddeutsche.
de/digital/bgh-grundsatzurteil-namen-der-sedlmayr-moerder-bleiben- online-1.144087. The case occurred after the names of these same two brothers were found on the website of Deutschlandradio, in an archive article dating from July 2000. The presiding judge stated, “This is not a blank check,” and pointed out that the right to rehabilitation of offenders had been taken into consideration.
70. Nissenbaum contends that safeguarding the situational factors enhances the individual’s identity and autonomy.
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