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relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 49 It is quite obvious that contemporary events shape the writing of history.
By viewing their own times, historians ask new questions about the past.
The hurricane that hit the Mississippi-Alabama Gulf Coast in August 2005, dubbed Katrina, is turning out be such an event. Scholars have pointed out the devastation wrought by the storm, the slowness in rebuilding New Or - leans, and the failings of government. Approximately 1,800 people lost their lives. Systemic relief efforts were few and far between, and the recovery of the city moves at a slow pace. Why did this happen the way it did? Certainly part of the answer lies in the history of the place where it happened, namely the Gulf Coast. Other answers are political, social, and economic.
In searching for some answers, it may be useful to reinvestigate the floods that covered the state of Ohio at the end of March 1913—particu- larly the most devastated location, the city of Dayton. Approximately 360 people perished in the Dayton flood. Yet in just a few months’ time the city was returning to normalcy, and by 1922 the Miami Conservancy District was established to prevent future floods from repeating the episode of 1913.
In light of Katrina, the relief and recovery efforts in the Dayton flood of 1913 seem all the more remarkable. Evaluating the events surrounding the Dayton flood provides an instructive case study in the history of relief and recovery from natural disasters.
Ohio History, Vol. 118 © 2011 by The Kent State University Press The National Cash Register Company and the Neighborhoods New Perspectives on Relief in the Dayton Flood of 1913 peter s. cajka The author wishes to thank Professors Larry Schweikart and John Heitmann at the University of Dayton for their support. 50 ohio history volume 118 1. Tom Dunham, Dayton in the Twentieth Century (Bloomington, Ind.: Arthur House, 2005), 2.
2. William E. Smith, History of Southwestern Ohio: The Miami Valleys (New York: Lewis Historical, 1964), 257.
3. Dunham, Dayton in the Twentieth Century, 2.
4. Ibid., 49.
5. Ibid.
Coming as it did in March 1913, the flood hit Dayton at a specific mo- ment in the city’s history. Therefore, a brief examination of conditions in Dayton before the flood is necessary. The city, as one historian put it, “is at the mercy of the swollen Miami River.”1 Dayton experienced significant floods in 1814, 1828, 1847, 1866, 1883, 1896, and 1898. After the flood in 1898, Daytonians responded by constructing levies on both sides of the Miami.
But their efforts were insufficient in protecting downtown Dayton. Yet, be- ing adjacent to rivers had its advantages. In the early and mid-nineteenth century, waterways were economically valuable to cities in America’s mid- western heartland. The Miami Canal “provided Dayton with cheap trans- portation, water power, and connections with the outside world.”2 In spite of periodic flooding, and because of the city’s position along the water, Day- ton’s population grew from 10,977 in 1850 to 85,333 by 1900.3 Prior to the turn of the century, Dayton underwent an economic shift away from agriculture toward industry. With machinery replacing human labor and a factory boom from steam and gas power, Dayton, in a region of the country that led in industry, science, and invention, stepped early into the industrial age. It witnessed the growth of corporations with its adjunct of salaried managers. Chief among them was the National Cash Register Company (NCR), founded in 1884 by John H. Patterson. Others included the Barney and Smith Company, Davis Sewing Machine Company, Dayton Power and Light Company, Speedwell Motor Car Company, and Dayton Engineer Laboratories Company.
The growing wealth of the city could be seen in the urban consumer culture that was well established in Dayton by 1900. The generous selection of goods offered by department stores made the downtown a growing des- tination for shoppers. The major neighborhoods of the city all had grocery and drugstores, some owned by recent immigrants. The North Side, for ex- ample, had nine in-neighborhood grocers.4 Other small business included bicycle shops and printing presses. Around the turn of the century, wealthy residents moved out of downtown Dayton, making more space for banking, business offices, restaurants, and motion picture theaters. Between 1900 and 1910, Dayton grew by 31,000 people, and “the downtown would reap the benefits as more people shopped, banked, ate, and visited the city’s busi- ness center.”5 Business districts developed at the intersections of Keowee relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 51 and Valley and Third and Williams, the Dayton Arcade was constructed in 1904, Elder and Johnson opened for business in 1905, and the Rike-Kumber department store opened its doors in 1908.
Housing, tight-knit urban neighborhoods, and religious institutions were also integral to community life in Dayton. An important social phenome- non in the city, and in America’s Midwest, was the high rate of single-family home ownership. High wages earned by specialized workers in Dayton’s factories fostered urban neighborhoods of single-family homes. Neighbor - hoods had a tradition of civic organization and initiative. Many families owned homes downtown in communities that mixed residential buildings with other urban institutions, which helped develop tight-knit neighbor - hoods. North Dayton had a mix of homes, factories, churches, and schools.
Dayton was home to many religious institutions, including the First Baptist Church, the Forest Avenue Church, and St. Thomas Episcopal Church. In addition, the United Brothers of Christ and the Catholic Church had strong institutional presence in the city.
In addition to the economic and cultural conditions of the city, the progres- sive movement was important to Dayton’s civic life. Broadly defined, progres- sivism was a set of actions undertaken by broad groups of Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in response to industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. It was a complex and multifaceted movement that combined “both excitement and doubt, optimism and fear.”6 Historian Una M. Cadegan has pointed out that “in 1912 Dayton was at the forefront of Progressive era reform in the U.S.” In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Daytonians exerted a tremendous amount of energy addressing the growth and industrialization of their city. Thus, Cadegan concludes, “when the flood occurred, there were systems and networks already in place that people could draw on in response to the flood’s most immediate needs.”7 Dayton provides an interesting case study of progressivism because it was there that John Patterson and other corporate leaders used modern methods of business to respond to the exigencies of industrialization. Scholars em- phasize Patterson’s drive to place business values of efficiency, productivity, and competence in city government. Beginning in 1896, he led a campaign to change the city’s government from a ward-based electorate to a city man- ager system, an effort described as “a heavy dose of expertise mixed with 6. For a general discussion of the historiography of progressivism, see Glenda Eliza- beth Gilmore, ed., Who Were the Progressives? (Boston: Bedford-St. Martin’s, 2002); Judith Sealander, Grand Plans: Business Progressivism and Social Change in Ohio’s Miami Valley , 1890–1929 (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988), 52.
7. Una M. Cadegan, “Where History Comes From: The Dayton Flood and Why We Re- member,” in Preserving Memories of Dayton’s Great Flood, ed. Elli Bambakidis (Dayton: Day- ton Metro Library, 2004), 4–5. 52 ohio history volume 118 8. John C. Teaford, Cities in the Heartland: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Midwest (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1994), 122.
9. Charlotte Reeve Conover, Dayton, Ohio: An Intimate History (New York: Lewis Histori- cal, 1932), 268–69; Allen W. Eckert, A Time of Terror: The Great Dayton Flood (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). Arthur E. Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District (New York: McGraw Hill, 1951), 31. Charles Lloyd Lindenfield, “The Great Dayton Flood of 1913” (master’s thesis, Ohio State University, 1962), a copy of which can be found in the Dayton Metro Library Local His- tory Room; Teaford, Cities in the Heartland; Sealander, Grand Plans, 33.
a thorough application of business methods.”8 Historians continue to de- bate the role of business leaders in the Progressive Era, particularly because this period witnessed the growth of massive corporations. Economic elites are recognized as a driving force in municipal reform. Recent scholarship, however, stresses that variegated groups formed broad coalitions aimed at reform. A portrait of the response to the Dayton flood of 1913 that integrates the efforts of business elites with other Daytonians like neighborhood lead- ers and downtown merchants offers a complex view of how a progressive coalition formed in response to an unanticipated natural disaster.
In terms of scholarship and memory, the flood of 1913 is perhaps the most important event in Dayton’s history. Relief efforts are remembered as “neighbors helping neighbors.” Memory is a telling action in and of it- self, but the historian cannot be content with this version of flood relief.
The sheer complexity of the city gave rise to a wide spectrum of responses.
A number of writers have reached conclusions similar to those attained through exercises of memory. Charlotte Reeve Conover, an often-quoted Dayton historian, found a few discrepancies but wrote effusively in 1932 about the generosity and dedication of Gem City residents. In 1951, Arthur E. Morgan championed the thesis that Daytonians united to drive down the number of deaths. Many studies have gone beyond the memory narra- tive. In 1962, scholar Charles Lloyd Lindenfield deepened our understand- ing of the flood by detailing three lines of relief: individual, organizational, and John Patterson’s effort. Other scholars, like Tom Dunham and John C.
Teaford, located the flood in a political context. By far the most compre- hensive treatment of the flood is Judith Sealander’s in Grand Plans: Busi- ness Progressivism and Social Change in Ohio’s Miami Valley, 1890–1929, in which she details the efforts of John Patterson and other business moguls during and after the flood. Although she mentions that “voluntary commu- nity organization, not reliance on government aid, dominated flood relief and recovery efforts,” her overwhelming focus on business has obscured the contributions of the city’s neighborhoods and organizations.9 Placing the efforts of business elites in Dayton’s social and cultural con- texts integrates the efforts of Patterson and the National Cash Register Com- pany with community organizations, technology, material culture, and the relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 53 urban consumer economy. Three important conclusions can be drawn from this exercise. First, NCR and the neighborhoods of Dayton View, West Day- ton, and Riverdale took on initial relief efforts. They operated independently, setting up relief stations and hospitals and running a sophisticated operation until almost a week after the flood, when they were consolidated into NCR’s Department of Distribution. Religious leaders, merchants, schoolmasters, civic leaders, housewives, and grocery store owners—in addition to Patter - son and business elites—coordinated the relief effort and were integral to the operation. Business efficiency was important in relief efforts, as was the tight-knit urban neighborhood. Stated simply, relief was both top-down and bottom-up. This was paramount for a successful relief effort. Second, every- day technology was crucial to flood relief, particularly in the form of the au- tomobile. Examining the material culture of Dayton in 1913 provides a more complex picture of what was possible during and after the flood. And third, rebuilding the consumer economy was central to relief and rehabilitation ef- forts. Policy makers made consumerism a part of progressive policy after the flood, thinking that consumer culture was evidence of a robust municipality.
Thus, rebuilding a vibrant consumer market was recognized as the reestab- lishment of the local economy as well as a cultural victory.
The flood came in the last days of March 1913, courtesy of some of the most severe weather in U.S. history. Tornadoes wreaked destruction in Nebraska and Iowa, and the storms that spawned them migrated west to east. On March 22, 1913, much of America’s Middle West, but specifically Indiana and Ohio, began to experience an unprecedented downpour.10 In the Mi- ami Valley, where temperatures did not get above 20 degrees, the still-frozen earth could not absorb all the water. Water levels continued to rise on Easter Sunday and the day after. On Tuesday, March 25, around 6:00 a.m., the Mad River Levee collapsed, flooding the Miami and Erie canals. The city’s factories and churches sounded their alarms. At 7:00 a.m. the old canal bed collapsed, pushing a wall of water over twenty-five feet high into every downtown street, filling up the downtown business districts and continu- ing into the adjacent residential areas of North Dayton, Edgemont, Dayton View, and Riverdale and threatening thousands of lives.11 Due the early hour, most Gem City business workers had not yet arrived at their jobs. Those unfortunates who were on the streets that morning fought the strong current. The major danger the water posed was its speed, which 10. Thomas W. Schmidlin and Jeanne Appelhans Schmidlin, Thunder in the Heartland: A Chronicle of Outstanding Weather Events in Ohio (Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 1996), 172–85.
11. Sealander, Grand Plans, 44. 54 ohio history volume 118 The Dayton neighborhoods affected in the 1913 flood. The National Cash Register facility managed to escape water damage. Dayton (Ohio) Metro Library relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 55 moved at 250,000 cubic feet per second. Tragically, a woman and child died when the waters overturned their horse-drawn carriage. Even those who were in their houses were not safe from the roiling waters. H. W. Lindsey, a resi- dent of South Dayton, noted that “the water is flowing west towards the river so very strongly that houses and barns were torn from their foundations.” A number of Daytonians went down with their houses. Lindsey witnessed a neighbor board a makeshift raft that was quickly destroyed by the current:
“Eventually the remnants were insufficient to keep the old man afloat and he finally sank below the surface.”12 Others who attempted rescues perished in the strong currents. And even those on boats were at risk, since “the savage current rendered their occupancy extremely hazardous.”13 Rescuer George McLintock, who saved an estimated fifty people, died when someone jumped into his boat and flipped it over. In the end, around 360 people perished in the Dayton flood—a low number in a city of 140,000.14 The initial effort of flood relief, and the most immediate, was the use of creative lifesaving devices by various individual Daytonians. A creative use of the city’s material culture and technology played a role in limiting the death toll. Many Daytonians sought out rooftops, attics, upper floors, trees, poles, and other elevations. A number of buildings in the city were higher than the thirty-foot flood line. While this left many “marooned”—a term used by participants to describe those who were stranded by the flood—it also saved their lives and allowed for their later rescue. This was the fate of an estimated 65,000 Daytonians. A number of others found themselves ma- rooned because, rather than escaping, they moved belongings such as pia- nos from the first floor of their house to the second. Sadly, the effort was insufficient and floodwaters still ruined these items. Ironically, those who were stranded commented on the great mass of things that came out of houses and took advantage their availability. Local Judge Walter D. Jones recalled that “down both streets poured a mass of drift, now a lot of chairs and tables from some home, now counters, shelving, barrels, boxes, crates of fruit . . . several pianos, piles of lumber, and worst of all some struggling, drowning horse.”15 These floating groceries actually provided livelihood for some. One resident fished a barrel of pickles out of the water, another a box of apples. H. W. Filley, trapped in the Union station with 115 others, recalled that “our food came from the debris which floated on the water. We had 12. Quoted in Curt Dalton, Through Flood, Through Fire: Personal Stories from Survivors of the Dayton Flood of 1913 (Dayton: Mazer, 2001), 93–94. This is a bound collection of valu- able primary sources, including diaries, newspaper articles, journal articles, memos, etc., that captures individuals’ perspectives on the flood relief and rehabilitation.
13. Lindenfield, “The Great Dayton Flood,” 30.
14. For a list, complete with age, address, and race, see Dalton, Through Flood, 173–74.
15. Ibid., 35. 56 ohio history volume 118 apples, ham, succotash, sausage, mushrooms, olives, tomatoes and cab- b a g e .” 16 In many instances, trapped Daytonians moved tubs to the rooftops in order to collect drinking water. Those at the Dayton Engineering Labora- tory Company actually made coffee and cooked provisions with “electricity generated by an automobile engine hooked up to a dynamo.”17 Yet others, like J. Harvey Kirkbride, saw the flood as an opportunity to loot and took supplies from downtown stores. Walking across roofs into department stores, he found “lots of apples and grapefruit . . . canned goods and to- bacco.”18 On Wednesday, March 26, fire broke out, and individual material relief needed to take the form of evacuation. The fire began when the Burkhardt and Rotterdam drugstore collapsed on Tuesday afternoon onto a gas line.
Around 1:30 a.m. the following day, a gas explosion started a fire that en- gulfed the entire north side of Third Street between St. Clair and Jeffer - son.19 Some residents used driftwood from sheds, fences, and houses to build rafts. Fred F. Aring recalled that “a lot of people are building rafts on their roofs from doors shutters and furniture.”20 Others extended ropes and cables to escape the burning buildings. An extreme example of this took place when A. J. Bard and 150 people who were trapped in the City National Bank building on Third Street used an elevator cable to escape the burning building. A boatman grabbed one end of the cable, and with the other fas- tened in the bank, “the 150 persons in the bank went their way, hand over hand, along the cable over the swirling torrent to the courthouse.”21 Here, relief and rescue took the form of individual resourcefulness.
The next most important line of relief was provided by individual Day- tonians with boats. A good number of Gem City residents owned boats for both leisure and commerce, and when Dayton flooded, they were quickly enlisted in the rescue efforts. Boaters saved family members, neighbors, and strangers. It is hard to know exactly how many Daytonians were saved with boats, but it numbers in the thousands. Arthur E. Morgan estimated that 150 people were involved in boat rescue efforts and that they removed more than 8,800 from flooded areas.22 The effort began immediately on the first day of flooding. The Dayton Daily News proclaimed that “boats were scarce at first, but soon the danger became so threatening that every man who 16. Ibid., 46.
1 7. Dayton: Being a Story of the Great Flood as Seen from the Delco Factory, Apr. 1913, Dayton History Books Online, http://www.daytonhistorybooks.citymax.com/page/page/4501184.html.
18. Dalton, Through Flood, 67.
19. For details on the fire, see ibid., 72–76.
20. Ibid., 86.
21. Ibid., 59.
22. Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District, 31. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 57 knew where there was a boat of any sort found its hiding place and it was confiscated for use.”23 Dayton periodicals ran stories detailing the nature of the rescuers’ work with boats. A typical case was that of J. Bob Fries and Fred Nitzel, who, with a canoe, “worked incessantly and were successful in taking 135 persons out of the flood.”24 Wilbur J. Schneider used a sixteen- foot rowboat to bring home an estimated 300 to 400 people.25 Robert Elder, a local department store owner, used his swimming and canoeing skills to save a number of lives.26 After being picked up by boat, Daytonians were taken to local relief stations. S. Shapira, an NCR worker, “saved about 100 people by means of a boat around Quitman, Fifth, Brown and Jefferson Streets . . . all were removed to the NCR hospital in ambulances.”27 These are just a few examples that filled the papers in the weeks after the flood.
As one part of his remarkable relief effort, John H. Patterson ordered his woodworking department to construct flat-bottom boats designed to seat a total of six people plus a rower. He gave the order on March 25 at 6:45 a.m., and within the hour NCR carpenters were producing the boats at a rate of two every fifteen minutes. They made nearly 300. Then “organized crews of other NCR employees took the boats throughout the flooded district, rescuing people who had been clinging for hours or days to utility poles, trees or snow covered rooftops.”28 The NCR boats had a significant impact on the relief effort both in bringing people to relief centers and in deliver - ing food. The Dayton Daily News wrote, “Free Oates, of the N.C.R., of Oak Street, using one of the flat-bottomed boats built at the NCR was able to bring to safety 10 or 12 persons and did valuable work in carrying food to pent up families in the upper stories of the flooded district.”29 NCR boats were used to move flood victims to a network of relief centers. Flood victim Lillie H. Kilpatrick recalled that “after calling for help the NCR boats came on Wednesday morning and took us all, one by one, a round about way over the over the burnt buildings to the Creamery . . . where a number of other persons were rescued and here we remained until Thursday morning with the NCR boats came again and took us out to the Cash Register.”30 From the early hours of the flood, effective rescue efforts came from sources other than the government, whether local, state, or federal. The local govern- ment’s effort was the least effective, and the flood seemed to confirm, for most 23. Dayton Daily News, Apr. 5, 1913.
24. “Heroes of the Flood,” ibid., Apr. 12, 1913.
25. Ibid.
26. “Robert Elder Risks Life to Save Others,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 2, 1913.
27. “Little Sidelights on Disaster Which Had Been Overlooked in Rush for News,” ibid., Apr. 5, 1913.
28. Sealander, Grand Plans, 4 7.
29. “Heroes of the Flood,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 5, 1913.
30. Lillie H. Kilpatrick’s untitled account in Dalton, Through Flood, 94. 58 ohio history volume 118 Dayton residents, the failure of the ward system. One reason for the govern- ment’s failure was geographic: When flooding began, water quickly filled city hall. By 10:30 a.m., flood currents were already so strong that Ohio National Guard general George Wood could not access the building and had to take refuge in a nearby residence.31 Therefore, relief work by Mayor Edward Phil- lips was limited to a national call for aid on March 26, in which he claimed that 5,000 lives had been lost and 30,000 Dayton residents were homeless.32 Mayor Phillips and the ward commissioners were not a force for relief, and their most important action was handing command of the relief operation over to NCR and Patterson, who was given the opportunity to demonstrate the efficacy of business values in city government.
Authorities at the state and federal levels experienced similar hardships.
The supplies were to come directly from Secretary of War Lindley M. Garri- son, but his train to Ohio was delayed by rain and forced to make a detour; on March 28, he was passing through Roanoke, Virginia, with the desti- nation of Columbus.33 Traveling even from Columbus to Dayton proved difficult; it took the messengers that Governor Cox dispatched to Dayton almost sixteen hours to arrive.
Governor Cox’s most significant action during the flood was his March 27 appointment of John Patterson as head of the Citizens’ Relief Committee (CRC). However, General Wood had already transferred authority to Pat- terson on the 25th, though Patterson had already appointed himself head of the relief committee earlier that same day. Cox did make one important call for aid. On April 5, he telegraphed the War Department at Washington and asked for 50,000 tents and 1 million rations.34 The same transportation difficulties affected relief at the federal level as well. Woodrow Wilson called for funds to be donated to the Red Cross,35 but because of the difficulty in transporting the government workers and materials, relief arrived too late to aid in initial rescue efforts. In sum, gov- ernment had little to no involvement in the initial relief effort. Its role, how- ever, would change with the recovery efforts.
Despite the government’s trouble in getting aid to Dayton, some immedi- ate relief was provided by neighboring villages, towns, suburbs, and farms, which provided the first wave of outside relief. Arthur Morgan, engineer and future architect of the Miami Conservancy District, noted that “farmers butchered cattle and hogs to add to the relief supplies. Farmer’s wives worked 31. Lindenfield, “The Great Dayton Flood,” 28.
32. “Mayor of Dayton Appeals for Aid for 30,000 Homeless,” Boston Globe, Mar. 26, 1913.
33. “Garrison Bound for Dayton,” Boston Evening Herald, Mar. 28, 1913.
34. “U.S. to Feed Ohio Starving,” Boston Traveler, Mar. 26, 1913.
35. “Wilson Orders Flood Relief,” Boston Herald, Mar. 27, 1913. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 59 all day and into the night baking bread, boiling hams and eggs . . . from their dairy houses came butter, cheese and milk.”36 The suburb of Greenville raised $1,000 in just thirty minutes.37 Lewisburg sent ten canoes manned by ex- perienced oarsmen.38 Some people also traveled to Dayton to assist in the relief effort. Automobiles and trucks made moving people and goods more effective. Within two hours after the reports of Dayton’s misfortune, Preble County sent “three automobile truck loads on their way to Dayton.”39Outside communities provided local organizations, like the relief committee in Day- ton View and the NCR, with needed support. Some made direct connections with Dayton’s neighborhoods. “Relief committees in Greenville, Troy, Tippe- canoe, Arcanum, West Milton, Pleasant Hill, Laura and other towns and vil- lages made house to house canvasses for relief supplies that were forwarded to the Riverdale Relief Committee.”40 Railroad supplies came into Dayton View from Brookville, Arcanum, Greenville, Eaton, West Alexandria, Eldo- rado, Union City, and West Milton. The local and regional effort was made possible by an array of citizens’ committees formed in places like South Park, Oakwood, Beavertown, Centerville, Lebanon, and Xenia.41 Finally, homes in these areas provided a place of refuge for citizens fleeing the city. Rescued families were sent out from the NCR plant to Beavertown and Centerville to take shelter with farmers.42 Corporations made similar contributions. The Pennsylvania Railroad shipped goods received from other corporations and citizen relief commit- tees free of charge. It sent their own supply train with its carpenters, wire- men, machines, and tradesmen and stocked with medical supplies, bed- ding, and food. On Wednesday, March 26, when floodwaters had crested and trains were once again moving, an NCR relief train arrived in Dayton with blankets, food, and medicine. Two others arrived on Thursday and Friday. Patterson was key in soliciting aid from corporations. He exchanged numerous telegrams with Henry Leland of the Cadillac Motor Company, R. B. Beach of the Chicago Commerce Association, and other corporate leaders. One of the most important corporate relief efforts came from the nascent automobile industry. On March 31, the Universal Truck Company sent a truck and driver to NCR.43 Henry Leland of Cadillac did the same, 36. Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District, 62.
37. “Suburban Cities Gave Assistance,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 15, 1913.
38. “Villages Quick to Aid Stricken Dayton,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 4, 1913.
39. “Preble County,” Dayton Evening Herald, Mar. 31, 1913.
40. “Farmers Assistance Deeply Appreciated,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 10, 1913.
41. Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District, 63.
42. Ibid.
43. H. L. Winter to John H. Patterson, Mar. 31, 1913, Dayton History, National Cash Regis- ter Company (NCR) Archives, Dayton, Ohio. 60 ohio history volume 118 sending Patterson two trucks and three “expert” drivers.44 Executive L. E.
Olwell, in an article in the New York American, wrote of the contribution of the automobile industry: “No sooner did news of the flood reach De- troit and Cleveland, centers of the automobile manufacturing industry than whole fleets of cars and trucks were on their way to the helpless cities . . .
From the Hudson, Packard, Chalmers, Studebaker, Peerless, Cadillac, Ford, Speedwell, White and Maxwell factories came cars and trucks.”45 Indeed, automobiles and trucks played an important role in moving refugees, trans- porting supplies, and removing debris from the city.
Other cities also made important contributions to the relief effort. A re- port made to John H. Patterson after the flood claimed that 232 U.S. cit- ies had contributed to the relief and rehabilitation effort.46 Detroit, Toledo, and Cincinnati provided the most important relief measures. Even though north-south railroads were still experiencing delays, these cities delivered relief supplies as early as March 26. Cincinnati provided the most signifi- cant relief. After exchanging wires with John Patterson, Mayor Henry Hunt sent boats and men to Dayton in cars provided by the Cincinnati Traction Company. On March 26 Cincinnatians formed their own Citizens’ Flood Relief Committee and sent another train to Dayton with four carloads of provisions, medical and undertakers’ supplies, and a large party of relief workers made up of twenty-five volunteer social workers, twenty trained nurses, and fifteen senior students from the University of Cincinnati.47 The mayor of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, perhaps sympathetic because of their own experience with a more devastating flood in 1889, wrote to Patterson, stating, “We have shipped you four cars of provisions and clocthing [sic ] accompanied by our chief of police who is at your command advise me to who and how we shall send money collected for your relief.”48 Yet efforts from outside the city were not nearly as substantial as the efforts of John Patterson and NCR. With no organizational help from the government, John Patterson and other business leaders stepped in to fill the void. Patterson organized a private effort that saved many lives both during and after the flood. At 6:45 a.m. on March 25, fifteen minutes before the levy broke, Patterson created the Dayton Citizens’ Relief Association, which he headed, and just below him were his top executives. In addition to ordering 44. H. M. Leland to John H. Patterson, Mar. 31, 1913, NCR Archives.
45. The article is from the New York American, June 1, 1913, and is reprinted in Morgan, The Conservancy District, 72–73.
46. Committee Report to John H. Patterson, Apr. 18, 1913, NCR Archives.
47. “Report of the Relief Extended to the Sufferers of the Ohio Floods of March 1913, by the Citizens Relief Committee of Cincinnati, OH,” found in Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District, 54–56.
48. Joseph Cauffiel to John H. Patterson, Mar. 28, 1913, NCR Archives. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 61 his woodworking department to build boats, he had the company’s food services division to make 2,000 loaves of bread and 500 gallons of soup; he ordered his hydraulics department to find fresh water; he told purchas- ing to buy cots, beds, blankets, pillows, work shirts, trouser, cotton dresses, shoes of all sizes, boots, coveralls, and gloves.49 Patterson’s foresight and action proved effective. His 7,100 employees, still being paid their wages, were organized and contributed to the relief effort. Some went out on boats, others on motorcycles, and some stayed in the factory to help refugees. The squads of motorcyclists patrolled the parts of the city not under water, de- livered supplies, and apprehended looters.50 A memo dated March 26 notes that “today food has been distributed by automobile and boats to as many needy people as we have food.”51 Later, NCR workers with motorcycles de- livered messages, food, clothing, and medicine. Under the leadership of R.
I. Hutgen, “there was about an average of 50 men working in the motorcycle squad while the relief work was in progress.”52 In addition, Patterson converted his factory into the nerve center of relief efforts and the city’s major relief station. Though there were many relief stations in the city, Patterson’s factory provided leadership and coor - dination for most others. Men in boats dropped off evacuees, and others in automobiles transported goods to a network of relief stations. Patterson turned the fourth level of his factory into a maternity ward; his fifth to sev- enth floors became sleeping quarters; the eighth housed barbers, cleaners, and laundrymen; and the tenth and eleventh were women’s quarters.53 Pat - terson’s female workers, who during normal work time served as secretaries and clerks, became waitresses who ushered flood survivors to tables and served them hot food. Sealander writes, “Other NCR workers toiled in dif- ferent parts of the building, sorting and fumigating great piles of clothing, brought to the plant by teams of NCR employees sent to fan through the non flooded parts of the city to ask for donations.”54 Arthur Ruhl, reporter for the Outlook, noted that all were fed, offered hot coffee, and even had the opportunity to press their clothing.55 He estimated that perhaps 5,000 people were fed on the company’s dollar. Relief efforts also included enter - tainment. Patterson cleared out several offices, placing in each a piano so that relief victims could pass the time by singing.
NCR’s location on the South Side resulted in it being difficult for aid 49. The minutes are reprinted in Dalton, Through Flood, 25–26.
50. Sealander, Grand Plans, 48.
51. NCR corporate memo, Mar. 26, 1913, NCR Archives.
52. “Motorcycle Squad Does Relief Work,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 5, 1913.
53. Dalton, Through Flood, 25–26.
54. Sealander, Grand Plans, 48.
55. Arthur Ruhl, “The Disaster at Dayton,” The Outlook, Apr. 12, 1913, 808–9. 62 ohio history volume 118 to reach the North Side and West Side. Patterson admitted this much in a wire sent to the New York Times on March 27: “We cannot reach central, northeastern, northern or western parts of the city.”56 Historian Charles Lloyd Lindenfield, finding that some commentators overestimated Pat- terson’s reach, wrote, “Daytonians separated from the NCR by inundated territory and having no outstanding leader of organization around which to build their relief efforts did a very good job of organizing themselves.”57 During the flood and in its immediate aftermath, relief organizations were created in Dayton View, Riverdale, North Dayton, and on the West Side.
These organizations operated independently of NCR until April 2, when the CRC began to coordinate the overall relief effort. Community organization is an important reason why the death toll was so low and the relief effort so effective. On April 5, the Dayton Journal noted, “Splendid organization is the most striking feature of the relief stations in North Dayton, Riverdale and Dayton View. All were put into operation within a very short time af- ter the flood started, growing from a stock of provision large enough for a few people, to organization capable of caring for the wants of five thousand people daily.”58 Few sources detailed the relief efforts in North Dayton, but efforts in Dayton View, Riverdale, and on the West Side were documented and are telling of the bottom-up currents of relief effort. Neighborhood re- lief stations were key in providing shelter and food to thousands of Gem City residents. Daytonians converted schools, churches, civic centers, and hospitals into relief centers. It is clear from a list of relief stations published by the Dayton Journal on April 5 that there was a substantial number and that many were created dedicated citizens, clergymen, and professionals.59 Sophisticated neighborhood organization took place in Dayton View, a wealthy community that was partially underwater. Dayton View was a “bedroom community” for the wealthy and, as such, was relatively isolated from Dayton’s commercial and industrial sectors. This division was made even more evident by the floodwaters. The Dayton Journal noted that “iso- lated, as they were, from the balance of the city and having in their section very few sources of supply, Dayton View residents quickly saw the need of immediate action in order to be able to care for the thousands who would be brought from the flooded section of the city.”60 Seventy-five of the resi- dents met on Tuesday, March 25, at 9:00 a.m. and created the Dayton View 56. John H. Patterson to the New York Times, Mar. 27, 1913, cited in Dalton, Through Flood, 121–22.
57. Lindenfield, “The Great Dayton Flood,” 57.
58. Dayton Journal, Apr. 5, 1913.
59. “Relief Stations, Their Location and Person in Charge of Each,” ibid., Apr. 3, 1913.
60. Ibid., Apr. 20, 1913. The entire article is reprinted in Lindenfield, “The Great Dayton Flood,” 52–57. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 63 Improvement Association, which consisted of individual committees for boats, food, automobiles, housing, and sanitation. The Improvement Asso- ciation immediately set up stations in the Forest Avenue Church and on the Williams Street and Dayton View bridges. The Dayton Journal claimed that the work at Forest Avenue Church “was without a doubt the greatest work of rescue during the entire flood . . . resulting in the saving of hundreds of lives and restoring to safety the total of 1,500 persons, many of whom were women and children.”61 An estimated 15,000 sought safety on their side of the Miami River. The residents of Dayton View sent food, water, and steril- ized milk to other flooded districts. They also built four makeshift hospi- tals in their district. Dr. John C. Reeve, arriving at Riverview on Saturday, March 29, recorded in his diary how “Dayton View is a huge relief station; schoolhouse headquarters, full and more coming. Good organization.”62 Importantly, the Dayton View Improvement Association was able to connect to the surrounding rural communities. Railroad cars came in from Brookville, Arcanum, Greenville, Eaton, West Alexandria, Eldorado, Union City, and West Milton.63 Each relief station in Dayton View man- aged to acquire automobiles, which enabled them to move flood victims to the countryside. Journalist Eugene J. Cour reported that “the Dayton View schoolhouse, military headquarters and the refugee station for the City of Dayton, was crowded with the thousands who had been rescued from the waters. Here they were sent to various homes on the heights . . . forty-five automobiles were running continuously from this point, carrying refugees to homes and churches.”64 Automobiles were used to move flood victims to places of safety in the countryside and to bring food and supplies back from the farms. This con- vinced many of the automobile’s value. Arthur E. Morgan proclaimed that “its behavior at the time of the Dayton flood was a revelation and greatly added to its prestige.”65 The citizens of Dayton View donated their vehicles to the auto- mobile committee, enabling it to “provide quick and efficient service.”66 Each rescue station in Dayton View was assigned an automobile so that refugees could be taken to homes immediately after getting out of the boats.
Dayton View was not the only community organization to make such contributions. On the West Side—a section almost completely underwa- ter—a relief committee was organized at 9:30 Tuesday morning, March 25, at 61. “Greatest Rescue Work Centers from Forest Avenue Church,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 2, 1913.
62. Dalton, Through Flood, 51.
63. Dayton Journal, Apr. 20, 1913.
64. Eugene J. Cour’s article from the Chicago Journal, Mar. 29, 1913, reprinted in Dalton, Through Flood, 140.
65. Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District, 72.
66. Dayton Journal, Apr. 20, 1913. 64 ohio history volume 118 the United Brethren Church. Chairman C. Kershner formed supply, sanita- tion, and finance committees and a citizens’ police force. The West Side was within walking distance of several downtown factories and had a number of retail outlets and businesses built along Fifth Street and at the corners of Third and Williams streets.67 This mix of homes, factories, retail outlets, churches, and schools provided an infrastructure for relief efforts there, and relief substations were established throughout the neighborhood. Again, the automobile was the key technology. The Dayton Journal reported that “Will and Walter Kuhns, Charles Thies, the grocer, Harry Thompson, C.E. Bice and many others obtained automobiles, did rescue work, rode out the coun- try and ‘nailed’ farmers telling them of the station in the city and beseeching them to rush back home for food supplies.”68 The people of Riverdale, which was just northwest of the Miami River’s bend, organized a similar committee. They made the local firehouse and schoolhouse their primary headquarters, with churches and shops also used as relief centers. The schoolhouse stored 6,000 rations on the first floor and had a hospital on the second. The group even created a registry that proved important in reuniting families after the flood. The Dayton Daily News re- ported that “the organization in Riverdale has been first class from the start and to this fact can be credited the general escape of the people from actual privation.”69 As in efforts on the West Side, they immediately dispatched wagons and automobiles to collect supplies from local farmers and the rural towns of Gordon, Trotwood, Dodson, and Wengerlawn.
Distributing foods and supplies was central to rehabilitating the city, which sustained a great deal of damage during the flood. Estimated prop- erty damage was around $100,000,000. Approximately 1,500 to 2,000 horses had drowned, and when the floodwaters receded, their carcasses were strewn throughout the city. After the waters receded, a thick coat of mud covered the city. The Dayton Daily News, reporting on the business district, wrote how “magnificent department stores are in horrible condi- tions . . . everything that would float has been overturned and reduced to worthless debris. That tells the story of every store, big and little.”70 Floodwaters had fully subsided by March 28, and relief efforts became rehabilitation efforts. Plans for this shift began on March 30 when R. H.
Grant, head of NCR’s distribution, formed a committee. He informed Pat- terson, “Our policy will be to provide for our Relief Stations which we have 67. Dunham, Dayton in the Twentieth Century, 50.
68. “West Side Is First in the Organization of Body for the Relief of Sufferers,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 4, 1913.
69. “Riverdale Relief Work,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 15, 1913.
70. “Immense Loss,” ibid., Mar. 28, 1913. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 65 organized and to cooperate with and help those that have started indepen- dently.”71 After April 2, NCR built on Dayton’s infrastructure and already existing relief organizations as they organized the rehabilitation effort into ten districts. Neighborhood groups never stopped contributing to the over - all effort.
On April 1, 1913, the Department of Distribution was officially formed.72 The department worked in conjunction with the army and channeled Red Cross funds into the rehabilitation effort.73 At the head was R. H. Grant, who worked hand in hand with supplies manager J. Q. Finfock. Under Grant was the Committee on Relief Stations—made up of Dr. Frank Garland, E. L.
Shuey, and W. B. Riley—which oversaw nine district managers and forty-six relief station heads. Each district had a defined geographic area, a manager, and an office. Schools, churches, clubs, and public meeting spaces were con- verted into relief stations. District No. 9, for example, was led by F. S. Smith, whose office was at Stivers High School and had a geographic boundary de- fined by roads, railroads, and the Mad River. It included Zimmer Hall, St.
Paul’s Church, Memorial Presbyterian Church, and Third Street German Baptist Church and had as its station heads C. M. Stephens, W. G. Morrison, Reverend Brownlee, Mr. Norblett, and Mrs. Bertha Zwick.
Without election or a formal transfer of authority, the Department of Distribution consolidated the city’s relief organizations and made them ac- countable to the CRC—all in the name of conservation and efficiency. The committee planned to check up on relief stations, appointing a committee of ladies for the effort, and took authority over the district commanders.
The April 2 memo stated, “It will be our policy from this time on to con- serve our supplies and only give the proper quantities of food and supplies to persons actually in need. . . . We want to bend every effort to supply the actual need of the people in the most economical way.”74 The system included holding the local manager and district manager accountable for seeing that each station received proper rations.
Memos exchanged between R. H. Grant and the district managers illumi- nate the effort to feed and supply Daytonians in the days immediately after the flood. Grant and the Department of Distribution provided crucial supplies and information to the managers of relief centers. Distribution forms were created, and managers could specify on them whether they needed food, fuel, clothing, bedding, or miscellaneous items. Relief centers also became places for monetary transactions: laborers and relief workers received their wages 71. R. H. Grant to Patterson, Chambers, and Finfock, Mar. 30, 1913, NCR Archives.
72. Citizens’ Relief Committee memo, Apr. 1, 1913, NCR Archives.
73. Sealander, Grand Plans, 50.
74. Citizens’ Relief Committee memo, Apr. 2, 1913, NCR Archives. 66 ohio history volume 118 and paid for food. On April 3, Grant shipped cooking and heating stoves, coal, oil in cans, wheelbarrows, brooms, rubber boots for nurses, disinfectant, and lime to Reverend Corley, manager of the Huffman School System.75 On April 6, Grant sent soup, vegetables, bread, salt, coffee, sugar, and pepper to several relief stations in an effort to feed 5,000 laborers.76 The memo noted that all of the relief stations already had cooking facilities, evidence of the extent to which NCR gathered information.
Of major concern to Grant and the district managers was the reestablish- ment of local grocery stores. D. A. Barlow, secretary of the Interstate Grocer’s in Dayton, estimated that the flood destroyed 150 to 175 grocers in the city and that losses were between $200,000 and $300,000.77 Reestablishing gro- cery stores further privatized relief efforts and alleviated NCR’s burden. The Department of Distribution wanted to see the local consumer economy pro- viding for Daytonians. The effort to reestablish grocery stores and channel consumers to them illuminates one facet of NCR’s efforts to get people off of relief as quickly as possible. On April 6, Grant wrote to J. L. Corley that “we are doing all we can to persuade the people to go to their grocers for their provisions.”78 Reporting to Grant, district manager W. A. Apple found that out of eleven grocers in their area, nine were well stocked, two were doing business with cash, and nine were prepared to offer credit.79 Apple also re- ported that “all grocers have agreed to submit to us lists of patrons who have means of supplying themselves, those who are employed and now earning money as well as those who are in a condition to need further relief.”80 By April 9, reopening grocery stores was a priority because NCR relief stations were then serving government rations.81 The information-gathering and business methods employed by the CRC prevented the misuse of supplies. NCR kept tabs on the status of supplies.
According to Judith Sealander, “the standardized relief and rehabilitation application forms required by the Citizens’ Relief Committee did eliminate wasteful duplicated regulations and did create a body of comparative in- formation about applications that allowed greater degrees of fairness in the emergency help.”82 On April 6, Grant wrote to a Mr. Digby: “I understand 75. R. H. Grant to Rev. Corley, Apr. 3, 1913, NCR Archives.
76. CRC Department of Distribution of Supplies memo, Apr. 6, 1913, NCR Archives.
77. “Grocers Ruined by Flood Need Assistance,” Interstate Grocer, Apr. 19, 1913, Special Collections and Archives, Paul Laurence Dunbar Library, Wright State University, Dayton (hereafter WSU).
78. H. R. Grant to J. L. Corley, Apr. 6, 1913, NCR Archives.
79. W. A. Apple to R. H. Grant, Apr. 7, 1913, NCR Archives.
80. W. A. Apple to R. H. Grant, Apr. 7, 1913, NCR Archives.
81. R. H. Grant, CRC Department of the Distribution of Supplies memo, Apr. 9, 1913, NCR Archives.
82. Sealander, Grand Plans, 54. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 67 that you have fifteen cases of drinking water up on the sidewalk in front of Memorial Hall. If you are not in need of the same, please see that they are returned to the NCR building at once.”83 Hearing another rumor of abuse, Grant wrote to National Bank cashier Clarence Keifer asking for the names of those who abused the supplies: “By instructions to our relief station managers and by means of investigators, we have done a great deal to stop people who were not needy from getting supplies from relief stations.”84 On April 21, he sent out a memo noting that NCR had distributed 2,696 pairs of boots and was asking for 1,000 back.85 The committee also compiled sta- tistics on how many stoves they had distributed to Dayton homes and the amount used and unused.
Overall, the efforts of the Department of Distribution were successful.
In an April 15 memo, Grant commended those responsible for distributing food and supplies to the relief stations. “It has been a source of great satis- faction to the Citizens’ Relief Committee,” he wrote, “that none of the food has been lost or has been allowed to deteriorate, with the exception of small perishable goods in transit.”86 Grant praised the efforts of the local railroad men who came to Dayton despite flooding. Because railroad transportation was made difficult, the city’s wholesalers could not get their supplies, but some still chose to deliver supplies. Grant detailed NCR’s success in supply- ing local wholesalers and asserted that because wholesalers sold to retailers, a great amount of money was saved. He noted that “all this money has been carefully accounted for and the accounts will be properly audited and open for inspection.”87 Grant’s laudatory appraisal was vindicated by an April 18 report to John H. Patterson in which the committee “heartily approved” of Grant’s and Finfock’s relief efforts.88 They were especially impressed by “the sales of perishable goods and other surplus supplies which has been done by careful check, and the fund so readily taken in by a cashier in connec- tion with a cash register.”89 Grant and Finfock also managed to sell excess commodities at a profit. The committee found that “the highest number of persons fed was 83,000 in one day; that as rapidly as possible the number has diminished until April 17 to 6,800.”90 The report further noted that out of the original forty-six relief stations, only four were in operation.
83. H. R. Grant to Mr. Digby, Apr. 6, 1913, NCR Archives.
84. H. R. Grant to Mr. Clarence Keifer, Apr. 10, 1913, NCR Archives.
85. Citizens’ Relief Committee, Department of Distribution memo, Apr. 21, 1913, NCR Archives.
86. H. R. Grant, CRC memo, Apr. 15, 1913, NCR Archives.
87. H. R. Grant, CRC memo, Apr. 15, 1913, NCR Archives.
88. Committee Report to John H. Patterson, Apr. 18, 1913, NCR Archives.
89. Committee Report to John H. Patterson, Apr. 18, 1913, NCR Archives.
90. Committee Report to John H. Patterson, Apr. 18, 1913, NCR Archives. 68 ohio history volume 118 Of particular importance was the rehabilitation of the family home.
Daytonians were encouraged to clean out their own homes in an effort to make the city beautiful. The importance of the single-family home to cities in America’s Midwest is evident in the concerted postflood efforts to bring back home life. The CRC ran an article in the Dayton Journal on April 5 stating, “The Relief committee desires to know at once what families are in need of assistance of other kinds than food and clothing. . . . We want to see the homes of Dayton re-established as quickly as possible.”91 Applications for the aid could be found at various city institutions. The program was a success; “A total of 1,082 families received an average grant worth $127 while spending an average of $725 repairing their homes.”92 Sealander notes that “homeowners could redeem vouchers for tools, lumber, plaster, and paint, in cases where their structures could be repaired.”93 This was in part behind NCR’s efforts to acquire stoves. On March 31 in a letter to the Springfield Chamber of Commerce, Patterson wrote, “Every stove puts a family in its own home to clean up.”94 The Red Cross also contributed over a thousand coal and gasoline stoves, free of charge.95 Returning Dayton families to their homes was motivated in part by a desire to rebuild the city’s economy. Policy makers made the family unit the basis of relief, linking the consumer economy with domestic and munici- pal housekeeping. The flood caused substantial damage to the consumer economy: some stores lost all of their merchandise, others collapsed, and some, like Rike-Kumler, were burned to the ground. On April 5, govern- ment officials assured Daytonians that as soon as relief efforts ended, they would invest in families and their homes.96 The efforts of NCR, Red Cross, and the government were also aimed in part at reestablishing the family as a consumer unit. The chair of the Red Cross National Relief Committee, Mabel T. Boardman, warned that “unless the people are assisted in such a way as to enable them to resume the normal condition of buying, the business community will be in a hopeless condition.”97 To remedy this, she called for feedback loop between wages and purchasing: “While factories are closed for repairs men can be given work for which they will be paid in the clearing away of the immense amount of debris . . . thus a purchasing 91. “Relief Committee Will Aid Homeless,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 5, 1913.
92. Sealander, Grand Plans, 52.
93. Ibid.
94. Patterson to the Chamber of Commerce of Springfield, Ohio, Mar. 31, 1913, NCR Ar - chives.
95. “If the Need Is Past—Return Supplies,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 10, 1913.
96. “Money Grants to Families,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 5, 1913.
97. Miss Mabel T. Boardman’s speech quoted in “Red Cross Tells What Work It Is Doing:
Rehabilitation of Individuals and Families Goes On,” Boston Evening Transcript, Apr. 5, 1913. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 69 power will be given the workers . . . the reestablishment of this market will enable the merchant to reemploy his staff.”98 The policy of the American Red Cross was to provide funding to families in order to return them to “normal life” rather than public works projects.99 The normal life consisted of purchasing goods from local merchants, rather than being on any kind of dole. A banking expert who worked with the secretary of the treasury struck a similar chord when he proclaimed that “businessmen are going to make great profits, these will not be undue profits but all of the house fur - nishings, all of the necessities of life, that have been ruined by the flood are going to be replaced.”100 The CRC contributed to the reestablishment of lo- cal businesses by creating the Business Rehabilitation Department. Grants were provided to small businesses so they could rebuild and restock.
The first wave of stores had opened just one week after the flood, and the momentum of developing the consumer economy continued in the next two weeks of the rehabilitation effort. Dayton’s periodicals hailed their return as a symbol of Dayton’s resiliency. Merchants and businessmen worked hard to reestablish the urban consumer economy. They had the important duty of supplying Gem City residents’ demand for cleaning products, new clothes, and housing materials. Fifty businesses opened on April 5, an event that the Dayton Journal saw as a rebirth of the city. Dayton’s progressive spirit “is evidenced in the fact that over half a hundred business houses threw open their doors to the public Friday morning.”101 On April 2, the Louis Traxler Company ran a banner “Don’t Worry: Dayton Will Get Bigger and Better; Get Busy.”102 Consumers braved the mud, cold weather, and potential dis- ease to shop downtown. One article reported that “Friday Morning saw many women in downtown store, there with evident purpose of making purchases of needed household supplies.”103 By April 7, the Dayton Journal found that businesses had provided an important level of normalcy: “The restoration of normal conditions was helped considerably by the opening of several ice cream parlors, candy stores, and lunch rooms all of which did rushing busi- ness.”104 On April 9, the Dayton Daily News published an in-depth report, determining that “there is no need for any Dayton family to go outside of the 98. Ibid.
99. “Ohio Red Cross Will Give All to Families,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 7, 1913.
100. “City Boosters Give Inspiring Messages,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 16, 1913.
101. “Opening of Half Hundred Downtown Stores Is Welcome Sign in Dayton,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 5, 1913.
102. “Hopeful Expressions Are Heard for a Bigger and Better City Everywhere,” ibid., Apr.
2, 1913.
103. “Question of Sanitation Most Serious Problem,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 11, 1913.
104. “Dayton Cheerfully Emerging from the Wreck and Gloom with Brightest Anticipa- tion,” Dayton Journal, Apr. 7, 1913. 70 ohio history volume 118 city for supplies. There now seems to be an abundance of food in the groceries and provision stores and all other lines are being replenished rapidly as well.
A glance through the advertising columns of the Daily News is inspiring.”105 The paper encouraged Gem City residents to make purchases in Dayton, es- pecially items for house repair. Later newspaper articles reinforced the mes- sage that money should be spent in Dayton. On April 17 the Daily News told residents about the merchants’ struggles to “overcome difficulties has been one of the striking accomplishments in this city of wonders,” concluding that “enterprise of this sort ought to be rewarded for its own sake.”106 Beyond being a major part of outside aid and contributing to the relief effort, automobiles and trucks were important to the rehabilitation effort.
As one article in the Boston American noted, these vehicles were “the only method of transportation, in as much as street cars, horses and carriages had been destroyed by high water.”107 The automobiles also moved people of sta- tus during rehabilitation efforts. Mrs. Eva Booth, a wealthy woman interested in donating money, was to leave Springfield on April 2 with a party of seven people and two automobiles.108 Patterson himself traveled in a car with the banner that read “commanding officer.” One of the most curious contribu- tions automobile drivers made to the rehabilitation effort was compulsory.
On March 30, Patterson gave permission to Capt. H. B. Kirtland to confiscate privately owned automobiles for the rehabilitation effort, telling him to “im- press such automobiles and other transportation as it is not covered by any special pass.”109 Luckily, hundreds of automobile tourists defied the governor’s prohibition of sightseers and arrived in the city. Kirtland wrote of the tourists, “They were a nuisance. In costly machines filled with silver thermos bottles, packed with picnic luncheons, crowded with men in women in holiday attire, the lawless rich from 20 cities crowded their way through the streets.”110 But on the first day, Kirtland and his sixteen men confiscated 918 automobiles.111 According to Kirtland, the cars were used to move nurses and refugees. The CRC confiscated four Harley-Davidson motorcycles because “the machines owned by the riders were continually breaking down.”112 The motorcycles were used to ship both supplies and workers to sites of need.
The role the automobile played in the flood convinced L. E. Olwell and 105. “An Incident That Speaks Volumes,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 9, 1913.
106. “A Long Pull, a Strong Pull and a Pull All Together, Means ‘We Win,’” ibid., Apr. 17, 1913.
107. “Motor Trucks a Big Aid to the Dayton Flood Victims,” Boston American, Apr. 6, 1913.
108. Mr. Bancroft to John Patterson, Mar. 29, 1913, NCR Archives.
109. John Patterson to Captain H. B. Kirkland, Mar. 30, 1913, NCR Archives.
110. Dalton, Through Flood, 130.
111. Ibid.
112. The Citizens’ Relief Committee, Department of the Distribution of Supplies memo, Apr. 26, 1913, NCR Archives. relief in the day ton fl o od of 1913 71 John Patterson that the machine could bring about a new age of transporta- tion in Dayton. Olwell, advertising manager of NCR, was convinced that “the great Ohio calamity pressed home the lesson that, at last, the motor car has demonstrated its right to rank as one of the greatest agencies of prog- ress and civilization. . . . In the absence of this great addition to improved machinery, the cries of imperiled thousands would have been lifted in vain, and countless lives that were saved would have been numbered among the dead.”113 Two days after Olwell’s statement, he received a letter from John Patterson arguing that the need for quick transportation was one of the most important lessons of the flood. “What Dayton [n]eeds now,” Patterson wrote, “is more terminals to accommodate merchants.” This could be ac- complished, Patterson suggested, by converting canals into boulevards and making better roads for automobiles. More terminals should also be built to help Dayton’s merchants unload their goods. But the most important lesson for Patterson was that “the automobile enables people to live in the country and do business in town. It annihilates distance and makes you indepen- dent of ordinary means of transportation.”114 Essentially, the auto had the potential to convert the rural dweller into an urban consumer.
The successful relief efforts in the Dayton flood of 1913 were a result of community organization and business efficiency. The most important mea- sures were taken by NCR’s John H. Patterson when he turned his factory into a relief station and used business methods to rehabilitate the city. As a result of the failed ward-based system of city government, on May 13, 1913, all fifteen candidates who supported a commission-manager charter won election to the city council.115 But NCR’s efforts at relief were not total, as the political legacy suggests. Relief was organized from the top down by Patterson and his business partners as well as from the bottom up by civic organizations, reli- gious leaders, and local merchants. With NCR cut off from certain sections of the city, neighborhood organizations sprung into action to provide relief, food, and transportation. Technology and urban material culture played im- portant roles in making the bottom-up efforts more successful. In addition, downtown merchants worked quickly to meet the demand for clean clothes, cleaning services, and numerous household items. Their success was not sim- ply economic; the contribution of merchants made for a moral and cultural victory central to Dayton’s rebirth. The bottom-up efforts were only enough to sustain the relief effort for a limited amount of time, however. NCR there- after organized those community impulses and made them more effective.
113. L. E. Olwell quoted in New York American, June 1, 1913, and reprinted in Morgan, The Miami Conservancy District, 72–73.
114. John Patterson to L. E. Olwell, Apr. 15, 1913, NCR Archives.
115. Dunham, Dayton in the Twentieth Century, 62.
