17:09 9 A studocu . com A 111 out of 514 - 1 - 9 |~ 6 - 6 . contains * voters . Analyze the candidate location game for the case in which * = 75 . In...

My question is on how to solve question 5 for my game theory class?

17:09 9A studocu . comA111out of 514- 1 - 9|~ 6 - 6 .contains * voters . Analyze the candidate location game for the case inwhich * = 75 . In a rationalizable outcome , can one of the candidates*win with probability ! ?!( C ) What happens if x > 75 or * < 75 ?4 . Consider the partnership game analyzed in this chapter , but assume thatC < O . Graph the players' best- response functions for this case , and explain*how they differ from those in the original model . If you can , find the ratio -nalizable strategies for the players . Use the graph to find them . Repeat theanalysis under the assumption that c > 1 / 4 .5 .Consider a duopoly game in which two firms simultaneously and independently select prices . Assume that the prices are required to be greater than orequal to zero . Denote firm I 's price as p , and firm 2's price as P 2 . The firms "products are differentiated . After the prices are set , consumers demand10 - PI + PE units of the good that firm I produces . Consumers demand*10 - P 2 + PI units of the good that firm 2 produces . Assume that each firmmust supply the number of units demanded . Also assume that each firmproduces at zero cost . The payoff for each firm is equal to the firm's profit .( a) Write the payoff functions of the firms ( as a function of their strategiesPI and P 2 ) .( b) Compute firm 2's best- response function ( as a function of p ) .Exercis( C ) Can you determine the rationalizable strategies in this game by inspeding the graph of the best - response functions ? What are the rationalizabstrategies ?\6 . Consider a location game with five regions on the beach in which a verdor can locate . The regions are arranged on a straight line , as in the orignal game discussed in the text . Instead of there being two vendors , as W }the original game , suppose there are three vendors who simultaneousand independently select on which of the five regions to locate . There athirty consumers in each of the five regions ; each consumer will walkthe nearest vendor and purchase a soda , generating a $1.00 profit for thevendor . Assume that if some consumers are the same distance from the tyor three nearest vendors , then these consumers are split equally betwenthese vendors .( a ) Can you rationalize the strategy of locating in region 1 ?( b ) If your answer to part ( a ) is "yes ," describe a belief that makes locationat region I a best response . If your answer is " no ," find a strategy thestrictly dominates nlaying strategy !'