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Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v 1 =10 and v 2 =10. Select all that apply.
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1=10 and v2=10. Select all that apply.
a.Both bidders submitting bids equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium.
b.Bidding a value b1 equal to her own valuation v1 is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder 1.
c.One bidder submitting a bid equal to 10 and the other submitting a bid equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium.
d.Both bidders submitting bids equal to 10 is a Nash equilibrium
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