ERIC VAN DEN STEEN DAVID LANE Aldi: The Dark Horse Discounter ALDI rnay not be the only store you shop, but it should be the first. Our customers...

ERIC VAN DEN STEEN

DAVID LANE

Aldi: The Dark Horse Discounter

ALDI rnay not be the only store you shop, but it should be the first. Our customers find they can do 90% of

their weekly shopping at ALDI.

Aldi U.S. website 1

Despite estimated 2012 sales of $73 billion from nearly 10,000 stores operating in 17 countries,2

Germany's privately-held Aldi remained one of the world's least-known discount grocers in 2013. Its

low profile was due in part to Aldi's penchant for secrecy, a legacy of its reclusive founders, Karl and

Theo Albrecht, and to Aldi's limited advertising. Aldi entered the U.S. market in 1976 but remained

relatively unknown there nearly 40 years later, even with some 1,200 stores in 32 states3 selling a limited

assortment of predominantly private label household items and groceries, including dairy and fresh

and frozen fruit, vegetables, and meats

Aldi's U.S. marketing materials asserted that its "unique operating model makes it almost

impossible for competitors to match price and quality,"4 and the company in December 2013

announced plans to open 50% more stores by 2018, increasing its U.S. retail presence to nearly 2,000

stores and accelerating its pace of expansion from 80 to 130 new stores each year.5 As yet the U.S. had

few similar grocers, with the possible exception of the more upscale Trader Joe's chain, which Aldi

owned (but did not manage). Yet U.S. discount grocers had strengths of their own. Warehouse club

stores such as BJs, Costco, and Walmarť's Sam's Club format all offered low prices on branded goods

that U.S. consumers aiready knew and loved. Walmart had a market presence, buying power, and

breadth of inventory that Aldi could not match. Despite Aldi's role in Walmart's exit from Germany in

2006 and driving U.K. grocery chain Asda into Walmart's arms in 1999, it remained unclear whether

Aldi was capable of sustained growth in the U.S., Walmart's home market

Aldi History

Aidi traced its roots back to 1948, when German brothers Theo and Karl Albrecht took over their

mother's Essen grocery store6 and began selling basic items at low prices. Few consumers in war-

ravaged Europe had money to spend, and little but essential products was available.7 The Albrechts

planned to expand the limited product range once the economy improved.8 However, while other

grocers indeed increased product selection as the German economy recovered, the brothers realized

they could maintain lower prices than their competitors if they did not follow suit but continued to

limit their own product selection to basics.9 Choosing to focus instead on low prices and efficient

operations,10 the Albrechts by 1958 owned and operated 300 outlets across Germany, with revenues

exceeding 100 million Deutsche marks (DM).11

Reputedly due to a disagreement over whether to sell cigarettes (which incidentally were prone to

theft),12 the Albrechts in 1960 split the company in two: one division in northern Germany (Aldi-Nord)

run by Theo and one in southern Germany (Aldi-Sud) run by Karl.13 Dividing the company allowed

each brother to make some independent decisions, though they still shared information, including cos

and performance metrics, comparisons of vendors, and some purchasing agreements.14 The only data

they never compared were the annual profits of the brothers' respective divisions.15 Combining th

family name "Albrecht" and the word "discount," the first store with the Aldi name opened in

Germany in 1962.16

A devotion to frugality seemed to permeate the brothers' biusiness: Theo was said to take notes at

executive meetings on both sides of a sheet of paper, using pencil stubs less than two inches long; he

turned lights off during the day whenever he deemed natural light sufficient, and he criticized

excessive spending. Once asked to inspect the plans for a new Dutch store, Theo responded, "This

layout is very good. But there's just one thing- this paper you're using is too thick. Use thinner paper

save money."1718 Transferred to the business model, the brothers' frugality resulted in savings by

doing without many expenses that other retailers took for granted as normal operating procedure (see

Exhibit 1). According to Dieter Brandes, formerly general manager and managing director of the Aldi-

Nord executive board, the Aldi culture also stressed simpicity, focus, and a desire to serve the

customer (see Exhibit 2)

In 1971, Theo was kidnapped and held 17 days before being released for a ransom of $4 million that

he himself negotiated. Theo later demanded (and received) tax relief on the payment, claiming it as a

business expense.19 Thereafter, the family went to great lengths to avoid relations with the media on

both business and family topics.20 In fact, Forbes at one time described Theo as "more reclusive than the

Yeti."21,1 Forgoing publicity was both a conscious choice and an important cost-saving element of Aldi

policy22 The company did not release financial information,23 and Aldi managers "were forbidden no

only to talk to the press but even to colleagues in other districts."24 Outsiders were forced to make do

with piecemeal information, and many estimated figures in trade publications were later found to be

incorrect, and had misled competitors

International Expansion

In the late 1960s, Aldi stores expanded to Austria, and by the mid-1970s stores were operating in

Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands.26 The company made a large impact in these first foreign

forays, and by the early 1990s held a 5% market share in the Netherlands, and generated an estimated

$1 billion in sales from its 260 Belgium stores by 1992.27 As of 2000, Aldi led German grocers with a

40% market shares and had inspired a rival in Lidl, owned by Germany's Schwarz Unternehmens

Treuhand, which copied every aspect of the Aldi operating model. (See Exhibit 3 for Aldi's ranking

among leading global retailers, and Exhibit 4 for the countries Aldi served and number of stores in

each.) Having already captured 90% of German shoppers,29 however, the company turned to other

markets for growth, entering the U.S. in 1976, and the U.K. in the late 1980s

United Kingdom Although Aldi was larger than any U.K. hard discount chain when it entered

the British market in 1989, the company had to overcome several unexpected challenges. Brand loyalty

among U.K. consumers led Aldi first to reduce its heavy reliance on private label goods30 and begin

stocking some national brands in 1990.31 Second, Aldi initially found a relentless competitor in the local

discount chain Kwik Save, whose CEO pledged to match Aldi's prices32 and purchased 100 existing

retail stores to limit possible locations for Aldi's expansion.33 Aldi responded in 1991 with an agreement

to open Aldi outlets at existing Gateway Foodmarket sites in the hope that Aldi's low prices would

entice new customers to Gateway, which offered better selection than Aldi.34 In its first five years in

the U.K., Aldi opened 100 stores, about half of its rumored goal of 200.35 Aldi persevered, however,

opening new stores at a compound average rate of 36% between 1990 and 199936 Surviving a U.K.

supermarket price war during the mid-1990s without compromising its operating model helped assure

Aldi's place. Leading U.K. supermarket chains had all launched low-priced private label product lines

of their own by 1995, each containing some 125 items,37 and subsequently slashed prices on basic items

including baked beans, bread, butter, and frozen turkey to defend against Aldi and other newly-arrived

hard discounters.38 U.K. hard discounter Kwik Save was the leading casualty, along with four other

weak U.K. discounters.39 Aldi emerged unscathed, while Kwik Save went bankrupt in 2007

In 2013, Aldi's U.K. product assortment remained limited to approximately 1,000 items (stock-

keeping units, or SKUs), compared with the 10,000 SKUs carried by the typical U.K. supermarket,10

and Aldi's successful private label focus had prompted local giant Tesco to create its own tiered range

of private label products 41 Late in 2013, Aldi held a historic high 3.9% share of the UK grocery m t

while the "big four" supermarkets- Asda, Morrison's, Sainsbury, and Tesco- for the first time all lost

market share over the same period, although they remained much larger.42 Aldi also led all rivals in

its growth rates, according to market research firm Kantar Worldpanel: "The number of shoppers

visiting Aldi increased 16% year-on-year at the same time as the average basket size has swelled by

nearly 15%-43 In contrast, U.K. grocery sales growth averaged just 3.2% for the period, Kantar

reported.44 The reason why, asserted one observer, was that, "Aldi has been found to be 40% cheaper

than Waitrose- and an annual saving of £1,700 isn't to be sniffed at. That's two weeks [of vacation

time in Spain."45 (Waitrose held a 4.9% market share in late 2013 but was rated the UK's best grocer

in one consumer survey; Aldi ranked second.46)

United States Aldi opened its first U.S. stores in the rural Midwest in 1976; U.S. headquarters

and an accompanying warehouse were sited in Batavia, nois. By the mid-1980s, Aldi operated

roughly 150 stores in the states of inois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin.47

Distribution centers were built in Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri, and two additional warehouses were

established by the close of the 1980s in Indiana and Ohio. Estimated U.S. sales reached the half-billion

dollar range by 1989,48 at which point the pace of U.S. expansion quickened, with new stores added

both in the Midwest and on the East Coast. Analysts estimated that U.S. stores nearly doubled from

about 200 in 1990 to nearly 400 in 1993, when U.S. sales reached an estimated $1.2 billion.49 In 2009

estimated US. revenues reached $6.5 billion, nearly 10% of total company revenues of 557.7 bilion.5

This compared to $70.2 billion in sales generated by Kroger, the largest U.S. grocery chain.51 That year,

Aldi ranked 25th among U.S. supermarkets,52 but the company's accelerating expansion plans-75

stores were slated to open in 2013, well above historic levels53- suggested that the company saw plenty

of room for growth.

The company's focus on private label products-95% of Aldi's US, assortment, compared with 22%

of food sales nationwide54-remained central to Aldi's value proposition. Its limited assortment of

approximately 1,400 SKUs per 17,000 square foot store in 2013 compared to as many as 45,000 SKUs

ximately 40% of the store's display space was for refrigerated and frozen

items, and some stores sold wine and beer.56 However, even 1,400 SKUs was a marked increase from

the initial 700 SKUs Aldi offered in 2004 in its U.S. stores, and the 1,000 SKUs available in 2007.57 As

for larger U.S. grocers.55 Appro

elsewhere, Aldi's accepted only cash or debit card payment.58

Aldi's prices could be "delightfully, breathtakingly low": three frozen pizzas for $3.24, or a good

bottle of wine for $2.3659 in 2013 Aldi prices were 15%-20% lower than Walmart's in the US. Midwest,

central aspect of Aldi's model was the ubiquity of private label brands in its stores,62 ranging

from Frisco Dent toothpaste to LaMissa hot chocolate mix.63 Aldi exercised rigorous quality control

over its private label items with daily sampling and lab tests, as well as comparisons with other leading

brands. Some private label products were manufactured by companies that produced well-known

branded items also.64 The company claimed that, "Every product we sell must meet or exceed the

leading national brand in taste, appearance, and/or performance,"65 though such measurements were

inevitably subjective. Yet third party surveys seemed to support Aldi's adherence to this tenet, at least

ome products: in a U.K. taste test, Aldi came out on top in 16 of the private label products tested,

more categories than leading retailers Marks & Spencer and Waitrose combined.66 More broadly, in

U.S. taste testing by Consumer Reports, national brands won best quality in 7 of 21 categories, private

labels in 3 of 21 categories, but testers dubbed national and store brands of similar quality in the

remaining 11 categories.6 Bolstering Aldi's own quality claims was its "double guarantee" to both

replace and refund any product that did not fully satisfy its buyer.68These efforts appeared successful

in 2012, Aldi ranked among the top 20 companies (and was the only grocer) on Facebook with the most

loyal fans, defined as those most likely to recommend the company, according to a third-party survey.69

Despite consumer popularity, Aldi stores reflected the frugality of their founders, from their

their bare-bones design. Ranging in size from approximately 8,000 to 15,000

square feet worldwide,70 Aldi stores were generally located in nondescript but well-trafficked locations

with limited parking; the company's real estate purchases were made in cash.71 Engineered for

simplicity, Aldi stores were remarkable only for their asceticism. Instead of shelving and aisle endcaps

Aldi products were displayed on store floors in their cardboard shipping boxes, stacked atop pallets

worked

with suppliers to ensure that consumers could easily open the delivered cases to access the packaged

goods themselves when a box ran out.3 Employees memorized all prices to speed checkout until Aldi

introduced scanners in 2001, almost 20 years after Walmart.74 Before this time, Aldi stores in Germany

to ease this memorization.75 Once Aldi converted to scanners

ch item to ensure that cashiers

could find and scan prices rapidly at the register. Store phone numbers were often unlisted to minimize

employee interruption.76 And all employees were cross-trained. As a result, by some accounts, as few

second-tier locati

on

(see Exhibit 5). Aisles in the U.S. were about eight feet wide on

average,2 and the company

isted prices in onl

ecimal point

all product packaging came

with bar c

odes printed on multiple

faces

as four employees could operate an Aldi store.7

Product assortment, variety, and pricing were decided centrally, limiting store manager

independence. In fact, Aldi offered only a limited selection among its limited assortment-two brands

of toilet paper, one brand of pickles78-in only one or two container sizes. The idea was that selling just

one type of most items made it easier for a customer to decide on their purchases, speeding up

shopping trips,79 Aldi stores turned over their inventory once each week on average, and 90% of Aldi

product were directly cross-docked at Aldi distribution centers from the delivering vendor to the

distributing Aldi truck without entering inventory.80

The essence of Aldi appealed to many shoppers for the same reasons that it repelled others. A 1994

company pamphlet outlined Aldi's philosophy: "When you buy a can of peas at Aldi, you're paying

almost entirely for the can of peas. Aldi doesn't need to tack on one more penny to pay for an army of

ped-in music or fancy display or check cashing or gimmicks and games. So your food

sed to pay for: food." But the low-budget ambience put some

customers off. As one observer contended, "people charge around the shelves to get out as soon as

dollar pays for what it's suppo

possible."82 Another account claimed that Aldi's initial U.K. and U.S. performance was hampered b

siting "unattractive" stores with "very few products" and "hardly any" fresh food in low-income

neighborhoods.83 Yet other analysts favored Aldi's approach, insisting that "certain customers are

overwhelmed by the large formats and wide selections offered by modern superstores. They are

intimidated in large stores and prefer the lack of assortment."34 Karl Albrecht didn't mind what others

thought; he had been quoted as saying, "At Aldi, the customer is not king We are providing not service,

but mass production."85

Shopping at Aldi did require some customer education, as its model required more consumer

participation than at other stores. Shopping carts were released from racks only after customers

deposited a coin-25 cents in the United States; the coin was returned once the shopper had returned

the cart to its proper location.86 Customers packed their purchases themselves at a separate packing

tation after checkout using bags brought from home, bags purchased at the register, or product boxes

Aldi made available to minimize its own trash. Most Aldi stores did not accept credit cards or personal

checks, requiring cash or debit cards instead. Manufacturers' coupons were rarely accepted, as few

applied to the private label items Aldi stocked. However, weekly "Special Buys" showcased as many

as 25 to 30 selected items at appealing prices, ranging from watermelons to bath products to

wheelchairs, which were available for a limited time or until supplies ran out. In December 2013, for

example, Aldi offered a tablet computer in its U.K. stores for £79, which sold out within 24 hours.88

Special Buys were published in the Aldi weekly newsletter, the only form of regular advertising Aldi

conducted,89 aside from its online presence. An artefact of its German origins, Aldi limited store

perating hours to approximately ten hours per day from Monday through Saturday, ending at either

7:00 p.m. or 8:00p.m.; Aldi stores opened at noon on Sundays, for five hours.

Aldi's private label suppliers reportedly appreciated the company's reputation for reliability:

Once a price has been fixed, Aldi adheres to it relentlessly. Neither seller nor Aldi itself are allowed

to rework prices, which gives security to suppliers....This unique loyalty has helped some suppliers to

grow with Aldi over the years."90 The private label brands were Aldi-owned but not immediately

associated with the company; customers in some cases believed they were a national brand from

another part of the country.91

Despite its penny-pinching reputation, Aldi asserted that its U.S. "employees receive generous

wages and benefits that are significantly higher than the national average. Employees averaging more

than 20 hours a week receive full health benefits."92 Data from the U.K. bore out these claims. Aldi

salaries for U.K. college graduates-who also received an Audi sedan and health and life insurance-

started at £40,000 in 2010 and rose to £60,000 within three years.93 The company's training program for

graduate hires ranked third-best in the U.K., behind only two leading accounting firms.94 As a result,

college graduate applicants flocked to Aldi, which enjoyed 12,000 applicants for the 50 positions on

offer each vear.95

Discount Retail in the United States

Discount retail emerged in the U.S. in the 1960s and caught on quickly: revenues increased at a

compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 25% over the decade ending in 1970,96 by which time

discounters generated $19 billion in annual sales, a figure that continued to grow throughout the 1970s

at a CAGR of 9%.97 Several factors attributed to this steep growth trajectory, including consumers who

increasingly accepted self-service, improved regulation of food safety that boosted consu

confidence in non-branded items, and rising television advertising by manufacturers of retail goods.98

Supplementing existing "five and ten" stores-so named because their products had at first all cost

around five to ten cents-the companies that grew into the Kmart, Target, and Walmart retail chains

all began operating in 1962.99 All three launched first in the Midwest: Kmart in Michigan, Target in

Minnesota, and Walmart in Arkansas. Known for its efficient distribution network, Walmart became

the largest U.S. retailer in 1990100 with a 41% share of the US. discount retail market to Kmart's second

place1 01 22%. Just three years earlier Kmart held a 34% share of the US. discount retail to Walmart's

20%,102 over the following two decades, Walmart grew revenues to nearly $447 billion in 2011, far

outpacing Target's $70 billion in sales that year.103 Kmart failed to rivai Walmart's low prices and

supply chain efficiencies or Target's fashion-forward reputation, and filed for bankruptcy in 2002.104

Competing Grocery Format

Trader Joe's In 1979, Aldi-Nord purchased Trader Joe's grocery stores, a California chain

launched in 1967 that initially had featured local wines and specialty foods, including organic products

at affordable prices.105 Granted total managerial independence, Trader Joe's began opening East Coast

and Midwest outlets in 1996 and 2000.106 Like Aldi, Trader Joe's offered a limited selection of private-

label foods and household items, most requiring no refrigeration, though consumer demand in the

2010s had gradually broadened the chain's offerings from frozen prepared food and frozen meats to

include a limited selection of fresh produce, dairy products, and prepared foods.

Warehouse Clubs As their name suggested, warehouse club stores were retailers that presented

and sold household goods and food items in a warehouse format but, in exchange for low prices

required shoppers to purchase annual memberships and to show their membership card as a condition

of purchase. Leading warehouse clubs included Costco (with an average store size of 143,000 squar

feet), Walmart's Sam's Club (133,000 square feet), and BJ's Wholesale Club (113,000 square feet)

Warehouse clubs offered their members access to products from boxes stacked on pallets on the ground

level; store employees replenished inventory by moving additional pallets from overhead shelves onto

the floor. Warehouse clubs packaged most of their food and fast-moving consumer good products in

larger sizes than supermarkets normally offered, or packaged bundled multiple supermarket-sized

units together for sale as a single product. The large product sizes were popular with restaurateurs and

other small businesses, as we as with consumers. Assortment consisted overwhelmingly of

nationally-recognized branded goods alongside private label products in some popular categories, but

warehouse stores offered few brands in each product category, typically a handful of shampoo brands,

and two or three brands in most other product categories other than fresh food. Shoppers bagged their

purchases with their own bags or in discarded boxes after purchase, which was done in cash or by

debit card to minimize processing fees incurred by the warehouse club

Walmart Stores

Sam Walton, founder of Walmart, built the chain in its early days on appealing to farmers, a

consumer segment that greatly valued low prices.107 When siting new stores, Walton initially targeted

small rural towns, those with demand just large enough to support one such store.105 Because these

rural towns were less accessible to existing distributors, Walmart built proprietary warehouses to allow

for goods to be purchased in bulk at lower prices and stored until they were needed.109 Walmart's

model of building its own warehouses and supporting logistics and IT capabilities to supply outlets far

from cities was, however, extremely capital-intensive-to fund its first warehouse, Walmart went

ublic in 1972.110 IPO proceeds did not alter Walton's devotion to frugality, however: "On buying trips

his rule of thumb was that trip expenses should not exceed 1 % of the purchases, which meant sharing

hotel rooms and walking instead of taking taxis."111 The company's motto was "Every Day Low

ich meant offering consumers national brands at lower prices than department or specialty

tores did.112 To deliver on this promise, Walmart negotiated hard with suppliers, its bargaining

strength aided by its growing market power

Although Walmart rose from humble beginnings to become the world's largest retailer, its U.S.

dominance did not often translate directly to foreign markets. In July 2006, for example, Walmart

announced that it was pulling out of Germany, having found German hard discounters difficult to

compete with, and German shopping, labor, and retail regulation more than it had bargained for.113

In the U.S., however, Walmart excelled by investing heavily in distribution logistics and information

technology capabilities. Walmart installed point of sale scanners in the 1980s and ran the largest

privately owned satellite system in the U.S. beginning in 1987 in order to transmit sales data, inventory

data, and credit card approval requests.14 By 2012 Walmart had the IT capability to check on individual

product sales both by country and by store on command,115making it essentially the only source of

real-time sales data for many suppliers.116

In addition to general merchandise, Walmart began selling

Supercenter format in the late 1980s,117 each of which employed an average of 300 people.118 Although

groceries generated smaller margins - with the operating margin on groceries estimated at about half

to two thirds of a store's overall operating margin, with the difference mainly due to lower gross

margins-they averaged 40 % of sales at the typical grocery/ discount retailer, drawing in customers to

purchase higher-margin general merchandise.119 120 By 2012, grocery sales accounted for over half

(55%) of Walmart's US. revenues of $264 billion 12i Walmart's global revenues were nearly $444 billion

over the same period 122 Private-label products accounted for 38% of Walmart's offerings.| 23 Over time

Walmart grew reliant on Supercenters, which sold"electronics, apparel, toys, and home furnishings

in addition to including full supermarkets and even pharmacies, banks, salons, or health clinics.125 In

2013, Supercenters comprised 3,211 (78%) of Walmart's 4,092 US. stores!26 and each offered some

100,000 SKUs within its average 182,000 square feet of floor space.127 Walmart stores averaged an

inventory turn 7.3 times per year

groceries with the launch of its

128

Walmart had begun experimenting with smaller format stores too. Walmart since 1998 had opened

319 standalone supermarkets, or "Neighborhood Markets," each averaging 38,000 square feet. In 2011

Walmart launched "Walmart Express" stores, each averaging 15,000 square feet and designed to create

a presence for Walmart in urban and rural areas that were impractical for its larger format stores.129

leant to access dense urban areas or the sparsely inhabited countryside, Walmart Express stores

averaged 15,000 square feet and carried a similar product assortment to Aldi, including household

items and fresh and frozen food.130

Ambitious Aldi

As 2013 came to a close, Aldi announced plans to open 650 new stores in the U.S. by 2018, increasing

its pace of expansion from 80 to 130 new stores per year, investing $3 billion in new land, facilities, and

equipment, and extending the company's geographic coverage from coast to coast.131 "We're ramping

up our expansion plans to meet growing demand for Aldi from customers across the country," noted

Aldi U.S. president Jason Hart. "Recently, we successfully entered new markets such as Houston, and

panded our presence in competitive markets like south Florida and New York City. At Aldi, we

believe that great quality is affordable, and we are eager to bring the Aldi difference to new market

like southern California."132 Hart added that Aldi would soon introduce a line of organic foods.133 Still

unclear, however, was whether Aldi's bet on the U.S. would pay off. (See Exhibit 6 for a comparisorn

of key Aldi and Walmart data, and Exhibit 7 for a comparison of the common size cost structure o

typical Walmart and Aldi shopping basket.)

QUESTIONS

Q1. Analyse the strategic position of the organisation by answering the following:

a.      What environmental factors could account for the organisation's performance? Develop this analysis to identify, with supporting evidence, the threats and opportunities facing the organisation.

b.     What can you hypothesise/suggest about the processes by which strategy developed in the organisation? Please explain any assumptions that you make. What organisation specific factors could account for the organisation's performance? Develop this analysis, to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation

Q2. What options are open to the organisation? What, in your analysis, is the best way forward for the company? Why? What are the potential advantages and difficulties associated with your proposal?

Q3. What do the financial figures say about the performance and sustainability of the organisation's chosen course?

Q4. Use the appropriate analysis techniques to evaluate trends in the firm's macro-environment, industry and market. Develop this analysis, to identify the opportunities or threats to the business.

Q5. Use the appropriate analysis tool(s) to evaluate internal resources/competitive advantages: Develop this analysis to evaluate the most significant strategic strengths or weaknesses in the business.

Q6. Evaluation of key strategic issues: bring together the results of your analysis to make the case for what you think are the main ongoing and evolving strategic issues. Consider both corporate and business-level issues.

Q7. Recommend strategies: draw on the case and mention any critical risks faced by the business or associated with specific strategies.

Q8. Use an appropriate analytical framework from the course to evaluate the relative attractiveness of the industry in which the organisation operates, as well as the key drivers and trends therein.

Q9. Analyse the resources and capabilities the organisation possesses that are the most pertinent to future profitable business. For each of the resources and capabilities you list above, use the appropriate framework to evaluate the competitive implications in the context of current strategy.

Q10. What does the data in the case tell us about the strategies and relative performance of different product groups and geographical areas (SBUs) within the organisation's operations? What are the strategic implications for Aldi going forward?

Q11. Analyse the organisation's positioning according to generic/competitive strategy, and hence bring out which strategy the firm is following and how it is supported.

(ii) Evaluate the extent to which the organisation is following strategies commensurate with the current stage and conditions in its industry.

Q12. What are the distinctive elements of the organisation's history that have shaped its corporate culture and strategy?