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Hi, I need help with essay on The courts decisions over the last thwenty five years or so reveal a remarkably confusing approach to the purpose of cross-examination under s1(f)(ii)Criminal E. Paper mu
Hi, I need help with essay on The courts decisions over the last thwenty five years or so reveal a remarkably confusing approach to the purpose of cross-examination under s1(f)(ii)Criminal E. Paper must be at least 2000 words. Please, no plagiarized work!
gainst the national interest are easy to fathom and understand but lately, especially the last two decades, court decisions that require adjudication of cases in which the good or the bad moral character of the defendant is relevant to the resolution of the facts in issue, had been murky and muddled that students of law are often left befuddled. This is to be expected as the allowance of evidence of the bad or good moral character of the accused is fully in the discretion of the judges.3 Some jurors disallow hearing of evidence of the character of the accused on the pretext that it is irrelevant to the case. According to Elliott, “evidence is relevant when it has a tendency in reason to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue”4 Relevancy or the materiality to the issue of fact raised in the pleadings is extremely important because if evidence is relevant as well as competent, then that evidence is admissible. What is then relevant and thus
admissible is therefore, dependent on the juror’s discretion. All that the court has to say after it refuses admittance of evidence is that it does so “in the interest of justice by virtue of Criminal Justice Act 1988 section 25(1).5
Wigmore’s Axiom of Admissibility which is supposed to facilitate the judges’ exercise of their discretion to allow or disallow admission of evidence as to the good or bad character of the accused merely confuse the judges and everybody else. According to Wigmore, what can be admitted are only facts with rational probative value unless some specific rule clearly forbids its admission. Again the term ‘rational probative value’ is dependent on the interpretation of each judge. The Alfred Altmore Pope Foundation case tersely expresses this dilemma: No precise and universal test of relevancy is furnished by the law but the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely on the discretion of the court, which must be exercised
