HIS 415 Week 7 DQs
This file of HIS 415 Week 7 DQs includes:
Coping with After-effects of Combat (graded)
Everyone reacts to experiences, often for a lifetime. The scars of warfare are not all physical ones. The deepest scars are not seen, they are psychological and well hidden. People who live and work with combat veterans often cope with those effects also, because they relate to those veterans who struggle with their memories and harsh experiences. The Vietnam War differed from other wars, in that the experiences were highly individualized and personalized. Divisions and support units were deployed to Vietnam for many years, and individuals would transfer in and out for tours of specified length, most commonly for 13 months. They would fly in for transfer to replace somebody who had been there for 13 months, or who had been wounded or killed, and then fly out alone to other assignments at the end of their own tour. This system was very destructive to both unit integrity and personal welfare. Perhaps you are, or know some combat veterans from Vietnam. With great care to not violate the privacy of people or divulge their names, what can be understood and applied from the stories of those who served and left their commands and teams to return home individually, as opposed to the experiences of other war veterans?
American Foreign Relations After the War (graded)
Cold War ideology after World War II fostered the developing viewpoint that the American military was invincible, even as a viable and dangerous enemy worked toward global superiority: the Soviet Union.
The practical application of this ideology was the policy of containing the expansionist intentions of global communism as attempted by the Soviet Union in locations of opportunity. The most notable of these proxy confrontations was the attempt to contain the communist threat in Vietnam - the subject of this course.
President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger labored long and hard to achieve peace with honor and end American involvement in Southeast Asia in the Paris Accords of 1973. The failure of that peace to endure is the story that ends our course.
Looking beyond the fall of Saigon in April 1975, we will consider how the domino theory ultimately proved false, as President Johnson had speculated: There was no global Communist surge of expansion, and the United States, with its NATO allies and its worldwide interests, did not collapse. How has American ability to act worldwide been affected by the fact that some of the most dire claims made in support of the war ultimately proved wrong?