i am attaching the original file so its easier to see the function of the game Consider the following game:L RU 2, 4 1, 6D 0, 10 5, 0 a) (3 points)

i am attaching the original file so its easier to see the function of the game

Consider the following game:L RU 2, 4 −1, 6D 0, 10 5, 0

a) (3 points) For what range of beliefs θ2 = (θ(L), 1 − θ2(L))) is U a best response forplayer 1? [Your answer should take the form: a ≤ θ2(L) ≤ b for specific numbers aand b, which may or may not be distinct.] Show your derivation clearly.

b) (3 points) For what range of beliefs θ2 = (θ(L), 1 − θ2(L))) is D a best response forplayer 1? Show your derivation clearly.

c) (2 points) For what range of beliefs θ2 = (θ(L), 1 − θ2(L))) are both U and D bestresponses for player 1?

2 Consider the partnership game with synergy. Player 1 chooses 0 ≤ x ≤ b, and Player2 chooses 0 ≤ y ≤ b, if the parameter b is a positive number. If b = ∞, x and y canbe any nonnegative real numbers. The effort levels x, y produce the partnership revenue4(x + y + cxy). The personal effort costs are x2for Player 1 and y2for Player 2. Eachplayer receives half the partnership revenue minus her personal effort cost. The synergyparameter c is a positive constant.

) (3 points) Derive the players’ best-response functions. Show your derivation clearly.

b) (3 points) For b = 10 and c =23, find the rationalizable strategies for each player.Do three iterations of deletion of dominated strategies to show that your answer iscorrect

.c) (3 points) For b = ∞ and c =23, find the rationalizable strategies for each player.Do three iterations of deletion of dominated strategies to show that your answer iscorrect.

d) (3 points) For b = ∞ and c = 2, are there any rationalizable strategies? Explain youranswer.