I will pay for the following article Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohanes Opposing Theories of Cooperation Among States. The work is to be 5 pages with three to five sources, with in-text citations and a

I will pay for the following article Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohanes Opposing Theories of Cooperation Among States. The work is to be 5 pages with three to five sources, with in-text citations and a reference page. Waltz argues that “no human order is proof against violence”, and “the distinction between national and international realms of politics is not found in the use or nonuse of force but in their different structures” (Waltz, 1986, p99). Waltz’ argument is based on his theory related to balance-of-power that disputes cooperation among states.

Keohane (1998) opposes Waltz’s concepts and states that institutions create the capability of states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements also termed as transaction costs by economists. The states mostly do not engage in centralized enforcement of agreements, “but they do reinforce practices of reciprocity, which provide incentives for governments to keep their own commitments to ensure that others do so as well” reiterates Jordan (2001, p.236). Thus, Keohane supports the institutions and systems theories promoting cooperation.

The main difference in a structure that Lau (1987) observes in Waltz’s theory is that the author refers to the international system as one of self-help, while the domestic system is not so. Consequently, states cannot afford to specialize and increase their level of economic interdependence in the way parts of a nation can. Due to states’ inability to rely on anyone to protect them internationally, they have to take measures towards “providing the means of protecting themselves against others” (Waltz, 1986, p.101).

Waltz often compares competition and cooperation in the economic market and in the area of international politics (Lau, 1987). Similar to individual organizations, states also aim to increase their gains. However, even if cooperation with another state would help to acquire considerable gains, they will not attempt to do so, to avoid an unequal distribution of the gains, which may result in a change in the distribution of power between the two states. Thus, if an expected gain is to be divided in the ratio of two to one, “one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other”, states Waltz.