Consider the following normal form of the game played by Mork and Mindy Mindy X Y Z Mork A 10 , 30 0 , 20 20 , 30 B 15 , 35 10 , 40 10 , 40 C 25 , 25...

Consider the following normal form of the game played by Mork and Mindy

                   Mindy      X             Y                Z

Mork

A                           10 , 30       0 , 20       20 , 30

B                           15 , 35       10 , 40     10 , 40

C                            25 , 25      5 , 25        5 , 25

a. Does Mork have a dominant strategy?

b. Does Mindy have a dominant strategy? (Answer: Yes)

c. Given that Mindy has a dominant strategy, does Mark have an optimal strategy?

d. What is the unique Nash Equilibrium of the game?