Consider the information aggregation game discussed in class. Two jurors get one of thesignals {G,I}. The defendant can be innocent or guilty with a...

Consider the information aggregation game discussed in class. Two jurors get one of thesignals {G,I}. The defendant can be innocent or guilty with a probability ½. Signal structure is given by

Π(G|guilty) = 4/5 = Π(I|innocent) and Π(G|innocent) = 1/5 = Π(I|guilty)E

Each juror only sees her signal. The payoff from acquitting for both is given by 0. The payoff from convicting the guilty is given by 2, and the payoff from convicting the innocent is given by -1. It is decided that defendant will be declared guilty (and convicted) if and only if both jurors choose convict. Is choosing convictwhen you see signal G and choosing acquit when you see signal I a Nash equilibrium for the jurors?Clearly exposit your arguments using Bayes rule to calculate the appropriate probabilities and the players'expected payoffs.