Hi, I am looking for someone to write an article on the transports regulatory reforms and the influence of market forces Paper must be at least 2750 words. Please, no plagiarized work!

Hi, I am looking for someone to write an article on the transports regulatory reforms and the influence of market forces Paper must be at least 2750 words. Please, no plagiarized work! In the rail industry, nevertheless, the essence of the regulatory transition problem was never summarized and the expectations were not fulfilled. Presently, the rail industry is subject to substantial sunk costs, since assets are long-lived and specialized to certain geographic markets. Much of the traffic is subjected to effective competition from competing railroads, modes of transportation, origins, and destinations, or products. Some shippers, however, are successful in transporting commodities for which rail have a substantial competitive advantage over competing modes, even if they are available in principle. Further, after the 1978 deregulation Act, these shippers have sunk considerable costs in specific locations or signed contracts with customers or vendors, which make them captive to individual railroads. The difficult problem in the transition is to permit maximum leeway for competitive forces while maintaining a substitute for the regulatory protection that was relied upon by captive shippers when they sank costs. These long-term investments were initially made by the shipper with the presumption of continued regulation and thus without the usual contractual protections against “opportunistic behavior” by the carrier in such circumstances”. (Baker et al, 1991, p. 12) “In the rail industry, after 1978 the ICC does not now assume jurisdiction over rates unless it has made a determination that the rail carrier possesses market dominance over the traffic. Section 4 addresses issues in market dominance determination, particularly the role of the revenue/variable cost ratio”.&nbsp.In the rail industry, nevertheless, the essence of the regulatory transition problem was never summarized and the expectations were not fulfilled. Presently, the rail industry is subject to substantial sunk costs, since assets are long-lived and specialized to certain geographic markets. Much of the traffic is subjected to effective competition from competing railroads, modes of transportation, origins, and destinations, or products. Some shippers, however, are successful in transporting commodities for which rail have a substantial competitive advantage over competing modes, even if they are available in principle. Further, after the 1978 deregulation Act, these shippers have sunk considerable costs in specific locations or signed contracts with customers or vendors, which make them captive to individual railroads. The difficult problem in the transition is to permit maximum leeway for competitive forces while maintaining a substitute for the regulatory protection that was relied upon by captive shippers when they sank costs. These long-term investments were initially made by the shipper with the presumption of continued regulation and thus without the usual contractual protections against “opportunistic behavior” by the carrier in such circumstances”. (Baker et al, 1991, p. 12) “In the rail industry, after 1978 the ICC does not now assume jurisdiction over rates unless it has made a determination that the rail carrier possesses market dominance over the traffic. Section 4 addresses issues in market dominance determination, particularly the role of the revenue/variable cost ratio”.&nbsp.The history of railroad regulatory policy may be largely summed up as an attempt to resolve the conflicting objectives. Shipper interests believed they had granted major concessions to deregulate competitive traffic and to achieve revenue adequacy while receiving in return residual regulation to protect captive shippers and guarantees that captive shippers would not be required to fund losses for certain categories of competitive traffic.&nbsp.When the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) began to institute a series of decisions that many shippers believed to have eviscerated the guarantees supposedly incorporated in the legislation, they found these decisions were based upon the theories of Ramsey Pricing and contestable markets, which were alarming for two major reasons:They had the consequence of undermining the competition that was the initial rationale for deregulation, and “They threatened a successful transition to deregulation by the regulatory reform literature that has rightly condemned much of this attempt to eliminate price discrimination, some of which was the natural result of short-term disequilibrium that would eventually have cured itself had regulatory constraints not interfered.&nbsp.