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I will pay for the following essay Game Theory. The essay is to be 3 pages with three to five sources, with in-text citations and a reference page.Download file to see previous pages... 2 threatens to
I will pay for the following essay Game Theory. The essay is to be 3 pages with three to five sources, with in-text citations and a reference page.Download file to see previous pages...
2 threatens to play q if the player 1 gives 2 the move. this may be bad for the player 1 so he decides to play W, but also would be bad for player 2. Now, given the opportunity to move, player 2 will prefer to play 1 since it is the remaining Nash equilibrium. One has to bear in mind the tree diagram of probability when handling game perfect equilibrium theory. In game 1, the correct sub-game starts at player2’s decision join. the condition that 2’s choices are Nash equilibrium strategy lowers or reduces the prerequisite that 2 takes the action that yields in the highest induce, thus, player 2 must play 1. these deductions are only possible because there exist a finite extensive form of the game, therefore exists a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In addition, the Nash sub perfect game equilibrium can be jointed to for the tree diagram of probabilities (McCain 55). A different problem with sub-game excellence is that of the concept is not in an alternative unnecessary changing of the game tree. For instance, a tree diagram that has the same form as that of normal form as game 2 but has sub-game completeness (McCain 56). When manipulating for equilibrium in zero, some game will not take into account of the challenger playoff. this is because the opponents are implicit known, they are ever diametric. On the other hand, in non-zero games, one has to put in mind opponents playoff. These will always yield different outcomes. A relevant example is that of innovation of Blu-ray by Toshiba and Sony companies, if both companies goes for the same innovation, the results may be more convenient for only than Toshiba, but if the two companies don’t involve in the same kind of coordination (if only has a greater probability or chance of winning in the innovation ). The game in comparison is Blu-ray for Sony to that of Toshiba, now, if the two companies happen to pick option, then Sony will have a big pay off compared to Toshiba. Consequently, if Toshiba Company reconsiders to the option of HD DVD will leave the Sony Company with a play of o. this will be considered as that playoff 1 for selection of Blu-ray. However, (HD DVD, HD DVD) is another strategic equilibrium. The game theories will term these as pure strategy equilibrium in non-zero game of Nash equilibrium (McCain 78). The co-ordination between the companies will bear some common problems in the scope of business and innovations. Although it is better to understand that solutions reached is as a result of Nash equilibrium. solutions obtained are of the beneficiary to the companies. Sony and Toshiba. Therefore, it important to understand the mixed strategy of Nash equilibrium. this case will put the guiding principle to base on any of the player or company this means that the mixed equilibrium must yield some payoff outcomes (McCain 123). For instance, if we take the mixed strategy for Sony company to be y for choosing Blu-ray and (1-y) for Toshiba company for choosing HD DVD, we can use Toshiba’s payoff to manipulate the values for HD DVD and Blu-ray, these will yield two outcomes as follows. If Toshiba company chooses Blu-ray if Toshiba company goes for HD DVD (1-y)*(y+0)*1 =0*(1-y)*(y+4) y =4-4*y y*5 =4 y =4D5 In this example, Sony’s strategy is to an unsystematic choosing of Blu-ray is (4/5) and the same time (1/5) to that of HD DVD.