Player 2 A) Consider the following grim-trigger strategy: t In round I, play X. o In all rounds after that, play X if the outcome of all previous

Please explain parts A and B using the game table below

Player 2 A) Consider the following grim-trigger strategy:t In round I, play X. o In all rounds after that, play X if the outcome of all previous rounds has been (X, X), and otherwise, play Z.If both players use this strategy, what range of discount factors 5 must they have for it to be a Nash equilibrium?B) Consider the following set of grim-trigger strategies:t In round I, player 1 plays Y and player 2 plays X.o In all rounds after that, if the outcome of all previous rounds has been (‘1', X), player 1plays Y and Player 2 plays X. Otherwise, both players play Z. If both players use the strategies described above, what range of discount factors 3 mustthey have for it to be a Nash equilibrium? (Note: the necessary discount factors may be different for the two players here. You may wish to denote them as 5. and 52.)